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^31 


THE 


HISTORY   OF   EOME. 


VOL.   II. 


LONDON:    PBIMTBD  BT 

sronzsirooDK  and  co^  mbw-stbbr  bqctabb 

▲V9  fkUhUUMWX  BTBBBT 


THE 


HISTOEY  OF  EOME. 


BT 


WILHELM     IHNE. 


ENGLISH  EDITION. 


VOL.  n. 


LONDON: 
I^ONGMANS,    GREEN,    AND    CO. 

1871. 


CONTENTS 


OF 


THE    SECOND    VOLUME. 


FOUETH  BOOK. 

STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  ASCENDANCY 

IN  THE   WEST. 


CHAPTBK  I. 
CABTHAGE. 

FAOB 

Differences  of  soil  and  climate  between  Europe  and  Africa     •  3 

Migrations  of  the  Semitic  and  Aryan  tribes  ....  3 

Phoenician  colonisation  in  Aj&ica 4 

Points   of   difference  between  the   Phoenician  and  Soman 

colonies 5 

Rapid  growth  and  power  of  Carthage 5 

Nature  of  the  Carthaginian  empire 6 

Elements  of  weakness  in  the  Carthaginian  state      ...  6 

Geographical  dangers -  .  7 

Agriculture  and  trade  of  Carthage 8 

Dependents  and  tributaries  of  Carthage          ....  9 

The  Liby-Phoenicians 10 

The  Carthaginian  state 10 

Acknowledgment  of  Carthaginian  supremacy  .        .        .10 

Phoenician  cities  of  northern  Africa II 

The  Numidians 12 

Foreign  possessions  of  Carthage 12 

Sardinia 13 

Gades  and  other  settlements  in  Spain 14 

Constitution  of  Carthage 14 


O 


84266 


VI 


CONTENTS  OF 


Points  of  likeness  between  the  Carthaginian  and  other  oon 

stitutions  •  •  •  . 
Municipal  goyemment  of  Carthage 
The  Suffetes 

The  command  of  the  army 
Carthaginian  timocracj 
The  Carthaginian  senate 
The  people . 
Criminal  jurisdiction   . 
Carthaginian  aristocracy 


PAGX 

15 
15 
16 
18 
18 
19 
19 
20 


CHAPTER  II. 
SICILY. 

Historical  geography  of  Sicily 

Greek  and  Carthaginian  power  in  Sicily 

Defeat  of  the  Carthaginians  at  Himera 

Preponderance  of  Syracuse  . 

Destruction  of  Agrigentum  . 

Tyranny  of  the  elder  Dionysius 

Victories  of  Dionysius . 

Siege  of  Syracuse 

Piraticiil  expeditions  of  Dionysius 

The  younger  Dionysius  and  Timoleon 

Barren  victories  of  Timoleon 

Tyranny  of  Agathokles 

Later  expeditions  of  Agathokles    . 


22 
23 
23 
24 
25 
25 
26 
26 
27 
28 
29 
29 
30 


-    CHAPTER  in. 
THE   FIRST   PUNIC   WAR,   264-241  B.C. 

First  Period.     To  the  capture  of  Agi-igentuniy  262  B.C. 

Fortunes  of  Zankle  or  Messana 32 

Capture  of  Rhegium  by  Roman  mutineers     ....  S3 

Hiero,  tyrant  of  Syracuse 34 

Relations  of  Carthage  to  Rome 35 

Jealousy  of  Rome  for  Carthage 36 

Resolution  of  the  Romans  to  aid  the  Mamertincs  of  Messana  .  37 

Change  in  the  character  of  Roman  history     ....  38 

Relative  strength  of  Rome  and  Carthago         ....  38 


THE  SECOND  VOLUMK 


VU 


Occupation  of  Messana  by  tbe  Romans . 
Landing  of  the  Romans  in  Sicily  .         • 
Ineffectual  league  of  Hiero  with  the  Carthaginians 
Second  campaign  in  Sicily,  263  b.g. 
Alliance  of  Hiero  with  Rome 
Decline  of  the  Carthaginian  power  in  Sicily   . 
Probable  causes  of  the  success  of  the  Romans 
Renewed  efforts  of  the  Carthaginians,  262  te.a 
The  Romans  besiege  Agrigentum  •        • 

Defeat  of  Hanno 

Escape  of  the  Carthaginian  garrison  under  Hannibal 
Historical  value  of  the  narrative  . 
Extended  designs  of  the  Romans  . 


PAOB 

89 
40 
40 
42 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
47 
48 
49 


Second  Period,  261-255  b.c.     The  first  Boman  fleet.    MylcB, 

Ecnomus,    Regulus  in  Africa. 

Maritime  supremacy  of  Carthage 49 

Determination  of  the  Romans  to  cope  with  Carthage  by  sea    .  50 

Late  development  of  the  Roman  navy 51 

The  building  of  the  fleet 52 

Improbabilities  of  the  story 53 

Composition  of  the  Roman  navy 54 

Capture  of  the  fleet  of  Cn.  Cornelius  Scipio   ....  55 

Battle  of  Mylse 55 

Roman  naval  tactics     .         .         •        .         .        .  .57 

Defeat  of  the  Carthaginians 57 

Relief  of  Segesta 58 

Operations  of  Hamilcar 59 

Destruction  of  Eryx  by  Ilamilcar 60 

Victory  of  Hamilcar  at  Thermae 60 

Renewed  successes  of  the  Romans         .     "^^        .         .         .61 

Expedition  of  Scipio  to  Corsica 62 

Battle  of  Tyndaris 64 

Movements  of  the  fleet  under  Regulus  and  Manlius  V ulso       .  65 

Battle  of  Ecnomus 65 

Landing  of  the  Romans  on  Carthaginian  territory  ...  66 

Ravages  of  the  Roman  army  in  Africa 67 

Exorbitant  demands  of  Regulus  as  conditions  of  peace    .  69 

Defeat  of  Regulus 70 

Victory  of  the  Romans  at  the  Hermiean  promontory       .         '.  71 

Destruction  of  the  Roman  fleet  off  the  coast  of  Sicily      .         .  72 


viii  CONTENTS  OF 


Third  Period,  254-250  B.a     The  victory  at  Panprmus. 

PAO« 

Capture  of  Panormus  by  On.  Cornelius  Scipio        ...  73 

Failure  of  the  second  Roman  expedition  to  Africa ...  73 

Exhaustion  of  both  sides 75 

Capture  of  Lipara  by  the  Romans  «        «        •         .         .76 

Victory  of  the  Romans  at  Panormus 76 

Alleged  mission  of  Carthaginian  envoys  to  Rome    ...  78 

The  story  of  Regulus  •..««...  78 

The  silence  of  Polybius        . 80 

Probable  origin  of  the  story  •         .        •         «    .  \         .80 

Fourth  Period,  250-249  b.c.    Lilyhcmm  and  Drepana. 

Effects  of  the  victory  of  Panormus 81 

Attack  on  Lilybaeum  by  the  Romans 82 

Number  of  the  besieging  force 88 

Duration  of  the  siege 83 

Modes  of  si^e  in  ancient  war&re 84 

Obstinacy  of  the  dege  of  Lily baBum 85 

Movements  of  Adherbal  and  the  Carthaginian  fleet         .         .  86 

Relief  of  Lilybasum  by  Hannibal 86 

Unsuccessful  attempt  of  Himilco  to  destroy  the  Roman  works  87 

Departure  of  Hannibal  with  his  fleet 88 

Capture  of  the  Rhodian  Hannibal          .....  88 

Distress  of  the  garrison  of.  Lily bseum     .....  89 
Destruction  of  the  Roman  siege- works  .         .         •        .        .89 

Perseverance  of  the  Romans 89 

Their  special  difliculties 90 

The  winter  blockade   ........  90 

Defeat  of  Claudius  Pulcher  at  Drepana          .         .         .         .  '91 

Dictatorship  of  A.  Atilius  Calatinus       .....  92 

Alleged  profanity  of  Claudius 93 

Energy  of  the  Carthaginians 94 

Destruction  of  the  Roman  fleet  and  transport  ships  under 

L.  Junius 95 

Seizure  of  the  temple  of  the  Erycinian  Venus  by  the  consul 

Junius 96 

Capture  of  Junius  by  the  Carthaginians         ....  97 

Fifth  Period,  248-241  b.c.     Hamilcar  Barcaa.    Battle  at  the 

^gatian  Islands.    Peace. 

Ravages  of  the  Carthaginian  fleet 97 

lienewal  of  the  alliance  witli  Iliero 99 


THE  SECOND  VOLUME.  ix 

PAOB 

Exchange  of  prisoners  with  Carthage 99 

Arrival  of  Hamilcar  Barcas 99 

His  treatment  of  the  Gallic  mercenaries         .         .         .        .100 

Operations  of  Hamilcar .100 

Occupation  of  Eryx  by  Hamilcar 101 

Sufferings  of  the  Roman  allies 102 

General  impoverishment  of  the  Boman  state  .        .         .         .103 

Tedious  prolongation  of  the  war 104 

Dispatch  of  Gains  Lutatius  Catulus  with  a  fleet  to  Sicily        .     105 
Defeat  of  the  Carthaginians  at  the  uEgatian  Islands         .         .106 

Negotiations  for  peace 106 

Position  of  the  Romans  at  the  close  of  the  war       .  .107 

Embassies  to  Rome  from  foreign  states .         .         .  .107 

Changes  in  the  military  institutions  of  Rome  .         .         .108 

Constitution  of  the  Roman  army  .         .         .         .         .         .110 

Evil  of  annually  elected  genends 110 

The  Roman  navy 112 

Constitution  of  the  Carthaginian  armies         .         .         .         .112 

The  Carthaginian  generals 114 

Carthaginian  inferiority  at  sea       .         .         .         .         .         .114 

Effect  of  the  peace  on  the  power  of  Carthage .         .         .         .115 


CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  WAR   OF  THE   MERCENARIES,  241-238   B.C. 

Revolt  of  the  Carthaginian  allies 116 

Cause  of  the  mutiny .     116 

Suppression  of  the  mutiny .118 

Conduct  of  the  Romans        «         .         .         .         .         .         .118 

Revolt  of  the  Carthaginian  mercenaries  in  Sardinia         .         .120 

Interference  of  the  Romans  in  Sardinia 121 

Surrender  of  Sardinia  to  the  Romans 121 


CHAPTER  V. 
THE   WAR  WITH  THE   GAULS,   225-222  B.C. 

Destruction  of  Falerii .         .123 

Gallic  and  Illyrian  wars 123 

Causes  of  the  long  inaction  of  the  Gauls  in  Italy    .         .         .123 
The  position  of  the  Gallic  tribes 124 


X  CONTENTS  OF 

PAGB 

Attack  on  the  colony  of  Ariminum 124 

Proposed  extenfdon  of  the  colony 125 

Agrarian  law  of  Caius  Flaminius 126 

Conduct  of  the  patricians  to  Flaminius 127 

The  great  road  of  Flaminius 127 

Movements  among  the  Gallic  tribes 127 

Fears  of  the  Romans 128 

March  of  the  Gauls 129 

Retreat  of  the  Gauls  from  Clusium  and  battle  of  Telamon       .  129 

Annihilation  of  the  Gallic  army 131 

Devastation  of  the  Boian  territory  by  the  consid  jEmilius       .  132 

Results  of  the  battle  of  Telamon 133 

Subjugation  of  the  Insubrians 134 


CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  FIRST   ILLYRIAN  WAR,  229-228   B.C. 

Roman  colonies  on  the  Adriatic    ......     136 

The  pirates  of  Illyricum 136 

Roman  embassy  to  Illyricum 138 

Successful  Roman  campaigns  in  Illyricum      .         .         .         .139 

CHAPTER  Vn. 
THE  SECOND   ILLYRIAN  WAR,  219   B.C. 

Alliance  of  Demetrius  of  Pharos  with  Antigonus,  king  of 

Macedonia 141 

Capture  of  Pharos  by -ffimilius  Paullus  .         .         .         .141 

Position  of  Rome  after  the  Gallic  and  Ulyrian  wars  .     142 

CHAPTER  Vin. 
THE  SECOND  PUNIC  OR  HANNIBALIAN  WAR,  218-201  B.C. 

First  Period.    From  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  the  battle  of 

Cannce^  218-216  b.c. 

Resultsof  the  first  Punic  war 143 

Effects  of  the  war  on  the  internal  constitution  of  Carthage      .     143 

Policy  of  Hamilcar  Barcas 145 

Phoenician  settlements  in  Spain 145 

Rapid  growth  of  Carthaginian  power  in  Spain        .  .14(5 


THE  SECOND  VOLUME.  xi 

PAQB 

Attitude  of  the  Roman  Htate 146 

Death  of  Hasdrubal 147 

Hannibal,  son  of  Hamilcar  Barcas 147 

Hatred  of  the  Romans  for  Hannibal 149 

Real  position  of  HannibiJ  as  a  Carthaginian  general        .         .150 

Resources  of  Carthage 152 

Policy  of  the  Romans  in  delaying  the  renewal  of  the  war        .     153 

Alliance  of  Sagnntum  with  Rome 154 

Preparations  of  Hannibal .154 

Importance  of  Saguntum      . 155 

Roman  embassy  to  Hannibal         .  .     '   .  156 

Siege  of  Saguntum  by  Hannibal 156 

Second  embassy  of  the  Romans  to  the  Carthaginians  .157 

Character  of  the  second  Punic  war 158 

Growth  of  an  Italo-Roman  nation 159 

Grain  to  the  conquered  tribes 159 

Burdens  of  the  Roman  allies         .         .         .         .  .160 

Population  of  Italy 160 

Naval  power  of  the  Romans  and  Carthaginians  .  .  .161 
Alliance  of  the  Carthaginians  with  the  Gauls  .         .         .162 

Expected  revolt  of  the  Italian  allies 163 

Attitude  of  the  Macedonian  government  .  .  .  .164 
Provisions  of  Hannibal  for  the  defence  of  Spain  and  Africa  .  164 
March  of  Hannibal  from  New  Carthage,  218  b.c.  .  .  .165 
Landing  of  a  Roman  army  at  Massilia  .  .         .166 

Inadequate  preparations  of  the  Romans  .         .  .166 

Rising  of  the  Boian  Gauls .     167 

Additional  Roman  levies       .         .         .         .         .         .         .167 

Voyage  and  march  of  Scipio 168 

Boldness  and  wisdom  of  HannibaFs  plan  .         .         .170 

Hannibal  and  the  AUobrogians     .         .         .         .         •         .171 

Passage  of  the  Alps 171 

Geographical  controversies 173 

March  to  the  Little  St.  Bernard    .  ....     173 

Hostility  of  the  mountaineers        .  .         .  .175 

Treacheiy  of  the  Gauls 176 

Descent  of  the  Alps 176 

Condition  of  Hannibal's  army        .         .  .         .         .177 

Hannibal  and  the  Taurinians 179 

Alleged   device  of  Hannibal  for   the  encouragement  of  his 

soldiers 180 

March  and  defeat  of  Scipio 180 

Passage  of  the  Trebia 181 

Attitude  of  the  Gallic  tribes 182 


xii  CONTENTS  OF 

PAGS 

Movement  of  the  Roman  army  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Trebia .  182 

Operations  of  Sempronius  in  Sicily 183 

Zeal  of  King  Hiero 184 

Junction  of  Sempronius  with  Scipio 185 

Preparations  for  the  battle  of  the  Trebia       «...  187 

Tactics  of  Hannibal 187 

Defeat  of  the  Bomans 188 

Retreat  of  Scipio  to  Placentia 189 

Success  and  ability  of  Hannibal 190 

Effects  of  Hannibal's  victory 190 

Hannibal's  treatment  of  his  prisoners 191 

Winter  operations  of  Hannibal 191 

Unsuccessful  attempt  of  Hannibal  to  cross  the  Apennines       .  192 

Operations  in  Spain 193 

Defeat  of  Hanno  by  Scipio 194 

Alarm  in  the  city  of  Rome  on  the  tidings  of  Hannibal's  victory 

at  the  Trebia 194 

Opposition  to  Flaminius 197 

Efforts  to  prevent  the  re-election  of  Flaminius       .         .        .  198 

Flaminius  elected  consul 198 

Marches  of  the  two  consuls 200 

Miscalculation  of  the  Romans 202 

March  of  the  Carthaginians 202 

Movements  of  Hannibal  towards  Rome 203 

Movements  of  Flaminius 204 

Reasons  for  the  censures  passed  upon  Flaminius     .         .         .  205 

Charges  brought  against  Flaminius 205 

Disposition  of  Hannibal's  forces 207 

The  battle  of  the  Thrasymene  lake 207 

Dismay  in  the  city  of  Rome  on  the  tidings  of  the  battle .         .210 

Defeat  of  Centenius 210 

Firmness  of  the  Roman  senate 211 

Prodictatorship  of  Q.  Fabius  Maximus 212 

Military  measures  of  Fabius 213 

Greatness  of  the  emergency .213 

Plans  of  Hannibal 214 

The  Carthaginians  in  Picenum      .         .         .         .         .         .215 

Adoption  of  the  Roman  arms 216 

Exultation  at  Carthage 216 

The  fidelity  of  the  Roman  allies 217 

Roman  firmness .  218 

Roman  levies 219 

Tactics  of  Fabius  in  Apulia 219 

Events  in  Campania 220 


THE  SECOND  VOLUME.  llii 

PAGB 

Disaatisiaction  of  the  Romans  with  Fabius     ....  222 
The  military  power  shared  equally  between  the  dictator  and 

the  master  of  the  horse 223 

Defeat  of  Minucius 224 

Effects  ofthe  policy  of  Fabius 224 

Spiritof  the  Roman  senate 225 

Operations  of  Cn.  Scipio  in  Spain 226 

Dispatch  of  reinforcements  for  Spain 227 

Civil  dissensions  at  Rome 228 

Enrolment  of  a  new  Roman  army 229 

Question  of  supplies 230 

Position  of  the  Roman  army 231 

Defectsof  Roman  military  usage 231 

Movements  of  the  consul  ^milius 232 

State  of  feeling  in  Rome 233 

The  battle-field  of  Cannffi 234 

Disposition  of  the  Carthaginian  army 235 

Defeat  of  the  Roman  cavalry 236 

Destruction  of  the  Roman  in&ntry 236 

Capture  of  the  Roman  camps 237 

Effects  of  the  battle  of  Cannffi 238 

Causes  assigned  by  popular  writers  for  the  Roman  defeat       .  239 

The  Roman  allies 240 

Disposition  of  Hannibal  towards  the  Romans                   .        .  240 

Danger  of  the  Roman  city 241 

Precautions  of  the  senate 241 

Military  measures  for  carrying  on  the  war     ....  242 

Second  Period,     From  the  battle  of  Cannce  to  the  Revolution 

in  Syracuse^  216-215  B.C. 

Position  of  Hannibal  in  Italy 244 

The  histories  of  Polybius 244 

Religious  ceremonies  at  Rome 246 

Drain  of  the  war  on  the  population  of  Italy    ....  247 

New  levies  of  the  dictator  M.  Junius  Pera    ....  249 

Refusal  of  the  Romans  to  ransom  the  prisoners  taken  at  Canns  249 

Roman  slanders  against  Hannibal 251 

Position  of  Hannibal  after  the  battle  of  Cannae       .         .         .  253 

Reasons  for  Hannibal's  hesitation  to  march  upon  Rome  .         .  254 

Policy  of  Hannibal 254 

Overtures  of  Hannibal  to  the  Roman  aUies    ....  255 

Fidelity  of  the  allies  to  Rome 255 

Revolts  in  Bruttium  and  Campania 256 

Change  in  the  character  of  the  war 257 


xiv  CONTENTS  OF 

PAGE 

Resolution  of  the  GarthaginianB  to  reinforce  Hannibal     .         .  257 

The  war  in  Spain 258 

Further  revolts  among  the  Roman  allies         ....  258 

Condition  of  Capua 258 

Disposition  of  the  plebeians  of  Capua  towards  Hannibal          .  259 

Revolt  of  Capua,  Atella,  and  Calatia 260 

The  resistance  of  Dec ius  Magius  to  Hannibal         .         .         .261 

Story  of  PacuviuB  Calavius 262 

Occupation  of  Nola  by  the  praetor  Marcellus 263 

Occupation  of  Nuceria  and  Acerrse  by  Hannibal    .                  .  264 

Siege  of  Casilinum 265 

Prospects  of  the  war 267 

Hannibal's  Italian  allies 267 

Defeat  of  Hasdrubal  at  Ibera  in  Spain  .         ...         .         .  268 

State  of  Corsica,  Sardinia,  and  Sicily 269 

Defeat  of  Postumius  Albinus  in  Cisalpine  Graul  .         .271 

Further  revolts  of  Roman  allies  in  Bruttium  .         .         .271 

Sojourn  of  Hannibal  in  Capua 272 

Operations  in  Campania,  215  B.C. 273 

Defeat  of  the  Carthaginians  at  Illiturgi  and  Intibili  in  Spain, 

215  B.C 275 

Success  of  the  Romans  in  Sardinia 276 

Alliance  of  Philip  of  Macedonia  with  Hannibal      .         .         .  276 

Mistaken  policy  of  Philip 278 

Third  Period,     The  War  in  Sicily,  215-212  b.c. 

Death  of  Hiero,  king  of  Syracuse 280 

Character  of  Hiero's  reign .281 

Relations  of  Hiero  with  Rome  and  Carthage  .  .282 

Effects  of  Roman  supremacy  in  Sicily 284 

Re-constitution  of  the  Roman  senate 285 

Financial  difficulties 288 

Financial  measures 289 

Commission  of  the  year  216  B.c 289 

Sumptuary  laws 290 

Amount  of  the  Roman  levies 290 

Recovery  of  Casilinum,  and  repulse  of  Hannibal  at  Nola        .     291 

Revolution  in  Sicily '.         .     292 

Negotiations  between  Hannibal  and  Hieronymus   .         .         .293 

Republican  reaction  in  Syracuse 294 

Death  of  Hieronymus 294 

Surrender  of  Ortygia  by  Andranodoros 295 

Massacre  of  the  &mily  of  Hiero    ......     296 


THE  SECOND  VOLUME.  xv 

PAOB 

Counter  revolution  in  Syracuse 297 

Triumph  of  the  Carthaginian  party  at  Syracuee      .         .         .  298 

March  of  Marcellus  to  Syracuse 299 

Military  resources  of  Syracuse 300 

Failure  of  the  attempts  of  Marcellus  to  storm  Syracuse  .        .  dOl 

Carthaginian  operations  in  Sicily 302 

Massacre  of  the  inhabitants  of  Enna  by  L.  Pinarius        •        .  303 

Results  of  the  massacre 304 

Siege  of  Syracuse  by  Marcellus 305 

Anarchy  in  Sp*acu8e 309 

Treachery  of  Mericus 310 

FaU  and  sack  of  Sjrracuse 310 

Fourth  Period,    From  the  taking  of  Syracuse  to  the 
capture  of  Capua,  212-211  b.c. 

Surrenderof  Agrigentum  by  Mutines,  and  complete  subjugation 

of  Sicily 313 

Eyents  in  Spain  and  Africa 314 

Employment  of  mercenaries  in  Spain 316 

Defeat  and  death  of  the  Scipios 316 

Operations  of  Hannibal  in  southern  Italy      .         .         .         .318 

Dishonesty  of  Roman  contractors 319 

Trial  of  M.  Postmnius  Pyrgensis 319 

Condenmation  of  Postumius  and  his  accomplices    .         .  320 

Roman  civic  morality 321 

Growth  of  superstition  in  Rome 321 

Levying  of  new  legions 322 

Surrender  of  Tarentum  to  Hannibal 323 

Proclamation  of  Hannibal  to  the  Tarentines           .         .         .  324 

Siege  of  the  citadel  of  Tarentum 325 

Alliance  of  other  Greek  cities  with  Hannibal         .         .         .  326 

Roman  designs  against  Capua 326 

Condition  of  Capua 327 

Request  of  the  Capuans  to  Hannibal  for  supplies    .         .  328 

Capture  of  the  convoys  for  Capua  by  the  Romans  .         .  328 

Defeat  and  death  of  Sempronius  Gracchus     «...  329 

Total  defeat  of  Fulvius  in  Apulia 330 

Relative  position  of  Hannibal  and  the  Romans                .  330 

Resolution  of  the  Roman  people 331 

Siege  of  Capua 331 

Resistance  of  the  Capuans 332 

Internal  condition  of  Capua 333 

Attempts  of  Hannibal  to  relieve  Capua          ....  333 

March  of  Hannibal  towards  Rome          .         .        •         •        -  335 


CONTENTS  OF 

Dismay  of  the  Romans 336 

Measures  of  the  senate 337 

Retreat  of  Hannibal  from  Rome 338 

Fall  of  Capua 340 

Treatment  of  Capua  by  the  Romans 841 

Execution  of  Capuans  at  Rome 343 

Explanation  of  Roman  policy 346 

Fifth  Period.    From  the  fall  of  Capua  to  the  battle  on  the 

Metaurus,  211-207  b.c. 

Change  in  the  character  of  the  war 346 

Dispatch  of  Roman  reinforcements  to  Spain  ....  346 

Early  life  of  Publius  Cornelius  Scipio 347 

Family  influence  of  the  Scipios  in  Rome        ....  348 

Character  of  Scipio 350 

Departure  of  Scipio  for  Spain 351 

Plans  of  Scipio 351 

Siege  and  capture  of  New  Carthage 352 

Roman  regulations  for  the  sack  of  towns       .         .         .         .  354 

Disposal  of  the  booty 354 

Plunder  of  New  Carthage 354 

Personal  anecdotes  of  Scipio 356 

Effects  of  the  fell  of  New  Carthage 357 

Disposition  of  the  Italian  towns 358 

Difliculties  of  HannibaFs  position 358 

Betrayal  of  Salapia  to  Marcellus 358 

Defeat  of  Cn.  Fulvius  Centumalus  at  Herdonea      .         .         .  359 

Destruction  of  Herdonea  by  Hannibal 360 

Operations  of  Marcellus 360 

Defeat  of  the  Roman  fleet  by  the  Tarentines  .•       .         .         .  361 

Pressure  of  the  war  on  the  Romans 362 

Refusal  of  twelve  Latin  colonies  to  contribute  men  and  money 

for  the  war 363 

Seriousness  of  the  crisis 363 

Fidelity  of  the  remaining  eighteen  Latin  colonies  .         .         .  364 

Roman  preparations  for  the  re-conquest  of  Tarentum     .        .  866 

Operations  of  Fabius  and  Marcellus 367 

Capture  of  the  Roman  army  before  Caulonia  by  Hannibal       .  367 

Betrayal  of  Tarentum  to  the  Romans 368 

Position  of  Hannibal  after  the  fall  of  Tarentum      .        .         .  369 

Fifth  consulship  of  Marcellus 370 

Death  of  Marcellus 371 

Character  and  ability  of  Marcellus 371 

Source  of  the  exaggerations  in  the  story  of  Marcellus     .  374 


THE  SECOND  VOLUME.  Xvii 

PAQB 

Haimng  of  the  aiege  of  Locri 375 

Prospects  of  the  Romans 375 

Discontent  in  Etruria 376 

Eyents  in  Spain 378 

Battle  of  Bcecula  and  march  of  Hasdrubal  .  .379 

Anxiety  in  Rome 381 

MUitaiy  measures  of  the  Romans 383 

Consnlship  of  C.  Claudius  Nero  and  M.  Livius  Sallnator         .  383 

Haadmbal's  march  through  Gaul 385 

MoTements  of  Hannibal 386 

Capture  of  the  messengers  of  Hasdrubal         .        •        .         .  387 

March  of  Nero 388 

Battle  of  the  Metaurus 389 

Effect  of  the  victory  on  the  Romans 391 

Plans  of  Hannibal 393 

Triumph  of  the  consuls        .        .        .        .        .        .         .  398 

Sixth  Period.     From  the  battle  on  the  Metaurus  to  the  taking 

ofLocri^  207-205  b.c. 

Character  of  Carthaginian  and  Roman  conquests  in  Spain       .     394 

Allied  exploits  of  Scipio  in  Spain 396 

Populari^  of  Scipio  in  Spain 397 

Magnificence  and  power  of  Scipio 399 

Capture  of  Oringis  by  the  Romans 400 

Second  battle  of  Becula 401 

OTertures-  of  Masinissa  to  Scipio 401 

Relations  of  Scipio  with  Sjrphax 402 

Alleged  meeting  of  Scipio  with  Syphax         ....     403 
Story  of  the  funeral  games  at  New  Carthage  .        .        .     404 

Storming  of  niiturgi 405 

Destruction  of  Astapa 406 

Illness  of  Scipio  and  mutiny  of  troops 406 

Defeat  of  Mandonius  and  Indibilis 407 

FallofGades 407 

Significance  of  the  battle  of  the  liletaurus      ....     409 

Policy  of  Philip  of  Macedon 409 

Condition  of  the  Greek  states 410 

League  between  the  ^tolians  and  the  Romans      .         .        .411 
Effects  of  the  league  with  the  .£tolians  .         .         .         .412 

War  between  the  ^tolians  and  Philip  of  Macedonia      .         .412 

Betom  of  Scipio  to  Rome 414 

Debates  on  the  expedition  to  Africa 415 

Poaiticm  of  Hannibal 417 

Compromise  between  Scipio  and  the  senate   .        .        •        .417 

yoito  ii«  a 


xvili  CONTENTS  OF 

PAGE 

Voluntary  contributions  for  the  fleet  and  army  of  Scipio         .  418 

State  of  the  Roman  troops 419 

Surprise  and  capture  of  Locri 420 

Atrocities  of  the  Roman  soldiers  after  the  capture  of  Locri      .  421 
Measures  of  the  Roman  senate  and  people  on  the  complaints 

of  the  Locrians     ...                  ....  422 

.  424 

.  426 

.  427 

.  428 


Preparations  of  Scipio  for  the  descent  on  Africa 
Expedition  of  Mago  from  Minorca 
Embarkation  of  Scipio  at  Lilybaeum 
Landing  of  Scipio  in  Africa 


Seventh  Period,     The  War  in  Africa  to  the  Conclusion  of 

Peace,  204-201  B.C. 

Character  of  the  war  in  Africa      .         .         •         •         .         ,429 

Plans  of  Scipio 430 

Siege  of  Utica 430 

Vigorous  resistance  of  the  Uticans         .         .         .         .         .431 

Alliance  of  Masinissa  with  Scipio 433 

Destruction  of  the  African  camps 434 

Defeat  of  Hasdrubal  and  Syphax 435 

Capture  of  Syphax  by  Masinissa 436 

Defeat  of  Scipio' s  fleet  by  the  Carthaginians  .   '     .         .         .  436 

Negotiations  for  peace ...         .         .         .         .         .         .  438 

Conditions  of  the  armistice 439 

Reception  of  the  Carthaginian  ambassadors  at  Rome        .         .  439 

Recall  and  death  of  Mago 440 

Relations  of  Hannibal  with  the  king  of  Macedonia  .         .441 

The  bronze  tablets  of  Hannibal     ......  442 

Slanderous  charges  against  Hannibal 443 

Recall  of  Hannibal  from  Italy       ....         .         .  444 

Landing  of  Hannibal  at  Leptis 445 

Failure  of  the  peace  negotiations 445 

Shipwreck  of  a  Roman  convoy  in  the  bay  of  Carthage    .         .  446 

Operations  of  Hannibal  against  Masinissa       ....  448 

The  so-called  battle  of  Zama 449 

Disposition  of  the  opposing  forces ,  450 

The  order  of  the  Roman  legions   .         .         .         .         .         .451 

Complete  defeat  of  the  Carthaginians 452 

Return  of  Hannibal  to  Carthage 453 

Policy  of  Scipio 453 

State  of  parties  in  Carthage 454 

Terms  of  peace    .........  455 

Truce  for  three  months 455 

Joy  in  Rome  on  the  tidings  of  Scipio's  victor}'       .         .         .  456 


THE  SECOND  VOLUME.  XlX 

PAOB 

Destruction  of  the  Carthaginian  fleet 456 

Eewards  bestowed  on  Masinissa 457 

Triumph  of  Scipio 457 

CHAPTER  K. 

Real  significance  of  the  second  Punic  war     ....  459 

The  narratives  of  Livy  and  Poljbius  and  other  historians        .  460 

Real  causes  of  Roman  superiority 461 

The  Italian  fortresses 462 

Reasons  for  the   Carthaginian  invasions  of  Italy  from  the 

north 463 

Naval  inactivity  of  the  Carthaginians 464 

Probable  reasons  for  the  decay  of  the  Carthaginian  navy        .  465 

Roman  military  organisation 466 

Lengthened  term  of  military  service 466 

Recognition  of  plunder  as  a  supplement  for  inadequate  pay- 
ment of  soldiers 467 

Ferocity  consequent  on  the  licence  of  pillage          .         .         •  468 

Influence  of  mercenaries  on  the  regular  armies  of  Rome          .  469 

Character  of  the  Roman  military  officers        ....  469 

The  usurers  and  speculators 470 

Influence  of  war  on  the  distribution  of  property     .         .         .471 

General  devastation  of  Italy 471 

Multiplication  of  Roman  festivals 473 

Character  of  Roman  amusements 473 

Character  of  Roman  art  and  literatiue 474 

Livius  Andronicus  and  his  successors 475 

Greek  influence  on  the  religion  of  the  Romans       .         .         .  476 

Increasing  poverty  of  the  lower  classes  of  Roman  citizens        .  478 
Lawless  enrichment  of  the  Roman  nobility    .         .        .         .479 

Preponderance  of  the  senate 479 

Modes  of  courting  popularity 481 

Growing  preponderance  of  die  nobility 482 

Rapid  growth  of  Roman  power 483 

APPENDIX. 

On  the  poptdation  of  Italy  in  the  third  century  b.c.        .        .  485 


I 


FOURTH  BOOK. 


STEUGGLE   FOE   THE 
ASCENDANCY  IN   THE   WEST. 


TOL.  II.  B 


CHAPTEE  I. 

OABTHAGE. 

Opposite  to  the  far-spreading  peninsulas  and  deep  indented     CHAP. 

shores  of  Europe  and  her  numerous  islands,  stretches  in  a r — ^ 

long  and  uniform  line  the  stony  coast  of  Africa,  the  most  Differences 
compact  part  of  the  old  as  well  as  of  the  new  world.     No  °f.  *°^J  ^^^ 

*  *  ,  ,  climate 

more  marked  contrast  can  be  found,  in  such  immediate  between 
proximity,  upon  the  surface  of  the  globe,  than  the  two  and^frica 
continents  which  form  the  abodes  of  the  black  and  white 
races  of  man.  The  solid  mass  of  land  in  the  sultry  south, 
the  primeval  seat  of  unmitigated  barbarism,  has  remained 
closed  to  the  present  day  against  the  refinement  of  a 
higher  civilisation,  whilst  Europe  early  received  the  seed 
of  culture  and  unfolded  the  richest  and  most  varied  forms 
of  intellectual,  social,  and  political  life.  On  the  east  of 
Africa  the  narrow  valley  formed  by  the  NUe  is.  indeed 
separated  from  the  heart  of  the  African  continent,  and 
on  the  north  the  cheerless  wastes  of  the  interior  bound  a 
belt  of  land  of  varying  breadth  along  the  coast  which  is 
capable  of  much  cultivation.  These  regions  diflfer,  how- 
ever, essentially  from  the  sea-girt  islands  and  peninsulas 
of  Europe,  where  a  milder  sun  and  a  greater  variety  of 
climate  have  brought  about  gentler  manners  and  richer 
forms  of  social  and  political  life. 

The  Mediterranean  Sea,  on  whose  shores  the  stream  of  Migrations 
migration  from  east  to  west  was  arrested  and  divided,  g^mifio 
turned  the  Semitic  races  to  the  north  coast  of  Africa  and  a»^<i  Ary..n 
the  Indo-Europeans  or  Aryans  to  the  countries  of  Europe  ; 
and  although  its  waters  could  not  prevent  the  hostile 
encounters  and  alternating  invasions  of  these  two  radically 

B  2 


4  EOMAN  mSTOEY. 

BOOK     different  peoples,  still  it  has  formed,  during  the  lapse  of 
^     \  •    ^   centuries,  an  immovable  barrier  between  them,  dividing 
the  civilised  lands  of  Christian  Europe  from  those  of  the 
^  Mohammedan  Barbaresks  who  have  ai^ain  sunk  almost 
mto  savagery, 
PhoBniraan       We  have  but  uncertain  information  with  respect  to  the 
tion^in*"      Original  population  of  the  countries  which  extend  from 
Africa,        Egypt  to  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  from  the  desert  to  the 
shores  of  the   Mediterranean   Sea.     One  single  race  of 
people,  the  Libyans,   divided   into  various   branches,  of 
which  the  Numidians,  the  Mauritanians,  and  the  Gsetulians 
are  the  most  import-ant,  have  had  possession  of  these 
regions  from  the  earliest  times ;  and  in  spite  of  migrations 
and  mixing  of  races,  the  present  Berbers  may  be  considered 
the  direct  descendants  of  the  original  population.     The 
nature  of  the  soil  caused  considerable  difference  in  the 
mode  of  life  and  in  the  character  of  the  population.     In 
the  fruitful  border-lands  of  the  sea-coast,  the  Libyans  led 
an  industrious  agricultural  life;  the  shepherd  hordes  of 
the  Numidians   and  Mauritanians  ranged   through  the 
steppes  and  deserts ;  and  in  the  recesses  of  the  Atlas,  the 
Gsetulians  dragged  on  a  miserable  existence.    None  of  these 
tribes  possessed  in  themselves  the  elements  of  a  higher 
cultivation.     This  cultivation  came  to  them  from  without. 
During  a  period  of  many  centuries,  the  Phoenicians,  a 
people  distinguished  by  ingenuity  and  enterprise,  made 
the  north  coast  of  Africa  the  object  of  their  voyages,  and 
there  they  planted  numerous  colonies.     It  would  appear 
that  the  course  of  these  earliest  explorers  and  founders  of 
cities  was  at  first  directed  more  to  the  north  of  the  Medi- 
terranean;  but  encountering  the  Greeks  on  the  shores 
and  islands  of  the  MgesLU  Sea,  they  retired  before  the 
greater  energy  of  that  people,  in  order  to  find  on  the 
coast  of  Africa  and  the  western  part  of  the  Mediterranean 
an  undisturbed   territory  for  the  development   of  their 
commercial  and  colonial  policy.     Thus  numerous  Phoeni- 
cian settlements  were  formed  on  the  coast  of  Africa,  in 
Spain,  and  in  many  of  the  western  islands. 


CAETHAGE.  6 

The  Pheenician  colonies  did  not  essentially  differ  from     CHAP. 

the  Greek.     Unlike  the  Boman  colonies,  they  were  not  . — ^ ^ 

established  by  the  mother  country,  in  order  to  further  her  pomts  of 
political  aims,  to  extend  and  strengthen  her  dominion,  and  difference 
to  be  kept  in  dependence  upon  her.     On  the  contrary,  thePhce- 
their  foundation  was  the  result  of  a  spirit  of  enterprise  in  ^0^°^*^^ 
the  emigrants,  of  internal  quarrels  at  home,  or  of  com-  colonies, 
mercial  projects;  and  only  a  weak  bond  of  affection  or 
interest   united   them   with   each   other    and   with   the 
mother  country.     Nevertheless  the  isolated  and  at  first 
independent  Phoenician  cities  in  the  west  gradually  grew 
into  one  powerfdl  united  state;  and  this  small  Semitic 
people  succeeded  by  their  concentrated  and  well-regulated 
force  in  ruling  for  centuries  over  numerous  populations 
composed  of  differing  races,  and  in  stamping  upon  them 
an  impression  which  was  recognisable  ages  after  the  fall 
of  the  Phcenician  dominion. 

This  union  of  the  widely-spread  Phoenician  communities  Bapid 
into  one  state  was  the  work  of  Carthage.  No  domestic  ^^power 
or  foreign  historian  has  explained  to  us  by  what  happy  o^  Caiv 
circumstances,  by  what  poUtical  or  military  superiority  *^- 
on  the  part  of  the  Cartha^nians,  or  by  what  states- 
men or  generals,  this  union  of  scattered  elements  was 
brought  about.  The  ancient  history  of  Carthage  has  dis- 
appeared even  more  completely  than  that  of  her  great  rival 
Bome,  and  in  its  place  we  find  only  idle  stories  and  fables. 
Dido  or  Elissa,  the  Tyrian  princess,  who  is  said  to  have 
emigrated  fit,m  her  itiTe  country  in  the  ninth  century 
before  our  era,  at  the  head  of  a  portion  of  the  discontented 
nobility,  and  to  have  founded  Byrsa,  the  citadel  of  Car- 
thage, appears  in  the  light  of  historical  investigation  to  be 
a  goddess.  The  stories  of  the  purchase  of  a  site  for  the 
new  city,  of  the  ox-hide  cut  into  strips,  and  of  the  rent 
which  for  many  years  had  to  be  paid  for  the  land  to  native 
princes,  are  legends  of  as  much  worth  as  those  of  the 
Boman  asylum,  or  the  rape  of  the  Sabines.  Carthage  was 
afc  first,  like  Bome,  an  unimportant  city,  whose  foundation 
and  early  history  could  not  have  aroused  the  attention  of 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


NatTire  of 
the  Car- 
thaginian 
empire. 


Elements 
of  weak- 
ness in  the 
Cnrthagi- 
nian  state. 


I 


contemporary  writers.  She  was  but  one  among  the  many 
Phcenician  colonies,  and  not  even  the  oldest  Phoenician 
settlement  on  the  African  coast.  But  the  happy  situation 
of  Carthage  appears  to  have  promoted  the  early  and  rapid 
growth  of  the  city ;  which,  asserting  her  supremacy  over 
her  sister  cities,  placed  herself  at  the  head  of  all  the  settle- 
ments belonging  to  the  Phoenician  race.  She  made  con- 
quests and  founded  colonies,  and  gained  dominion  over  the 
western  seas  and  coasts  by  her  commercial  influence  and 
by  the  strength  of  her  forces  in  war. 

The  Carthaginian  empire  was  in  its  constitution  not 
unlike  that  of  Rome.  Both  had  grown  out  of  one  city  as 
their  centre;  both  ruled  over  allies  of  alien  and  of 
kindred  race ;  both  had  sent  out  numerous  colonies,  and 
through  them  had  spread  their  nationality.  But  with  all 
this  resemblance  there  were  causes  existing  which  im- 
pressed upon  the  two  states  widely  different  characteristics 
and  determined  their  several  destinies. 

We  dare  not  decide  whether  Rome  was  richer  than 
Carthage  in  political  wisdom  and  warlike  spirit.  Both 
these  qualities  distinguished  the  two  peoples  in  the 
highest  degree,  developed  their  national  strength,  and  made 
the  struggle  between  them  the  longest  and  most  chequered 
that  is  known  in  ancient  history.  Even  we,  who  draw  our 
knowledge  of  the  Carthaginians  only  from  the  questionable 
statements  of  Greek  and  Roman  writers,  can  arrive  at  a 
full  conviction  that  they  were  at  least  worthy  rivals  of 
the  Romans.  The  decision  in  the  great  contest  did  not 
depend  upon  superiority  of  mind  or  courage.  No  Roman 
army  ever  fought  more  bravely  than  that  under  Hamilcar 
Barcas  on  Mount  Eryx,  or  than  the  garrison  of  Lilybseum, 
or  than  the  Carthaginians  in  their  last  desperate  conflict 
with  Scipio  the  Destroyer.  The  wisdom  of  the  Roman 
senate,  which  we  cannot  rate  too  highly,  did  not  accom- 
plish more  than  the  senate  of  Carthage,  which  for  600 
years  governed  the  greatest  commercial  state  in  the  old 
world  without  a  single  fdndamental  revolution.  What, 
then,  was  the  decisive  force  which,  after  the  long  trembling 


CARTHAGB. 


of  the  balance  between  Bome  and  Carthage,  turned  the     chap. 
scale?    It  was  the  homogeneousness  of  the  material  out  ^ 


of  which  the  Boman  state  was  constructed,  as  compared 
with  the  varied  elements  wliich  formed  the  Cartha- 
ginian.^ The  Eomans  were  Latins,  of  the  same  blood  as 
the  Sabines,  the  Samnites,  the  Lucanians,  and  the  Cam- 
pauians,  and  all  the  other  races  which  formed  the  prin- 
cipal stock  of  the  population  of  Italy.  They  were  related 
in  blood  even  with  their  Grecian  allies,  and  they  harmonised 
in  a  great  measure  with  the  Etruscans  in  their  mode  of 
life,  in  political  thought  and  religious  rites.  But  the 
Carthaginians  were  strangers  in  Africa,  and  they  remained 
so  to  the  end.  The  hard  soil  of  Africa  produced  an  un- 
impressible  race,  and  the  Semitic  Phoenicians  were  exclu- 
sive in  their  intercourse  with  strangers.  Though  the 
Carthaginians  and  Libyans  lived  together  in  Africa  for 
many  centuries,  the  diflference  between  them  never  dis- 
appeared. With  the  Bomans  it  was  different.  They  could 
not  help  growing  into  one  people  with  their  subjects. 
Difference  of  race  rendered  this  impossible  to  the  Cartha- 
ginians. If  they  had  been  numerous  enough  to  absorb  the 
Libyans,  this  fact  would  have  been  less  prejudicial.  But 
their  mother  country,  Phcenicia,  was  too  small  to  send  out 
ever-fresh  supplies  of  emigrants.  The  roots  of  their  power 
had  not  therefore  struck  deep  enough  into  the  soil  of  their 
new  home,  and  the  fearfril  storm  which  broke  upon  them 
in  the  Boman  wars  tore  them  up. 

To  this  element  of  national  weakness  was  added  a  Geogra- 
second.  Italy  is  a  compact,  well-defined  land.  Large  ™^^^°" 
enough  to  hold  a  numerous  population,  it  is  not  broken  up 
by  mountains  nor  deeply  indented  by  arms  of  the  sea,  like 
Greece.  It  is  surrounded  on  almost  all  sides  by  water, 
and  consequently  not  much  exposed  to  the  danger  of 
foreign  encroachments.  If  we  compare  this  with  the 
Carthaginian  territory,  we  shall  find  that  the  long  stretch 

>  Polybius  (i.  65,  §   7)  points  out  this  contrast  by  comparing  the  fjdri 
cififUKTa  KoX  fidpfiapa  of  the  Carthaginians  with  those  of  the  Bomans,  it^ 


8 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Agricul- 
ture and 
trade  of 
Carthage. 


of  coast  from  Kyrfend  to  the  ocean,  her  uncertain  frontier 
towards  the  interior  of  the  African  continent,Cher  scattered 
possessions  beyond  the  sea,  in  Sicily,  Sardinia,  Malta,  the 
Balearic  Isles  and  in  Spain,  formed  a  yery  unsafe  basis  for 
the  formation  of  a  powerful  and  durable  state. 

These  were  the  weaJb:  parts  of  Cartha&re.  It  has  indeed 
been  eaid  tixat  the  Car^ginians  were  merely  a  nation  of 
traders,  bent  on  gain,  animated  by  ne  warlike  spirit,  and 
that  therefore  they  were  doomed  to  succumb  in  the  struggle 
with  Bome.^  But  this  assertion  is  untrue,  and  the  in- 
ference is  unjust.  The  Carthaginians  were  by  no  means 
exclusively  a  commercial  and  trading  people.  They  prac- 
tised agriculture  no  less  than  the  Somans.  Their  system 
of  tillage  was  even  more  rational  and  more  advanced  than 
the  Roman.  They  had  writings  on  husbandry  which  the 
Boman  senate  caused  to  be  translated  expressly  for  the 
instruction  of  the  Boman  people.  If,  therefore,  peasants 
possess  more  than  the  people  of  towns  the  requisite  quali- 
ties of  good  Qoldiers,  (which  may,  however,  be  doubted), 
still  this  fact  would  be  no  argument  for  denying  that  the 
Carthaginians  excelled  in  war.  And  indeed  how  could  a 
people  have  been  wanting  in  warlike  spirit  who  braved 
the  storms  and  rocks  of  every  sea,  who  established  them- 
selves on  every  coast,  and  subdued  the  wildest  and  boldest 
races  9  If  the  Carthaginians  formed  their  armies  out  of 
hired  foreign  troops  and  not  out  of  citizens,  the  cause 
is  not  to  be  found  in  their  want  of  courage  or  deficient 
patriotism.  The  men,  and  even  the  women,  of  Carthage 
were  ever  ready  to  sacrifice  their  lives  for  the  defence  of  their 
homes ;  but  for  their  foreign  wars  they  counted  the  blood 
of  citizens  too  dear.  A  mercenary  army  cost  the  state  less 
than  an  army  of  citizens,  who  were  much  too  valuable  as 
artizans  or  merchants,  as  officials  or  overseers,  to  serve  as 

'  Compare  the  just  remarka  of  Yiacke  {Dsr  rwdU  puniwAe  Krieg,  1841, 
p.  94)  on  the  warlike  qualities  of  commercial  states :  '  The  merchants  of 
Carthage  were  no  more  mere  shopkeepers  than  those  merchants  on  the  Znjdersee 
and  the  Thames  who  seized  the  government  of  India.'  Vineke  ought  to  hare 
added :  '  and  who  fought  yictoriously  with  the  greatest  military  powers  of 
Europe— with  Spain  under  Philip  H.,  and  with  France  under  Napoleon.' 


CAETHAGE.  9 

common  soldiers.  Military  service  is  sought  only  by  rude  CHAP. 
and  poor  nations  as  a  means  of  subsistence.  The  Sam-  ;  _  ^ 
nites,  the  Iberians,  the  Gktuls,  and  the  Ligurians,  and, 
among  the  Greeks  especially,  the  Arcadians  and  the  rest 
of  the  Peloponnesians,  served  for  hire,  because  they  were 
needy  or  uncultivated.  Love  of  the  military  service  as  a 
profession  and  occupation  of  life  is  never  found  in  the  mass  , 
of  an  advanced  people  where  the  value  of  labour  ranks  high. 
We  must  not  on  this  account  reproach  such  a  nation  with 
cowardice.  The  English  are  surpassed  by  no  people  of 
Europe  in  bravery ;  and  yet  in  England,  except  the  officers, 
none  but  the  lowest  classes  adopt  a  soldier's  life,  because 
it  is  the  worst  paid.  Of  course  in  times  of  national  enthu- 
siasm or  danger  it  is  different.  Then  every  member  of  a 
healthy  state  willingly  takes  up  arms.  So  it  was  among 
the  Carthaginians,  and  therefore  we  are  not  justified  in 
crediting  them  vdth  less  capacity  for  war  than  the  bravest 
nations  of  the  old  world. 

In  speaking  of  the  Carthaginian  people  we  must  strictly  Depen- 
include  only  the  Punians,  that  is  to  say,  the  population  of  trib^t^es 
pure  Phoenician  descent.     These  were  to  be  found  only  of  Car- 
in  the  city  of  Carthage  and  in  the  other  Phcenician  '^- 
colonies,  and  were  very  few  in  proportion  to  the  mass  of 
the  remaining  population.     The  aboriginal  African  race 
of  the    Libyans   inhabited  the   fruitful  region  south  of 
Carthage  to  the  lake  Tritonis ;    these   the    Phoenician 
settlers  had  reduced  to  complete  dependence  and  made 
tributary.'     They  were  now  the  subjects  of  Carthage,  and 
their  lot  was  not  enviable.      It  is  true  that  they  were 
personally  free ;  but  they  formed  no  part  of  the  Carthagi- 
nian people,  and  they  had  no  rights  but  those  which  the 

'  It  ii  very  improbable  that,  as  Justin  Htattta  (xiz.  2),  the  Carthaginians, 
down  to  the  time  of  Darius  Hystaspis,  paid  a  ground-rent  to  the  Libyans  for 
the  land  on  which  their  town  was  built.  (Compare  Heeren,  Ideen,  ii.  1-34.) 
But  granted  even  that  this  statement  were  true,  it  woald  not  follow  that  (as 
Hommsen  says,  Bom,  Gesch.  i.  493)  they  were  deficient  in  political  capacity. 
No  one  will  xenture  to  accuse  the  English  people  of  such  a  defect.  Yet 
the  East  India  Company  continued  up  to  the  year  1827  to  acknowledge  the 
Great  Mogul  as  the  nominal  sovereign  of  India,  and  allowed  him  to  keep  a 
mock  court  at  Delhi  until  1857. 


10 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


The  Libv- 

« 

Phojni- 
cians. 


The  Car- 
thaginian 
state. 


Acknow- 
ledgment 
of  Cartha- 
^nian  su- 
premacy. 


generosity  or  policy  of  the  Carthaginianfl  granted  theuj. 
The  amount  of  the  services  which  they  had  to  render  to 
the  state  was  not  fixed  and  determined  by  mutual  agree- 
ment, by  stipulation  or  law,  but  depended  on  the  neces- 
sities of  Carthage ;  and  on  this  account  they  were  always 
ready  to  join  with  foreign  enemies  whenever  the  soil  of 
Africa  became  the  theatre  of  war. 

During  the  600  years  of  Carthaginian  supremacy,  a 
certain  mingling  of  the  races  of  the  Libyans  and  Cartha- 
ginians naturally  took  place.  A  number  of  Carthaginians, 
citizens  of  pure  Phoenician  blood,  settled  among  the 
Libyans,  and  thus  arose  the  mixed  race  of  the  Liby- 
Phoenicians,  who  probably  spread  Carthaginian  customs 
and  the  Phoenician  language  in  Africa  in  the  same  way 
as  the  Latin  colonies  carried  the  Latin  language  and 
Koman  customs  over  Italy.  From  these  Liby-Phcenicians 
were  principally  taken  the  colonists  who  were  sent  out  by 
Carthage  to  form  settlements,  not  only  in  Africa,  but  also 
in  Spain,  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  the  other  islands.  We  have 
no  very  accurate  information  about  the  Liby-Phoenicians. 
Whether  they  were  more  animated  by  the  Phoenician 
spirit,  or  whether  the  Libyan  nationality  prevailed,  must 
remain  undecided.  It  is,  however,  probable  that,  in  course 
of  time,  they  assumed  more  and  more  of  the  Phoenician 
character. 

The  Carthaginian  citizens,  the  native  Libyans,  and  the 
mixed  population  of  the  Liby-Phcenicians  constituted 
therefore,  in  strictness  of  speech,  the  republic  of  Carthage, 
in  the  same  way  as  Kome,  the  Boman  colonies,  and  the 
subject  Italian  population  formed  the  body  of  the  Eoman 
state.  But  the  wider  Carthaginian  empire  included  three 
other,  elements ;  the  confederate  Punic  cities,  the  depen- 
dent African  nomadic  races,  and  the  foreign  possessions. 

It  is  a  sure  sign  of  the  political  ability  of  the  Cartha- 
ginians that,  so  far  as  we  know,  no  wars  arising  from 
jealousy  and  rivalry  took  place  between  the  different 
Phoenician  colonies,  like  those  which  ruined  the  once 
flourishing  Greek  settlements  in  Italy  and  Sicily.     It  is 


CARTHAGE.  11 

true  that  the  Phoenicians  were  careful  to  exclude  other     CHAP, 
nations  from  the  regions  where  they  had  founded  their  ^      /  _^ 


trading  establishments,  and  Carthage  may  also  have  en- 
deavoured to  concentrate  the  trade  of  her  African  posses- 
sions in  Carthage  itself.*  But  there  were  no  wars  of 
extermination  between  diflferent  cities  and  the  Phcenician 
race.  All  the  Tyrian  and  Sidonian  colonies  in  Africa, 
on  the  islands  of  the  western  Mediterranean  Sea,  and  in 
Spain,  which  had  in  part  been  formed  before  Carthage, 
gradually  joined  themselves  to  her,  and  acknowledged  her 
as  the  head  of  their  nation.  How  this  union  was  effected 
is  hidden  in  the  darkness  of  the  early  Carthaginian  history. 
We  may  perhaps  assume  that  the  common  national  and 
mercantile  interests  prompted  the  isolated  settlements  of 
the  far-sighted  Phoenicians  to  a  peaceful  union  and  sub- 
ordination to  the  most  powerful  state.*  Thus  it  was 
possible  for  a  handful  of  men  of  a  foreign  race  '  to  establish 
in  a  distant  part  of  the  world  an  extensive  dominion  over 
scattered  tracts  of  land  and  wild  barbarian  populations. 

The  most  important  city  of  these  Phoenician  confederates  phcsnician 
was  Utica,  situated  at  no  great  distance  north  of  Carthage  cities  ^^ 
at  the  mouth  of  the  river    Bagradas.      In  the   public  Africa. 
treaties  which  Carthage  concluded,  Utica  was  generally 
mentioned  as  one  of  the  contracting  parties.^      It  was 
therefore  rather  an  ally  than  a  subject  of  Carthage,  holding 
to  her  the  same  relationship  which  Prseneste  and  some 
other  Italian  cities  bore  to  Eome.     We  have  very  little 
information  about  the  remaining  Phoenician  cities  on  the 

'  Movers,  Thonizier^  ii.  2,  488.  Yet  it  is  not  probable  that  the  Cartha- 
ginians, as  Movers  suspects,  destroyed  the  port  of  Great  Leptis.  If  they  had 
done  so,  the  export  of  goods  from  Great  Leptis  to  Carthage  would  hare  been 
confined  to  the  long  and  tedious  road  by  land,  which  of  course  would  hare 
resulted  in  a  loss  to  the  Carthaginian  traders.  Many  of  the  famous  ports  of 
antiquity  were  silted  up  in  the  course  of  ages,  and  among  them,  no  doubt,  that 
of  Great  Leptis,  without  the  interference  of  man. 

'  At  least  nothing  is  known  of  a  forcible  subjection  of  the  smaller  Phcenician 
settlements  to  Carthage. 

'  The  English  dominion  in  India  is  to  some  extent  analogous;  but  the 
Anglo-Indians  have  the  whole  power  of  the  mother  country  to  back  them. 

*  Folybius,  iii.  24. 


12 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


The  Nu- 
midiana. 


Foreign 


r 

north  coast  of  Africa.  None  of  them  were  of  such  im- 
portance as  to  be  placed  in  the  same  rank  with  Carthage 
and  Utica.  They  were  bound  to  pay  a  fixed  tribute  and 
to  famish  contingents  of  troops,  but  they  enjoyed  self- 
government  and  they  retained  their  own  laws. 

On  the  south  and  west  of  the  immediate  territory  of  the 
Carthaginian  repubUc  lived  various  races  of  native  Libyans, 
who  are  commonly  known  by  the  name  of  Numidians. 
But  these  were  in  no  way,  as  their  Greek  name  (*  Nomads ') 
would  seem  to  imply,  exclusively  pastoral  races.  Several 
districts  in  their  possession,  especially  in  the  modem 
Algeria,  were  admirably  suited  for  agriculture.  Hence 
they  had  not  only  fixed  and  permanent  abodes,  but  a 
number  of  not  unimportant  cities,  of  which  Hippo  and 
Cirta,  the  residences  of  the  chief  Numidian  princes,  were 
the  most  considerable.  Their  own  interest,  far  more  than 
the  superior  force  of  the  Carthaginians,  bound  the  chiefs  of 
several  Numidian  races  as  allies  to  the  rich  commercial 
city.  They  assisted  in  great  paxt  in  caxrying  on  the  com- 
merce  of  Carthage  with  the  interior  parts  of  Africa,  and 
derived  a  profit  from  this  forwarding  trade.  The  military 
service  in  the  Carthaginian  armies  had  great  attractions 
for  the  needy  sons  of  the  desert,  who  delighted  above  all 
things  in  robbery  and  plunder ;  and  the  light  cavalry  of 
the  Numidians  was  equalled  neither  by  the  Bomans  nor  by 
the  Greeks.  A  wise  policy  on  the  part  of  Carthage  kept 
the  princes  of  Numidia  in  good  humour.  Presents,  marks 
of  honour,  and  intermarriage  with  noble  Carthaginian 
ladies,  united  them  with  the  city,  which  thus  disposed  of 
them  without  their  suspecting  that  they  were  in  a  state  of 
dependence.  That,  however,  such  an  uncertain,  fluctuating 
alliance  was  not  without  danger  for  Carthage — that  the 
excitable  Numidians,  caring  only  for  their  own  immediate 
advantage,  would  join  the  enemies  of  Carthage  without 
scruple  in  the  hour  of  need,  Carthage  was  doomed  to 
experience  to  her  sorrow  in  her  wars  with  Eome. 

Besides  her  own  immediate  territory  in   Africa,  the 


CAETHAGE.  13 

allied  Phcenician  cities,  and  the  Numidian  confederates,     CHAP. 

Carthage  had  also  a  number  of  foreign  possessions  and  ^ A^^ 

colonies,  extending  her  name  and  influence  throughout  posses- 
the  western  parts  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea.    A  line  of  S^Jfu^^ 
colonies  had  been  founded  on  the  north  coast  of  Africa  as 
far  as  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar,  and  even  on  the  western 
shore  of  the  continent,  i.e.  on  the  coasts  of  Numidia  and 
Mauritania ;  but  these  were  intended  to  further  the  com- 
merce of  Carthage,  not  in  any  way  to  assist  her  in  her 
conquests.     In  like  manner,  the  earliest  settlements  in 
Spain  and  the  islands  of  the  Mediterranean,  in  Malta,  the 
Balearic  and  Lipari  Isles,  in  Sardinia,  and  especially  in 
Sicily,  were  originally  trading  factories,  and  not  colonies  in 
the  Boman  sense.     But  where  commerce  required  the 
protection  of  arms,  these  establishments  were  soon  changed 
into  military  posts,  like  those  of  the  English  in  the  East 
Indies ;  and  the  conquest  of  larger  or  smaller  tracts  of  land 
and  of  entire  islands  was  the  consequence.     It  is  evident 
that  for  several  centuries  the  Carthaginians  in  Sicily  were 
not  bent  on  conquest.     They  avoided  encountering  the 
Greeks,  they  gave  up  the  whole  south  and  east  coast, 
where  at  first  there  had  been  numerous  Phoenician  colo- 
nies,* and  they  confined  themselves  to  a  few  small  strong- 
holds  in  the  extreme  west  of  the  island,  which  they 
required  as  trading  and  shipping  stations.     They  appear 
only  in  the  fifth  century  to  have  made  an  attempt  to  get 
military  possession  of  the  greater  part  of  Sicily.     But 
after  the  failure  of  this  attempt  by  the  defeat  at  Himera- 
(480  B.C.)  we  hear  of  no  further  similar  undertakings  till 
the  time  of  the  Peloponnesian  war. 

Sardinia,  on  the  other  hand,  seems  early  to  have  come  Saidioia. 
into  the  power  of  the  Carthaginians,  after  the  attempt  of 
the  Greeks  of  Phokaia  to  make  a  settlement  there  had 
been  thwarted  by  the  Carthaginian  fleet.  Sardinia  was 
not,  like  Sicily,  a  land  that  attracted  many  strangers.  It 
was  not  the  eternal  apple  of  discord  of  contending  neigh- 

>  Movers,  Phbniner,  ii.  2,  Z2i  ff.    Thocjdides,  vi.  2. 


14 


R024AN  fflSTORY. 


Gades  and 
other 

settlements 
in  Spain. 


Constitu- 
tion of 
Carthage. 


Points  of 
likeness 
between 
the 


bonrs,  like  the  richer  sister  island,  and  so  it  seems  that,  as 
the  Carthaginians  found  no  rival  there,  it  was  acquired 
without  much  eflPort  on  their  part. 

Gades,  the  earliest  Phoenician  colony  in  Spain,  and  the 
other  kindred  settlements  in  the  valley  of  the  Bsetis,  the 
old  land  of  Tartessus,^  appear  to  have  stood  in  friendly 
relations  to  Carthage.  The  African  and  Spanish  Phoeni- 
cians carried  on  an  active  intercourse  with  each  other 
without  jealousy  or  mutual  injury,  and  in  war  they  aided 
each  other.  At  a  later  period,  when  Carthage  was  ex- 
tending her  conquests  in  Spain,  Gades  and  the  other 
Punic  places  seem  to  have  stood  to  her  in  the  same  re- 
lationship as  Utica. 

Thus  the  Carthaginian  state  was  formed  out  of  elements 
diflPering  widely  from  one  another  in  origin  and  geogra- 
phical position.  The  constitution  and  organisation  of  the 
state  were  admirably  fitted  for  times  of  peace,  and  for 
commercial  and  industrial  development.  By  the  activity 
of  the  Carthaginian  merchants,  the  varied  productions  of 
the  several  districts  found  their  markets.  The  different 
peoples  mutually  supplied  their  wants,  and  could  not  fail 
to  recognise  their  common  interest  in  this  intercourse 
with  one  another,  and  in  the  services  rendered  by  Carthage. 
But  for  the  strain  of  a  great  war  such  a  state  was  too 
slightly  framed.  From  the  nature  of  things  it  was  hardly 
to  be  expected  that  it  could  undertake  any  war  with  suc- 
cess, or  survive  a  great  reverse.  But  Carthage,  notwith- 
standing, came  out  victoriously  from  many  a  struggle ;  and 
for  centuries  she  maintained  herself  as  the  first  state  in 
the  western  sea,  before  she  sunk  under  the  hard  blows  of 
the  Boman  legions.  This  result  was  brought  about  by  a 
wise  political  organisation  of  the  state,  which  bound  the 
heterogeneous  elements  into  one  solid  body. 

Our  information  about  the  constitution  of  Carthage 
comes  to  us  indirectly  through  Greek  and  Boman  authors, 
and  many  points  with  respect  to  it  remain  obscure  and 


>  Morers,  Phonhier,  ii.  2,  694  ff.  * 


CARTHAGE.  15 

unintelligible  in  consequence,  more  especially  its  origin     CHAP, 
and  progressive  development;  but  its  general  character 


is  tolerably  clear,  and  we  cannot  hesitate  to  rank  it,  on  the  Carthagi- 
authority  of  Aristotle  and  Polybius,  among  the  best  of  ^^^^  ^^^ 

•^  .        .  .    .  other  con- 

ancient  constitutions.  A  striking  phenomenon  may  here  stltutions. 
be  noted.  In  spite  of  the  radically  diflPerent  national  charac- 
ter of  the  Semitic  Carthaginians,  their  political  institutions, 
far  from  presenting  a  decided  contrast  to  the  Greek 
and  Italian  forms  of  government,  resembled  them  strongly, 
not  only  in  general  outline  but  even  in  detail.  This  simi- 
larity led  Aristotle  '  to  compare  the  constitution  of  Car- 
thage with  that  of  Sparta  and  Crete,  while  Polybius  ^  thinks 
that  it  resembled  the  Boman.  This  likeness  may  be  partly 
explained  bj"  the  fact  that  these  foreign  observers  .were 
inclined  to  discover  analogies  in  Carthage  to  their  own 
native  institutions,  and  that  they  were  strengthened  in  this 
view  by  the  employment  of  Greek  and  Roman  names,  just 
as  they  were  constantly  recognising  the  Hellenic  deities  in 
the  gods  of  the  barbarians.  But  without  a  correspondence 
of  outline  in  the  constitution  of  these  states,  such  a  com- 
parison would  not  have  been  possible,  and  so  we  are 
compelled  to  infer  that  in  political  life  the  Carthaginians 
were  not  Asiatics  but  Occidentals,  or  else  had  become  so 
through  the  force  of  circumstances. 

Carthage  had  from  the  very  commencement  this  feature  Municipal 
in  common  with  the  Greek  and  Eoman  republics,  that  the  ^Jq^  of 
state  had  grown  out  of  a  city  and  preserved  the  municipal  Carthage. 
form  of  government.  In  consequence  a  republican  adminis- 
tration became  necessary,  that  is  to  say,  there  took  place 
a  periodical  change  of  elected  and  responsible  magistrates, 
the  people  being  acknowledged  as  the  source  of  all  political 
power. 

The  first  officers  of  state,  who  were  called  Kings  or  TheSuf- 
Suffetes   (a  term  identical  with  the  Hebrew    Shofetim,    ^  ^' 
judges),  were  chosen  by  the  people  out  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguished families.     If  we  had  more  particulars  about 

>  Aristotle,  Polit,  ii.  8,  1.  •  Polybius,  vi.  61. 


16 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


The  com- 
mand of 
the  army. 


the  gradual  growth  of  the  constitution  of  Carthage,  we 
should  probably  find  that  these  officers  were  at  first  invested 
with  comprehensive  powers,  but  that  in  the  course  of  time, 
like  the  corresponding  authorities  in  Athens,  Sparta,  Borne, 
and  other  places,  they  became  more  and  more  restricted, 
and  had  to  resign  to  other  functionaries  a  part  of  their 
original  authority.  At  a  later  period,  the  suffetes  appear 
to  have  discharged  only  religious  and  other  honorary 
functions,  such  as  the  presidency  in  the  senate ;  and  per- 
haps they  also  took  some  part  in  the  administration  of 
justice-  It  is  remarkable  that  we  cannot  state  with  cer- 
tainty whether  one  or  two  sujBFetes  held  office  at  the  same 
time;  but  it  would  seem  probable  that  there  were  always 
two,  as  they  were  compared  to  the  Spartan  kings  and  the 
Boman  consuls.  Still  more  uncertain  is  the  duration  of 
their  term  of  office.  It  may  perhaps  be  taken  for  granted 
that,  if  the  dignity  was  originally  conferred  for  life,  it  was 
afterwards  Umited  to  the  period  of  a  year. 

The  most  important  office,  though  perhaps  not  the 
highest  in  rank,  was  that  of  the  military  commander. 
This  was  not  limited  to  a  fixed  time,  and  seems  generally 
to  have  been  endowed  with  extensive,  in  fact  almost 
dictatorial  power,  though  subject  to  the  gravest  responsi- 
bility. In  the  organisation  and  employment  of  this  im- 
portant dignity,  the  Carthaginians  proved  their  political 
wisdom,  and  chiefly  to  this  they  owed  their  great  successes 
and  the  spread  of  their  power.  While  the  Romans  con- 
tinued year  after  year  to  place  new  consuls  with  divided 
powers  at  the  head  of  their  brave  legions,  even  when 
fighting  against  such  foes  as  Hannibal,  the  Carthaginians 
had  early  arrived  at  the  conviction  that  vast  and  distant 
wars  could  be  brought  to  a  successful  issue  only  by  men 
who  had  uncontrolled  and  permanent  authority  in  their 
own  array.  No  petty  jealousy,  no  republican  fear  of  tyranny, 
kept  them  from  intrusting  the  whole  power  of  the  state  to 
the  most  approved  generals,  even  if  they  belonged,  as 
repeatedly  happened,  to  an  eminent  family,  and  succeeded 
to  the  command  as  if  by  hereditary  right.     For  a  whole 


CAKTHAGE.  17 

centmy  members  of  the  Mago  family  were  at  the  head  of     chap. 
the   CarthagiBian  armies,  and  Carthage  owed    to    their  .      \'     . 
prudence  and  courage  the  establishment  of  her  dominion 
in  Sicily  and  Sardinia.     This  feature  of  the  constitution  of 
Carthage  stands  out  in  boldest  relief  in  the  war  of  Hanni- 
bal,  when,   according  to  the  common   view,    the    most 
flourishing  age  of  the  state  was  already  over.     Hamilcar 
Barcas,  the  heroic  father,  was  followed  by  his  heroic  son- 
in-law,  Hasdrubal ;  and  Hamilcar's  fame  was  only  sur- 
passed by  that  of  his  more  glorious  sons.     None  of  these 
men  ever  attempted  to  destroy  the  freedom  of  the  republic, 
while  in  Greece  and  Sicily  republican  institutions  were 
always    in   danger   of  being   overthrown   by   successful 
generals,  a  fate  which  Eome  herself  suffered  at  a  later 
period.     The  Carthaginian  commanders-in-chief,  like  the 
generals  of  modern  history,  were  uncontrolled   masters 
in  the  field,  but  always  subject  to  the  civil  authority  of 
the  state.     The  statesmen  of  Carthage  sought  to  obtain 
their   end  by   a  strict  subordination  of  the  military  to 
the    civil    power,    and    by   the    severe    punishment   of 
offenders;    not  by  splitting  up  the    chief  command,  or 
limiting  its  duration.     They  instituted  a  civil  commission, 
consisting  of  members  of  the  select  council,  who  accom- 
panied the  generals  to  the  field,  and  superintended  any 
political  measures,  such  as  the  conclusion  of  treaties.* 
Thus  every  Carthaginian  army  represented  in  a  certain 
degree  the  state  in  miniature ;  the  generals  were    the 
executive,  the  committee  of  senators  were  the  senate,  and 
the  Carthaginians  serving  in  the  army  were  the  people. 
How  far  such  a  control  of  the  generals  was  unwise  or 
the  punishments  unjust,  we  have  no  means  of  deciding 
with  our  scanty   means    of  information.     But   the   fact 
that  the  best  citizens  were  always  ready  to  devote  their 
energies  and  their  lives  to  the  service  of  their  country 
speaks  well  for  the  wisdom  of  tlie  control  and  the  justice 
of  the  sentences. 


'  Poly  bins,  vii.  9. 

VOL.  n.  0 


18 


EOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 

Cartha- 
ginian 
timocracj. 


The  Car- 
thaginian 
senate. 


In  addition  to  the  suffetes  and  generals,  other  Cartha- 
ginian officers  are  occasionally  mentioned,  and  these  are 
designated  bj  corresponding  Latin  names,  such  as  praetors 
and  qnsestors.  In  a  powerfnl,  well-ordered,  and  compli- 
cated political  organism,  like  the  Carthaginian  republic, 
there  were  of  course  many  officials  and  many  branches  of 
the  administration.  To  hold  an  office  without  salary 
was  an  honour,  and  consequently  the  administration 
was  in  the  hands  of  families  distinguished  by  birth  and 
riches. 

These  families  were  represented,  everywhere  among  the 
ancients,  in  the  senate,  which  in  truth  was  the  soul  of  the 
Carthaginian  state,  as  it  was  of  the  Boman,  and  which  really 
conducted  the  whole  foreign  and  domestic  policy.  In 
spite  of  this  conspicuous  position,  which  must  always  have 
attracted  the  attention  of  other  nations,  we  have  no  satis- 
factory information  about  the  organisation  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian senate.  It  would  seem  that  it  was  numerous, 
containing  one  or  two  special  committees,  which  in  the 
course  of  time  became  established  as  special  boards  of 
administration  and  justice.  The  criminal  and  political 
jurisdiction  was  intrusted  to  a  body  of  100  or  104  members, 
who  probably  formed  a  special  division  of  the  senate, 
though  we  are  by  no  means  certain  of  it.  According  to 
Aristotle,*  they  were  chosen  from  the  *  Pentarchies,'  by 
which  we  are  perhaps  to  understand  divisions  of  the  senate 
into  committees  of  five  members  each.  At  least  it  is  im- 
possible that  the  Carthaginian  senate  could  have  remained 
at  the  head  of  the  administration  if  the  judicial  office  had 
passed  into  other  hands.  But  if  the  Hundred  (or  Hundred- 
and-four)  were  a  portion  of  the  senate,  and  were  periodically 
renewed  from  among  the  greater  body,  they  could  act  as 
their  commissioners.  Through  these  the  senate  controlled 
the  entire  political  life,  keeping  especially  the  generals  in 
dependence  on  the  civil  authority.*    The  Corporation  of 

'  Aristotle,  PolU,  ii.  8,  §  4. 

«  This  constitutes  the  similarity  of  the  Body  of  One  Hundred  with  the 
Spartan  Ephors,  mentioned  by  Aristotle  (Polit.  ii,  8,  {  2). 


CARTHAGE.  19 

the  Hundred,  which  had  at  first  been  renewed  by  the  CHAP, 
yearly  choice  of  new  members,  assumed  gradually  a  more  -  _  /  - 
permanent  character  by  the  re-election  of  the  same 
men,  and  this  may  have  led  to  their  separating  themselves 
as  a  distinct  branch  of  the  government  from  the  rest  of 
the  senate. — ^A  second  division  of  the  great  council  is  men- 
tioned, under  the  name  of  select  council.'  This  numbered 
thirty  members,  and  seems  to  have  been  a  supreme  board 
of  administration.  No  information  has  come  down  to  us 
with  respect  to  the  choice  of  members,  the  duration  of 
their  office,  or  their  special  ftinctions.  Our  knowledge, 
therefore,  of  the  organisation  of  the  Carthaginian  senate 
taken  altogether  is  very  imperfect,  though  there  can  be 
little  doubt  about  its  general  character  and  its  power  in 
the  state. 

The  influence  of  the  people  seems  to  have  been  of  little  The 
moment.  It  is  reported  that  they  had  only  to  give  their  ^^^  ^' 
votes  where  a  difference  of  opioion  arose  between  the 
senate  and  the  suffetes.'  The  assembly  of  the  people  had 
the  right  of  electing  the  magistrates.  But  that  was  a 
privilege  of  small  importance  in  a  state  where  birth  and 
wealth  decided  the  election.  The  highest  offices  of  state 
were,  if  not  exactly  purchasable,  as  Aristotle  declares,' 
still  easily  attained  by  the  rich  and  influential,  as  in  all 
countries  where  public  offices  conferring  interest  and  profit 
are  obtained  by  popular  election. 

In  the  Greek  republics  the  people  exercised  their  sove-  Criminal 
reigniy  in  the  popular  tribunals  still  more  than  in  the  tbn.  ^^ 
election  of  magistrates.  The  choice  of  the  magistrates 
could,  in  a  fully  developed  democracy,  be  effected  by  lot, 
but  only  the  well-considered  verdict  of  the  citizens  could 
give  a  decision  affecting  the  life  and  freedom  of  a  fellow- 
citizen.  These  popular  tribunals,  which,  as  being  guided 
and  influenced  by  caprice,  prejudice,  and  political  passions, 
caused  unspeakable  mischief   among  the  Greek  states. 


>  SamctKM  eoncUmm, — lArj,  xzz.  16.    The  ytpo^ia  as  distinct  from  the 
ir&yKXiiros, — ^Polybins,  x.  18,  !  1.  '  Aristotle,  PolU.  ii.  8,  {  8. 

•  I\)lit,  ii.  8,  !  6. 

c2 


20  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     were  unknown  in  Carthage.*     The  firmness  and  steadiness 
^_    .  '    -  of  the  Carthaginian  constitution  was  no  doubt  in  a  great 
measure   owing  to  the   circimistance    that  the  judicial 
Board  of  the  Hundred  (or  Hundred-and-four)  had  in  their 
own  hands  the  administration  of  criminal  justice. 
Cartha-  The  Carthaginian  state  had  in  truth,  as  Polybius  states, 

tocracy.  ^  mixed  constitution  like  Some.  In  other  words,  it  was 
neither  a  pure  monarchy  nor  an  exclusive  aristocracy  nor 
yet  a  perfect  democracy ;  but  all  three  elements  were  com- 
bined in  it.  Yet  it  is  clear  that  one  of  these  elements, 
the  aristocracy,  greatly  preponderated.  The  nobility  of 
Carthage  were  not  a  nobility  of  blood,  like  the  Eoman 
patricians ;  but  this  honour  appears,  like  the  later  nobility 
in  Eome,  to  have  been  open  to  merit  and  riches,  as  was  to 
be  expected  in  a  commercial  city.  The  tendency  towards 
plutocracy  draws  down  the  greatest  censure  which  Aristotle 
passes  upon  Carthage.  Some  families  were  conspicuous 
by  their  hereditary  and  almost  regal  influence.  But,  in 
spite  of  this,  monarchy  was  never  established  in  Carthage, 
though  the  attempt  is  said  to  have  been  made  twice.  No 
complete  revolution  ever  took  place,  and  there  was  no 
breach  with  the  past.  Political  life  there  was  in  all  its 
fulness,  and  consequently  also  there  were  political  con- 
flicts; but  these  never  resulted  in  revolutions  stained 
with  blood  and  atrocities,  such  as  took  place  in  most  of 
the  Greek  cities,  and  in  none  more  often  than  in  the 
unhappy  city  of  Syracuse.  In  this  respect,  therefore, 
Carthage  may  be  compared  with  Eome ;  in  both  alike  the 
internal  development  of  the  state  advanced  slowly  with- 
out any  violent  reaction,  and  on  this  account  Aristotle 
bestows  on  her  deserved  praise.*  This  steadiness  of  her 
constitution,  which  lasted  for  more  than  600  years,  was 
due,  according  to  Aristotle,*  to  the  extent  of  the  Cartha- 

»  AristoUe,  Polit.  iii.  1,  §  7. 

«  Polit.  ii.  8,  §  1 :  tnifitToy  8i  woXire/or  avvrtrayfidyjis  rh  rhv  drj/xov  l^x^veoM 
9tafi4y€iy  iwrf  rd^tt  rris  mMrdas  koJ  fi^€  ardari¥  8  Tf  ico)  &{ioy  c(Vc?y,  yryevriireat 

»  Polit.  ii.  8,  §  9. 


w^r^^r^' '  "m'M^r^m^w.  ^m.  '  ■     -m  «.    l  '  -.-    "L  ■'    .L  _^  - 


CAETHA0E.  Si 

ginian   dominion  over  snbject   territories,  whereby  the     CHAP. 

state  was  enabled  to  get  rid  of  malcontent  citizens  and  to   . ; , 

send  them  as  colonists  elsewhere.'  But  it  is  mainly  due, 
after  all,  to  the  firm  and  wise  government  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian aristocracy. 

'  The  same  advantage  is  enjojed  at  the  present  time  by  the  United  States, 
Bod  the  Puritan  emigrations  from  England  had  the  same  tendency  of  remoTing 
the  elements  of  discontent  away  from  home. 


22  ROMAN  mSTORY. 


CHAPTER  IL 

BIOILT. 

BOOK     The  island  of  Sicily  seems  destined  by  its  position  to 
^7'    ^  form  the  connecting  link  between   Europe  and  Africa. 


Historical  ^^^^st  almost  touching  Italy  in  the  north-east,  it  stretches 
geography  itself  westwards  towards  the  great  Afirican  continent, 
which  appears  to  approach  it  from  the  south  with  an  out- 
stretched arm.  Thus  this  large  island  divides  the  whole 
basin  of  the  Mediterranean  sea  into  an  eastern  and  a 
western,  a  Greek  and  a  barbarian  half.  Few  Greek  settlers 
ventured  westward  beyond  the  narrow  straits  between 
Italy  and  Sicily.  Etruscans  and  Carthaginians  were  the 
exclusive  masters  of  the  western  sea,  and  in  those  parts 
where  their  power  was  supreme  they  allowed  no  Greek 
settlement  or  Greek  commerce.  The  triangular  island 
had  one  of  her  sides  turned  towards  the  country  of  the 
Greeks  in  the  east ;  while  the  other  two  coasts,  converging 
in  a  western  direction,  extended  into  the  sea  of  the 
barbarians,  and  almost  reached  the  very  centre  of  Cartha- 
ginian power.  Thus  it  happened  that  the  east  coast  of 
the  island  and  the  nearest  portions  of  the  other  two  coasts 
were  filled  with  Greek  colonies ;  while  the  western  part^ 
with  the  adjacent  islands,  remained  in  possession  of  the 
Phoenicians,  who,  it  seems,  before  the  time  of  the  Greek 
immigration,  had  settlements  all  round  the  coast.  The 
greater  energy  of  the  Greeks  seemed  destined  to  Hellenise 
the  whole  island.  No  native  people  could  obstruct  their 
progress.  The  aborigines  of  Sicily,  the  Sikeli  or  Sikani,*  no 

^  The  supposed  difference  between  Sikeli  and  Sikani,  assumed  by  Thucydides 
(vi.  2)f  Strabo  (yi.  2,  4),  and  Dionysius  (i.  22),  is  not  real    They  are  clearly 


SICILY.  23 

doubt  a  people  of  the  same  race  as  the  oldest  population  of     CHAP. 
Italy,  were  cut  off  by  the  sea  from  their  natural  allies  in  a 


struggle  with  foreign  intruders,  and,  being  confined  to 
their  own  strength  alone,  they  could  never  become  dan- 
gerous, as  the  Lucanian  and  Bruttian  barbarians  were  to 
the  Greeks  in  Italy.  Only  once  there  arose  among  them 
a  native  leader,  called  Duketius,  who  had  the  ambition, 
but  not  the  ability,  to  found  a  national  kingdom  of  Sicily. 
On  the  whole,  Sicily  was  destined,  from  the  beginning  of 
history  to  modem  times,  to  be  the  battle-field  and  the 
prize  of  victory  for  foreign  nations. 

The  origin  and  the  development  of  the  Greek  towns  in  Greek  and 
Sicily  belong,  properly  speaking,  to  the  history  of  Greece.  £*^^n* 
Their  wars  also  with  Carthage,  for  the  possession  of  the  power  in 
island,  have  only  an  indirect  relation  with  the  history  of    ^^*  ^' 
Itome.     We  cast  on  them,  therefore,  only  a  passing  glance. 
It  wiU  suffice  for  us  to  see  how,  in  consequence  of  the  un- 
steady policy  of  the  quarrelsome  Greeks  and  the  aimless, 
fitful  exertions  of  the  Carthaginians,  neither  the  one  nor 
the  other  attained  a  complete  and  undisputed  sovereignty 
over  the  island,  and  how  each  successively  had  to  succumb 
to  the  judicious  policy  and  the  persevering  energy  of  the 
Bomans. 

In  the  west  of  the  island  the  Carthaginians  had  ancient  Defeat  of 
Phoenician  colonies  in  their  possession,  of  which  Motye,  Lnians  at " 
Panormus,   and   Solus  were  the  most  important.      The  Himera. 
Greeks  had  ventured  on  the  south  side  as  far  as  Selinus, 
and  on  the  north  as  far  as  Himera,  and  it  seemed  that,  in 
course  of  time,  the  last  remaining  Punic  fortresses  must 
fall  into  their  hands.     Carthage  desired  a  peaceful  pos- 
session for  the  purposes  of  trade  and  commerce,  and  until 
the  fifth  century  before  our  era  had  not  entered  upon  any 
great  warlike  enterprise.     At  the  time  of  the  Persian  war, 
however,  a  great  change  took  place  in  the  policy  of  Car- 
thage.    Taking  advantage  of  the  internal  dissensions  of 

either  one  people,  or  branches  of  one  people,  as  Sabini  and  Sabelli,  and  the 
difference  in  the  names  is  dialectic  or  accidental.  See  Forbiger  in  Fauly's  Real- 
EncyclopadiBt  yi.  1159.    Lewis,  CredibilUy  of  Early  Rojnan  ^siary,  i.  273. 


24  ROMAN  HISTOKY. 

BOOK     the  Greeks,^  they  sent  for  the  first  time  a  considerable 
^^ — r^ — '   army  into  Sicily,  as  if  they  contemplated  the  conquest  of 
the  whole  island.     This  attack  on  the  Greeks  in  the  west 
happened  at  the  time  when  there  was  every  prospect  of 
their  mother  country  falling  a  .victim  to  the  Persians. 
But  at  the  very  time  when  Greek  freedom  came  out  vic- 
torious from  the  unequal  struggle  at  Salamis,  the  Sicilian 
Greeks,  under  the  command  of  Gelon,  the  ruler  of  Gela 
and  Syracuse,  defeated  the  great  Carthaginian  army  before 
Himera,  and  thus  put  an  end  for  a  considerable  time  to  the 
Carthaginian  plans  of  conquest.^ 
Preponder-       Syracuse  from  this  time  became  more  and  more  the 
Syracuse,     l^^ad  of  the  Greek  cities.      The  rulers  Gelon  and  Hiero, 
distinguished  not  less  by  their  military  abilities  than  by 
their  wise  policy,  understood  how  to  curb  the  excitable, 
active,  and  restless  Greeks  in  Sicily,  and  to  govern  them 
with  that  kind  of  stedfast  rule  which  alone  seemed  salutary 
for  them.     As  soon,  however,  as  the  firm  government  of 
the  tyrants  gave  place  to  what  was  called  freedom,  all 
wild  passions  broke  loose  within  every  town  in  the  con- 
federacy of  the  Sicilian  Greeks.     The  empire  of  SjTacuse, 
which  under    princes  as   vigorous  as  Gelon  and  Hiero 
might  probably  have  been  extended  over  the  whole  of 

>  Himera,  Selinus,  Mcssana,  and  Rhegium  sided  with  the  Carthaginians. 

•  Gelon's  victory  at  Himera  was  a  favourite  topic  for  the  vainglorious  Greeks. 
The  Sicilian  colonists  naturally  wished  to  rival  the  great  exploits  of  the 
mother  country,  and  they  found  in  the  attack  of  the  western  barbarians  upon 
Sicily  a  welcome  pendant  to  that  of  the  Persians  upon  Greece  proper. 
(Diodorus,  xi.  20.)  If  Mardonius  led  300,000  men  into  battle  at  Platsea,  the 
Carthaginian  army  at  Himera  could  not  amount  to  less.  For  the  same  purpose 
the  fiction  was  invented  that  the  battle  at  Himera  took  place  on  the  same  day 
with  that  of  Thermopylae  or  of  Salamis.  In  later  times  it  was  even  alleged 
that  the  Persians  and  Punians  made  a  combined  attack  in  the  east  and  in  the 
west,  for  the  extinction  of  the  Greek  nation.  The  king  of  Persia,  it  was  said, 
embraced  in  his  schemes  of  conquest  Sicily  as  well  as  Greece,  and  as  sovereign 
of  Phoenicia  ordered  the  Carthaginians,  the  Phoenician  colonists  in  Africa,  to 
attack  the  Sicilian  Greeks.  Herodotus  (vii.  165)  says  nothing  of  such  plans. 
According  to  him,  the  war  between  Greeks  and  Carthaginians  in  Sicily  arose 
from  local  causes.  Moreover,  Carthage  was  far  too  independent,  by  her 
geographical  position  and  by  her  power,  to  be  determined  in  her  policy  by  the 
wishes  of  her  mother  country,  or  by  the  dictates  of  the  Persian  monarch. 
Compare  Dahlmann,  Forschungen  su  Rerodot^  186. 


SICILY.  25 

Sicily,  was  broken  up.     Every  town  again  became  inde-     CHAP. 

pendent.     The  arbitrary  measures  of  the  Syracusan  princes  —  / . 

were  upset,  democracy  re-established,  the  expelled  citizens 
brought  back,  and  the  friends  of  the  tyrants  banished.  In 
spite  of  these  revolutions,  involving  confiscation  of  pro- 
perty and  confusion  of  all  kinds,  Sicily  enjoyed  great 
prosperity*  for  half  a  century,  and  the  Carthaginians  made 
no  attempt  to  extend  the  bounds  of  their  dominion  in  the 
island.  It  was  only  after  the  unhappy  termination  of  the 
Athenian  expedition  against  Syracuse,  when  this  town, 
victorious  but  exhausted,  and  distracted  by  internal  dis- 
sensions, continued  the  war  against  Athens  in  the  ^gean 
Sea,  that  the  Carthaginians,  seventy  years  after  their  great 
defeat  at  Himera,  again  made  a  vigorous  attack  on  the 
Greek  cities  of  Sicily. 

Segesta,  which  was  only  partially  Greek,  and  had  already  Destnic- 
caused  the  interference  of  the  Athenians  in  the  internal  Agrigen- 
affairs  of  the  island,  invoked  Carthaginian  aid  in  a  dispute  ^^™- 
with  the  neighbouring  town  Selinus.  Hamilcar,  the  grand- 
son of  the  Hannibal  who  had  fallen  at  Himera,  landed  in 
Sicily  with  a  large  army,  and  conquered  in  quick  succes- 
sion Selinus  and  Himera,  destroying  them  with  all  the 
horrors  of  barbarian  warfare.  But  the  greatest  blow  for 
the  Sicilian  Greeks  was  the  fall  of  Akragas  or  Agrigentum, 
the  second  town  of  the  island,  whose  glorious  temples  and 
strong  walls  were  overthrown,  and  whose  rich  works  of 
art  were  carried  away  to  Carthage.  Since  the  taking  of 
Miletus  by  the  Persians,  such  a  dreadful  misfortune  had 
happened  to  no  Hellenic  town.  The  Punic  conquerors 
pushed  on  irresistibly  along  the  southern  coast  of  the 
island  towards  the  east. 

The  Syracusans  had  tried  in  vain  to  arrest  them  at  Tyranny  of 
Agrigentum.     The  failure  of  their  undertaking  caused  an  iJi^™}^ 
internal  revolution,   which  overthrew   the  republic  and 
gave   monarchical  power  to  the   elder  Dionysius.     But 
even  Dionysius  was  not  capable  of  stemming  the  further 

*  Cortius,  Griech,  Geach,  ii.  487  ff. 


26 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Victories  of 
Bionysiiu. 


Siege  of 
Syracuse. 


progress  of  the  Carthaginians.  Gela  fell  into  their  hands 
and  Camarina  was  forsaken  bj  its  inhabitants.  The  whole 
of  the  south  coast  of  the  island  was  now  in  their  power, 
and  it  seemed  that  Syracuse  would  experience  the  same 
fate.  At  length  Dionjsius  succeeded  in  concluding  a 
treaty,  whereby  he  gave  over  to  them  all  the  conquered 
towns,  being  himself  recognised  by  them  as  governor  of 
Syracuse.  The  Carthaginians  now  permitted  the  exiled 
inhabitants  and  other  Greeks  to  return  to  the  towns  that 
had  been  destroyed.  It  seems  never  to  have  occurred  to 
them  that  it  was  desirable  to  garrison  the  fortified  places 
which  they  had  taken,  or  to  colonise  them  in  the  manner 
of  the  Bomans.  Probably  they  fancied  that,  having  en- 
tirely broken  and  humbled  their  enemies  in  the  field,  they 
would  be  able,  from  their  maritime  stronghold  of  Motye, 
to  overawe  the  conquered  districts  and  to  keep  them  in 
subjection. 

But  they  had  estimated  the  energy  of  the  Greeks  too 
low.  Dionysius,  established  in  his  dominion  over  Syracuse, 
prepared  himself  for  a  new  war  against  Carthage,  and  in 
397  B.O.  suddenly  invaded  the  Carthaginian  territory. 
His  attack  was  irresistible.  Even  the  island  town  of 
Motye,  in  the  extreme  west  of  Sicily,  the  chief  stronghold 
of  Carthaginian  power,  was  besieged  and  finally  taken  by 
means  of  an  artificial  dam  which  coimected  it  with  the 
mainland. 

The  conquests  of  the  Greeks,  as  those  of  the  Carthagi- 
nians, in  Sicily,  were  but  of  short  duration.  Dionysius 
retaliated  for  the  destruction  of  Greek  towns  by  laying 
waste  Motye  and  severely  punishing  the  surviving  inhabi- 
tants ;  but  when  he  had  done  this  he  withdrew,  to  occupy 
himself  with  other  schemes,  as  if  Carthage  had  been 
thoroughly  humbled  and  expelled  from  Sicily.  In  the 
following  year,  however  (396  b.c.),  the  Carthaginians  again, 
with  very  little  trouble,  retook  Motye,^  and  advanced  with 


*  The  dams  by  which  Bionysius  had  joined  the  island  town  with  the  main- 
land of  sadly  had  probably  destroyed  the  advantages  of  its  inaukr  position. 
Consequently  the  Carthaginians  did  not  restore  Hotye.    They  made  Lilybsnm 


SICILY.  27 

a  large  armj  and  fleet  towards  the  east  of  the  island,     CHAP. 
where  they  conquered  Messana,  and,  after  driving  Diony-  ,_    /  _> 
sins  back,  besieged  him  in  Syraxsuse. 

So  changeable  was  the  fortune  of  war  in  Sicily,  and  so  Piratical 
dependent  on  accidental  circumstances,  that  the  question  ofDionj-"* 
whether  the  island  was  to  be  Greek  or  Carthaginian  was  s^^* 
almost  within  the  space  of   one  year  decided  in  two 
opposite  ways,  and  the  hopes  of  each  of  the  two  rivals, 
after  having  risen  to  the    highest  point,   were    finally 
dashed  to  the  ground.     The  victorious  career  of  Carthage 
was  arrested  by  the  walls  of  Syracuse,  just  as,  twenty 
years  before,  the  flower  of  the  Athenian   citizens   had 
perished  in  the  same  spot.    A  malignant  distemper  broke 
out  in  the  army  of  the  besiegers,  compelling  Himilco,  the 
Carthaginian  general,  to  a  speedy  flight  and  to  the  dis- 
graceful sacrifice  of  the  greater  part  of  his  army,  which 
consisted    of  foreign  mercenaries.     Dionysius  was  now 
again,  as  with  one  blow,  undisputed  master  of  the  whole  of 
Sicily,  and  he  had  leisure  to  plan  the  subjection  of  all  the 
Greek  towns  to  the  west  of  the  Ionian  Sea.     He  under- 
took now  his  piratical  expeditions  against  Caulonia,  Hip- 
ponium,  Croton,  and  Bhegium,  which  brought  unspeak- 
able misery  on  these  once-flourishing  cities  at  the  very 
time  when  they  were  being  pressed  by  the  Italian  nations, 
the  Lucanians  and  the  Bruttians.     The  bloody  defeat 
which   the   Thurians    suffered  from  the  Lucanians,  and 
the  conquest  of  Bhegiam  by  Dionysius,*  accompanied  with 
the  most  atrocious  cruelty,  were  the  saddest  events  of  this 
period,  so  disastrous  to  the  Greek  nation.     If  Dionysius 
had  pursued  a  national  policy,  and,  instead  of  allying  him- 
self with  the  Lucanians  to  attack  the  Greek  cities,  had 
marshalled  the  Greeks  against  Carthage,  he  would  most 
probably  have  become  master  of  aU  Sicily.     But  the  faint- 
hearted manner  in  which  he  carried  on  the  war  against 

their  chief  stronghold,  and  changed  it  from  an  open  and  insignificant  place 
into  a  fortress  of  the  first  magnitude.  See  Schubring  uber  Motye-Lilybseum 
in  PMlaloffus,  1866. 

'  At  the  time  of  the  burning  of  Kome  by  the  Gauls. 


28  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     the  enemies  of  the  Greek  race  stood  oat  in  strong  contrast 


IV. 


,  with  the  perseverance  which  he  exhibited  in  enslaving 
his  own  countrymen.  After  short  hostilities  (383  B.C.),  he 
concluded  a  peace  with  Carthage,  in  which  he  ceded  to  her 
the  western  part  of  Sicily  as  far  as  the  river  Halycus. 
Then,  after  a  long  pause,  he  attempted,  for  the  last  time, 
an  attack  on  the  Carthaginian  towns,  conquering  Selinus, 
Entella,  and  Eryx,  and  laying  siege  to  Lilybseum,  which, 
after  the  destruction  of  Motye,  had  been  strongly  fortified 
by  the  Carthaginians  and  waa  now  their  principal  strong- 
hold  in  Sicily.  After  he  had  been  driven  back  from 
Lilybffium,  the  war  ceased,  without  any  treaty  of  peace. 
Dionysius  died  shortly  afterwards. 
The  The  Carthaginians  took  no  advantage  either  of  the  in- 

bionysius  Capacity  of  his  son,  the  younger  Dionysius,  or  of  the 
fwn  ^*™°"  feebleness  of  Syracuse  in  the  Dionian  revolution,  to  extend 
their  dominion  further.  It  was  only  when  Timoleon  of 
Corinth  ventured  on  the  bold  scheme  of  restoring  the 
freedom  of  Syracuse  that  we  find  a  Carthaginian  army 
and  fleet  before  the  town,  with  the  intention  of  anticipat- 
ing Timoleon  and  of  conquering  Syracuse  for  Carthage 
after  the  overthrow  of  the  tyrant  Dionysius.  Never  did 
they  seem  so  near  the  accomplishment  of  their  long- 
cherished  hope.  Being  joined  with  Hiketas,  the  ruler  of 
Leontini,  they  had  already  made  themselves  masters  of  the 
town  of  Syracuse.  Their  ships  had  taken  possession  of  the 
harbour.  Only  the  small  fortified  island  Ortygia,  the  key 
of  Syracuse,  was  still  in  the  hands  of  Dionysius,  who, 
when  he  could  no  longer  maintain  his  ground,  had  the 
choice  to  which  of  his  enemies  he  would  surrender,  to 
Timoleon  or  to  the  Carthaginians  and  Hiketas.  The  good 
fortune  ^  or  the  wisdom  of  Timoleon  carried  the  day.  He 
obtained  by  agreement  the  possession  of  Ortygia  and  he 
sent  Dionysius,  with  his  treasures,  as  exile  to  Corinth. 
Again  the  Carthaginians  saw  the  prize  of  all  their  efforts 
snatched  from  their  hands.     They  feared  treason  on  the 

*  The  expedition  of  Timoleon  is  remarkable  for  the  unusual  number  of 
supernatural  events.    Plutarch's  biography  is  a  continuous  story  of  miracles. 


SICILY.  29 

part  of  Hiketas,  their  Greek  ally ;  and  their  general  Mago     CHAP. 


II. 


sailed  back  to  Africa.  There  he  escaped  by  a  voluntary  >, 
death  the  punishment  which  the  Carthaginian  senate  in- 
flicted only  too  often  on  unfortunate  generals.  His  body 
was  nailed  to  the  cross. 

Timoleon  crowned  his  glorious  work  of  the  deliverance  Barren 
of  Syracuse  and  the  expulsion  of  all  the  tyrants  of  Sicily  Thno?a)n. 
by  a  brilliant  victory  over  a  superior  Carthaginian  army 
on  the  river  Krimesus.  This  defeat  was  disastrous  to 
Carthage  because  they  lost  in  it  a  select  body  consisting 
of  citizens  from  the  first  families.  Yet  the  result  of  this 
much  lauded  victory  was  by  no  means  the  expulsion  of 
the  Punians  from  Sicily.  It  seems  not  even  to  have 
produced  a  change  in  the  respective  strength  of  the  two 
beUigerents  or  an  alteration  of  boundary  between  the 
Greek  and  Carthaginian  territory. 

Between  the  overthrow  of  the  second  Dionysius  and  TyranDyof 
the  dominion  of  Agathokles,  the  most  noxious  and  most  2ies. 
hateful  of  her  tyrants,  Syracuse  enjoyed,  for  twenty-two 
years,  democratic  government  and  comparative  rest,  as  well 
as  peaceful  intercourse  with  the  Carthaginians  and  with 
the  other  Sicilian  Greeks.    But  the  worthless  Agathokles 
had  hardly  seized  the  monarchical  power  which  seemed 
to  have  been  put  down  for  ever  in  Syracuse  by  the  noble 
Timoleon,  than  the  national  war  between   Greeks  and 
Punians  again  broke  out,  and  was   carried  on  with   a 
violence  and  animosity  hitherto  unknown.     After  one  de- 
cisive victory  over  Agathokles,  the  Carthaginians  for  the 
third  time  besieged  Syracuse  with   an  army  and  fleet, 
and  for  the  third  time  they  seemed  on  the  point  of  gain- 
ing the  last  stronghold  of  Greek  independence  in  Sicily. 
Agathokles  then,  with  true   Greek  ingenuity  and  with 
the  recklessness  of  despair,  ventured  upon  an  enterprise 
which  thwarted  all  the  calculations  of  the  Carthaginians. 
He  burst  forth  with  his  ships  out  of  the  blockaded  har- 
bour of  Syracuse,  and  landed  an  army  on  the  coast  of 
Africa.    Attacked  in  their  own  country,  the  Carthaginians 

were  compelled  to  relinquish  all  thoughts  of  conquering 


80 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Later  ez- 
peditiona 
of  Aga- 
thokles. 


Syracuse.  For  four  years  AgathoUes  conducted  the  war  in 
Africa  with  extraordinary  success.  He  not  only  conquered 
many  of  the  country  towns  of  the  Carthaginians,  and  lived 
in  luxury  from  the  rich  spoils  of  that  fruitful  and  flourish- 
ing land,  but  he  took  possession  also  of  the  most  impor- 
tant Phoenician  towns  under  the  dominion  of  Carthage, 
such  as  Thapsus,  Hadrumetum,  and  even  Utica  and  Tunis, 
in  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  Carthage.  Internal 
foes  joined  themselves  to  the  foreign  enemy,  who  attacked 
the  state  in  its  most  vulnerable  part.  The  treachery  of  the 
general  Bomilcar,  and  the  revolt  of  subjects  and  allies, 
reduced  the  proud  Punian  town  almost  to  ruin.  There 
was  now  no  longer  any  trust  in  the  power  of  money  or 
their  foreign  mercenaiies.  The  citizens  of  the  town  them- 
selves, and  the  men  of  the  noblest  blood,  were  called  out 
and  courageously  sacrificed.  The  perseverance  of  Carthage 
prevailed.  Agathokles  escaped  with  difficulty  to  Sicily, 
and  two  of  his  sons,  with  his  whole  army,  fell  as  victims  to 
a  recklessness  which  had  not  sufficient  power  to  back  it. 
Thus  failed  an  undertaking  on  which  Begulus  ventured 
in  the  first  Punic  war  with  a  similar  result,  and  which 
succeeded  only  in  the  second  war  with  Bome  after  the 
strength  of  Carthage  was  so  completely  exhausted  that 
even  a  Hannibal  could  not  restore  it. 

The  expedition  of  Agathokles  had  no  influence  on  the 
relative  position  of  the  Carthaginians  and  Greeks  in  Sicily. 
Affcer  many  fruitless  struggles  the  treaty  of  peace  left  the 
Carthaginians  in  possession  of  the  western  portion  with 
the  dominion  over  Selinus  and  Himera.  Agathokles,  like 
his  predecessors  Hiero  and  Dionysius,  now  formed  other 
schemes  than  that  of  the  conquest  of  all  Sicily.  He  made 
several  expeditions  into  Italy  and  into  the  Adriatic  .Sea, 
conquered  even  the  island  of  Corcyra,  causing  destruction 
and  ruin  wherever  he  appeared,  without  gaining  a  single 
permanent  conquest.  When  at  length,  at  a  great  age,  he 
was  murdered  by  his  grandson,  new  dissensions  broke  out, 
as  was  usually  the  case  after  the  fall  of  a  tyrant.  Sicily, 
now  thoroughly  exhausted,  and  retaining  less  and  less  of 


SICILY.  81 

her  Greek  nationality,  sought  a  protector  from  Pyrrhus,     CHAP, 
king  of    the  semi-barbarous   Epirots.      How    this    last 
attempt  to  unite  the  Sicilian  Greeks  and  to  free  the  island 
from  Carthaginians  failed  has  been  already  related.' 

The  freedom  of  the  Greeks  in  the  mother  country  had 
already  perished.  In  Sicily,  too,  its  days  were  numbered. 
Bat  the  prize  for  which  the  Carthaginians  had  contended 
so  long  was  not  to  be  gained  by  them.  A  new  competitor 
appeared.  The  conquerors  of  Pyrrhus  followed  in  his 
footsteps  with  more  energy  and  success,  and,  affcer  a  long 
and  changeful  struggle,  gave  to  the  afflicted  Sicilians  peace 
and  order,  in  exchange  for  their  lost  independence. 

'  See  Yol.  i.  ch.  zri. 


32 


BOMAN  HISTOKY. 


CHAPTER  ni. 


THE   FIRST   PUNIO   WAR,   264-241    B.O. 


BOOK 
IV. 

Fortunes 
of  Zankle 
or  Mes- 
sana. 


First  Period. — To  the  captv/re  of  Agrigentum,  262  B.C. 

In  no  country  inhabited  by  Greeks  had  the  national 
prosperity  suffered  more  than  in  Sicily  by  violent  and  de- 
structive revolutions,  by  a  succession  of  arbitrary  rulers  and 
atrocious  tyrants,  by  the  destruction  of  towns,  and  by  the 
transplantation  or  butchery  of  their  inhabitants.  Even 
the  older  and  milder  rulers  of  Syracuse,  Gelon  and  his 
brother  Hiero,  practised,  with  the  greatest  recklessness,  the 
Asiatic  custom  of  transporting  whole  nations  into  new 
settlements,  and  the  confiscation  and  new  division  of 
land.  Their  successors — especially  the  first  Dionysius  and 
the  infamous  Agathokles — ^vied  with  the  Punic  barbarians 
in  cruelties  of  the  most  revolting  kind.  All  towns  in  the 
island  experienced,  one  after  another,  the  horrors  of  con- 
quest, plunder,  devastation,  and  the  murder  or  slavery  of 
their  inhabitants.  The  noble  temples  and  works  of  art 
of  a  former  age  sank  in  ruins,  the  walls  were  repeatedly 
pulled  down  and  built  up  again,  and  the  fruitful  fields  laid 
Tmste.  We  can  scarcely  imagine  how  it  was  that  Greek 
civilisation  and  even  a  remnant  of  prosperity  could  survive 
these  endless  calamities ;  and  we  should  welcome  any 
evidence  which  might  tend  to  prove  that  historians 
depicted  in  too  glaring  colours  the  troubles  which  were 
experienced  in  their  own  time.  But  the  gradual  decline  of 
Greek  power  in  all  parts  of  the  island,  the  growth  of  bar- 
barism, and  the  helplessness  of  the  people,  are  too  clearly 
to  be  discerned  to  leave  any  doubt  of  the  truthfulness  of 
the  picture  as  a  whole. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR. 


83 


CHAP. 
III. 


First 
Pkriod. 
264-262 

B.C. 


•  There  was  no  town  in  the  island  which  during  three  cen- 
turies had  been  visited  by  greater  calamities  than  Messana.* 
Messana  had  been  originally  a  Chalcidian  colony,  but  was 
seized  by  a  band  of  Samians  and  Milesians,  who,  being 
expelled  from  their  homes  by  the  Persians,  went  to  Sicily 
and  drove  away  or  enslaved  the  old  inhabitants  of  the 
town.  Shortly  after  this  the  town  fell  into  the  hands  of 
Anaxilaos,  the  tyrant  of  Ehegium,  who  introduced  new 
colonists,  especially  exiled  Messanians,  and  changed  the 
original  name  of  Zankle  into  Messana.  In  that  devas- 
tating war  which  the  Carthaginians  carried  on  with  the 
elder  Dionj-sius,  and  in  which  Selinus,Himera,  Agrigentum, 
Gela,  and  Camarina  were  destroyed,  Messana  suflFered  the 
same  fate,  and  its  inhabitants  were  scattered  in  all  direc- 
tions. Rebuilt  soon  after  (396  B.C.),  and  peopled  with  new 
inhabitants  by  Dionysius,  the  town  seemed  in  some  measure 
to  have  recovered,  when  it  fell  (312  b.o.)  into  the  power  of 
Agathokles.  It  shared  with  all  the  other  towns  of  the 
island  the  fate  which  this  tyrant  brought  on  Sicily ;  yet  in 
spite  of  the  many  blows  it  suffered,  it  appears  to  have 
reached  a  certain  degree  of  importance  and  prosperity, 
which  must  be  attributed  in  part  at  least  to  its  unrivalled 
position  in  the  Sicilian  straits.  After  the  fall  of  Agatho- 
kles a  new  misfortune  befell  it,  and  Messana  ceased  for 
ever  to  be  a  Greek  colony.  A  band  of  Campanian  mer- 
cenaries, who  called  themselves  Mamertines,  that  is,  the 
sons  of  Mars,  and  who  had  fought  in  the  service  of  the 
Syracusan  tyrants,  entered  the  town,  on  their  way  back 
to  Italy,  and  were  hospitably  entertained  by  the  inhabi- 
tants. But,  instead  of  crossing  over  to  Ehegium,  they  fell 
upon  and  murdered  the  citizens,  and  took  possession  of 
the  place.* 

Messana  was  now  an  independent  barbarian  town  in  Capture  of 
Sicily.      Shortly   after,   a   Roman  legion,   consisting   of  ^*^^8'*^"^ 

*  HermAnn,  Griech,  Siaatsalterthiimfrf  §  83. 

•  A  similar  act  of  infamous  barbarity  had  been  perpetrated  before  by  the 
tyrant  Dionysius  the  elder.  Having  ttiken  Cataua  by  treason,  and  having 
plundered  and  de8troye<l  it,  he  sold  the  inhabitants  as  slaves,  and  handed  over 
the  place  to  a  band  of  Campanian  mercenaries. — Diodorus,  xir.  15. 

VOL.  II.  D 


84  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     Campanians,  fellow-countiymen  of  the  Messanian  free- 
booters,  imitated  their  example,  and  by  a  similar  act  of 


by  Roman  8'trocity  took  possession  of  Ehegium  on  the  Italian  side  of 
mutineers,  the  straits."  United  by  relationship  and  common  interests, 
the  pirate  states  of  Messana  and  Bhegium  mutually 
defended  themselves  against  their  common  enemies,  and 
were  for  a  time  the  terror  of  all  surrounding  countries,  and 
especially  of  the  Greek  towns. 
Hiero,  After  Ehegium  had  been  conquered  by  the  Bomans,'  the 

Syracuse,  day  of  punishmeut  seemed  to  be  approaching  also' for  the 
Mamertines  of  Messana.  Apart  from  the  consideration 
that  the  possession  of  Messana  would  be  a  great  acquisition 
to  the  state  of  SjTacuse,  that  city,  as  the  foremost  Greek 
community  in  Sicily,  was  called  upon  to  avenge  the  fate 
of  the  murdered  Messanians,  and  to  exterminate  that  band 
of  robbers,  which  made  the  whole  island  unsafe.  Hiero, 
the  leader  of  the  Syracusan  army,  was  sent  against  them. 
He  began  by  ridding  himself  of  a  number  of  his  mer- 
cenaries who  were  troublesome  or  whom  he  suspected  of 
treason.  He  placed  them  in  a  position  where  they  were 
exposed  to  a  hostile  attack  &om  the  enemy,  and  left  them 
without  support,  so  that  they  were  all  cut  down.'  He  then 
enlisted  new  mercenaries,  equipped  the  militia  of  Syracuse, 
and  gained  a  decisive  victory  over  the  Mamertines  in  the 
field,  after  which  they  gave  up  their  predatory  excursions 
and  retired  within  the  walls  of  Messana.  The  success  of 
Hiero  made  him  master  of  Syracuse,  whose  citizens  had  no 
means  of  keeping  a  victorious  general  in  subjection  to  the 
laws  of  the  state.  Fortunately,  Hiero  was  not  a  tyrant 
like  Agathokles.  On  the  whole,  he  governed  as  a  mild 
and  sagacious  politician,  and  succeeded,  under  the  most 
difficult  circumstances,  when  placed  between  the  two  great 
belligerent  powers  of  Bome  and  Carthage,  in  maintaining 

>  Vol.  i.  p.  618.  •  Vol.  i.  p.  640. 

*  It  was  not  the  first  time  that  mercenary  troops  were  exposed  to  snch  treason 
at  the  hands  of  Syracusan  generals.  During  the  siege  of  Syracuse  by  the 
Carthaginians,  the  first  Dionysius  had  acted  in  the  same  manner  (Diodoms, 
ziv.  72).  Afterwards,  the  Carthaginians,  and  cvon  the  Ilomans,  did  the  same. 
^Plutarch,  Fab,  Max.  22. 


THB  FIEST  PimiC  WAB. 


85 


CHAP. 
lU. 


FiBST 
PBBIOD, 

264-262 

B.C. 


the  independence  of  Syracuse,  and  in  securing  for  his 
native  town  during  his  reign  of  fifty  years  a  period  of 
reviving  prosperity.  First  of  all,  he  aimed  at  expelling  the 
Italian  barbarians  from  Sicily,  and  at  establishing  his 
power  in  the  east  of  the  island  by  the  conquest  of  Messana. 
The  Mamertines  had  taken  the  part  of  the  Carthaginians 
during  the  invasion  of  Pyrrhus  in  Sicily,  and  with  then- 
assistance  had  successfully  defended  Messana.  The  attack 
of  Hiero,  who  in  some  measure  was  at  the  head  of  the 
Greeks,  as  the  successor  of  Pyrrhus,  forced  the  Mamertines 
to  seek  aid  from  a  foreign  power,  after  their  most  faithful 
confederates,  the  mutineers  of  Bhegium,  had  perished  by 
the  sword  of  the  Romans  or  the  axe  of  the  executioner. 
They  had  only  the  choice  between  Carthage  and  Bome. 
Each  of  these  states  had  its  party  in  Messana.  The  Bomaus 
were  further  off  than  the  Carthaginians,  and  perhaps  the 
Mamertines  were  a&aid  to  ask  for  protection  from  those 
who  had  so  severely  punished  the  Campanian  freebooters 
of  Ehegium.  A  troop  of  Carthaginians  under  Hanno^was 
therefore  admitted  into  the  citadel  of  Messana,  and  thus 
the  long-cherished  wish  of  Carthage  for  the  dominion  over 
the  whole  of  Sicily  seemed  near  its  fulfilment. 

Of  the  three  strongest  and  most  important  places  in  ReiationB 
Sicily,  they  had  now  Lilybseum  and  Messana  in  their  pos-  t^age  to 
session,  and  thus  their  communication  with  Africa  and  Kon^e- 
Italy  was  secured.  Syracuse,  the  third  town  of  importance, 
was  very  much  reduced  and  weakened,  and  seemed  inca- 
pable of  any  protracted  resistance.  Carthage  had  long  been 
in  friendly  relations  with  Bome,  and  these  relations  had 
during  the  war  of  Pyrrhus  taken  the  form  of  a  complete 
military  alliance.  Carthage  and  Bome  had,  apparently,  the 
9ame  interests,  the  same  friends,  and  the  same  enemies.  On 
the  continent  of  Italy,  Bome  had  subjected  to  herself  all 
the  Greek  settlements.  What  could  be  more  natural  or 
more  fair  than  that  the  fruits  of  the  victory  over  Pyrrhus 
in  Sicily  should  be  reaped  by  Carthage  ?  The  straits  of 
Messana  were  the  natural  boundary  between  the  commer- 
cial city,  the  mistress  of  the  seas  and  islands,  and  the 

D  2 


86 


KOMAN  HISTORY. 


UOOH 
IV. 


Jealousy 
of  Rome 
for  Car- 
thage. 


continental  empire  of  the  Eomans,  whose  dominion  seemed 
to  have  found  its  legitimate  termination  in  Tarentum  and 
Bhegium. 

But  the  friendship  between  Eome  and  Carthage,  which 
had  arisen  out  of  their  common  danger,  was  weakened 
after  their  common  victory  and  was  shaken  after  the 
defeat  of  Pyrrhus  at  Beneventum.  It  was  by  no  means 
clear  that  Cartfiage  was  free  from  all  desire  of  gaining 
possessions  in  Italy.  The  Romans  at  least  were  jealous 
of  their  allies,  and  had  stipulated  in  the  treaty  with  Car- 
thage, in  the  year  348  B.C.,'  that  the  Carthaginians  should 
not  found  or  hold  any  fortresses  in  Latium  or  indeed 
in  any  part  of  the  Soman  dominions.  They  showed 
the  same  jealousy  when  in  the  war  with  Pyrrhus  a  Car- 
thaginian fleet  entered  the  Tiber,  ostensibly  for  the  assist- 
ance of  Rome,  by  declining  the  proffered  aid.  When  a 
Carthaginian  fleet  showed  itself  before  Tarentum  in  272  B.C., 
and  seemed  about  to  anticipate  the  Romans  in  the  occupa- 
tion of  this  town,  they  complained  formally  of  a  hostile 
intention  on  the  part  of  the  Carthaginians.^  The  Cartha- 
ginians denied  having  this  intention,  but  the  Romans 
nevertheless  had  good  reason  to  be  on  their  guard,  and  to 
entertain  fear  of  Carthaginian  interference  in  the  affairs  of 
Italy  as  well  as  jealousy  of  their  powerful  neighbour,  who 
had  now  got  a  firm  footing  in  Spain  and  governed  all  the 
islands  of  the  Sardinian  and  Tyrrhenian  seas.'  While  this 
feeling  was  prevalent  in  Rome,  an  embassy  came  from  the 
Mamertines,  commissioned  to  deliver  over  to  Rome  Messana 
and  the  territory  belonging  to  it,*  a  present  which  indeed 
involved  the  necessity  of  first  clearing  the  town  of  the 

*  This  oldest  commercial  treaty  between  Rome  and  Carthage  is  erroneously 
placed  by  Poly  bins  (iii.  22)  in  the  year  609  b.c.  See  Momm  sen's  Chronologir, 
320  f.  The  treaty  was  a  kind  of  international  navigation  act,  intended  to 
keep  down  foreign  competition.  The  second  treaty  shows  this  intention  still 
more  clearly. 

'  It  seems  that  the  Romans  looked  upon  or  pretended  to  look  upon  ihis 
interference  of  the  Carthaginian  fleet  as  a  breach  of  the  treaty  of  friendship 
between  the  two  nations,  and  that  they  made  use  of  it  to  justify  their  war 
against  Carthage.  Liry  (xxi.  10)  makes  Hanno  say,  in  the  Carthaginian  senate : 
'  Taiento,  id  est>  Italia  non  abstinueramuA  ex  foedere.' 

•  Polybius,  i.  10,  §  8.  *  Poly  bins,  i.  10,  §  2. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR.  87 

Carthaginians  and  then  of  defending  it   against  them.*     CHAP. 

The  Carthaginians,  it  appears,  had  made  themselves  ob-  . ,_' , 

noxious  since  they  had  had  possession  of  the  citadel  of    _^^^t 
Messana,  and  the  Roman  party  felt  itself  strong  enough    264-262 
to  take  the  bold  step  of  invoking  the  aid  of  the  fiomans.  ^'^' 

But  for  Borne  the  decision  v^as  a  difficult  one.  There  Resolution 
could  hardly  be  any  doubt  that  to  grant  the  request  of  Romans  to 
the  Mamertines  would  be   to  declare  war  against  Car-  ^^^^ 

°  Mamer- 

thage  and  Syracuse,  and  that  such  a  war  would  tax  the  tines  of 
resources  of  the  nation  to  the  utmost.  In  addition  to  '^®®**'^*" 
this  the  proposal  of  the  Mamertines  was  by  no  means 
honourable  to  Rome.  A  band  of  robbers  offered  dominion 
over  a  town  which  they  had  seized  by  the  most  outrageous 
act  of  violence ;  and  this  offer  was  made  to  the  Romans, 
who  so  recently  had  put  to  death  the  accomplices  of  the 
Mamertines  for  a  similar  treachery  towards  Rhegium. 
Moreover,  the  assistance  of  the  Romans  was  called  in 
against  Hiero  of  Syracuse,  to  whom^  they  were  indebted 
for  aid  in  the  siege  of  Rhegium,  and  at  the  same  time 
against  the  Carthaginians,  their  allies  in  the  scarcely  ter- 
minated war  with  Pyrrhus.  Long  and  earnest  were  the 
deliberations  in  the  Roman  senate ;  and  when  at  length 
the  prospect  of  extension  of  power  outweighed  all  moral 
considerations,  the  people  also  voted  for  an  undertaking 
which    seemed  to    promise  abundant  spoils   and  gain.* 

'  According  to  Zonaras  (viii.  0),  the  Mamertines  had  first  apph'ed  to  the 
Boraans  for  aid,  and  had  not  received  the  CartliaginiiinH  into  their  town  until 
they  despaired  of  a-ssistance  being  sent  from  Kome.  There  are  great  dis- 
crepancies in  the  accounts  of  Polyhius  and  Zonaras,  from  which  it  is  evident 
that  they  followed  different  authorities.  Zonaras,  or  rather  Dio  Cassius,  whom 
he  copied,  perhaps  followed  Philinus,  whilst  Polybius  made  use  of  this  writer 
chiefly  for  the  purpose  of  testing  the  diverging  statements  of  Fabius  Pictor.  The 
two  hietoriane,  Philinus  and  Fabius,  had  written  the  history  of  the  First  Punic 
War  respectively  from  the  Carthaginian  and  the  Roman  point  of  view,  and  had 
thereby  become  one-sided  and  partial.  Polybius  was  more  independeut  in  his 
judgment;  still  we  may  reasonably  doubt  that  he  always  succeeded  in  dis- 
oDtangling  the  truth  from  the  conflicting  evidence  which  was  accessible 
to  him. 

'  Polybius  (i.  11)  reports  that  the  senate  did  not  finally  resolve  upon  war 
but  left  the  decision   to  the  people.     This  statement  is  unintelligible,  for 
Bccording  to  the  constitutional  law  and  practice  the  final  decision  always  rested 


&8 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Change 
in  the 
character 
of  Roman 
histoTj. 


Relative 
strength  of 


However,  if  the  decision  was  not  exactly  honourable,  neither 
could  it,  from  the  Eoman  point  of  view,  be  condemned. 
The  surprise  of  Messana  by  the  Mamertines  was,  as  far  as 
Eome  was  concerned,  different  from  the  act  of  the  Cam- 
panian  legion  in  Bhegium ;  the  latter,  being  in  the  service 
of  the  Bomans,  had  broken  their  military  oath,  and  had 
been  guilty  of  mutiny  and  open  rebellion.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Mamertines  in  Sicily  were,  a«  regarded  the 
Eomans,  an  independent  foreign  people.  They  had  wronged 
neither  Bome  nor  Eoman  allies  or  subjects.  However 
atrocious  their  act  had  been,  the  Eomans  were  not  entitled 
to  take  them  to  account  for  it,  nor  called  upon  to  forego 
any  political  advantages  merely  because  they  disap- 
proved of  the  deed.  The  unblushing  desire  for  extension 
and  conquest  needed  no  excuse  or  justification  in  antiquity ; 
and  Eome  in  particular,  by  reason  of  her  former  history 
and  organisation,  could  not  stop  short  in  her  career  of 
conquest,  and  pause,  for  moral  scruples  at  the  Sicilian 
straits. 

A  new  era  begins  in  the  history  of  Eome  with  the  first 
crossing  of  the  legions  into  Sicily.  The  obscurity  which 
rested  on  the  wars  of  Eome  with  Sabellians  and  Greeks 
disappears  not  gradually  but  suddenly.  The  Arcadian 
Polybius,  one  of  the  most  trustworthy  of  ancient  writers, 
and  at  the  same  time  an  experienced  politician,  has  left 
us  a  history  of  the  First  Punic  War  drawn  from  contempo- 
rary sources,  especially  Philinus  and  Fabius  Pictor,  written 
with  so  much  fulness  that  now,  for  the  first  time,  we  feel  a 
confidence  in  the  details  of  Eoman  history  which  imparts 
true  interest  to  the  events  related  and  a  real  worth  to  the 
narrative. 

The  first  war  with  Carthage  lasted  twenty-three  years, 

with  the  people.  In  no  case  could  the  senate  resolve  upon  war  without  the 
consent  of  the  people.  Polybius  does  not  say  that  the  majority  of  the  senate 
was  against  the  war.  He  wished  only  to  convey  the  impression  that  the 
discredit,  inseparable  from  the  Boman  policy,  was  attributable  not  to  the 
senate,  but  to  the  people.  It  is  the  old  story  over  again.  The  dirty  work  is 
to  be  done  by  the  lower  class  of  people,  not  by  the  nobility.  Comparo 
vd.  i.  p.  229. 


THE  FERST  PUNIC  WAR.  39 

jfrom  264  to  241  B.C.     The  long  duration  of  the  struggle     CHAP, 
showed  that  the  combatants  were  not  unequally  matched.     _    ,  '  _^ 
The  strength  of  Eome  lay  in  the  warlike  qualities  of  her    p^^^^ 
citizens  and  subjects.  Carthage  was  immeasurably  superior    964-262 
in  wealth.  If  money  were  the  most  important  thing  in  war,        ^'^' 
Bome  would  have  succumbed.     But  in  the  long  war,  which  ?°'?^"^ 
dried  up  the  most  abundant  resources,  the  diflFerence  be- 
tween rich  and  poor  gradually  disappeared,  and  Carthage 
was  sooner  exhausted  than  Eome,  which  had  never  been 
wealthy.     The  diflference  in  the  financial  position  of  the 
two   states  was   the   more   important,   as    the   war  was 
carried  on  not  only  by  land  but  also  by  sea,  and  the  equip- 
ment of  fleets  was  more  expensive  than  that  of  land 
armies,  especially  for  a  state  like  Eome,  which  now  for 
the  first  time  appeared  as  a  maritime  power.     It  must 
not,  however,  be  forgotten  that  the  naval  and  financial 
strength  of  all  the  Greek  towns  in  Italy,  and  also  of  Syra- 
cuse, was  at  the  disposal  of  the  Eomans.     If  they  are  less 
frequently  mentioned  in  the  course  of  the  war  than  might 
be  expected,  it  is  due  to  the  usual  custom  of  historians, 
who,  out  of  national  pride,  pass  over  in  silence  the  assist* 
ance  rendered  by  subordinate  allies.     The  prize  of  the 
war,  the  beautiful  island  of  Sicily,  was  gained  by  the  vic- 
torious Eomans.     But  this  was  not  the  only  result.     The 
superiority  of  Eome  over  Carthage  was  shown,  and  the 
war  in  Sicily,  great  and  important  as  it  was,  was  only 
the  prelude  to  the  greater  and  more  important  struggle 
which  established  the  dominion  of  Eome  on  the  ruins  of 
Carthage. 

The  carrying  out  of  the  decree  to  give  the  Mamertines  occupa- 
the  desired  assistance  was  intrusted  to  the  consul  Appius  ^1?^  ^^ 

/>.  ^  ,  Mesf  ana 

Claudius  Caudex,  while  the  second  consul  was   still  in  by  the 
Etruria,   bringing    to    an    end    the   war  with   Volsinii.*  Romans. 
Appius  proved  himself  equal  to  the  task  in  the  council 
as  well  as  in  the  field.     Although  the  war  with  Carthage 
and  Syracuse  was,  by  the  decision  of  the  Eoman  people, 

'  See  vol.  i.  p.  479. 


40  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  practically  begun,  no  formal  declaration  was  made.'  Appius 
w  ,  '-^  dispatched  to  Ehegium  his  legate  C.  Claudius,  who  crossed 
over  to  Messana,  with  the  ostensible  object  of  settling  the 
diflBculty  that  had  arisen,  and  invited  the  commander 
of  the  Carthaginian  garrison  in  the  citadel  to  a  conference 
with  the  assembled  Mamertines.  On  this  occasion,  the 
Roman  honour  did  not  appear  in  a  very  advantageous 
light  by  the  side  of  the  much  abused  Punic  faithlessness. 
The  Carthaginian  general,  who  had  come  down  from  tho 
citadel  without  a  guard,  was  taken  prisoner,  and  was 
weak  enough  to  give  orders  to  his  men  for  evacuating  the 
fortress.  The  Boman  party  had  clearly  gained  the  upper 
hand  in  Messana,  since  they  felt  assured  of  the  assistance 
of  Rome. 
Landing  of      Thus  Rome  obtained  possession  of  Messana,  even  before 

trllff 

Romans  in  ^^^®  consul  and  the  two  legions  had  crossed  the  straits. 

Sicily.         It  -vvas  now  the  duty  of  the  Carthaginian  admiral,  who 

was  in  the  neighbourhood  with  a  fleet,  to  prevent  their 

landing  in  Sicily.     But  Appius  Claudius  crossed  during 

the  night  without  loss  or  difficulty,  and  thus,  at  the  very 

beginning  of  the  war,  the  sea,  on  which  hitherto  Carthage 

had  exercised  uncontrolled  dominion,  favoured  the  Romans. 

The  experience  of  the  war  throughout  was  to  the  same 

eflfect.     On  the  whole,  Rome,  though  a  continental  power, 

showed  itself  equal  to  the  maritime  power  of  Carthage, 

and  was  in  the  end  enabled  by  a  great  na.val  victory  to 

dictate  peace. 

Ineffectual        In  possession  of  Messana,  and  at  the  head  of  two  legions, 

HiSTwith  -A-ppius  followed  up  his  advantage  with  ability  and  bold- 

the  Car-      ness.     Hiero  and  the  Carthaginians  had  been  obliged,  by 

'  the  decisive  act  of  the  Romans,  to  make  common  cause 

together.     For  the  first  time  after  200  years  of  hostility, 

Syracuse    ent^ered   into    a   league   with   her    hereditary 

enemies  the  Greeks.     But  the  friendship  was  not  to  be  of 

*  When  this  was  done,  we  do  not  know.  According  to  the  old  sacred  law 
and  international  practice,  it  was  necessary  to  declare  war  in  due  form.  Tho. 
lioman  fetialis,  however,  was  not  obliged  to  travel  all  the  way  to  Carthage  to 
do  this.  lie  could  throw  his  spear  over  the  hostile  frontier  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  Home.    See  vol.  i^  556. 


B.C. 


THE  FIItST  PUNIC  WAE.  41 

long  duration,  thanks  to  the  rapid  success  of  Eome,  No 
sooner  had  Appius  landed  than  he  attacked  Hiero,  and 
80  terrified  him  that  he  immediately*  lost  courage,  and  ^^^^ 
hurried  back  to  Sj^racuse.  Thus  the  league  was  practi-  264-262 
cally  dissolved.  Appius  then  attacked  the  Carthaginians, 
and  the  result  was,  that  they  gave  up  the  siege.  After 
Messana  was  in  this  manner  placed  out  of  danger, 
Appius  assumed  the  offensive.  With  one  blow  the  whole 
of  Sicily  seemed  to  have  fallen  into  his  power.     On  the 

'  Polybius  (i.  11,  12)  minutely  examines  the  contradictions  in  the  reports  of 
Fabius  Pictor  and  Pliilinus.  Ac  ording  to  the  latter,  Appius  Claudius  vas 
worated  in  his  encounter  with  Hiero  and  also  in  that  with  the  Carthaginians. 
Polybius  rejects  this  statement,  because  he  ciinnot  on  this  supposition  under- 
stand the  retreat  of  the  allies.  Accowling  to  Zonaras  (viii.  9),  who  perhaps 
indirectly  reproduces  the  account  of  Philinus,  the  advantage  was  upon  the 
whole  on  the  side  of  the  Romans,  but  their  two  victories  were  by  no  means 
decisive  or  unattended  with  loss,  a  fact  which  is  apparent  even  from  Polybius 
(i.  16,  §  9).  The  Roman  cavalry  was  routed  by  that  of  the  Syracusans,  but  as 
their  infantry  was  victorious,  Hiero  broke  up  and  returned  to  S}Tacuse.  In 
their  attack  upon  the  Carthaginians,  the  Romans  made  an  attempt  to  storm 
their  camp.  On  their  repulse,  the  Carthaginians  made  a  sally,  and  fol- 
lowed up  their  advantage,  but  were  driven  back  into  their  camp.  Such 
battles,  in  which  gain  and  loss  are  divided  on  both  sides,  are  most  naturally 
claimed  as  victories  by  both  parties.  The  conclusion  arrived  at  by  Polybius, 
that  the  Romans  must  have  been  decidedly  victorious,  because  both  the 
Carthaginians  and  the  Syracusans  retreated,  does  not  seem  altogether  cer- 
tain. We  know  what  happens  in  the  military  operations  of  allies,  ^specially 
when  they  have  not  full  confidence  in  one  another.  The  Carthaginians  and 
the  Greeks  had  always  been  hereditary  enemies,  and  were  now  for  the  first 
time  making  common  cause  to  repel  a  common  enemy.  Iliero  could  not  per- 
suade himself  that  the  Romans  had  crossed  the  straits  without  the  connivjince 
or  assistance  of  the  Carthaginians  (Diodorus,  xxiii.  ff.  4) ;  and  when  he  found 
himself  unexjxjctcdly  attacked  by  them  on  the  very  morning  after  their  landing, 
and  left  without  assistance  by  his  allies,  he  lost  courage,  though  for  the  moment 
he  had  maintained  his  position.  The  Carthaginians,  on  the  other  hand,  could 
see  no  cause  for  Hiero's  precipitate  retreat  but  treason  or  cowardice  ;  and  they 
were  not  far  wrong  in  such  a  supposition,  for  soon  after  they  found  Hiero 
changed  into  an  ally  of  the  Romans.  They  did  not  therefore  venture  to  take 
the  offensive,  but  remained  in  their  camp  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Messana, 
without  however  being  further  molested  by  Claudius  after  his  first  attack  had 
failed.  If  Claudius  could  have  boasted  of  any  decided  victory  during  this 
campaign,  he  would  no  doubt  have  been  rewarded  with  a  triumph.  Rut  his 
mud  advance  against  Syracuse  ended  in  discomfiture  and  loss,  and  the  Romans 
found  it  necessary  to  double  the  strength  of  their  army  in  Sicily  for  the  ensuing 
campaign.  All  these  considerations  tend  to  show  that,  though  Polybius  is  on 
the  whole  a  trustworthy  snd  conscientious  guide,  we  are  still  far  removed  from 
the  historical  certainty  which  can  be  obtained  only  from  contemporary  witnesses. 


42 


EOMAN  HISTORY. 


Second 
campaign 
in  Sicily, 
263  B.a 


BOOK  one  side  he  penetrated  as  far  as  Syracuse,  and  on  the 
other  to  the  Carthaginian  frontier.  The  Eoman  soldiers 
were  doubtless  rewarded  with  rich  spoils ;  and  this  seemed 
to  justify  the  decision  of  the  people,  who  had  consented 
to  the  war  partly  in  the  hope  of  such  gain.  But  Syra- 
cuse, which  had  gloriously  resisted  so  many  enemies, 
was  not  to  be  taken  at  a  run.  Appius  Claudius  was 
obliged  to  return  to  Messana,  after  experiencing  great 
dangers,  which  he  could  escape  only  by  perfidy  and  cun- 
ning. The  conquest  of  this  town,  therefore,  was  the  only 
lasting  success  of  the  first  campaign  which  Some  had 
undertaken  beyond  the  sea. 

In  the  following  year,  the  war  in  Sicily  was  carried  on 
with  two  consula.r  armies,  that  is,  four  legions,  a  force  of 
at  least  36,000  men,  consisting  in  equal  parts  of  Romans 
and  allies.  This  army  seems  small  when  we  compare  the 
numbers  which  are  reported  to  have  been  engaged  in  the 
former  wars  of  Carthaginians  and  Greeks  in  Sicily.*  It 
is  said  that  at  Himera  (480  B.C.)  800,000  Carthaginians 
were  engaged ;  Dionysius  repeatedly  led  armies  of  100,000 
men  into  the  field,  and  now  there  was  a  force  of  only  four 
legions  against  the  combined  army  of  Carthaginians  and 
Greeks.  We  shall  do  well  to  test  the  huge  exaggerations 
of  the  earlier  traditions  by  the  more  credible  account 
given  by  Polybius  of  the  Eoman  military  force.  The 
Greeks  were,  it  is  true,  in  the  third  century  much  reduced, 
and  their  force  was  probably  only  a  shadow  of  their  early 
armies ;  but  the  Carthaginians  were  now  at  the  very 
zenith  of  their  power,  and  had  certainly  reason  to  pursue 
the  war  in  Sicily  in  good  earnest. 

On  the  appearance  of  the  Soman  army,  the  Sicilian 
^^  ^^^  cities,  one  after  another,  deserted  the  cause  of  Hiero  and 
the  Carthaginians,  and  joined  the  Romans,  so  that  the 
latter,  without  a  struggle,  obtained  possession  of  the 
greater  part  of  the  island,^  and  now  turned  against  Syra- 
cuse. Then  Hiero  saw  that,  in  concluding  an  alliance 
with  Carthage,  he  had  made  a  great  mistake,  and  that 


Alliance  of 

Hiero 

Borne. 


*  See  aboYe,  p.  24,  note  2.        '  Polybius,  i.  16,  g  3  f  Zosaias,  Tiii  9. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR. 


43 


it  was  high  time  to  alter  his  policy.  His  subjects  shared 
his  desire  for  peace  with  Borne,  and  therefore  it  could  not 
be  a  difficult  task  to  arrive  at  an  agreement,  especiallj  as 
it  was  in  the  interest  of  the  Bomans  to  break  up  the 
alliance  between  Carthage  and  Syracuse,  and,  by  friend- 
ship with  Hiero,  to  have  the  chief  resources  of  the  island 
at  their  disposal.  Hiero  accordingly  concluded  a  peace 
with  Bome  for  fifteen  years,*  engaged  to  deliver  up  the 
prisoners  of  war,  to  pay  the  sum  of  a  hundred  talents, 
and  to  place  himself  completely  in  the  position  of  a  de- 
pendent ally.  The  Bomans  owed  a  considerable  part  of 
their  success  to  the  faithful  services  rendered  by  Hiero 
during  the  whole  course  of  the  war.  He  was  never  tired 
of  furnishing  supplies  of  all  kinds,^  and  thus  he  relieved 
them  of  part  of  their  anxiety  for  the  maintenance  of  their 
troops.  Nor  was  the  Boman  alliance  less  useful  to  Hiero. 
It  is  true  he  reigned  over  Syracuse  only  by  the  per- 
mission and  protection  of  Bome,  and  the  city  suffered 
grievously  from  the  long  continuation  of  the  war.  Never- 
theless, it  recovered  from  its  declining  state ;  and  Hiero, 
emulating  his  predecessors  Gelo,  Hiero,  and  Dionysius, 
could  display  before  his  countrymen  all  the  magnificence 
of  a  Greek  prince,  and  appear  as  a  candidate  for  the  prizes 
in  the  Greek  national  games.' 

The  Carthaginians  could  not  maintain  their  advanced 
position  in  the  nei^bourhood  of  Messana,  in  fr^nt  of  the 
two  Boman  consular  armies,  although  no  engagement 
seems  to  have  taken  place.^     The  towns  also,  which  had 

'  Biodorns,  zziii.  ff.  5.  '  Biodoros,  xsiii.  ff.  9. 

'  Foljrbius,  i.  16,  <pikoarcipw&v  Kcd  ^iAo8o|«i^  els  to6s  "EXXriPos. 

*  Neither  Polybius  nor  Zonaras  mention  a  battle  in  which  the  Koman  con- 
eu\s  engaged  the  united  forces  of  the  Carthaginians  and  Sjracusans.  Accord- 
ing to  the  narrative  of  these  historians,  the  Sicilian  towns  fell  one  after  another 
into  the  hands  of  the  Romans  without  a  struggle.  On  the  other  hand,  Pliny 
reports  {Hisi.  Nat.  Tii.  60),  that  in  the  year  263  B.C.  Marcus  Valerius  Messala 
caused  a  picture  to  be  put  up  in  the  Curia  Hostilia,  which  represented  his 
yictory  over  Hiero  and  the  Carthaginians.  We  have  here  an  example  of  the 
barefaced  and  boundless  falsification  of  history  of  which  the  noble  families  of 
Bome  were  guilty.  Belying  on  the  evidence  of  Polybius,  we  can  affirm  without 
hesitation  that  the  alleged  victory  of  M.  Valerius  Messala  is  a  fiction.  Butt 
even  the  boldest  family  panegyrists  could  not  venture  to  misrepresent  events 
outright  before  contemporary  witnesses.    It  was  necessary  to  wait  awhile,  until 


CHAP. 
III. 

Ftbst 
Pbbiod, 
264-262 

B.C. 


Decline  of 
the  Car- 
thaginian 
power  in 
Sicily. 


44  ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK     hitherto  been  on  their  side,  joined  the  Eomans.     Even 

"w — ^ *   Segesta,  the  old  and  faithful  ally  of  Carthage  in  Sicily, 

made  use  of  its  alleged  Trojan  origin,  to  ask  favourable 
conditions  from  Rome,  and  killed  the  Carthaginian  gar- 
rison as  a  proof  of  its  attachment  to  its  new  ally.  Thus, 
in  a  short  time,  and  without  much  exertion,  the  Eomans 
gained  a  position  in  Sicily  which  the  Carthaginians  had 
for  centuries  aimed  at  in  vaiii. 
Probable         Compared  with  the  rapid  and  successful  action  of  the 

CAUSt^S  OI 

the  success  Romans  in  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  movements 
S^^^®  of  the  Carthaginians  appear  to  have  been  singularly 
slow  and  weak.  Before  the  breaking  out  of  hostilities, 
the  advantage  had  been  decidedly  on  their  side.  They 
had  military  possession  of  Messana;  with  their  fleet  they 
so  completely  commanded  the  straits  that  in  the  conscious 
pride  of  their  superiority  their  admiral  declared  that  the 
Romans  should  not  without  his  permission  even  wash  their 
hands  in  the  sea.*  The  resources  of  almost  the  whole  of 
Sicily  were  at  their  disposal,  and  the  communication  with 
Africa  was  at  all  times  secure.  Whether  the  important 
city  of  Messana  was  lost  by  the  incapacity  or  timidity  of 
Hanno,  who  paid  with  his  life  for  his  evacuation  of  the 
citadel,  or  through  an  exaggerated  fear  of  a  breach  with 
Rome,  or  by  confidence  in  Roman  moderation,  it  is  not 
possible  to  decide.     Nor  do  we  know  how  the  Romans 

the  memory  of  events  had  faded  away,  and  until  fiction  had  gradually  acquired 
credence  enough,  by  dint  of  frequent  repetition  in  the  family  circle,  to  venture 
into  publicity.  There  cannot  be  any  doubt,  therefore,  that  the  date  given  by 
Pliny  f  >r  the  public  exhibition  of  the  picture  is  false.  Pliny  thought  he  could 
not  go  wrong  in  naming  the  year  of  the  consulship  of  Valerius  as  that  in  which  the 
picture  was  painted,  and  put  up  in  the  senate-house  ;  and  he  showed  here,  as 
on  many  other  occasions,  his  want  of  judgment.  His  statement  is  of  no  value 
whatever  for  the  history  of  art.  Like  the  lying  epitaph  of  Scipio  Barbatus 
(see  vol.  i.  p.  459),  this  alleged  historical  painting  originated  many  years  after 
th«  death  of  the  man  whose  glory  it  was  intended  to  perpetuate.  It  is  one  of 
the  proofs  of  the  worthlessness  of  the  Capitoline  fasti,  that  they  record  a 
triumph  of  Valerius  over  the  Punians  and  Hicro,  king  of  the  Siculi.  After 
this  proof  of  the  unscrupulous  vanity  of  the  Valerii  it  is  no  matter  of  surprise 
that  they  ascribe  the  first  application  of  the  name  Meesala  to  the  consul  of  the 
year  263,  though  he  neither  took  the  place  nor  (as  Seneca  says :  De  Brevitate 
Vita,  13)  had  the  honour  of  defending  it. 
>  Zonaras,  viii.  9. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAE. 


45 


were  able,  in  the  face  of  a  hostile  fleet,  to  cross  the  straits 
•with  an  army  of  10,000  men,  and  in  the  year  after  with 
double  that  number.  It  seems  that  this  could  not  have  been 
easy  even  with  the  assistance  of  the  ships  of  Rhegium, 
Tarentum,  NeapoKs,  Locri,  and  other  Greek  towns  in  Italy, 
for  even  the  assembling  of  these  ships  in  the  straits  might 
have  been  prevented.  The  small  strip  of  water  which 
separates  Sicily  from  Italy  was  sufficient  in  modem  times 
to  limit  the  French  power  to  the  continent,  and,  under" 
the  protection  of  the  English  fleet,  to  save  Sicily  for  the 
Bourbons.  How  was  it  that  the  same  straits,  even  at  the 
first  trial,  caused  the  Romans  no  greater  difficulties  than 
any  broad  river  P  Was  the  Carthaginian  fleet  too  small 
to  prevent  their  crossing  by  force?  Was  it  the  result 
simply  of  negligence,  or  of  one  of  the  innumerable  cir- 
cumstances which  place  warlike  operations  by  sea  so  far 
beyond  all  calculation?  Apparently,  Carthage  did  not 
expect  a  war  with  Rome,  and  was  wholly  unprepared  for 
it.  This  may  be  inferred  with  tolerable  certainty,  not  only 
from  the  result  of  their  first  encounter  with  the  Romans 
in  Messana,  but  also  from  the  fact  that  in  the  second  year 
of  the  war  they  left  Hiero  unsupported,  and  thus  com* 
pelled  him  to  throw  himself  into  the  arms  of  the  Romans.^ 
The  gravity  of  their  position  was  now  apparent,  and 
induced  them  to  make  preparations  for  the  third  campaign 
on  a  more  extensive  scale.*  For  the  basis  of  their  opera- 
tions they  chose  Agrigentum.  This  town,  which  since  its 
conquest  and  destruction  by  the  Carthaginians  in  the 
year  405,  had  alternately  been  imder  Carthaginian  and 
Syracusan  dominion,  had  by  the  aid  of  Timoleon  acquired 
a  precarious  independence,  but  had  never  recovered   its 

'  One  cause  of  their  weakness  we  learn  accidentally  from  Zonaras  (viii.  0). 
On  the  breaking  oat  of  hostilities,  the  Carthaginians  ciused  the  Italian  merce- 
naries who  served  in  their  army  to  be  massacred.  We  are  not  informed  of  the 
strength  of  this  body  of  troops.  If  the  Punic  garrison  of  Measana  consisted 
of  such  men,  who,  as  countrymen  of  the  Mamertines,  were  favourably  dis- 
posed towards  them,  the  loss  of  Messana  is  easily  explained.  At  any  rate,  the 
position  of  the  Carthaginian  generals  was  very  precarious  if  they  had  recourse 
to  such  a  desperate  measure  as  the  massacre  of  their  own  troops. 

»  Polybius,  i.  17,  §  3. 


CHAP, 

ni. 

-  _i  _         n  g^ 

FlHST 

Period, 
264-262 

B.C. 


Kenewed 
eflTort  of 
the  Car- 
thaginians, 
262  B.C. 


46 


BOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV, 


Th6 
Bomans 


Agrigen- 
tum. 


former  splendour.  Situated  on  a  rockj  platean  surrounded 
by  steep  precipices  at  the  confluence  of  the  brooks  Hjpsos 
and  Akragas,  it  was  naturally  so  strong  as  to  appear 
impregnable  at  a  time  when  the  art  of  besieging  cities 
was  so  little  advanced ;  but  as  it  was  not  immediately  on 
the  coast  ^  and  had  no  harbour,  it  was  impossible  to  supply 
it  with  provisions  by  sea.  It  is  therefore  strange  that  the 
Carthaginians  should  choose  just  this  town  for  their  basis, 
instead  of  their  strongest  fortress,  Lilybeeum.  Probably, 
the  choice  was  determined  by  the  closer  vicinity  of  Syra- 
cuse and  Messana,  the  conquest  of  which  they  had  by  no 
means  ceased  to  hope  for. 

The  consuls  for  the  year  262,  L.  Postumius  Megellus  and 
Q.  Mamilius  Vitulus,  marched  with  all  their  forces'  against 
Agrigentum,  where  Hannibal  was  stationed  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  magazines  with  an  army  of  mercenaries  so  in- 
ferior in  numbers  that  he  could  not  hazard  a  battle.  They 
set  to  work  in  the  slow  and  tedious  mode  of  attack  which 
they  had  learnt  in  Latium  and  Samnium,  and  which,  when 
they  had  superior  numbers  at  their  command,  could  not 
fail  eventually  to  lead  to  success.'  Outside  the  town  they 
established  two  fortified  camps  in  the  east  and  the  west, 
and  united  these  by  a  double  line  of  trenches,  so  that  they 
were  secured  against  sallies  from  the  besieged  as  well  as 
from  any  attacks  of  an  army  that  might  come  to  relieve 
the  town.     After  they  had  cut  off  all  communications. 


1  See  Haltans,  Rom,  Gesch.  i.  160.  Siefert,  Akragas  und  sein  Gebiet, 
1845. 

•  The  army  must  have  consisted  of  two  consular  armies  or  four  legions, 
although  after  the  conclusion  of  the  peace  with  Hiero  in  the  preceding  year 
the  Romans  had  hoped  that  two  legions  would  suffice  for  carrying  on  the  war 
in  Sicily  (Polybius,  i.  17,  §  1).  Moreover,  we  may  presume  that  all  their  allies, 
especially  the  Synicusans  and  Mamertines,  sent  auxiliaries.  To  blockade  so 
large  a  town  aa  Agrigentum  a  much  larger  force  was  necessary  than  four 
legions.  According  to  the  Agrigentine  historian  Philinus  (quoted  by  Dio- 
dorus,  xziii.  ff.  7),  the  army  of  the  Bomans  and  their  allies  consisted  of  100,000 
men. 

■  Fours  years  later,  at  the  siege  of  Camarina,  the  Romans  tried  their  own 
national  mode  of  attack,  and  when  this  failed,  they  employed  Greek  engines  of 
siege,  supplied  by  Hiero,  and  thus  succeeded  in  taking  Camarina.— Diodorus, 
xziii.  ff.  9. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR.  47 

they  qnietly  awaited  the  effects  of  hunger,  which  could 
not  jGEbil  soon  to  show  themselves.    Bj  the  prompt  assist- 
ance of  their  Sicilian  allies,  especially  of  Hiero,  they  were     t£^^^ 
amply  supplied  with  provisions,  which  were  collected  by    264-262 
them  in  the  neighbouring  town  of  Erbessus.  ^'^' 

But  when,  after  five  months'  siege,  a  Carthaginian  army  Defeat  of 
under  Hanno  marched  from  Heraclea  to  relieve  the  town,  ^*"°®- 
the  situation  of  the  Eomans  began  to  be  serious,  especially 
after  Hanno  had  succeeded  in  taking  the  town  of  Erbessus 
with  all  the  stores  in  it.  The  besiegers  now  experienced 
almost  as  much  distress  as  the  besieged.  They  began 
to  suffer  want  and  privation,  although  Hiero  did  all  that 
was  possible  to  send  them  new  supplies.  An  attack  on 
the  town  promised  as  little  success  as  one  on  the  army  of 
Hanno,  who  had  taken  up  a  strong  position  on  a  hill  in 
the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  the  Romans.  The  consuls 
already  thought  of  raising  the  siege,  which  had  lasted 
almost  seven  months,  when  fire  signals  from  the  town, 
giving  notice  of  the  increasing  distress  of  the  besieged, 
induced  Hanno  to  offer  battle.  With  the  courage  of 
despair,  the  Eomans  accepted  it,  and  obtained  a  decisive 
and  brilliant  victory.  The  Carthaginians,  it  appears,  now 
for  the  first  time  made  use  of  elephants,  which  they  had 
learnt  to  apply  to  the  purposes  of  war  during  either  the 
invasion  of  Agathokles  in  Africa  or  of  Pyrrhus  in  Sicily. 
But  these  animals  seem  on  this  occasion,  as  on  many  others, 
to  have  done  more  harm  than  good.  Almost  all  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  Romans.  The  fragments  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian army  fled  to  Heraclea,  leaving  their  camp,  with 
rich  spoils,  to  the  victorious  army. 

In  the  night  following  this  victory,   Hannibal  took  Escape  of 
advantage  of  the  exhaustion  and  confusion  in  the  Roman  [^®  9*^^^ 
army  secretly  to  leave  Agrigentum  and  to  slip  away  un-  garrison 
noticed  over  the  Roman  lines.     In  this  manner,  he  saved  Hannibfti. 
at  least  a  part  of  his  army,  after  it  had  been  materially 
weakened  by  hunger  and  desertion.     But  the  miserable 
inhabitants  of  the  town,  who  doubtless  had  unwillingly 
shared  in  the   struggle  and  in  the  horrors  of  a  seven 


48 


RO:VIAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Historical 
value  of 
the  narra- 
tive. 


months'  siege,  were  doomed  to  pay  the  penalty  for  the 
escape  of  the  Carthaginians.  They  were  all  *  sold  as  slaves, 
and  so  for  the  second  time  the  splendid  city  of  Akragas 
perished,  after  it  had  nearly  recovered  from  the  devasta- 
tion caused  by  the  Carthaginians.  But  new  settlers  soon 
gathered  again  on  this  favoured  spot.  Even  in  the  course 
of  the  same  war,  Agrigentum  became  again  the  theatre  of 
some  hardly-contested  struggles  between  Carthaginians 
and  flomans ;  and  not  until  it  had  been  conquered  and  laid 
waste  in  the  wars  with  Hannibal  for  the  third  time  did  it 
cease  to  exist  as  a  Greek  town.  With  such  persistent 
energy  did  the  Greeks  cling  to  the  spots  where  they  had 
set  up  their  household  hearths  and  their  temples,  and 
where  they  had  intrusted  to  the  mother  earth  the  ashes 
of  their  dead. 

The  siege  of  Agrigentum  is  the  first  event  in  the 
military  history  of  Rome  which  is  historically  authenti- 
cated not  only  in  its  final  result  but  to  some  extent  also  in 
the  details  of  its  progress.^    The  earlier  descriptions  of 

*  According  to  Diodorus  (xxiii.  ff.  9),  25,000  in  number. 

'  Nevertheless,  much  remains  obscure,  and  the  numbers  especially  are  by 
no  means  to  be  trusted.  That  the  Komans  employed  not  one  but  two  consular 
armies  is  certain  beyond  dispute,  as  it  is  admitted  that  both  consuls  took  part 
in  the  siege.  Yet  Polybius  does  not  distinctly  state  this,  and  even  suggests 
the  contrary  by  saying  (i.  17)  that  the  senate  had  resolved  to  carry  on  the 
"War  in  Sicily  with  only  one  consular  army.  He  omitted  to  relate  that  this  re- 
solution was  subsequently  modified.  He  also  neglects  altogether  to  mention  the 
Sicilian  auxiliaries  of  the  Romans,  who,  according  to  Diodorus  (xxi^i.  ff.  7), 
swelled  the  whole  army  to  100,000  men.  Moreover,  we  cannot  ascertain  the 
strength  of  the  Carthaginian  garrison  of  Agrigentum  under  Hannibal.  Poly- 
bius (i.  18),  speaking  of  the  sufferings  caused  by  famine,  says  that  not  less 
than  50,000  men  were  shut  up  in  the  town.  Did  he  include  in  this  number 
the  inhabitants  of  Agrigentum,  or  only  the  men  capable  of  bearing  arms  ?  or  did 
he  estimate  the  Carthaginian  garrison  alone  at  this  figure  ?  The  army  of  Hanno, 
which  came  to  the  relief  of  the  town,  numbered,  accoixiing  to  Philinus  (quoted 
by  Diodorus,  xxiii.  ff.  8),  50,000  foot  and  6,000  horse ;  according  to  Orosius 
(iv.  7),  only  30,000  foot  and  1,500  horse.  Polybius  says  that  but  few  escaped 
of  this  army,  while  according  to  Diodorus  its  loss  amounted  only  to  7,200  men. 
These  discrepancies,  which  betray  their  origin  in  the  writings  of  Philinus  and 
Fabius  Pictor  respectively,  cannot  now  be  reconciled.  We  should  like  also  to 
be  authentically  informed  of  the  extent  of  the  Roman  losses,  which  Diodorus 
(xxiii.  ff.  9)  no  doubt  exaggerates  by  making  them  amount  to  30,000  foot  and 
540  horse. 


THE  FIEST  PUNIC  WAE.  49 

battles  are  altogether  fancy  pictures.     Even  of  the  battle     CHAP, 
of  Heraclea,  the  first  in  the  war  with  Pjrrrhus  which  is  ^_    /  _^ 
related  intelligibly,  we  cannot  tell  for  certain  how  far  the    ^'^^ 
narrators  made  nse  of  the  notes  of  Pyrrhus  or  of  other  con-    264-262 
temporaries  and  how  much  they  actually  invented.   Hence       ^'^' 
we  may  measure  the  amount  of  benefit  to  be  obtained  from 
studying  the  details  of  Soman  military  operations  in  the 
Samnite  or  Volscian  wars,  and  the  innumerable  descrip- 
tions of  sieges  and  battles  given  by  Livy. 

The  Itomans  had  sat  down  before  Agrigentum  in  the  Extended 
early  part  of  summer.  At  the  end  of  the  year  the  consuls  f^'P*® 
returned  to  Messana.  Their  losses  in  the  battles,  and  Romims. 
from  privations  and  sickness  during  a  tedious  siege,  had 
been  very  great ;  but  a  glorious  success  had  been  gained. 
Sicily,  with  the  exception  of  only  a  few  fortresses,  was 
entirely  subdued ;  and  the  Bomans, .  it  would  seem,  now 
began  for  the  first  time  to  aim  at  a  higher  object  than  that 
which  they  had  had  in  view  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.* 
Their  ambition  was  now  no  longer  restrained  to  keeping 
the  Carthaginians  out  of  Messana.  The  prospect  was 
opening  before  them  of  acquiring  the  whole  of  Sicily;  and 
the  prize  which  after  centuries  of  bloody  wars  was  not 
attained  by  their  haughty  rival,  which  the  rulers  of 
Syracuse  and  lastly  the  King  of  Epirus  had  vainly  aimed 
at,  appeared  after  a  short  conflict  about  to  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  Boman  legions  as  the  reward  of  their  courage 
and  perseverance. 


Second  Period,  261-255  B.C. 

THE   FIBST  BOMAN   FLEET.      MYIuE.      E0N0MX7S. 

BEGULUS   IN  AFBIOA. 

The  war  in  Sicily  wm,  in  the  following  year,  pursued  Maritime 
with  aU  possible  vigour.     The  two   consuls  of  261,  L.  '^P^™*^ 
Valerius   Flaccus  and  T.  Otacilius  Crassus   (cousin  and  thage. 
brother  of  the  consuls  of  273),  conquered  many  places  in 

»  Polybius,  i.  20,  {  1. 
VOL.  II.  E 


50  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     the  island.   Bnt  the  incidents  of  this  campaign  proved  more 
and  more  that  the  Bomans  without  a  large  fleet  conld  not 


defend  such  an  island  as  Sicily,  with  its  vast  extent  of 
coast,  against  the   Carthaginians  who   were  undisputed 
masters  of  the  sea.     If  the  towns  in  the  interior  of  the 
country  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  Romans,  those  on  the 
coasts,  which  were  far  more  important,  were  continually 
exposed  to  the  unexpected  attacks  of  the  Carthaginians 
by   sea.     In  addition  to  this,   the   Carthaginians  made 
use  of  their  naval  strength  to  send  ships  from  Sardinia 
and  other  of  their  possessions,  for  the  purpose  of  harass- 
ing the  coast  of  Italy.     It  was  easy  for  them,  in  this  way, 
to  keep  large  portions  of  Soman  territory  in  continual 
excitement  and   serious   danger.     They  would   suddenly 
land  on  the  undefended  coast,  plunder  the  open  country, 
destroy  farm-houses   and  plantations,  carry  off  the  in- 
habitants into  slavery,  and  retire  to  their  ships  before 
a  force  could  be  collected  to  march  against  them.'     The 
maritime  power  of  the  Bomans  and  their  Greek  allies 
was  not  able  to  put  an  end  to  such  proceedings.     It 
seemed  that  the  war  so  boldly  undertaken,  far  from  lead- 
ing to   a  permanent  acquisition   of  new  territory,   was 
beginning  to  endanger  their  old  possessions, 
j>etemina-      xJnder  these  circumstances,  the  Eomans  boldly  resolved 
the  to  meet  the  enemy  on  his  own  element ;  and  indeed,  there 

cope  with  °  was  no  other  alternative,  if  they  did  not  intend  to  retire 
^*^»go     from  the  contest  with  disgrace.    Eome  was  obliged    to 
encounter  Carthage  at  sea,  not  merely  if  she  wished  to 
overthrow  and  humiliate  her  rival,  but  if  she  meant  to  hold 
her  own  ground. 

The  success  which  attended  the  first  gpreat  naval  en- 
gagement of  the  Eomans,  and  which  surpassed  all  expec- 
tations, inspired  them  with  an  enthusiasm  which  im- 
parted fresh  strength  to  their  national  pride.  New  honours 

'  See  vol.  i.  p.  421.  To  ward  off  srch  attacks  upon  the  coast  the  Komans  had 
established  their  maritime  colonies,  which  generally  consisted  of  Roman  citizens. 
These  are  the  forts  (<f>povpal),  mentioned  by  Zonaras  (viii.  10),  as  lining  and 
protecting  the  coasts  of  Italy. 


by  sea. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR. 


51 


and  a  permanent  monument  commemorated  the  victory 
which  restored  the  wavering  fortunes  of  war  even  on  that 
element  on  which  the  Bomans  had  never  before  ventured 
to  meet  their  enemies  nor  to  hope  for  success.     For  this 
reason  the  resolution  of  the  Bomans  to  build  a  large  fleet, 
and  their  first  naval  victory,  were  favourite  topics  for  the 
patriotic  historians,  and  exaggerated  accounts  were  the 
consequence.     To  make  the  effort  of  the  nation  sfcill  more 
conspicuous,  it  was  asserted  that  the  Eomans  had  never 
ventured  on  the  sea  before,*  that  they  had  not  possessed  a 
single  ship  of  war,  and  were  wholly  and  entirely  ignorant 
of  the  art  of  building  ships,  or  of  fitting  them  out  and 
using  them  for  military  purposes.     That  this  is  a  great 
error  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say.     Though  Eome  ori- 
ginally had  no  fleet  worth  menxioning,  and  left  to  the 
Etruscans  the  trade  as  well  as  the  dominion  at  sea,  still, 
by    the  conquest    of   Antium  she    acquired    ships    and 
a  serviceable  harbour.     Since  the  treaty  with  Naples,*  in 
the   second  Samnite  war,   she  had   Greek  seamen   and 
Greek  ship-builders  at  her  disposal.     At  the  same  time  she 
sent  out  ships  to  make  hostile  invasions  in  Campania.^ 
In  the  year  311  two  Boman  admirals  are  mentioned,^  and, 
as  we  have  seen,  the  war  with  Tarentum  had  been  caused 
by  the  appearance  of  a  Boman  fleet  before  the  harbour  of 
that  town.     The  assertion  that  the  Bomans  were  utterly 
ignorant  of  maritime  affairs  becomes  thus  unintelligible.* 
The  error  is  quite  evident,  and  warns  us  against  accepting 
without  examination  the  other  accounts  of  the  building 
and  the  manning  of  the  first  Boman  fleet. 

The  truth  which  lies  at  the  root  of  the  narrative  is  this,  Late 

'  Polybius,i.  20,  {  9  :  'Then  the  Romans  first  undertook  to  build  ships,  .  .  . 
and,  vi^ont  having  any  appliances  for  ship-bnilding  or  having  ever  thought 
of  the  sea,  they  conceived  the  plan  then  for  the  first  time,  and  went  to  work 
wich  such  spirit  that,  without  a  previous  trial,  they  ventured  to  attack  the  Car- 
thaginians at  sea,  who  were  of  old  the  first  naval  power,  without  a  rival,'  &c. 

■  Compare  Livy,  xxxv.  16 :  *  Neapolitani  ...  a  quibus  (vos  Romani)  naves 
ex  fcedere  exigitis.'  Livy,  zxn.  39  :  '  Postremo  ipse  a  sociis  Rheginisque  et  a 
Velia  et  a  Pfeesto  debitas  ex  foedere  exigendo  (sc.  naves)  classem  viginti  navium 
eflfecit.*  •  See  vol.  i.  p.  421.  *  See  vol.  i.  p.  412. 

*  Even  PolybiuB  is  here  guilty  of  exaggeration. 

B  2 


CHAP. 
111. 


ShXX)ND 

Period, 
261-256 

B.C. 


52  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     that  the  Bomans  in  the  besrinmnff  of  the  war  in  Sicily 
had  neglected  their  navy.    They  were  never  fond  of  the  sea. 


develop-  While  the  mariners  of  other  nations  challenged  the  dan- 
mentoithe  ggj-g  q{  ^j^g  high  seas  with  enthusiasm,  the  Romans  never 
uary.  trusted  themselves  without  trembling  t^o  that  inconstant 

element,  on  which  their  firm  courage  did  not  supply  the 
want  of  skill  and  natural  aptitude.  They  had  therefore 
failed  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  which  the 
possession  of  the  harbour  of  Antium  offered  to  them  of 
keeping  up  a  moderately  respectable  fleet.  They  probably 
laid  the  burden  of  the  naval  wars  as  much  as  they  could 
on  their  Greek  and  Etruscan  allies,  and  they  may  have 
hoped  at  the  beginning  of  the  Punic  war  that  they  would 
never  need  a  fleet  for  any  other  object  than  for  crossing 
over  to  Sicily.  The  impossibility  of  entertaining  such  an 
idea  any  longer  was  now  proved,  and  they  were  obliged 
to  make  up  their  minds  to  meet  the  masters  of  the  sea  on 
their  own  element. 
The  build-  The  narrative  of  the  building  of  the  flrst  Boman  fleet  is 
fle^t!  ^  hardly  less  a  story  of  wonder  than  those  of  the  regal 
period ;  and  had  the  incident  been  recorded  a  few  gene- 
rations earlier,  benevolent  gods  would  have  appeared,  to 
build  ships  for  the  Bomans  and  to  guide  them  on  the  roll- 
ing waves.  But  Polybius  was  a  rationalist.  He  believed 
in  no  divine  interference,  and  he  relates  the  wonderful 
in  a  manner  that  excites  astonishment,  but  does  not  con- 
tradict the  laws  of  nature.  The  decision  of  the  Boman 
senate  to  build  a  fleet  was  not  carried  out,  it  is  said,  with- 
out the  greatest  difficulty.'  The  Bomans  were  utterly 
unacquainted  with  the  art  of  building  the  quinqueremes — 
large  ships  of  war  vdth  five  benches  for  rowers,  one  above 
the  other,  which  formed  the  strength  of  the  Carthaginian 
fleets.  They  knew  only  triremes — smaller  ships  with  three 
benches  for  rowers,  such  as  formerly  had  been  used  among 
the  Greeks.  They  would,  therefore,  have  been  obliged  to 
give  up  the  idea  of  building  a  fleet,  if  a  stranded  Cartha- 
ginian quinquereme  had  not  fallen  into  their  hands,  which 

>  Polybius,  i.  20,  21. 


THE  FIEST  PUNIC  WAR.  53 

they  used  as  a  model.*     They  set  to  work  with  such  zeal     CHAP. 

that,  within  two  months'  after  the  felling  of  the  wood,  a   , ^ . 

fleet  of  one  hundred  quinqueremes  and  thirty  triremes  was     p^^ 
ready  to  be  launched.     They  were  manned  by  Roman    26i-26a 
citizens  and  Italian  allies  who  had  never  before  handled  an       ^'^' 
oar,  and  in  order  to  gain  time  these  men  were  exercised  on 
the  land  to  make  the  movements  necessary  in  rowing,  to 
keep  time,  and  to  understand  the  word  of  command.   After 
a  little  practice  on  board  the  ships,  these  crews  were  able 
to  go  out  to  sea.,  and  to  challenge  the  boldest,  the  most 
experienced,  and  most  dreaded  seamen  of  their  time. 

We  cannot  help  receiving  this  description  with  some  Improba- 
hesitation  and  doubt.  That  it  was  utterly  impossible  to  ^|j  gj^^ 
build  within  the  short  space  of  sixty  days  a  ship  capable  of 
holding  three  hundred  rowers  and  one  hundred  and  twenty 
soldiers,^  we  will  not  exactly  maintain,  as  we  know  too 
little  of  the  structure  of  those  ships,  and  as  old  historians 
who  did  know  it  thought  that  the  feat  was  wonderful,  and 
even  hardly  credible,*  but  not  positively  impossible.  It  is, 
however,  surely  a  different  thing  when  the  story  asserts 
that  an  entire  fleet  of  one   hundred  and  twenty   ships 

*  Polybius,  i.  20,  §  15.  The  same  anecdote  is  repeated  with  little  yariation 
in  the  narrative  of  the  siege  of  Lilybseum  in  the  year  249,  the  fifteenth  year  of 
the  war.  Zonaras,  viii .  1 6 :  KAa^tos  rpt^pci $  itKrip^as  (rw4\afit  9i*  canwy  "hyvwa 
rhv  KapxH^^i'tov  imcKdovra  ircKr^pcc  ical  ^apaJitiyfia  to7s  *PwfuUois  riis  irofKuriccv^s 
r&p  y€&p  ^hrro.  Polybius,  in  a  later  passage  (i.  59,  §  8),  tells  a  similar  story 
again,  referring  to  the  yery  lust  year  of  the  war.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  such 
a  fable  could  be  invented,  or  find  credence,  for  it  is  well  known  that  the  building 
of  quinqueremes  had  been  understood  and  practised  in  Syracuse  for  at  least  a 
century  and  a  half  (Biodorus,  xiv.  41,  42).  Supposing  therefore,  what  is  not 
at  all  probable,  that  none  of  the  Greek  towns  in  Italy,  not  even  Tarenturo,  had 
become  acquainted  with  the  build  of  these  vessels,  yet  the  Romans,  if  they 
wanted  a  model,  could  surely  get  it  easily  from  their  allies,  the  Syracusans, 
without  waiting  for  the  chance  of  a  stranded  Carthaginian  vessel. 

«  Pliny,  HisL  Nat.  xvi.  39.    Florus,  ii.  6. 

"  This  was  the  number  on  board  the  Boman  vessels  in  the  battle  of 
£cnomus. 

*  Polybius  (i.  38,  §  6),  speaking  of  the  construction  of  a  Roman  fleet  in  three 
months,  in  254  b.c.,  says  *  that  it  is  not  easy  to  believe  it.'  Yet  the  Romans 
by  this  time  had  considerable  experience  in  shipbuilding,  and  the  time  they 
took  was  longer  by  one-half.  We  may  therefore,  a  fortiori^  apply  the  expres- 
sion of  Polybius  to  the  first  feat  of  the  Romans,  and  say  <  that  it  is  not  easy 
to  believe  it.' 


64  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     was  built  in  so  short  a  time.     Extensive  dockyards,  and 

" ^ .   the  necessary  number  of  skilled  ship-carpenters,  might 

perhaps  be  found  in  a  town  like  Carthage,  where  ship- 
building was  practised  and  carried  on  on  a  large  scale  all 
the  year  round.  These  conditions  did  not  exist  in  Borne ; 
and  we  may  therefore  well  ask  whether  it  is  probable  that 
all  the  ships  of  the  new  fleet  were  now  newly  built  and 
built  in  Bome,  and,  farther,  whether  in  the  Etruscan 
towns,  in  Naples,  Elea,  Bhegium,  Tarentum,  Locri,  and, 
above  all,  in  Syracuse  and  Messana,  there  were  no  ships 
ready  for  use,  or  whether  it  was  impossible  to  build  any 
in  these  places.  Surely  this  would  be  in  the  highest 
degree  surprising.  We  know  that  the  Bomans  availed 
themselves  without  scruple  of  the  resources  of  their  allies,' 
and  we  see  no  reason  why  they  should  have  done  so  less 
now  than  at  the  breaking  out  of  the  wai',  when  they  made 
use  of  the  Greek  ships  for  crossing  over  to  Sicily. 
Conposj-         ^j^Q  believe,  therefore,  in  spite  of  the  account  of  Poly- 

tion  of  tha-       ,  ,  • 

Roman.       bius,  that  the  greater  portion  of  the  ships  of  the  Boman 
°*^-  fleet  came  from   Greek  and  Etruscan  towns,  and  were 

manned  by  Greeks  and  Etruscans.  The  latter  supposition 
is  even  more  forced  upon  us  than  the  former.  A  few 
rowers  may  have  been  drilled  in  the  way  indicated,  and 
mixed  up  with  old,  experienced  seamen ;  but  how  anyone 
can  possibly  imagine  that  the  ships  were  entirely  manned  by 
crews  who  had  learnt  rowing  on  land  is  incomprehensible. 
We  should  have  to  consider  the  art  of  navigation  of  the 
ancients  as  in  the  highest  degree  contemptible ;  we  should 
not  be  able  to  understand  how  the  historians  could  speak 
of  naval  powers  and  of  a  dominion  of  the  sea ;  how  her 

'  Next  to  the  naval  sendee,  the  cavalry  service  was  least  congenial  to  the 
Romans,  and  of  this,  therefore,  they  threw  by  far  the  greater  burden  on  their 
allies.  The  name  for  the  crews  was  '  socii  narales,'  a  term  which  shows  that 
the  allies  principally  had  to  furnish  them.  The  Greek  towns  were  not  obliged 
to  send  contingents  to  the  laud  army,  but  they  had  to  furnish  ships  and  sailors 
instead  (Livy  xxvi.  39,  xxxvi.  42).  As  we  have  previously  observed  (vol.  i. 
p.  275),  the  Roman  historians  systematically  omitted  to  mention  the  assistance 
of  their  allies;  yet  Zonaras  (viii.  14)  reports  that  Hiero  of  Syracuse  supplied 
the  consul  C.  Aurelius  Cotta  (252  b.c.)  with  ships.  Compare  also  Diodorus, 
xxiii.  £r.  9,  above,  p.  51,  note  2. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAB.  65 

fleet  could  be  said  to  constitute  the  glory,  security,  and     CHAP. 

greatness  of  Carthage,  if  it  had  been  possible  for  a  conti- , — . 

nental  power  like  Borne,  without  any  preparation  or  assist-     p'^^^ 
ance,  in  two  months  to  find  ships,  captains,  and  sailors    261-255 
who  on  their  first  encounter  were  more  than  a  match  for       ^^' 
the  oldest  naval  empire.     If  we  bear  in  mind  that  it  was  a 
common  practice  among  the  Eoman  historians  to  appro- 
priate to  themselyes  the  merits  of  their  allies,^  we  shall 
with  the  less  hesitation  doubt  the  boastful  stories  which 
teU  us  how  the  first  fleet  was  buUt,  and  we  shall  in  the  end 
venture  to  suspect  that  a  greater,  and  perhaps  much  the 
greater,  part  of  the  credit  belongs  to  the  Etruscans  and  to 
the  Italian  and  Sicilian  Greeks. 

The  first  undertaking  of  the  Eoman  fleet  was  a  failure.  Capture  of 
The  consul  Cn.  Cornelius  Scipio  sailed  iVith  a  detachment  on.  Corne- 
consisting  of  seventeen  ships  to  Sicily,  and  was  incautious  ^^  Sdpio. 
enough  to  enter  the  harbour  of  the  small  island  of  Lipara, 
which  had  been  represented  to  him  as  ready  to  revolt  from 
Carthage.     But  a  Carthii.ginian  squadron  which  lay  in  the 
neighbourhood,  and  blocked  up  the  harbour  in  the  night, 
took  the  consul's  ships  and  their  crews,  and,  instead  of 
the  expected  glory,  Scipio  obtained  only  the  nickname  of 
Asina.' 

This  loss  was  soon  after  repaired.     The  Carthaginian  Battle  of 
admiral,  Hannibal,  the  defender  of  Agrigentum,  embol-     ^ 
dened  by  this  easy  success,  sailed  with  a  squadron  of  fifty 
ships  towards  the  Roman  fleet,  which  was  advancing  along 
the  coast  of  Italy  from  the  north.     But  he  was  suddenly 
surprised  by  it,  attacked^  and  put  to  flight,  with  the  loss  of 

>  Vol.  i.  p.  276. 

'  Poly bi us,  i.  21.  Macrobius,  Sat  i.  5.  See  Niebuhr,  Rom.  Gesch.  iii. 
677 ;  English  translation,  iii.  579.  Some  Roman  writers  so  represented 
this  incident  as  to  make  the  Carthaginians  appear  guilty  of  treachery  and 
peijury  (see  Zton&T&s,  viii.  10).  They  related  that  Boodes,  the  Carthaginian 
admiral,  fearing  to  drive  the  Romans  to  despair,  iuYited  Scipio  and  his 
officers  to  come  on  board  his  ship  for  the  purpose  of  negotiating,  and  then 
seized  them  all,  whereupon  the  Roman  crews  lost  courage  and  surrendered.  It 
is  needless  to  say  that  tliis  attempt  to  clear  Scipio  of  the  charge  of  rashness 
and  to  accuse  the  Carthaginians  of  treachery  is  futile  and  childish.  Polybius 
.says  nothing  even  of  a  stratagem  of  the  Carthaginians. 


56  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     the  greater  part  of  his  ships.     After  this  preliminary  trial 

, . ' ..   of  strength,  the  Boman  fleet  arrived  in  the  harbour  of 

Messana;  and  as  the  consul  Scipio,  who  was  to  have 
taken  the  command  of  the  fleet,  was  made  prisoner,  his 
colleague,  Cains  Doilius,  gave  the  command  of  the  land 
army  to  his  subordinate  ofScer,  and  without  delay  led  the 
Bopian  against  the  Carthaginian  fleet,  which  was  de- 
vastating the  coast  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Pelorus,  the 
north-eastern  promontory  of  Sicily.  The  enemies  met  off 
Myl£B,  and  here  was  fought  the  first  battle  at  sea,  which 
was  to  decide  whether  the  Boman  state  should  be  confined 
to  Italy,  or  whether  it  should  gradually  extend  itself  to  all 
the  islands  and  coasts  of  the  Mediterranean — a  sea  which 
they  were  now  to  prove  themselves  entitled  to  speak  of  as 
emphatically  *  their  own.'  ^  It  is  said  that  the  Carthaginian 
fleet,  under  the  command  of  Hannibal,  consisted  of  one 
hundred  and  thirty  ships.  It  had  therefore  ten  more  ships 
than  the  Boman.  Each  of  these  was  without  doubt  far 
superior  to  the  Boman  ships  in  the  manner  of  sailing,  in 
agility  and  speed,  but  more  especially  in  the  skill  of  the 
captains  and  sailors,  even  though,  as  we  suppose,  a  great 
number  of  the  Boman  vessels  were  built  and  manned  by 
Greeks.  The  tactics  of  ancient  naval  warfare  consisted 
chiefly  in  running  the  ships  against  the  broadside  of  the 
hostile  ships,  and  either  sinking  them  by  the  force  of  the 
collision,  or  brushing  away  the  mass  of  bristling  oars.  For 
this  purpose  the  prows  had  under  the  water-line  sharp  iron 
prongs  called  beaks  {ro8tra)y  which  penetrated  the  timbers 
of  the  enemy's  ships.  It  was,  therefore,  of  the  greatest 
importance  for  each  captain  to  have  his  ship  so  completely 
under  his  control  as  to  be  able  to  turn  about,  to  advance, 
or  retreat  with  the  greatest  rapidity,  and  to  watch  and 
seize  the  favourable  moment  for  the  decisive  rush.  To 
fight  from  the  deck  with  arrows  and  other  missiles  could, 
in  this  species  of  tactics,  be  only  of  subordinate  importance, 
and  therefore  there  was  only  a  small  number  of  soldiers 
on  board  the  ships  by  the  side  of  the  rowers. 

>  '  Hare  nostrum.* 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR.  57 

The  Eomans  were  well  aware  of  the  superiority  of  the     CHAP. 
Carthaginians  in  maritime  tactics.     They  could  not  hope  s_ — .J— / 
to  vie  with  them  in  this  respect.     They  therefore  hit  upon    p^^^^ 
a  plan  for  supplying  their  want  of  skill  at  sea,  by  a  mode  of    261-265 
fighting  which  should  place  not  ship  against  ship,  but  man 
asfaiiist  man,  and  which  in  a  certain  way  should  make  the  ^^^^ 

&  7  J  ^  naval  tac- 

sea-fight  very  much  like  a  battle  on  land.  They  invented  tics. 
the  boarding-bridges.^  On  the  fore  part  of  the  ship,  against 
a  mast  twenty- four  feet  high,  a  ladder  thirty-six  feet 
long  was  fixed,  twelve  feet  above  the  deck,  in  such  a 
manner  that  it  could  be  moved  up  and  down  as  well  as 
sideways.  This  drawing  up  and  down  was  eflPected  by 
means  of  a  rope  which  passed  from  the  end  of  the  ladder 
through  a  ring  at  the  top  of  the  mast  on  to  the  deck. 
How  the  horizontal  movements  were  produced  does  not 
appear  from  the  account  of  Polybius,  who  fails  also  to 
explain  how  the  lower  end  of  the  ladder,  which  was  fixed 
to  the  mast  twelve  feet  above  the  deck,  could  be  reached. 
Perhaps  there  was  a  second  part  to  the  ladder  fixed  to  it 
with  hinges,  leading  from  the  deck  up  towards  the  mast, 
and  serving  at  the  same  time  to  move  the  ladder  all  round 
the  mast.  The  ladder  was  so  broad  that  two  soldiers 
could  stand  abreast  on  it.  Bailings  right  and  lefb  served 
as  a  protection  against  missiles  and  against  the  danger  of 
falling.  At  the  end  of  the  ladder  was  a  strong  pointed 
hook  bent  downwards.  If  the  enemy  approached  near 
enoagh,  they  had  only  to  let  go  the  rope  which  held  the 
ladder  upright.  If  it  fell  on  the  deck  of  the  hostile  ship, 
the  hook  penetrated  the  timbers  and  held  the  two  ships 
together.  Then  the  soldiers  ran  from  the  deck  along  the 
ladder  to  board,  and  the  sea-fight  became  a  hand-to-hand 
engagement.' 

When  the  Carthaginians  under  Hannibal  perceived  the  Defeat  of 

>  It  18  not  stated  who  web  the  real  inventor.  We  should  like  to  know  whether 
it  was  a  Boman  or  a  Greek. 

'  The  description  which  Polybius  (i.  22)  gives  of  the  bo€irdiDg-bridges  is  the 
only  one  which  we  have,  and  it  is  not  sufficiently  clear  and  complete,  so  that 
doubts  remain  concerning  some  parts  of  the  apparatus.  See  Haltaus,  Gtsch.  der 
Bomer,  Beilage,  pp.  607-628. 


68  BOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     Boman  fleet,  they  bore  down  upon  it  and  began  the  battle, 
confident  of  an  easy  victory.    But  they  were  sadly  dis- 


tbeCar-      appointed.      The    boarding-bridges    answered    perfectly. 

thaginiAM.  Fifty  Carthaginian  vessels  were  taken  or  destroyed,  and  a 
great  number  of  prisoners  were  made.  Hannibal  himself 
escaped  with  difficulty  and  had  to  abandon  his  flag-ship, 
a  huge  vessel  of  seven  rows  of  oars,  taken  in  the  late  war 
from  King  Pyrrhus.  The  remainder  of  the  Carthaginian 
vessels  took  to  flight.  If  the  joy  at  this  first  glorious 
victory  was  great,  it  was  fully  justified.  The  honour  of  a 
triumph^  was  awarded  to  Duilius;  and  the  story  goes 
that  he  was  permitted  to  prolong  this  triumph  throughout 
his  whole  life  by  causing  himself  to  be  accompanied  by  a 
flute-player  and  a  torch-bearer  whenever  he  returned 
home  of  an  evening  from  a  banquet.'  A  column,  deco- 
rated with  the  beaks  of  conquered  ships  and  with  an  in- 
scription celebrating  the  victory,*  was  erected  on  the 
Forum  as  a  memorial  of  the  battle. 

J«lie^o^  This  decisive  victory  of  the  Eomans  happened  just  in 
time  to  restore  the  fortune  of  war,  which  had  seriously 
gone  against  them  in  Sicily.  Most  of  the  towns  on  the 
coast  and  many  in  the  interior  had  fallen,  as  we  have 
seen,  during  the  preceding  year,  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  The  Carthaginians  were  now  besieging  Segesta, 
to  revenge  themselves  for  the  treachery  of  the  Segestans, 
who  had  murdered  the  Carthaginian  garrison  and  given 
the  town  over  to  the  Romans.^  During  the  consul's 
absence  from  the  army  the  military  tribune  C.  CsBciUus 
had  attempted  to  assist  the  town,  but  was  surprised  and 
suffered  much  loss.^  The  greater  part  of  the  Eoman  army 
in  Sicily  lay  in  Segesta.  It  was,  therefore,  very  fortunate 
that  Duilius  was  able,  after  his  victory  at  Mylse,  to  take 

*  lAyjt  epit.  17.    This  was  the  first  triumphus  navalis. 
'  Cicero,  De  Senectute,  13.  Valerius  Jdozimus,  iii.  6,  4. 

*  The  fragments  of  this  inscription  which  are  still  extant  appear  to  he  parts 
of  the  column  restored  hy  Tiberius,  and  not  of  the  original  monument.  See 
Flatner  and  Urlich's  Som,  p.  234. 

*  See  above,  p.  44. 
'  Zonaras,  viii.  11.     Of  this  defeat  no  mention  is  made  by  Poly  bins,  i.  14. 


THE  FERST  PUNIC  WAR.  59 

the  soldiers  from  the  ships  and  relieve  this  town.     With     CHAP. 

Ill 
the  army  thns  set  free,  he  was  able  to   conqner  some  ^.^ — ^ — 

towns,  as  for  instance  Macella,  and  to  put  other  friendly    p^^ 
cities  in  a  state  of  defence.  261-266 

Since  the  fall  of  Agrigentnm,  the  command  of  the  ^^ 
Carthaginian  troops  in  Sicily  had  been  in  the  hands  of  Operations 
Hamilcar — not  the  celebrated  Hamilcar  the  father  of  car, 
Hannibal,^  but  a  man  not  unlike  his  namesake  in  enter- 
prising spirit  and  ability.  It  was  probably  owing  to  him 
that  during  these  years  the  Carthaginians  did  not  lose 
Sicily.  He  succeeded  in  so  far  counteracting  the  effect 
of  the  Boman  victories  at  Agrigentum  and  Mylse  as  to 
make  it  doubtftil  to  which  side  the  fortune  of  war  waa 
turning.  These  exploits  of  Hamilcar  cannot  be  given  in 
detail,  as  the  report  of  Philinus,  who  wrote  the  history  of 
the  war  from  the  Carthaginian  point  of  view,  has  been  lost,* 
and  as  the  order  of  time  in  which  the  events  succeeded 
each  other  is  also  doubtftd.'  Still,  the  grand  form  of 
Hamilcar  stands  out  in  such  bold  relief  that  we  recognise 
in  him  one  of  the  greatest  generals  of  that  period.  In 
the  outset  he  sacrificed  a  part  of  his  mutinous  mercenaries 
after  the  manner  which  we  have  already  seen  applied  by 
Dionysius  and  Hiero.  He  sent  them  to  attack  the  town 
of  Entella,  afber  having  first  warned  the  Eoman  garrison 
of  their  approach,  and  thus  attained  a  double  advantage, 
inasmuch  as  he  got  rid  of  the  inconvenient  mercenaries, 
and,  as  despair  made  them  fight  bravely,  he  inflicted  con- 
siderable injury  on  the  Bomans.  This  faithless  proceeding, 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  was  by  no  means  unheard  of  or 
exceptional,  shows  how  dangerous  for  both  sides  was  the 
relation  between  mercenaries  and  their  commanders.  On 
the  one  side,  instead  of  patriotism,  faithftilness,  and  devo- 
tion, we  find   among  the  soldiers  a  spirit  of  rapacity, 

>  Zonaras  (viii.  10)  erroneously  supposes  him  to  be  the  father  of  the  great 
Hannibal. 

'  We  derive  our  infonnation  chiefly  from  the  confused  fragments  of  Diodorus 
(xxiii.  fr.  9).  Polybius  passes  over  a  good  deal  in  silence,  either  for  the 
sake  of  brevity,  or  from  partiality  for  the  Romans. 

*  Diodorus  {loo.  cit.)  seems  to  refer  everything  to  the  year  after  the  conquest 
of  Agrigentum,  -which  is  certainly  a  mistake. 


60 


ROMAN  mSTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Destruc- 
tion of 
Eryx  by 
Hamilcar. 


Victory  of 
Hamilcar 
at  Thermae. 


hardly  restrained  by  military  discipline ;  on  the  other  we 
observe  cold  calculation  and  heartlessness,  which  saw  in  a 
soldier  no  kinsman,  citizen,  or  brother,  but  an  instrument 
of  war  purchasable  for  a  certain  sum,  and  worthy  of  no 
considerations  bub  those  which  called  for  the  preservation 
of  valuable  property. 

With  quite  as  much  harshness,  though  with  less  cruelty, 
Hamilcar  treated  the  inhabitants  of  the  old  town  of 
Eryx.  This  town  of  the  Elymi,  at  first  friendly  to  the 
Punians  and  then  subject  to  them,  appears  to  have  been 
exposed  to  the  attacks  of  the  Romans  because  it  was  not 
situated  immediately  on  the  coast.  Hamilcar  razed  it  to 
the  ground,  and  sent  the  inhabitants  away  to  the  neigh- 
bouring promontory,  Drepana,  where  he  built  a  new 
fortified  town,  which,  with  the  neighbouring  town  of 
Lilybseum,  formed  as  it  were  a  common  system  of  defence, 
and  subsequently  proved  its  strength  by  a  long-continued 
resistance  to  the  persevering  attacks  of  the  Bomans.  Of 
the  venerable  town  of  Eryx  there  remained  only  the 
temple  of  Yenus,  the  building  of  which  was  attributed  to 
^neas,  the  son  of  the  goddess. 

After  Hamilcar  had  thus  covered  his  retreat,  he  proceeded 
to  the  attack.  We  have  already  heard  of  the  siege  of 
Begesta.  The  victory  of  the  Romans  at  Mylse  saved 
Segesta,  after  it  had  been  driven  to  the  utmost  distress. 
But  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Thermse,^  Hamilcar  succeeded 
in  inflicting  a  great  blow.  He  surprised  a  portion  of  the 
Roman  army,  and  killed  4,000  men.*  The  consequences 
of  the  victory  at  My  lee  appear  to  have  been  confined  to 
the  raising  of  the  siege  of  Segesta.  The  Romans  did  not 
succeed  in  taking  the  little  fortress  of  Myttiatratum  (now 


*  ThprmsB  was  a  town  built  by  the  Carthaginians  near  the  site  of  the  ancient 
city  of  Himera,  which  they  had  destroyed  (Diodonis,  xiii.  69  ff.  79). 

«  According  to  Diodorus,  (xxiii.  fr.  9),  6,000  men.  Polybius  (i.  24,  §§  3,  4) 
excuses  and  extenuates  the  defeat  of  the  Homans.  He  says  that  the  allies 
suffered  the  loss,  not  the  Roman  legions  ;  for  a  dispute  had  broken  out  between 
these  two  classes  of  troops  concerning  the  place  of  honour,  and  the  allies  had 
taken  up  a  separate  position,  where  they  were  surprised  and  cut  to  pieces  by 
the  Carthaginians. 


1 


THE  FIBST  PUNIC  WAR.  61 

called  Mistrella)  on  the  northern  coa^t  of  Sicily.  In  spite 
of  the  greatest  possible  exertions,  they  had  to  retreat,  at 
the  end  of  a  seven  months'  siege,  with  heavy  losses.^  Pe^od 
They  lost,  further,  a  number  of  Sicilian  towns,  the  greater  261-256 
part  of  which,  it  appears,  went  over  voluntarily  to  the  ^'^' 
Carthaginians.  Among  these  is  mentioned  the  important 
town  of  Camarina  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of 
Syracuse,  and  even  Enna,  in  the  middle  of  the  island,  the 
town  sacred  to  Ceres  and  Proserpina  (Demeter  and 
Persephone)  the  protecting  goddesses  of  Sicily.  The  hill 
Camicus,  where  the  citadel  of  Agrigentum  stood,  fell  also 
again  into  the  power  of  the  Carthaginians,  who  would 
indeed,  according  to  the  report  of  Zonaras,  have  again 
subdued  the  whole  of  Sicily  if  the  consul  of  259,  C.  Aquillius 
Florus,  had  not  wintered  in  the  island,  instead  of  returning 
to  Bome  with  his  legions,  according  to  the  usual  custom 
after  the  end  of  the  summer  campaign. 

In  the  following  year  fortune  began  once  more  to  smile  Renewed 
on  the  Eomans.    Both  consuls,  A.  Atilius  Calatinus  and  ^f ^^e^®^ 
C.  Sulpicius  Paterculus,  went  to  Sicily.     They  succeeded  Romang. 
in  retaking  the  most  important  of  the  places  which  had 
revolted,  especially  Camarina  *  and  Enna,  together  with 
Myttistratum,'  which  had  just  been  so  obstinately  defended. 

*  Poljbius  (i.  24,  §  11)  mentions  only  the  final  conquest  of  Myttistratum 
two  years  later,  after  it  had,  as  he  says,  stood  a  protracted  siege.  Diodorus 
alone  (zxiii.  fr.  9)  states  that  a  prmous  siege  ended  with  the  retreat  of  the 
Romans  from  the  place.  Polybiua  betrays  here  as  elsewhere  a  partiality  for 
the  Romans,  which  is  no  doubt  due,  at  least  in  part,  to  the  authorities  whom  he 
consulted. 

*  At  the  siege  of  Camarina  the  Roman  army  ran  great  risk  of  being  annihi- 
lated or  captured.  It  was  saTed  by  the  self-devotion  of  a  militazy  tribune  and 
400  mfin  (Livy,  epit.  17  ;  Zonaras,  viii.  12;  Gellius,  iii.  7).  Cato,  who,  in  his 
historical  work  Origines,  compares  the  exploit  of  this  tribune  to  that  of 
Tjeonidas  at  Thermopylae,  laments  that  the  Roman  hero  earned  but  scanty 
praise,  while  the  deed  of  Leonidas  was  celebrated  all  over  Greece  by  historians, 
poets,  sculptors,  and  the  whole  nation.  The  brave  tribune  has  indeed  been 
hardly  treated,  for  we  do  not  even  know  his  name.  Whilst  Cato  calls  him  Q. 
Csedicius,  the  annalist  Claudius  Quadrigarius  calls  him  Laberius,  and  Livy 
Marcus  Calpumius.  Camarina  resisted  all  the  attacks  of  the  Romans  until  at 
length  Hiero  supplied  his  allies  with  engines  for  the  siege  (Diodorus,  he,  cit). 
It  is  noteworthy  that  Polybius  says  nothing  of  all  this. 

"  Polybius,  i.  24,  §§  9-12.  Littana  (Diodorus,  zxiii.  f^.  9.) — ^probably  identical 


62  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     At  the  conquest  of  this  town,  which  had  cost  them  so  much, 
^ — r-I — '  the  resentment  among  the  Boman  soldiers  was  such  thnt, 
after  the  secret  retreat  of  the  Carthaginian  garrison,  they 
fell  on  the  helpless  inhabitants,  and  murdered  them  without 
mercy,  until  the  consul  put  an  end  to  their  ferocity  by 
promising  them,  as  part  of  their  spoil,  all  the  men  whose 
lives  they   would  spare.     The  inhabitants   of  Camarina 
were  sold  as  slaves.     We  do  not  read  that  this  was  the 
fate  of  Enna ;  but  this  town  could  not  expect  an  easier  lot, 
unless  it  redeemed  its  former  treason  by  now  betraying 
the  Carthaginian  garrison  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans. 
From  these  scanty  details  we  can  form  some  idea  of  the 
indescribable  misery  which  this  bloody  war  brought  upon 
Sicily. 
Erpedition       The  succcsscs  of  Hamilcar  in  Sicily,  in  the  year  259, 
ComImI.^  ^  ■'^ere,  it  appears,  to  be  attributed  in  part  to  the  circumstance 
that  the  Romans   after  the  battle   of   MylsB  had  sent 
L.  Cornelius  Scipio,  one  of  the  consuls  of  the  year  269,  to 
Corsica,  in  the  hope  of  driving  the  Carthaginians  quite  out 
of  the  Tyrrhenian  sea.     On  this  island  the  Carthaginians 
had,  as  £bt  as  we  know,  no  settlements  or  possessions.    Still 
they  must  have  had  in  the  town  of  Aleria  a  station  for  their 
fleet,  whence  they  could  constantly  alarm  and  threaten 
Italy.     Aleria  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Bomans,  and  thus 
the  whole  island  was  cleared  of  the  Carthaginians.     From 
thence  Scipio  sailed  to  Sardinia ;  but  here  nothing  was 
done.     Both  Carthaginians  and  Bomans  avoided  an  en- 
counter, and  Scipio  returned  home.*     This  expedition  to 
Corsica  and  Sardinia,  which  Polybius,  probably  on  account 
of  its  insignificance  and  its  fiiilure,  does  not  even  mention, 
was  for  the  Cornelian  house  a  sufficient  occasion  to  celebrate 
Scipio  as  a  conqueror  and  hero.     They  were  justified  in 

with  Hippana,  mentioned  by  Polybius,  (i.  24,  §  10) — was  likewise  taken,  as 
also  the  hill  Camicns  near  Agrigentum,  and  the  town  of  Erbessns.  An  attempt 
of  the  consul  Atilius  to  seize  the  island  of  Lipara  failed.  How  little  the 
later  compilers  of  historical  compendiaries  are  to  be  trusted  mAy  be  seen  from 
the  statements  of  Aurelius  Victor  (39)  and  Florus  (ii.  2),  that  Drepana  and 
Lilybsum  were  taken  by  the  Romans. 
'  Zonaras,  Tiii.  1 1. 


B.a 


THE  HBST  PUNIC  WAR  63 

saying  that  lie  took  Aleria ;  and  as  the  expulsion  of  the     CHAP. 

Carthaginians  from  C!orsica  followed,  he  might  be  regarded  ^ r^ — ^ 

as  the  conqueror  of  Corsica,  though  in  truth  Corsica  was  p^^od 
not  occupied  by  the  Eomans  till  after  the  peace  with  .261-256 
Carthage.  Accordingly  these  exploits  are  noticed  on  the 
second  grave-stone  in  the  series  of  monuments  belonging 
to  the  family  of  the  Scipios,  with  the  first  of  which  we  have 
already  become  acquainted.^  From  this  modesty,  which  con- 
fined itself  to  the  real  facts,  we  cannot  help  inferring  that 
the  inscription  was  composed  shortly  after  the  death  of 
Scipio,  when  the  memory  of  his  deeds  was  fresh,  and  a  great 
exaggeration  could  hardly  be  ventured  upon.  If  it  had 
not  been  so,  and  if  the  inscription  had  had  a  later  origin, 
there  is  nothing  more  certain  than  that  in  this,  as  in  that 
of  the  father,  great  untruths  would  have  been  introduced. 
This  becomes  quite  evident  from  the  additions  which  we 
find  in  later  authors,  and  which  can  have  originated  only 
in  the  family  traditions  of  the  Scipios.  Valerius  Maximus, 
Orosius,  and  Silius  Italicus^  mention  a  second  campaign  of 
Scipio  in  Sardinia,  in  which  he  besieged  and  conquered 
Olbia,  defeated  Hanno,  the  Carthaginian  general,  and 
displayed  his  magnanimity  by  causing  his  body  to  be  in- 
terred with  all  honours.^  He  then  gained  possession  with- 
out difficulty  of  a  number  of  hostile  towns  by  a  peculiar 
stratagem,  and  finally,  as  the   Capitoline  £etsti  testify, 

'  See  Tol.  i.  p.  469.  The  following  is  the  epitaph  (Orelli,  Inteript  Latin* 
Selfcl.  n.  662)  :— 

Hone  oino  ploirume  consentiont  B(oiaae} 
Duonoro  optumo  ftiise  Tiro 
Luciom  Scipione.    Filios  Barbati 
CoDSol  censor  aidilis  hie  fuet  a(pnd  tos) 
Hec  cepit  Corsica  Aleriamqtie  iirbe 
Dedet  tempestatibns  aide  merito. 

Compare  Bitschl,  Rheinisches  Mumim^  1864. 

'  Valerius  Maxinms,  t.  1,  2.    Orosius,  iy.  T,    Silius  Italicas,  vi.  671. 

*  Traits  of  generosity  and  a  chivalrous  disposition  seldom  met  with  among  ths 
Eomans  we  shall  frequently  find  in  the  histoiy  of  the  Scipios.  They  are  quite 
characteristic  of  this  particular  family,  and  their  insertion  into  the  history  of 
Borne  seems  to  be  owing  to  a  writer  of  poetic  imagination.  Perhaps  we  can 
here  trace  the  band  of  the  poet  Ennius,  who  was  a  client  of  the  Scipios. 


64 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Battle  of 
Tyndaris. 


celebrated  a  magnificent  triumph.'  These  additions,  of 
which  neither  the  epitaph  of  Scipio,  nor  Zonaras,  nor 
Poljbius  know  anything,  are  nothing  more  than  empty 
inventions.  Moreover,  we  see  from  Polybius  and  Zonaras, 
that,  in  the  year  before  Scipio's  consulate,  Hannibal,  not 
Hamno,  had  the  command  in  Sardinia.  When  the  former, 
in  the  year  following  (268),  had  been  blocked  up  in  a 
harbour  in  Sardinia  by  the  consul  Sulpicius,  and,  after 
losing  many  of  his  ships,  had  been  murdered  by  his  own 
mutinous  soldiers,  Eanno  received  the  command  of  the 
Carthaginians  in  Sardinia,  and  could  not  therefore  have 
been  conquered,  slain,  and  buried  by  Scipio  the  year 
before.^ 

The  year  268  had  restored  the  superiority  of  the  Somans 
in  Sicily.  They  had  conquered  Camarina,  Enna,  Myttis- 
tratum,  and  many  other  towns,  and  driven  back  Hamilcar 
to  the  west  side  of  the  island.  The  expeditions  which 
they  had  undeirtaken  against  Corsica  and  Sardinia  had 
also  been  on  the  whole  successful.  The  power  of  Carthage 
in  the  Tyrrhenian  sea  was  weakened,  and  Italy  for  the 
present  secure  against  any  hostile  fleet.  To  these  suc- 
cesses was  added  in  the  following  year  a  glorious  battle 
by  sea  (267  B.C.)  at  Tyndaris,  on  the  northern  coast  of 
Sicily.  It  was  no  decisive  victory,  for  both  parties 
claimed  an  advantage.  Still  it  inspired  the  Bomans  with 
new  confidence  in  their  navy.  It  induced  them  to  enlarge 
their  fleet,  and  to  prosecute  the  naval  war  on  a  larger  scale. 
It  prompted  the  bold  idea  of  removing  the  seat  of  war  into 
the  enemy's  country,  and  of  attacking  Africa  instead  of 
protecting  Italy  against  the  Carthaginian  invasions. 
Whether  their  hopes  went   further,  whether  they  had 


1  We  have  often  had  occasion  to  notice  the  worthlessneas  of  the  Capitoline 
fasti  as  historical  documents.  Circnmstantial  lies  engrayed  on  marble  slabs  are 
very  imposing;  nevertheless  the  following  document  must  be  rejected  as  entirely 
fictitious : 

Cornelius  L.  f.  On.  n.  Scipio  Cos.      An.  cdxcit. 
De  Foenis  et  Sardinia  Corsica  V.  id.  Mart, 

*  PolybiuSi  i.  24,  §  6.    Zonaras,  riii.  12.    Livy,  epit  17. 


THE  HEST  PUNIC  WAR.  65 

already  conceived  the  scheme  which  Scipio  succeeded  in     CHAP, 
carrying  ont  at  the  end  of  the  second  war  with  Carthage,  >>.    ,J — . 
viz.  that  of  aiming  a  deadly  blow  at  the  very  centre  of    1^^^ 
Carthaginian  power,  and  so  bringing  the  struggle  to  a    261-266 

B  C 

conclusion,  would  be  difficult  to  prove.  In  that  case  they 
would  have  estimated  the  strength  of  Carthage  much  too 
low,  and  their  own  powers  too  high  ? 

Efforts  were  now  made  in  Bome  to  fit  out  an  armament.  Movements 
A  fleet  of  330  ships  of  war  sailed  to  Sicily,  took  on  board  ^nder 
an  army  of  about  40,000  men,  consisting  of  two  consular  Reeulus 
armies,  and  sailed  along  the  south  coast  of  Sicily  west-  Manlius 
wards,  under  the  command  of  the  two  consuls,  M.  Atilius  ^'^^^°* 
Regulus  and  L.  Manlius  Vulso.  Between  the  promontory 
of  Ecnomus  and  the  town  of  Heraclea  the  Bomans  met  a 
Carthaginian  fleet  still  stronger  than  their  ovm,  under  the 
command  of  Hamilcar  and  Hanno,  whose  object  was  to 
obstruct  their  way  to  Africa.  If  we  may  rely  on  the 
accounts  of  Polybius,  there  was  here  an  army  of  140,000 
Bomans,  opposed  to  150,000  Carthaginians.  But  it  is 
hardly  credible  that  the  Carthaginian  ships  should  have 
had  an  army  on  board  equal  to  that  of  the  Bomans,  as  the 
latter  intended  a  descent  on  Africa,  and  had  their  whole 
land  force,  i.e,  four  double  legions,  with  them.  The 
Carthaginians  would  have  had  no  object  in  encumber- 
ing their  ships  to  that  extent,  especially  as  their  tactics 
did  not  consist  so  much  in  boarding  as  in  disabling 
iheir  enemies'  ships,  and  as  they  endeavoured  in  every 
way  to  avoid  the  Boman  boarding-ladders.  We  have  no 
Carthaginian  authority  to  test  the  report  of  Boman 
witnesses  that  the  fleet  of  Hamilcar  consisted  of  350 
ships.  There  is,  then,  no  choice  left  but  to  follow  Polybius, 
who  has  described  the  battle  at  Ecnomus  with  such  clear- 
ness and  accuracy  of  detail  that  nothing  more  can  be 
desired.^ 

The  Carthaginian  fleet  advanced  from  the  west  in  a  Battle  of 
single  long  extended  front,  which  stretched  from  the  coast  Ecnomus. 

>  Poljbiofi,!.  26-28. 
VOL.  II.  F 


66  BOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     far  oat  into  the  sea,  and  only  on  the  left  wing  fonned  an 


IV. 


,  angle,  by  one  detachment  being  placed  rather  in  advance. 
The  Boman  fleet,  consisting  of  four  divisions,  formed  with 
three  of  them  a  hollow  triangle,  the  point  of  which,  headed 
by  the  consuls  in  person,  was  directed  against  the 
Carthaginian  line.  The  quinqueremes,  which  formed  the 
base  of  the  triangle,  had  the  ships  of  burden  in  tow,  while 
the  fourth  division  formed  the  rear  in  one  line  of  war- 
ships, which  carried  the  veteran  troops,  the  triarians  of 
the  legions.  If  this  wedge-like  form  of  the  Eoman  fleet 
was  suited  to  breaking  through  the  Carthaginian  line,  the 
long  line  of  the  latter  was  on  the  other  hand  calculated  to 
surround  the  Romans.  This  disposition  determined  the 
issue  of  the  battle.  The  consuls  broke  through  the 
line  of  Carthaginian  vessels  without  trouble.  By  their 
advance  the  two  lines  of  Boman  ships  which  formed  the 
sides  of  the  triangle  were  separated  from  the  base.  Against 
this  remainder  were  now  directed  the  attacks  of  both  the 
Carthaginian  wings.  The  great  naval  battle  resolved 
itself  into  three  distinct  parts,  each  of  which  was  sufficiently 
important  to  rank  as  a  battle  by  itself.  The  Eoman  ships 
with  the  transports  were  hard  pressed  and  obliged  to  slip 
their  cables,  to  sacrifice  the  transports,  and  to  retreat.  The 
reserve,  with  the  triarians,  was  in  the  same  distress.  At 
length,  when  the  consuls,  giving  up  the  pursuit  of  the 
Carthaginian  centre,  came  to  the  assistance  of  their 
own  main  body,  the  victory  turned  to  the  side  of  the 
Bomans.  The  boarding-ladders  seem  again  to  have 
rendered  important  service.  Thirty  Carthaginian  ships 
were  destroyed,  sixty-four  were  taken.  The  loss  of  the 
Bomans  was  at  the  outside  twenty-four  ships. 
lAnding  of  After  such  a  decided  victory  the  way  to  Carthage  was 
Komans  on  opcu  to  the  Bomans.  But  to  our  astonishment  we  read 
Cartha<?i-     ^^  ^j^^y  returned  to  Messana  for  the  purpose  of  takiner  in 

man  teen-  •'  ,  ,  x-      x-  & 

tLty.  supplies,  and  repairmg  their  damaged  vessels.^     From  this 

■  Zonaias,  Tiii.  12.  There  is  also  a  report  of  negotiations  of  peace,  by  which 
Hamilcar  wished  to  gain  time.  On  this  occasion  a  silly  story  is  related,  which 
exhibits  the  barefiiced  mendacity  and  childish  vanity  of  the  later  collectors  of 


THE  FIBST  PUNIC  WAR.  67 

we  may  conclude  that  the  losses  of  the  Romans  were  also     chap. 
considerable,  and  must  haye  Mien  heavily  especially  on  ^-   , ' ,.. 
the  transport  ships,  which  carried  the  provisions,  a  cir-     p^^^^ 
cnmstance  of   which  oar  narrator  makes   no  mention.    261-256 
After  a  short  time  the  fleet  again  set  sail,  and  without  any       ^^' 
opposition  reached  the  African  coast  near  the  Hermsean 
promontory  (Cape  Bon)  east  of  Carthage.    The  Bomans 
then  sailed  eastwards  along  the  coast  as  far  as  Clypea, 
which  they  took  and  fortified. 

From  this  point  they  made  expeditions  into  the  most  Ravages  of 
fertile  part  of  the  Carthaginian  dominions,  which  in  the  ^ytn "* 
fifty  yeat^  since  the  devastating  invasion  of  Agathokles  Africa, 
had  recovered  themselves,  and  presented  to  the  eyes  of  the 
Italians  a  picture  of  unimagined  riches  and  luxurious  fer- 
tility.^     The  industry  and  skill  of  the  inhabitants  had 
converted  the  whole  of  those  districts  into  a  garden. 

anecdotes.  When  Hanno,  we  are  told,  appeared  as  negotiator  in  the  Roman 
camp,  the  consuls  vere  advised  to  seize  him,  in  retaliation  for  the  treacherons 
imprisonment  of  Scipio  off  the  island  of  Lipara  (pee  ahove,  p.  55).  Hanno  was 
in  imminent  danger,  but  saved  himself  by  the  remark  that  '  if  the  Romans 
acted  in  this  manner,  they  would  be  as  bad  as  the  Carthaginians.'  The  consuls 
thereupon  felt  too  proud  to  retain  as  a  prisoner  a  hostile  general  who  had  come 
on  a  message  of  peace,  trusting  to  the  protection  of  the  law  of  nations.  It 
seems  strange  that  any  Roman  writer  could  (like  Valerius  Mazimus,  vi.  6,  2) 
find  in  this  ptoceeding  an  occasion  for  glorifying  Roman  integrity  and  honour, 
even  if  it  were  true  that  Cornelius  Scipio  was  treacherously  seized  by  the  Car- 
thaginians five  years  before.  But  it  is  too  bad  to  make  a  Carthaginian  general 
flatter  the  Roman  people  at  the  cost  of  his  *own  and  his  country's  abasement. 
Of  such  indirect  self-laudation  of  the  Romans  we  have  frequent  instances. 
We  have  noticed  it  on  the  occasion  of  the  war  with  Fyrrhus  (vol  i.  pp.  496, 524). 
Polybius  says  nothing  of  the  whole  incident. 

>  This  fertility  indireetly  contradicts  the  absurd  stoty  of  the  monstrous  serpent 
which  (ac  appears  from  Livy,  epit  18,  and  Valerius  Maximus,  i.  8,  19)  occupied 
a  prominent  place  in  the  later  narratives  of  the  war,  but  which  is  not  referred 
to  by  PolybiuB.  Near  the  river  Bagradas,  it  is  said,  the  Roman  army  encoun- 
tered  a  gigantic  serpent,  which  devoured  the  soldiers  that  approached  incau- 
tiously and  which  kept  the  whole  army  at  a  distance  from  the  river.  No  missile 
could  pierce  its  skin.  A  detachment  was  sent  against  it,  and  it  was  at  last 
crushed  by  huge  stones  which  were  dischaiged  by  ballistse.  Its  putrefying  body 
infected  the  air,  and  forced  the  Romans  to  leave  the  neighbourhood.  We  have 
a  meamire  of  the  credulity  and  the  credibility  of  Roman  historians  in  their 
references  to  alleged  evidence  in  the  assurance  that  the  skin  of  this  serpent, 
measuring  one  hundred  and  twenty  feet  in  length,  was  brought  to  Rome  and 
exhibited  there  down  to  the  time  of  the  Numantine  war,  t.e.  133  b.c.  (Pliny, 
Hist.  Nat.  viu.  H). 

f2 


68  KOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     Agriculture  flourished  among  the  Carthaginians  in  the 
/  ,/  highest  degree ;  more  especiallj  theyunderstood  how  to  ren- 
der that  rich  but  hot  and  dry  soil  productive,  by  conduct- 
ing over  it,  in  innumerable  canals,  an  ample  supply  of  water, 
the  most  needful  of  all  requisites.     The  country,  which  still 
in  the  time  of  the  emperors  was  the  granary  of  the  Eomans, 
was  under  the  Carthaginians  in  the  most  flourishing  state. 
It  was  covered  with  numberless  villages  and  open  towns, 
and  with  the  magnificent  country  residences  of  the  Punic 
nobility.     Carthage,  as  mistress  of  the  sea,  feared  no  hos- 
tile invasions,  and  most  of  the  towns  were  unfortified.     Ko 
chain  of  fortresses,  like  those  of  the  Boman  colonies  on  the 
coast  or  in  the  interior  of  the  country,  offered  places  of 
refuge  to  the  distressed  inhabitants,  or  contained  a  popu- 
lation able  and  ready  to  fight,  like  the  Eoman  colonists, 
who  could  oppose  the  predatory  marches  of  the  enemy. 
The  horror  and  distress  therefore  of  the  African  population 
were  great  when,  all  of  a  sudden,  40,000  rapacious  foes 
overran  their  country,  exercising  the  fearful  rights  of  war 
which  delivered  into  the  hands  of  the  conquerors  the  life, 
possessions,  and  freedom  of  every  inhabitant.     The  Cartha- 
ginians had  in  the  course  of  the  war  disturbed  the  coast  of 
Italy,  burnt  houses,  destroyed  harvests,  cut  down  fruit- 
trees,  carried  away  spoil  and  prisoners.     They  now  suffered 
in  Africa  an  ample  retribution,  and  the  Boman  soldier 
indemnified  himself  thoroughly  for  the  dangers  he  had 
undergone,  and  the  terrors  with  which  his  imagination 
had  filled  the  unknown  bounds  of  the  African  continent. 
We  read  of  20,000  men  torn  from  their  homes  and  sold  as 
slaves.     The  spoils  were  all  sent  to  the  fortress  of  Clypea. 
Thither  some  time  afterwards  orders  were  sent  from  Borne 
that  one  of  the  two  consuls  with  his  army  and  with  most 
of  the  ships  and  spoils  should  return  to  Italy,  while  the 
other  consul  with  two  legions  and  forty  ships  should  i^main 
in  Africa  to  carry  on  the  war.     This  resolution  of  the 
Boman  senate  would  be  unintelligible  if  the  expedition  to 
Africa  had  been  intended  to  answer  any  purpose  other  than 
that  of  a  vigorous  diversion.     It  could  not  have  been  sup- 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAE.  69 

posed  in  Borne  that  two  legions,  which  were  not  sufficient     CHAP, 
in  Sicily  to  keep  the  Carthaginians  in  check,  could  carry  ^.    ^   __^ 
on  the  war  effectually  in  Africa  and  overthrow  the  power     Sbcond 
of  the  Carthaginians  in  their  own  country.     If  Begulus    261-255 
had  confined  himself  to  enterprises  on  a  small  scale,  the       "'^* 
success  would  haye  been  adequate  to  the  sacrifice.     But 
elated,  ifc  seems,  by  his  unexpected  good  fortune,  he  raised 
his  hopes  higher  and  aspired  to  the  glory  of  terminating 
the  war  by  a  signal  victory.* 

The  battle  at  Ecnomus  and  the  landing  of  the  hostile  Exorbitant 
army  on  their  coast  had  entirely  disconcerted  the  Cartha-  Reguius^as 
ginians.  At  first  they  were  afiraid  of  an  attack  on  their  conditions 
capital,  and  a  portion  of  the  fleet  'had  sailed  back  from 
Sicily  to  protect  it.  There  were  clearly  no  great  forces  in 
Africa,  as  a  hostile  invasion  was  not  apprehended.  Now 
the  Romans  had  effected  a  landing,  thanks  to  their  victory 
at  Ecnomus ;  and  the  Carthaginians  were  not  in  a  position 
to  defend  the  open  country  against  them*  In  their 
anxiety  for  the  safety  of  the  capital  they  at  first  concen- 
trated their  troops  near  it ;  and  in  this  fact  we  find  an 
explanation  of  the  great  successes  of  Begulus.  He  was 
enabled  not  only  to  march  through  the  length  and  breadth 
of  the  country  without  danger,  but  to  maintain  his  advan- 
tage when  the  Carthaginians  ventured  to  attack  him* 
He  is  said  to  have  won  a  decided  victory  because  the 
Carthaginians,  out  of  fear,  would  not  venture  on  the  level 
ground,  but  kept  on  the  heights,  where  their  elephants 
and  horse,  their  most  powerful  arms,  were  almost  useless. 
Mention  is  also  made  of  a  revolt  of  Numidian  allies  or 
subjects,  which  caused  to  the  Carthaginians  a  greater  loss 
than  that  of  signal  defeat.  They  were  therefore  disposed 
to  peace,  and  tried  to  negotiate  vrith  Begulus,  who  on  his 
side  wished  to  end  the  war  before  he  was  superseded  in 
the  command  by  a  successor.  But  the  conditions  which 
he  offered  were  such  as  could  be  accepted  only  after  a 
complete  overthrow.     He  insisted  that  they  should  resign 

»  PolybiuB,  i.  31,  §  4. 


70 


BOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Defeat  of 
BeguluB. 


Sicily,  pay  a  contribution  of  war,  restore  the  prisoners  and 
deserters,  deliver  up  the  fleet  and  content  themselves 
with  a  single  ship,  and,  finally,  make  their  foreign  policy 
dependent  on  the  pleasure  of  Borne. 

The  negotiations  were  therefore  broken  off,  and  the  war 
was  carried  on  with  redoubled  energy. 

In  the  meantime  the  year  of  the  consulship  of  Begulus 
had  expired.  He  remained,  however,  as  proconsul  in  Africa, 
and  his  army  seems  to  have  been  strengthened  by  Numi- 
dians  and  other  Africans.'  The  Carthaginians  also  increased 
their  forces.  Among  the  Greek  mercenaries  whom  they  now 
got  together  was  a  Spartan  officer  of  the  name  of  Xanthip- 
pus,  of  whose  antecedents  we  know  nothing,  but  who,  if  all 
that  is  related  of  his  exploits  in  the  African  war  be  true, 
must  have  been  a  man  of  great  military  ability.  It  is 
said  that  he  directed  the  attention  of  the  Carthaginians  to 
the  fact  that  their  generals  were  worsted  in  the  war  with 
Begulus  because  they  did  not  understand  how  to  select  a 
proper  ground  for  their  elephants  and  their  powerful 
cavalry,*  By  his  advice,  it  is  said,  the  Carthaginians  now 
lefb  the  hills  and  challenged  the  Bomans  to  fight  on  the 
level   ground.     Begulus,  with    too  much  boldness,  had 

'  This  is  evident  from  the  circumstance  that  in  the  next  battle,  so  fatal  to 
the  Roman  arms,  Regulus  had  a  force  of  30,000  (according  to  Appian, 
viii.  3)  or  32,000  men  (according  to  Eutropius,  ii.  21,  and  Orosius,  iv.  9). 

'It  seems  rery  strange,  as  Mommsen  justly  remarks  {Ram.  Gesch,  i.  529, 
Anm. ;  English  translation,  ii.  44),  that  the  Carthaginian  generals  should  hare 
had  to  learn  this  from  a  stranger.  Is  it  possible  that  the  jealousy  of  the  Roman 
historians  grudged  the  Carthaginians  the  credit  of  having  gained  the  victory 
by  their  o'wn  ingenuity  and  strength  ?  Perhaps  the  chief  merit  of  Xanthippus 
consisted  in  the  proper  use  of  the  elephants.  The  employment  of  these  animals 
in  war  originated  in  Asia,  and  had  passed  into  the  tactics  of  the  Greeks  by  the 
successors  of  Alexander  the  Great.  From  them  the  Carthaginians  had  learnt 
it,  either  in  their  war  with  Pyrrhus,  or  even  before,  from  Greek  mercenaries. 
But  they  appear  not  to  have  been  thorough  masters  of  this  new  engine  of  war. 
In  the  battle  of  Agrigentum  the  elephants  had  been  of  no  use  and  had  even 
contributed  to  the  deft'at  of  the  Carthaginians  (see  above,  p.  47).  But  at 
Tunes,  where  Begulus  was  routed,  they  decided  the  victory.  If,  as  is  most 
likely,  Xanthippus  was  an  officer  from  the  school  of  Alexander  the  Great,  it 
was  perhaps  due  to  him  that  the  elephants  were  this  time  handled  properly. 
This  conjecture  receives  an  indirect  confirmation  by  the  issue  of  the  battle  of 
Panormus  (see  below,  p.  77)>  where  the  Carthaginian  army  was  defeated  chiefly 
owing  to  the  unskilfulness  of  Hasdrubal  in  the  use  of  the  elephants. 


THE  FIEST  PUNIC  WAR.  71 

advanced  from  Clypea,  the  basis  of  bis  operations,  and  bad     CHAP. 


lU. 


penetrated  into  the  neigbbourbood  of  Cartbage,  wbere  be  . 
bad  taken  possession  of  Tunes.     Here  be  could  not  pos-     f?^^^"* 
siblj  maintain  bimself.     He  was  obliged  to  accept  a  battle    261-255 
on  tbe  plain,  and  suffered  a  signal  defeat,  wbicb,  owing  to       ^'^' 
tbe  great  superiority  of  tbe  Cartbaginian  cavalry,  ended 
in  tbe  almost  complete  annihilation  of  tbe  Bomans.     Only 
about  2,000  escaped  witb  difficulty  to  Clypea;  500  were 
taken  prisoners,  and  among  tbese  Begulus  bimself.     Tbe 
Eoman  expedition  to  Africa,  so  boldly  undertaken  and  at 
first  so  gloriously  carried  out,  met  witb  a  more  miserable 
fate  tban  tbat  of  Agatbokles,  and  seemed  indisputably  to 
confirm  tbe  opinion  tbat  tbe  Cartbaginians  were  invincible 
in  their  own  conntry.' 

It  was  necessary  now,  if  possible,  to  save  tbe  remainder  Victory  of 
of  tbe  Eoman  army,  and  to  bring  tbem  uninjured  back  to  it^nrnns  at 
Italy.    A  still  larger  Eoman  fleet  tban  tbat  wbicb  bad  theHer- 

msean  pro- 

conquered  at  Ecnomus  was  accordingly  sent  to  Africa,  and  montoiy. 
obtained  over  tbe  Cartbaginians  at  tbe  Hermsean  promon- 
tory a  victory  wbicb,  judging  by  tbe  number  of  Cartba- 
ginian vessels  taken,  must  bave  been  more  brilliant  tban 
tbe  last.'    If  tbe  Eomans  bad  intended  to  continue  tbe 

'  We  cannot  credit  the  reports  according  to  which,  the  Carthaginians  treated 
Xanthippns  with  ingratitude  and  caused  him  to  be  murdered  on  his  return  to 
his  own  country,  in  order  to  expunge  the  humiliating  memory  of  their  great  ob- 
ligations to  him  (Valerius  MaximuR,  ix.  6,  1;  Zonaras,  viii.  13;  Appian,  viii.  4). 
Polybius  had  heard  of  these  or  similar  charges,  but  he  rejected  them,  and  related 
(i.  36,  §  2)  that  Xanthippus  left  Carthage  shortly  after  his  victory,  from  the  fear 
of  exposing  himself  to  jealousy  and  calumny. 

'  According  to  Polybius  (i.  86,  §11)  not  less  than  114  Carthaginian  vessels 
were  taken  with  their  crews.  But  the  statements  concerning  this  victory  are 
veiy  conflicting.  Instead  of  114  captured  vessels,  Diodorus  (xxiii,  fr.  14) 
mentions  only  24,  not  to  speak  of  the  numbers  given  by  Eutropius  and  Orosius. 
Haltaus  {Gesch.  der  Bomer,  i.  308,  Anm.)  proposes  to  change  the  number  kKorhv 
9€KaT4cffapa$  of  Polybius  into  f£ico<n  koL  r4fftrapa%f  and  thus  to  make  the  statements 
of  Polybius  and  Diodorus  agree  with  one  another.  This  ingenious  conjecture  is 
highly  commendable.  If  we  adopt  it,  we  shall  no  longer  see  anything  strange 
in  the  narrative  of  Polybius,  who  tells  us  that  the  Romans  drove  back  the  Car- 
thaginians with  ease  and  at  the  first  onset  (^|  k^i6Jiov  koX  ^f8(»s  rpcifM^^cyoi),  an 
expression  which  would  hardly  be  appropriate,  if  114  vessels  had  been 
taken.  Such  a  number  of  captured  vessels  would  make  the  victory  near  the 
Hermsran  promontory  a  more  brilliant  one  than  that  of  Ecnomus ;  and  it  would, 


72  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  war  in  Africa  till  they  had  utterly  overthrown  Carthage, 
-_  /  -  they  would  have  been  able  now  to  carry  their  plan  into 
execution,  though  not  under  such  favourable  circumstances 
as  before  the  defeat  of  Begulus.  The  fact,  however,  that 
they  did  not  do  this,  and  that  they  sent  no  new  army  to 
Africa,*  strengthens  the  inference  suggested  by  the  with- 
drawal of  half  of  the  invading  army  after  the  landing 
of  Begulus,  viz.,  that  the  expedition  to  Africa  was  under- 
taken only  for  the  sake  of  plundering  and  injuring  the 
land,  and  for  dividing  the  Carthaginian  forces.  The  only 
use  made  of  the  victory  at  the  Hermeean  promontory  was  to 
take  into  their  ships  the  remnant  of  the  legions  of  Segidus 
and  the  spoils  which  had  been  collected  in  Clypea. 
Destnic-  The  Soman  fleet  sailed  back  to  Sicily  heavily  laden. 

Roman  But  now,  after  so  much  well-merited  success,  a  misfortune 
fleet  off  the  overtook  them  on  the  southern  coast  of  Sicily  frx)m  which 
Sicily.  no  bravery  could  protect  them.  A  fearfril  hurricane 
destroyed  the  greater  number  of  the  ships,  and  strewed 
the  entire  shore,  from  Camarina  to  the  promontory 
Pachynus,  with  wrecks  and  corpses.  Only  eighty  vessels 
escaped  destruction,  a  miserable  remnant  of  the  fleet  which, 
after  twice  conquering  the  Carthaginians,  seemed  able 
fr*om  this  time  forward  to  exercise  undisputed  dominion 
over  the  sea. 

to  Bay  the  leAst,  be  surprising  that  Polybins  should  dispose  of  it  in  three  lines, 
whilst  he  devotes  as  many  chapters  to  the  battle  of  £cnomu8.  Zonaras  (riii. 
14),  in  his  description  of  the  battle  near  the  Hermnan  promontory,  differs 
widely  from  Folybius.  Dion  Cassius,  whom  Zonaras  abridged,  had  evidently 
drawn  his  information  from  another  source,  possibly  from  Philtnus.  Accord* 
ing  to  this  account  tlie  battle  was  long  doubtful,  and  was  at  last  decided  in 
favour  of  the  Romans  when  those  Roman  vessels  which  had  wintered  in  Clypea 
advanced  and  attcuiked  the  Carthaginians  in  the  rear.  This  is  another  instance 
which  shows  that  the  detail  of  descriptions  of  battles  deserves  as  yet  little 
credit. 

*  Polybius  says  nothing  of  a  landing  of  Roman  troops  in  Clypea,  and  of  & 
battle  with  the  Carthaginians,  reported  by  Zonaras  (viii.  14),  in  which  (accord- 
ing to  Orosius,  iv.  9)  9,000  of  them  were  killed.  This  alleged  victory  was 
probably  gained  only  on  paper  by  some  patriotic  Roman  annalist,  as  a  set-off 
against  the  defeat  of  Regulus. 


THE  FIKST  PUNIC  WAR.  78 


Third  Period,  254-250. 

THE   VICTOET  AT   PANOEMUS. 

It  was  among  sach  reverses  as  these  tliat  Borne  showed 
her  greatness.     In  three  months  a  new  fleet  of  220  ships 
joined  the  remnant  of  the  disabled  fleet  in  Messana,  and      Third 
sailed  towards  the  western  part  of  the  island^  to  attack  the    264-260 
fortresses  of  the  Carthaginians,  who,  little  expecting  such       ^'^' 
a  result,  were  fully  enga&red  in  Africa  in  subduing:  and  Capture  of 

'  •'         °   °  °  PaDormus 

punishing  their  revolted  subjects.  Thus  it  happened  that  by  Cn. 
the  Bomans  made  a  signal  and  important  conquest.  Next  to  g^^i^  ^^ 
LilybsBum  and  Drepana,  Panormus  was  the  most  consider- 
able Carthaginian  stronghold  in  Sicily.  Its  situation  on  the 
north  coast,  in  connexion  with  the  Punic  stations  on  the 
LiparsBan  Islands,  made  it  easy  for  an  enemy  to  attack  and 
ravage  the  Italian  coast.  The  place,  which,  under  Punic 
dominion,  had  reached  a  high  state  of  prosperity,  consisted 
in  a  strongly  fortified  old  town  and  a  suburb  or  new  town, 
which  had  its  own  walls  and  towers.  This  new  town  was  now 
attacked  by  the  Bomans  with  great  force  both  by  land  and 
sea,  and  after  a  vigorous  resistance  it  fell  into  their  hands. 
The  defenders  took  refuge  in  the  old  town,  which  was  more 
strongly  fortified ;  and  here,  after  a  long  blockade,  they 
were  forced  by  hunger  to  surrender.  They  were  allowed 
to  buy  themselves  off  each  for  two  minse.  By  this  means 
10,000  of  the  inhabitants  obtained  their  freedom.  The 
remainder,  13,000  in  number,  who  had  not  the  means  to 
pay  the  sum  required,  were  sold  as  slaves.*  This  brilliant 
success  was  gained  by  Cn.  Cornelius  Scipio,  who  six  years 
before  had  been  taken  prisoner  in  Lipara,  and  had  since 
then  gained  his  freedom  either  by  ransom  or  exchange. 

The  undisturbed  blockade  of  the  important  town  of  Failure  of 
Panormus,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Drepana  and  Lilybeeum,  ^®  second 

'  The  mnsom  must  have  been  paid  either  by  the  Carthaginian  state,  or  by 
fHends  or  relatires  of  the  captives,  not  living  in  Panormas,  for  according  to 
the  laws  of  war  all  the  money  and  valuables  contained  in  Panormus  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  Romans. 


74  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  shows  that  at  that  time  the  Carthaginians  had  not  a  suf- 
—  /  ,^  ficient  army  in  Sicily,  as  otherwise  they  would  certainly 
Roman  ex-  have  tried  to  deliver  Panormus.'  They  were  folly  engaged 
pwiition  to  i^  Africa.  The  Eomans  accordingly  ventured  in  the  same 
year  to  attack  Drepana,  and  though  their  enterprise 
failed,  they  attempted  in  the  following  year  to  take  even 
Lilybseum,  and  then  made  a  second  expedition  into  Africa, 
most  probably  in  order  to  take  advantage  of  the  difficulties 
of  the  Carthaginians  in  their  own  country.  This  under- 
taking, which,  like  the  former  invasion,  was  intended  to  be 
only  a  raid  on  a  large  scale,  utterly  failed,  producing 
not  even  the  glory  which  crowned  the  first  acts  of  Regu- 
lus.  The  great  Roman  fleet,  with  two  consular  armies 
on  board,  sailed  towards  the  same  coast  on  which  Regu- 
lus  had  landed,  east  of  the  Hermsean  promontory,  where 
lay  the  most  flourishing  part  of  the  Carthaginian  territory. 
The  Romans  succeeded  in  landing  in  different  places,  and 
collecting  spoil ;  but  nowhere,  as  formerly  in  Clypea,  could 
they  obtain  a  firm  footing.  At  last  the  ships  were  cast  on  the 
sand  banks  in  the  shallow  waters  of  the  lesser  Syrtis  (Gulf  of 
Cabes),  and  could  only  be  got  afloat  again  with  the  greatest 
trouble,  on  the  return  of  the  tide,  and  after  every  thing  had 
been  thrown  overboard  that  could  be  dispensed  with.  The 
return  voyage  resembled  a  flight,  and  near  the  Palinurian 
promontory  on  the  coast  of  Lucania  (west  of  Policastro) 
the  ships  were  overtaken  by  a  terrible  storm,  in  which  a  hun- 
dred and  fifty  of  them  were  lost.  The  repetition  of  such 
a  dreadful  misfortune  in  so  short  a  time,  the  loss  of  two 
magnificent  fleets  within  three  years,  quite  disgusted  the 
Romans  with  the  sea.  They  resolved  to  relinquish  for  the 
future  all  naval  expeditions,  and,  devoting  all  their  energies 
to  their  land  army,  to  keep  equipped  only  as  many  ships  as 
might  be  needed  to  supply  the  army  in  Sicily  with  pro- 

'  It  IB  Stated  that  in  this  year  the  Carthaginians  retook  Agrigentum,  and 
that  they  would  hare  reconquered  the  whole  of  Sicily  if  they  had  not  been 
informed  of  the  arrival  of  both  consuls  (Zonaras,  viii.  14).  The  latter  asser- 
tion is  an  unmeaning  phrase,  and  as  to  Agrigentum,  it  is  hardly  probable  that 
after  its  repeated  captures  that  town  can  have  been  a  place  of  much  impor- 
tance or  militaiy  strength. 


THE  FIBST  PUNIC  WAR.  75 

visions,  and  to  afford  all  necessary  protection  to  the  coast     CHAP. 

of  Italy.     We  may  fairly  feel  surprised  at  finding  in  the  w J- ^ 

Capitoline  fasti  the  record  of  a  victory  of  the  consul  C.     ^"^ 
Sempronius  Bleesus  over  the  Punians.'     If  such  a  triumph    264-250 
really  was  celebrated  after  such  an  utter  failure,  it  would 
follow  that  under  certain  circumstances  the  honour  was 
easily  obtained. 

The  two  years  of  the  war  which  now  followed  were  years  Exhaus- 
of  exhaustion  and  comparative  rest  on  both  sides.  The  ^^^ 
war,  which  had  now  lasted  twelve  years,  had  caused 
innumerable  losses,  and  still  the  end  was  far  off.  The 
Bomans  had,  it  is  true,  according  to  our  reports,  been 
conquerors  in  almost  every  engagement,  not  only  by  land, 
bnt,  what  was  prized  far  higher  and  gave  them  far  greater 
satisfaction,  by  sea  also.  The  defeat  of  Begulus  was  the 
only  reverse  of  any  importance  which  their  army  by  land 
had  experienced.  In  consequence  of  that  reverse  they  had 
to  leave  Africa ;  but  in  Sicily  they  had  gradually  advanced 
further  westward.  The  towns  which  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war  had  been  only  doubtful  possessions,  inclining  first 
to  one  side  and  then  to  the  other,  were  all  either  in  the 
iron  grip  of  the  Bomans,  or  were  destroyed  and  had  lost 
all  importance  as  military  stations.  In  the  west  the 
limits  of  the  territory  where  the  Carthaginians  were  still 
able  to  offer  a  vigorous  resistance  were  more  and  more 
contracted.  From  Agrigentum  and  Panormus  they  had 
fallen  back  upon  Lilybaeum  and  Drepana,  and  even  towards 
these  the  Eomans  had  already  stretched  out  their  hands. 
Still  more,  Bome  had  contended  for  the  mastery  over  the 
sea  with  the  greatest  maritime  power  in  the  world,  and 
had  been  victorious  in  each  of  the  three  great  naval 
engagements.  But  they  were  not  at  home  on  that 
element,  and  in  the  two  tremendous  storms  of  the  years 
255   and   2-33  they  lost,  with  the  fruits  of  their  heroic 

*  That  the  Capitoline  fasti  are  utterly  unworthy  of  credit  we  have  already  seen 
(i.  280  €t  geq. ;  528,  note  2).  In  the  present  instance  the  alleged  triumph  of  C. 
Sempronius  Ti.  f.  Ti.  n.  Blsesns  Cos  de  Poenis  is  no  doubt  a  forgery,  imported 
into  the  public  annals  through  the  mendacity  of  the  Sempronian  family. 


76  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     perseverance,  even  their  confidence  and  their   courage. 
The  greatest  burden  of  the  war  fell  on  the  unfortunate 


island  of  Sicily,  but  Italy  suffered  also  by  her  sacrifices  of 
men  and  materials  of  war,  by  the  predatory  incursions  of 
the  enemy,  and  by  the  interruption  of  her  trade.  It  may 
therefore  easily  be  explained  how  both  belligerents  were 
satisfied  to  pause  awhile  from  any  greater  enterprise,  and 
thus  gain  time  to  recover  their  strength. 

U^hj  ^^^  *^®  ^^  ^^^  ^^*  ^^^®  entirely.  In  the  year  252  the 
tho  Ro-  Romans  succeeded  in  taking  Lipara,  with  the  aid  of  a  fleet 
™*°*'  which  their  faithful  ally  Hiero,  of  Syracuse,  sent  to  their 
assistance,^  and  Thermae  (or  Himera),  the  only  place  on 
the  north  coast  of  Sicily  which  was  left  to  the  Carthagi- 
nians after  the  loss  of  Panormus.  That  the  Carthaginians 
should  quietly  allow  this,  without  making  any  attempt  to 
ward  off  the  attack,  is  very  surprising.  In  the  annals  which 
have  come  down  to  us,  the  history  of  the  war  is  unfortu- 
nately written  so  decidedly  from  a  Boman  point  of  view  that 
we  know  nothing  at  all  of  the  internal  affairs  of  the  Car- 
thaginians, and  of  what  they  were  doing  when  not  engaged 
against  the  Romans.  We  may  suppose  they  had  still 
enough  to  do  in  quelling  the  insurrection  of  their  subjects, 
and  so  were  compelled  to  leave  the  Romans  in  Sicily  to 
act  unopposed. 
7h^.  "^^  -^^  length,  in  the  year  251,  they  sent  a  fleet  of  200  ships 
mans  at  under  Hasdrubal,  and  a  strong  army  of  30,000  men  into 
Sicily,  with  a  detachment  of  140  elephants.^  These 
acimals,  known  to  the  Romans  since  the  time  of  Fyrrhus, 
had  again  become  objects  of  fresh  terror  after  the  defeat  of 
Regulus,  of  which  they  had  been  the  principal  cause,  and 
the  greatest  timidity  reigned  in  the  army  of  the  proconsul.* 
Caecilius  Metellus  shut  himself  up  in  Panormus  with  only 
a  consular  army,  and  evaded  the  engagement.  In  the 
meantime  Hasdrubal  laid  waste  the  open  country  and 
drew  near  to  the  town,  where,  between  the  walls  and  the 


*  Zonaras,  viii.  14.    Diodonu,  xziiL  fr.  14.    Trontin.  Strateg.  ir.  12. 
«  Orosiufl,  iv.  9.  ■  Polybiug,  i.  39,  §  11. 


Panormus. 


B.C. 


THE  FIEST  PUNIC  WAR  77 

river  Orethus,*  lie  had  no  room  either  for  drawing  np  his     CHAP. 

TTT 

forces — especially  the  elephants  and  the  horse — or  for  re-  v.,  /  ,.. 
treating  in  case  of  a  reverse.  Confident  of  success,  and  in-  ^^^ 
tent  only  on  drawing  the  enemy  out  of  the  town  and  getting  264-260 
them  to  accept  a  battle,  he  failed  to  take  the  common  pre- 
caution of  covering  himself  with  mounds  and  trenches.*  On 
the  other  side,  Metellus,  who  could  at  any  time  retreat, 
formed  his  column  inside  the  gates,  and  sent  a  number  of 
light-armed  troops  to  harass  the  Carthaginians  and  draw 
them  nearer  to  the  town.  When  the  elephants  had  driven 
back  the  Boman  skirmishers  as  far  as  the  town  trench,  and 
were  now  exposed  to  their  missiles  and  unable  to  do  any- 
thing further,  they  fell  into  great  disorder,  became  un- 
manageable, turned  round  on  the  Carthaginian  infantry, 
and  caused  the  utmost  confusion.  Metellus  availed  himself 
of  this  moment  to  burst  forth  out  of  the  town,  and  to  attack 
the  enemy  in  flank.  The  mercenaries,  unable  to  keep 
their  ground,  rushed  in  wild  flight  towards  the  sea,  where 
they  hoped  to  be  taken  in  by  the  Carthaginian  vessels, 
but  the  greater  part  perished  miserably.  Metellus  gained 
a  brilliant  and  decided  victory.  The  charm  was  broken, 
the  Bomans  were  themselves  again,'  Fanormus  was  saved, 
and  the  Carthaginians  were  compelled  henceforth  to  give 
up  all  thoughts  of  an  aggressive  war,  and  to  confine  them- 
selves to  the  defence  of  the  few  fortresses  which  they  still 
possessed  in  Sicily.  Having  lost  ThermsB  in  252,*  and 
still  earlier  Solus  or  Soluntum,  Kephalsedion  and  Tyndaris, 
they  now  abandoned  Selinus,  transplanting  the  inhabitants 
to  Lilybseum.  The  incompetent  Hasdrubal  on  his  return 
paid  for  his  defeat  the  penalty  of  crucifixion.  The  cap- 
tured elephants,  the  number  of  which,  according  to  some 
writers,  was  about  120,^  were  led  in  triumph  to  Borne  and 

*  This  small  river  flowed  into  the  sea  not  far  from  the  town  on  the  south 
side.    See  Schubring,  Topo^apkie  von  Panormus.    Liibeck,  1870,  p.  24. 

«  Diodoras,  xxiii.  fr.  14.  ■  Polybius,  i.  40,  §  16. 

*  Polybius,  i.  89,  §  18 ;  Diodoms,  xziii.  fr.  14 ;  Zonaras,  viii.  14. 

*  Liyy,  epit.  19;  Zonaras,  viii.  14.  The  number  varies,  however,  and  is 
given  by  different  writers  as  60,  100,  104,  120,  and  142.  According  to 
Polybius  (i.  40,  §  15),  only  ten  were  taken  during  the  battle ;  the  rest  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  Homans  when  the  battle  was  over.  Their  number  is  not 
stated  by  Polybius. 


78 


KOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Alleged 
mission  of 
Carthagi- 
nian 

envoys  to 
Rome. 


The  story 
of  Regu- 
lus. 


there  hunted  to  death  in  the  circus.  Never  had  a  Boman 
general  merited  or  celebrated  a  more  splendid  triumph 
than  Metellus,'  who,  with  two  legions,  had  defeated  and 
annihilated  an  army  of  double  the  strength  of  his  own.' 
The  elephants  on  the  coins  of  the  Csecilian  family  pre- 
served, until  late  times,  the  memory  of  this  glorious  victory. 

The  battle  of  Fanormus  marks  the  turning-point  in  the 
war,  which  had  now  lasted  thirteen  years.  The  courage 
of  the  Carthaginians  seemed  at  length  to  be  quite  broken. 
They  decided  to  enter  into  negotiations  for  peace,  or  to 
propose  at  least  an  exchange  of  prisoners.  The  embassy 
dispatched  to  Eome  for  this  purpose  has  become  famous 
in  history,  especially  because,  as  it  is  related,  the  cap- 
tive Begulus  was  sent  with  it  in  order  to  support  the 
proposals  of  the  Carthaginians  with  his  influence.  The 
conduct  of  Begulus  became  the  subject  of  poetical  effu- 
sions, the  echo  of  which  we  find  in  Horace  •  and  Silius 
Italicus.^  Closely  connected  with  this  is  the  tradition  of 
the  violent  death  of  Begulus,  which  is  so  characteristic  of 
the  Boman  historians  that  we  cannot  pass  it  over  in 
silence. 

Five  years  had  passed  since  the  unhappy  battle  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Tunes,  which  consigned  Begulus  and  500 

»  Polyhius,  i.  40.  §  10. 

*  Metellus  was  alive  many  years  after  this  yictory ;  he  was  made  once  more 
eonsnl,  then  master  of  the  horse  and  dictator,  and  lastly  pontifex  maximns. 
As  such  he  sarf^d,  from  the  burning  temple  of  Testa,  the  sacred  Palladium, 
the  statue  of  the  tutelary  deity  of  Rome,  at  the  risk  of  his  life,  and  with  the 
loss  of  his  eyesight,  and  for  this  exploit  he  obtained  leave  to  use  a  chariot 
when  he  wished  to  attend  the  meetings  of  the  senate.  Fliny  {Hist.  Nat, 
yii.  45)  mentions  the  laudatory  speech  which  the  son  of  Metellus  delivered  at 
the  funeral  of  his  father  and  committed  to  writing,  and  in  which  he  said  *  that 
he  had  accomplished  the  ten  best  and  greatest  things  which  wise  men  spend 
their  lives  to  obtain :  that  he  had  wished  to  be  a  first-rate  warrior,  a  good 
orator,  a  brave  general ;  that  he  wished  to  conduct  the  highest  state  affairs,  to 
enjoy  the  greatest  honour,  to  possess  great  wisdom,  to  be  esteemed  the  first 
among  the  senators,  to  acquire  great  wealth  honestly,  to  leave  behind 
many  children,  and  to  be  the  most  distinguished  man  in  the  community.' 
From  this  specimen  we  may  form  an  opinion  of  the  nature  and  quality  of  the 
family  documents  which  were  the  chief  source  from  which  the  earliest  Roman 
annalists  composed  their  so-called  history  of  Rome. 

'  Horace,  Od.^  iii.  5.  *  Silius  Italicus,  Punic,  vi.  346-386. 


B.C. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR.  79 

of  his  fellow-soldiers  to  captivity.     Now  when  the  Cartha-     CHAP. 

ginians  decided,  after  their  defeat  at  Panormus,  to  make  an  .„   ^ ' 

exchange  of  prisoners,  and,  if  possible,  to  conclude  peace     y^^ 
with  Borne,  they  sent  Begulus  with  the  embassy,  for  they    264-260 
considered  him  a  fit  person  to  advocate  their  proposals. 
But  in  this  expectation  they  were  signally  disappointed. 
Begulus   gave   his    advice  not  only  against    the  peace, 
but  also  against  the  exchange  of  prisoners,  because  he 
thought  it  would  result  only  in  the  advantage  of  Carthage. 
He  resisted  all  the  entreaties  of  his  own  family  and  friends, 
who  wished  him  to  stay  in  Borne ;  and  when  they  urged 
him,  and  the  senate  seemed  disposed  to  make  the  ex- 
change, he  declared  that  he  could  no  longer  be  of  any 
service  to  his  country,  and  that,  moreover,  he  was  doomed 
to  an  early  death,  the  Carthaginians  having  given  hini  a 
slow  poison.     He  refused  even  to  go  into  the  town  to  see 
his  wife  and  children,  and,  time  to  his  oath,  returned  to 
Carthage,  although  he  knew  that  a  cruel  punishment 
awaited  him.      The   Carthaginians,  exasperated  at  this 
disappointment  of  their  hopes,  invented  the  most  horrible 
tortures  to  kill  him  by  slow  degrees.  They  shut  him  up  with 
an  elephant,  to  keep  him  in  constant  fear ;  thoy  prevented 
his  sleeping,  caused  him  to  feel  the  pangs  of  hunger,  cut 
off  his  eyelids  and  exposed  him  to  the  burning  rays  of  the 
sun,  against  which  he  was  no  longer  able  to  close  his  eyes. 
At  last  they  shut  him  up  in  a  box  stuck  all  over  with  nails, 
and  thus  killed  him  outright.     When  this  became  known 
in  Borne,  the  senate  delivered  up  two  noble  Carthaginian 
prisoners,  Bostar  and  Hamilcar,  to  the  vddow  and  the  sons 
of  Begulus.     These  unhappy  creatures  were  then  shut  up 
in  a  narrow  cage  which  pressed  their  limbs  together,  and 
they  were  kept  for  many  days  without  food.      When 
Bostar  died  of  hunger,  the  cruel  Bom  an  matron  left  the 
putrefying  corpse  in  the  narrow  cage  by  the  side  of  his 
surviving  companion,  whose  life  she  prolonged  by  spare 
and  meagre  diet  in  order  to  lengthen  out  his  sufferings. 
At  last  this  horrible  treatment  became  known,'  and  the 

*  This  treatment  was  the   more  atrocious  as  the  captive  Hamilcar  had 


80  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     heartless  torturers,  escaping  with  difficulty  the  severest 
-_    .  •    ^  punishment,  were  compelled  to  bury  the  body  of  Bostar, 

and  to  treat  Hamilcar  with  humanity. 
The  silence  This  is  the  story  as  it  is  found  related  by  a  host  of 
bius^^^"  Greek  and  Boman  authors.^  Among  these,  however,  the 
most  important  is  wanting.  Polybius  mentions  neither 
the  embassy  of  the  Carthaginians,  nor  the  tortures  of 
Eegulus,  nor  those  of  Bostar  and  Hamilcar;  and  he 
observes,  as  we  have  seen,  the  same  significant  silence  with 
regard  to  the  alleged  ingratitude  and  treachery  of  the  Car- 
thaginians towards  Xanthippus.*  Moreover,  Zonaras,  who 
copied  Dion  Cassius,  refers  to  the  martyrdom  of  Regulus 
as  a  rumour.'  Besides,  there  are  contradictions  in  the 
various  reports.  According  to  Seneca  and  Florus  the 
unhappy  Begulus  wad  crucified ;  ^  according  to  Zonaras, 
Begulus  only  pretended  he  had  taken  poison,  whilst  other 
authorities  say  that  the  Carthaginians  really  gave  it  him. 
Apart  from  these  contradictions  the  facts  reported  are  in 
themselves  suspicious.  That  the  Bomans  should  not  have 
agreed  willingly  to  an  exchange  of  prisoners  is  hardly 
credible ;  they  did  it  two  years  later,*  and  it  is  highly 
probable  that  Cn.  Scipio  was  thus  released  from  his  cap- 
tivity.* And  can  we  imagine  that  the  Carthaginians 
tortured  Begulus  in  so  useless  and  foolish  a  manner,  at 
the  same  time  challenging  the  Bomans  to  retaliation? 
Were  they  really  such  monsters  as  the  Boman  historians 
liked  to  picture  them? 
Probable  Such  questions  and  considerations  have  for  a  long  time 
Se^story.  ^^>^^  Called  forth  by  the  traditional  story  of  the  Carthagi- 
nian embassy  and  the  death  of  Begulus.     The  account  of 

befriended  Regalus  in  Cftrthage,  88  appears  to  be  intimated  by  Diodorns 
(xxiv.  fr.  90,  Tauchn.) 

'  Cicero,  Livy,  Valerius  Maximns,  Gellius,  Seneca,  Florus,  Eutropius, 
Anrelius  Victor,  Dion  Cassius,  Appian,  Diodorns,  Zonaras. 

*  See  above,  p.  71,  note  1.  *  Zonaras,  viii.  15. 

*  Hence  poison,  hunger,  depriration  of  sleep,  and  other  tortures  "were  not 
sufficient  to  put  an  end  to  the  life  of  R^gulus ;  he  must  also  undergo  the 
ignominious  punishment  of  slares. 

*  Zonaras,  viii.  16.  '  See  abore,  p.  73. 


THE  FIKST  PUNIC  WAR.  81 

the  martyrdom  of  Begulas  has  been  almost  universally  CHAP, 
regarded  as  a  malicious  invention,  and  the  suspicion  has  s« — ^J.^ 
arisen  that  it  originated  within  the  family  of  Eegulus  ^^^ 
itself.*  This  view  is  recommended  by  its  internal  credi-  254-260 
bility.  The  noble  Carthaginian  prisoners  were  given  up 
probably  to  the  family  of  the  Atilii,  as  a  security  for  the 
exchange  of  Begulus.  But  Begulus  died  in  imprisonment 
before  the  exchange  could  be  made.  Thinking  that  cruel 
treatment  had  hastened  his  death,  the  widow  of  Eegulus 
took  her  revenge  in  the  horrible  tortures  of  the  two  Car- 
thaginians, and,  to  justify  this,  the  story  of  the  martyrdom 
of  Begulus  was  invented.  But  the  government  and  the 
Koman  people  as  such  took  no  part  in  the  tortures  of 
innocent  captives ;  on  the  contrary  they  put  an  ei^d  to  the 
private  revenge  as  soon  as  the  fact  became  known.  The 
senate  was  not  capable  of  defiling  the  Boman  name  by 
unheard-of  cruelties  towards  prisoners,  and  of  thus  giving 
the  Carthaginians  an  excuse  for  retaliation.'  Only  to  the 
revengeful  passion  of  a  woman,  not  to  the  whole  Boman 
people,  may  be  attributed  such  utter  contempt  of  all  human 
find  divine  law  as  is  represented  in  the  cruelties  practised 
towards  the  Carthaginian  prisoners.  If  we  take  this  view 
of  the  story  we  shall  find  it  improbable  that  Begulus 
took  a  part  in  the  embassy  of  the  Carthaginians,'  what- 
ever we  may  think  of  the  authenticity  of  the  embassy 
itself. 

Fourth  Period,  250-249  B.C. 

LILTB^UM   AND   DBEPANA. 

The  brilliant  victory  at  Panormus  had    inspired  the  EflTecteof 
Bomans  with  new  hopes,  and  had  perhaps  raised  their  of  p]^-^ 
demands.    They  determined  to  complete  the  conquest  of  ^^« 
Sicily,^  and  to  attack  the  last  and  greatest  strongholds  of 

>  This  was  surmised  as  early  as  the  sixteenth  century  by  Palmer  (Exeroit 
in  Auctor.  Grae.  p.  151).  See  Niebuhr,  Bom,  Gesch,  iii.  705;  English 
translation,  iii.  599.  '  Diodorus,  xziy.  p.  91  (Tauchn.) 

'  Polybius'  silence  seems  to  be  almost  condnsiTe. 

«  Polybins,  i.  41,  §  2. 

VOL.  II.  O 


82 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 

IV. 

^ . ' 

Attack  on 
lilybflemn 
by  the 
Romans. 


the  Carthaginians  in  that  island,  namely  Liljbsenm  and 
Drepana. 

Liljbaeum  (the  modem  Marsala),  situated  on  a  small 
strip  of  land,  terminated  by  the  promontory  of  the  same 
name,  'was  founded  after  the  destruction  of  the  island 
town  of  Motye,  and  had  been  since  that  event  the  chief 
fortress  of  the  Carthaginians.'  Besieged  by  Dionysius  in 
the  year  368  B.C.,  and  by  Pyrrhus  in  276  B.o.,  it  had 
proved  its  strength,  and  had  remained unconquered.  Nature 
and  art  had  joined  hands  in  making  this  fortress  in- 
vincible, if  defended  with  Punic  fanaticism.*  Two  sides 
of  the  town  were  washed  by  the  sea,  and  were  protected, 
not  only  by  strong  walls,  but  more  especially  by  shallows 
and  sunken  rocks,  which  made  it  impossible  for  any  but  the 
most  skilful  pilots  or  the  most  daring  sailors  to  reach  the 
harbour.  On  the  land  side  the  town  was  covered  by  strong 
walls  and  towers,  and  a  moat  one  hundred  and  twenty  feet 
deep  and  eighty  feet  broad.  The  harbour  was  on  the 
north  side,  and  was  inclosed  with  the  town  in  one  line  of 
fortifications.'  The  garrison  consisted  of  the  citizens 
and  10,000  infantry,  mostly  mercenaries,  not  to  be  relied 
on,  and  a  strong  division  of  horse.*  It  was  impos- 
sible to  take  such  a  maritime  fortress  without  the  co- 
operation of  a  fleet.  The  Romans  y^ere  obliged  to  make 
up  their  minds  to  build  a  new  fleet,  in  spite  of  their 


*  See  above,  p.  26,  note  1. 

*  See  Schubring  on  *  Motye-Lilybseum '  in  the  PhUologus  of  1866.  The  site 
of  the  ancient  Lilybseum  is  partially  covered  by  the  modern  Marsala. 

'  This  port  is  now  silted  up  and  useless,  and  where  the  Carthaginian  galleys 
rode  there  are  now  saltworks.  But  during  the  whole  of  antiquity  the  port  of 
Lilybseum  was  highly  esteemed.  It  was  here  that  in  the  first  year  of  the 
Hannibalian  war,  the  consul  Sempronius  collected  a  fleet  for  his  intended 
expedition  to  Africa ;  from  this  port  Scipio  sailed,  and  in  later  times  it  was  a 
station  for  part  of  the  Homan  fleet.  The  Arabs  called  it  Mars  Alia,  the 
haven  of  God,  whence  the  modem  name  of  Marsala.  The  total  destruction  of 
the  port  was  probably  eflTected  by  Bon  Juan  of  Austria,  who  wished  to  make  it 
useless  for  the  Barbaresk  pirates.  The  modern  port  of  Marsala  is  on  the 
south  side  of  the  town,  and  formed  by  an  artificial  mole. 

*  According  to  Diodorus  (xziv.  fr.  1)  Uie  cavalry  amounted  to  7,000,  and 
the  infantry,  including  the  inhabitants  capable  of  bearing  arms,  to  60,000  men. 
Both  statements  seem  vastly  exaggerated. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR.  88 

resolution  three  years  before.'  The  two  consuls  of  the  year 
250,  C.  Atilius  Regulas  and  L.  Maulius  Yulso,  of  whom 
one  was  a  kinsman,  the  other  the  colleague,  of  M.  Begulus     p^^" 
of  the  year  256,  sailed  towards  Sicily  with  two  hundred    250-249 
ships,  and  anchored  before  the  harbour  of  Lilybeeum,  partly       ^'^' 
to  cut  off  the  town  from  supplies,  and  partly  also  to  prevent 
the   Carthaginian  fleet  from  interrupting  the  landing  of 
necessaries  for  the  large  besieging  army.^ 

The  Boman  land  army  consisted  of  four  legions,  which.  Number  of 
with  the  Italian  aUies,  made  together  about  40,000  men.  In  ^^  )^' 
addition  to  these,  there  were  the  Sicilian  allies,  and  the 
crews  of  the  fleet,  so  that  the  report  of  Diodorus  does  not 
seem  improbable,  that  the  besieging  army  amounted 
altogether  to  about  110,000  men.  To  supply  such  an 
immense  number  of  men  with  provisions,  at  the  furthest 
comer  of  Sicily,  and  to  bring  together  all  the  implements 
and  materials  for  the  siege,  was  no  small  labour ;  and  as 
the  task  extended  over  many  months,  this  undertaking 
alone  was  calculated  to  strain  the  resources  of  the  republic 
to  the  very  utmost. 

The  siege  of  Lilybseum  lasted  almost  as  long  as  the  Ihiration 
fabulous  siege  of  Troy,  and  the  hardly  less  fabulous  one  l[^ 
of  Yeii,  with  this  difference  ouly,  that  Lilybseum  resisted 
successfully  to  the  end  of  the  war,  and  was  delivered  up 
to  the  Romans  only  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  peace. 
We  have  no  detailed  account  of  this  protracted  struggle, 
but  it  is  on  the  whole  pretty  clearly  narrated  in  the 
masterly  sketch  of  Polybius,  which  possesses  a  greater 
interest  for  us  than  any  part  of  the  military  history  of 

»  Polybius,  i.  39. 

'  It  is  not  probable,  dot  attested  by  any  ancient;  writer^  that,  as  Mommsen 
supposes  {Rom.  Gesch.  i.  533 ;  English  translation,  ii.  49)  the  Roman  fleet 
sailed  right  into  the  harbour  of  Lilybeeum.  On  this  supposition  it  would  be 
unintelligible  why  the  Romans  three  times  endeavoured  to  block  up  the 
entrance  to  the  harbour.  Fiobably  the  anchoring-grouud  in  the  harbour  was 
so  near  to  the  walls  that  ships  stationed  there  were  exposed  to  be  attacked  or 
even  fired  from  the  walls.  Again  in  the  last  year  of  the  war,  when  the 
Roman  ships  occupied  the  harbour  of  Brepana,  they  did  not  venture  into  that 
of  Lilybeeum  (Polybius,  i.  59,  §  9),  but  remained  in  the  neighbouring  bays 
and  roadsteads. 

o  2 


84 


EOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Modes  of 
siege  in 
ancient 
warfare. 


Borne  of  the  preceding  periods.  We  see  here  exemplified 
not  only  the  art  of  siege,  in  it€  most  important  features, 
as  practised  by  the  ancients,  but  we  discern  in  it  clearly 
the  character  of  the  two  belligerent  nations,  the  bearing  of 
their  strong  and  their  weak  points  on  the  prosecution  of 
the  war ;  and  we  shall  feel  ourselves  rewarded  therefore  by 
bestowing  a  little  more  attention  on  this  memorable  con- 
test than  we  have  given  to  any  previous  events  in  the 
military  history  of  Borne. 

In  the  art  of  besieging  towns  the  Bomans  were  but 
little  advanced  before  their  acquaintance  with  the  Greeks, 
and  even  among  the  Greeks  it  was  long  before  the  art 
reached  the  highest  point  of  perfection  that  it  was 
capable  of  attaining  in  antiquity.  Trenches  and  walls 
were  the  material  difficulties  with  which  besiegers  had  to 
contend.  Before  the  walls  could  be  attacked,  the  trenches 
must  be  filled  up,  and  this  was  done  with  fascines  and 
earth.  As  soon  as  the  trenches  were  so  far  filled  up  as 
to  allow  a  passage,  wooden  besieging  towers  and  rams 
were  pushed  forward.  These  towers  consisted  of  several 
stories,  and  were  higher  than  the  walls  of  the  town.  On 
the  different  stories  soldiers  were  placed,  armed  with 
missiles,  for  the  purpose  of  clearing  the  walls,  or  of  reach- 
ing them  by  means  of  drawbridges.  The  rams  were  long 
beams,  with  iron  heads,  suspended  under  a  covering  roof, 
and  were  swung  backwards  and  forwards  by  soldiers 
to  make  breaches  in  the  walls.  These  two  operations 
were  the  most  important.  They  were  supported  by  the 
artillery  of  the  ancients— the  large  wooden  catapults  and 
ballistse,  a  kind  of  gigantic  crossbows,  which  shot  off 
heavy  darts,  balls,  or  stones  against  the  besieged.  Where 
the  nature  of  the  ground  permitted,  mines  were  dug 
under  the  enemy's  fortifications,  and  supported  by  beams. 
If  these  beams  were  burnt,  the  walls  above  immediately 
gave  way.  Against  such  mines  the  besieged  dug  counter- 
mines, partly  to  keep  off  the  advance  of  the  underground 
attack,  and  partly  to  undermine  the  dam  and  to  over- 
throw the  besieging  towers  that  were  standing  on  it. 


ww^fmv^^^vmi^^  "  "niu^ 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR.  8o 

All  these  different  kinds  of  attack  and  defence  were     CHAP. 

resorted  to  at  Liljbeeum.     The   Bomans   employed  the  ^ , '  ^ 

crews  of  their  ships  for  the  works  of  the  siege,'  and  by  p^^^ 
the  aid  of  so  many  hands  they  soon  succeeded  in  filling  250-249 
up  part  of  the  town  trench,  while  by  their  wooden  towers,  "'*'' 
battering-rams,  protecting  roofs,  and  projectiles,  they  ^^^'^ 
approached  the  wall,  destroying  seven  towers  at  the  point  the  siege 
where  it  joined  the  sea  on  the  south,  and  thereby  opening  ^^i^^' 
a  wide  breach.  Through  this  breach  the  Bomans  made 
an  attack,  and  penetrated  into  the  interior  of  the  place. 
But  here  they  found  that  the  Carthaginians  had  built  up 
another  wall  behind  the  one  which  had  been  destroyed. 
This  fact,  and  the  violent  resistance  opposed  to  them  in 
the  streets,  compelled  them  to  retreat.  Similar  attempts 
were  often  made.  Day  after  day  there  were  bloody 
combats,  in  which  more  lives  were  lost  than  in  open 
battle.^  In  one  of  these,  it  is  said,  the  Bomans  lost  10,000 
men.*  The  losses  on  the  Carthaginian  side  were  probably 
not  less.  Under  such  circumstances,  the  ability  of  the 
besieged  to  resist  had  diminished  considerably.  En- 
thusiasm and  patriotism  alone  can  inspire  courage  in  a 
reduced  and  exhausted  garrison.  But  enthusiasm  and 
patriotism  were  just  the  qualities  least  known  in  the 
Carthaginian  mercenaries.  Above  all  others  the  Gallic 
soldiers  were  the  most  vacillating  and  untrustworthy.* 
They  were  inclined  to  mutiny ;  *  some  of  their  leaders 
secretly  went  over  to  the  Bomans  and  promised  them  to 
induce  their  countrymen  to  revolt.  All  would  have  been 
lost,  if  Himilco  had  not  been  informed  of  the  treachery  by 
a  faithful  Greek,  the  Achaean  Alexon.  Not  venturing  to 
act  with  severity,  be  determined  by  entreaties,  by  pre- 
sents, and  by  promises  to  keep  the  mercenaries  up  to 
their  duty.  This  scheme  succeeded  with  the  venal  bar- 
barians.   When  the  deserters  approached  the  walls  and 

«  Polybius,  i.  49,  {  1.  «  Polybins,  i.  42,  §  13. 

'  Biodoms,    xxiv.    fr.  1.      This  eyidently  exaggerated    statement  seems 
traceable  to  Philiniis. 

*  Polybius,  ii.  7,  §  5.  *  Polybins,  i.  43.     Zouaras,  Tiii.  15. 


86 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 

f 

Move- 
meota  of 
Adherbal 
and  the 
Cartha- 
ginian 
fleet. 


Relief  of 
LiljrbfBum 
by 
Hannibal. 


invited  their  former  comrades  to  mutiny,  they  were  driven 
back  by  stones  and  arrows. 

Many  months  had  passed  since  the  beginning  of  the 
blockade.  While  the  Boman  army  had  inclosed  the  town 
on  the  land  side  by  a  continuous  circumvallation  and 
trenches  which  extended  in  a  half  circle  from  the  northern 
to  the  southern  shore,  the  fleet  had  blockaded  the  har- 
bour and  endeavoured  to  obstruct  all  entrance  by  sinking 
stones.^  Lilybseum  was  thus  shut  off  from  all  communica- 
tion with  Carthage,  and  was  left  to  itself  and  the  courage  of 
its  garrison.  But  it  was  neither  forgotten  nor  neglected. 
It  might  be  supposed  in  Carthage  that  a  town  like  Lily- 
bceum  would  be  able  to  hold  out  for  some  months  yrithout 
needing  aid,  and  it  had  been  well  supplied  with  provisions 
before  the  siege  began.  It  was  well  known  also  that  if  it 
were  necessary  to  break  through  the  blockade,  the  Boman 
ships  would  not  be  able  to  hinder  it.  Probably  the 
greater  part  of  their  ships  were  drawn  up  on  shore,  while 
the  rowers  were  employed  in  filling  up  the  moat.  Some 
few  ships  might  be  out  at  sea,  or  might  be  lying  at 
anchor,  ready  to  sail,  in  well-protected  roadsteads ;  but 
the  violent  storms,  and  the  still  more  dangerous  shallows 
of  that  coast,  rendered  it  impossible  for  the  Boman 
captains  to  make  the  blockade  of  Lilybseum  effective. 
The  Carthaginian  fleet  which  was  stationed  at  Di^epana, 
under  the  command  of  Adherbal,  instead  of  attacking  the 
Boman  fleet  before  Lilybseum,  made  use  of  the  time  to 
scour  the  coasts  of  Italy  and  Sicily,  and  to  hinder  the 
conveyance  of  provisions  for  the  supply  of  the  immense 
besieging  army. 

Meanwhile  an  expedition  was  fitted  out  in  Carthage  for 
reinforcing  and  victualling  the  garrison  of  Lilybseum, 
An  enterprising  admiral  called  Hannibal,  a  man  not  rxa- 
worthy  of  this  great  name,  sailed  with  fifty  ships  and 
10,000  men  from  Africa*  to  the  ^gatian  Islands,  west  of 
Lilybseum.     Here  he  lay,  quietly  hoping  for  a  favourable 

'  Diodorus,  xziv.  fr.  1.    Fifteen  ships  laden  with  stonce  were  snnk. 

'  Polybius,  i.   44,  J  2.     According  to  Diodorus  (xxiv.  ft.  1),  t)ie  foic« 


THE  FIRST  PUNIO  WAK. 


87 


wind.*  At  last  it  blew  strong  from  the  west;  Hannibal 
now  unfurled  all  sail,  and  without  paying  attention  to 
the  Soman  ships,  but  still  fully  equipped  for  an  en- 
counter, steered  through  the  difficult  channels  between 
cliffs  and  sandbanks  towards  the  entrance  of  the  harbour, 
where  the  stones  which  the  Eomans  had  sunk  had  long 
since  been  washed  away  by  the  storms.  The  Eomans, 
seized  with  astonishment  and  admiration,  dared  not  ob- 
struct the  way  of  the  Carthaginian  vessels,  which  shot 
past  them  heavily  laden,  and  with  their  decks  crowded 
with  soldiers,  ready  for  battle.^  The  walls  and  towers  of 
Lilybseum  were  lined  with  its  valiant  defenders,  who, 
with  mingled  fear  and  hope,  looked  on  at  the  grand  spec- 
tacle. The  harbour  was  gained  without  loss.  The  com- 
plete success  of  this  undertaking  inspired  the  besieged 
with  fresh  hope  and  courage,  and  gave  the  Bomans  warn- 
ing that  Lilybseum  was  not  likely  soon  to  be  in  their 
power. 

Himilco  determined  to  avail  himself  of  the  enthusiasm 
which  Hannibal's  arrival  had  stirred  up.  Sallying  out  on 
the  following  morning,  he  made  an  attempt  to  destroy 
the  machines  for  the  siege.  But  the  Bomans  had  antici- 
pated this,  and  offered  obstinate  resistance.  The  battle 
was  long  undecided,  especially  near  the  Eoman  works, 
which  the  Carthaginians  tried  in  vain  to  set  on  fire.  At 
length  Himilco  saw  the  futility  of  his  attempt,  and  com- 
manded a  retreat.  In  this  manner  the  Eoman  soldiers 
were  compensated  for  the  vexation  which  the  superiority 
of  their  enemies  at  sea  had  caused  them  on  the  previous 
day. 

ftmounted  to  40,000  men.     He  relates  some  interesting  details,  but  on  the 
whole  his  narrative  is  confused  and  inaccurate. 

*  It  has  been  asked  (Haltaus,  Gesch,  der  Somer^  i.  384)  why  the  Bomans  did 
not  attack  him.  The  reply  to  this  question  is  contained  in  what  has  been  stated 
in  the  text.  Most  of  the  Boman  ships  were  drawn  ashore,  the  crews  were 
employed  at  the  siege-works,  and  a  great  number  of  the  men  had  already 
perished. 

*  According  to  Folybius  (i.  44,  {  4)^  the  Romans  feared  to  be  drifted  into 
the  harbour.  This  shows  clearly  that  the  harbour  was  untenable  for  Boman 
ahips.    See  abo?e,  p.  83,  note  2. 


CHAP. 

in. 

^ 1 ' 

FOUBTH 

Pkbiod, 
250-249 

B.C. 


TJnBQCcess- 
ful 

attempt  of 
Himilco  to 
destroy  the 
Boman 
works. 


88 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 

^ » 

DepArture 
of  Hanni- 
bal with 
his  fleet. 


Captore 
of  the 
Rhodian 
Hannibal. 


The  nighfc  following,  Hannibal  sailed  away  again  witli 
his  fleet.  He  went  to  Drepana,  taking  with  him  the  horse- 
men, who  till  now  had  lain  in  Liljbsenm,  and  were  of 
no  use  there,  while  in  the  rear  of  the  Boman  army  they 
could  do  excellent  service,  partly  in  harassing  the  enemy, 
and  partly  in  obstructing  the  arrival  of  provisions  by 
land.^ 

The  bold  exploit  of  Hannibal  had  proved  that  the  port 
of  Lily bfieum  was  open  to  a  Carthaginian  fleet.  From  this 
time  even  isolated  vessels  ventured  in  and  out,  and  defied 
the  slow  Boman  cruisers,  who  gave  themselves  useless 
trouble  to  intercept  them.  A  Carthaginian  captain,  called 
the  Bhodian  Hannibal,  made  himself  specially  conspicuous 
by  eluding  the  Romans  in  his  fast-sailing  trireme,  slipping 
in  between  them  and  purposely  allowing  them  almost  to 
reach  him,  that  he  might  make  them  the  more  keenly 
feel  his  superiority.  The  Romans,  in  their  vexation,  now 
sought  again  to  block  up  the  mouth  of  the  harbour.  But 
the  storms  and  the  floods  mocked  their  endeavours.  The 
stones,  even  in  the  act  of  sinking,  Polybius  says,  were 
thrown  on  one  side  of  the  current ;  ^  but  in  one  place 
the  passage  was  narrowed,  at  least  for  a  time,  and,  luckily 
for  the  Romans,  a  quick-sailing  Carthaginian  galley'  ran 
agpx>und  there,  and  fell  into  their  hands.  Manning  it 
with  their  best  rowers,  they  waited  for  the  Ehodian,  who, 
coming  out  of  the  harbour  with  his  usual  confidence,  was 
now  overtaken.  Seeing  that  he  could  not  escape  by  dint 
of  speed,  Hannibal  turned  round  and  attacked  his  pur- 


1  Diodonu  (xxiv.  fr.  1)  relates  that  7.000  horse,  which  in  the  beginning  of 
the  siege  formed  part  of  the  garrison,  were  afterwards  sent  to  Drepana  because 
they  were  of  no  use  in  Lilybenm.  He  does  not  state  the  time  when  this  was 
done.  The  inference  contained  in  the  text  seems  obvious.  The  caralry  could 
not  leave  Lilybieum  by  land,  as  the  Romans,  in  the  very  beginning  of  the 
siege,  had  drawn  a  ditch  and  mound  all  along  the  land  side  of  Lilybieum  from 
sea  to  sea.  The  first  opportunity  for  diHpatching  the  caraliy  by  sea  to 
Drepana  presented  itself  when  Hannibal  left  the  port  of  Lilybeum,  and  could 
as  easily  take  the  men  and  horses  as  ballast. 

«  Polybius,  i.  47,  {  4. 

■  This  fast  galley  was  a  rtrpifpfis  (quadriremis),  ix,  a  vessel  with  four  rows 
of  oars. — ^Polybius,  i.  47)  f  5. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR.  89 

sners ;  but  he  was  unequally  matched  in  strength,  and  was     CHAP. 

taken  prisoner  with  his  ship.  >,    ,  ' * 

Trifling   encounters  like   these  could  have  but  little     fl^^™ 
influence  on  the  progress  of  the  siege.  Slowly,  but  securely,    250-249 
the  Eoman  works  proceeded.     The  dam  which  levelled  the       ^'^' 
filled-up  moat  became  broader  and  broader ;  the  artillery  ^*e  »^-*^ 
and  batterin&f-rams  were    directed    against   the   towers  Bon  of 

T  '1    T\ 

which  still  remained  standing ;  mines  were  dug  under  the  ^  ^  "^" 
second  inner  wall,  and  the  besieged  were  too  weak  to  keep 
pace  with  the  works  of  the  Romans  by  counter-mines. 
It  appeared  that  the  loss  of  Lilybfieum  was  unavoid- 
able unless  the  besieged  should  receive  some  unlooked-for 
aid. 

In  this  desperate  situation  Himilco  determined  to  repeat,  Destruc- 
under  more  favourable  circumstances,  the  attempt  which  R^man 
had  once  so  signally  failed.*     One   night,  when  a   gale  si^g©- 

works 

of  wind  was  blowing  from  the  west,  which  overthrew 
towers  and  made  the  buildings  in  the  town  tremble  and 
shake,  he  made  a  sally,  and  this  time  he  succeeded  in 
setting  fire  to  the  Soman  siege-works.  The  dry  wood 
was  at  once  kindled,  and  the  violent  wind  fanned  the  flame 
into  ungovernable  fury,  blowing  the  sparks  and  smoke 
into  the  eyes  of  the  Romans,  who  in  vain  called  up  all 
their  courage  and  perseverance  in  the  hopeless  contest 
with  their  enemies  and  the  elements.  One  wooden  struc- 
ture after  another  was  caught  by  the  flames,  and  burnt  to 
the  ground.  When  the  day  dawned,  the  spot  was  covered 
with  charred  beams.  The  labour  of  months  was  destroyed 
in  a  few  hours,  and  for  the  present  all  hope  was  lost  of 
taking  Lilybeeum  by  storm. 

The  consuls  now  changed  the  siege  into  a  blockade,  a  Persever- 
plan  which  could  not  hold  out  any  prospect  of  success  so  ^^^m  ^* 
long  as  the  port  was  open.     But  it  was  not  in  the  nature 
of  the  Romans  easily  to  give  up  what  they  had  once 
undertaken.     Their  character  in  some  measure  resembled 
that  of  the  bull-dog,  which  when  it  bites  will  not  let 

»  Polybiug,  i.  48. 


90  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     go.     The  circumyallations  of  the  town  were  strengthened,' 
—   , '  ,^  the  two  Kotnan  camps  on  the  north  and  south  ends  of  this 
line  were  well  fortified;  and,  thus  protected  against  all 
possible  attacks,  the  besiegers  looked  forward  to  the  time 
when  they  might  resume  more  vigorous  operations. 
Their  For  the  present  this  was  not  possible.     The  Boman 

m^ultiee,  a,rmy  had  suffered  great  losses,  not  only  in  battle,  but  in 
the  labours  and  privations  of  so  prolonged  a  siege.  The 
greatest  difficulty  was  to  provide  an  army  of  100,000  men 
with  all  necessaries  at  such  a  distance  from  Bome.^  Sicily 
was  quite  drained  and  impoverished.  Hiero  of  Syracuse, 
it  is  true,  made  every  effort  in  his  power,  but  his  power 
soon  reached  its  limit.  Italy  alone  could  supply  what  was 
necessary,  but  even  Italy  sorely  felt  the  pressure  of  the 
war.  The  Punic  fleet  of  Drepana  commanded  the  sea^ 
and  the  dreaded  Numidian  horsemen,  the  ^  Cossacks  of 
antiquity,'  overran  Sicily,  levied  heavy  contributions  from 
the  friends  of  the  Eomans,  and  seized  the  provisions  which 
were  sent  by  land  to  the  camp  of  Lilybseum. 
The  winter  The  winter  had  come,  with  its  heavy  rains,  its  storms, 
and  all  its  usual  discomforts.  One  of  the  two  consuls,  with 
two  legions,  returned  home ;  the  rest  of  the  army  remained 
in  the  fortified  camp  before  Lilybseum.  The  Boman 
soldiers  were  not  accustomed  to  pass  the  bad  season  of  the 
year  in  tents,  exposed  to  wet,  cold,  and  all  kinds  of  priva- 
tions. They  were  in  want  of  indispensable  necessaries. 
The  consuls  had  hoped  to  be  able  in  the  course  of  the 
summer  to  take  Lilybeeum  by  storm,'  and  therefore  the 
troops  were  probably  not  prepared  for  a  winter  campaign. 
Added  to  all  this  came  hunger,  the  worst  of  all  evils  at 
this  juncture,  bearing  in  its  train  ravaging  sickness. 
Ten  thousand  men  succumbed  to  these  sufferings,^  and  the 
survivors  wei*e  in  such  pitiable  case  that  they  were  like  a 
besieged  garrison  in  the  last  stage  of  exhaustion. 

'  Thns  is  explained  the  fact  that  Poljbius  speaks  twice  of  the  construc- 
tion of  lines  of  circumvallation— i.  42,  {  8,  and  i.  48,  §10. 

'  The  siege  of  Sebastopol,  1854-d5,  affords  a  parallel  case  and  an  illus- 
tration. '  Pulybius,  i.  41,  §  4.  *  Diodorus,  loc*  cit.  p.  86. 


THE  FIKST  PUNIC  WAR.  91 

In  Rome  it  was  felt  that  the  Eoman  fleet,  which  lay     CHAP, 
useless  on  the  shore,  must  be  once  more  equipped.     The  — L, — ^ 
following  year  therefore   (249)   the   consul  P.  Claudius     ll^™ 
Pulcher,  the  son  of  Appius  Claudius  the  Blind,  was  sent  to    250-249 
Sicily  with  a  new  consular  army,  and  a  division  of  10,000 
recruits  as  rowers,  to  fill  up  the  gaps  which  fatigue,  priva-  cjau?iiw 
tions,  and  sickness  had  caused  in  the  crews  of  the  fleet.  Pulcher  at 
The  object  of  this  reinforcement  could  only  be  that  of     "P*^** 
attacking  the  Carthaginian  fleet  under  Adherbal  in  Dre- 
pana,  for  this  fleet  was  the  chief  cause  of  all  the  misery 
which  had  befallen  the  besieging  army.     Claudius  had 
without  doubt  received  an  express  order  to  hazard  a  battle 
by  sea.     It  was  nothing  but  the  ill- success  of  this  under- 
taking that  made  him  afterwards  an  object  of  the  accusa- 
tion and  reproaches  which  all  unsuccessful  generals  have 
to  expect.     He  began  by  re-establishing  strict  discipline 
in  the  army,  and  thus  he  made  many  enemies.     He  then 
vainly  sought  once  more  to  block  up  the  entrance  to  the 
harbour  of  Lilybaeum,  and  thus  to  cut  oflf  the  supply  of 
provisions  to  the  town,  which  during  the  winter  had  been 
effected  without  any  difficulty.     His  next  step  was  to  equip 
his  fleet,  mixing  the  new  rowers  with  those  still  left  of  the 
old  ones,  and  manning  the  ships  with  the  picked  men  of 
the  legion,  especially  volunteers,   who  expected  certain 
victory  and  rich  spoil ;  and,  after  holding  a  council  of  war, 
in  which  his  scheme  was  approved,  he  sailed  away  from 
Lilybseum   in   the  stillness  of  midnight,  to  surprise   the 
Carthaginian  fleet  in  the  harbour  of  Drepana,  which  he 
reached  the  following  morning.    Keeping  his  ships  on  the 
right  close  to  shore,  he  entered  the  harbour,  which,  on  the 
south  of  a  crescent-shaped  peninsula,  opens  out  towards 
the  west  in  the  form  of  a  trumpet.     Adherbal,  though  un- 
prepared and  surprised,  formed  his  plans  without  delay,  and 
his  arrangements  for  the  battle  were  made  as  soon  as  the 
ships  of  the  enemy  came  in  sight.     His  fleet  was  promptly 
manned  and  ready  for  the   engagement;  and  while  the 
Romans  sailed  slowly  in  at  one  side  of  the  harbour,  he  left 
it  on  the  other  and  stood  out  to  sea.     Claudius,  to  avoid 


92 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK  being  shut  up  in  the  haxbour,  gave  the  order  to  return. 
.  '  -  WhUe  the  Soman  ships  were  one  after  another  obeying 
this  order,  they  got  entangled,  broke  their  oars,  hampered 
each  other  in  their  movements,  and  fell  into  helpless 
confusion.  Adherbal  seized  the  opportunity  for  making 
the  attack.  The  Eomans,  close  to  the  shore  and  in  the 
greatest  disorder  and  dismay,  were  unable  to  retreat, 
manoeuvre,  or  assist  each  other.  Almost  without  resist- 
ance they  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Carthaginians,  or 
were  wrecked  in  the  shallows  near  the  neighbouring  coast. 
Only  thirty  ships  out  of  two  hundred  and  ten  escaped. 
Ninety-three  were  taken  with  all  their  crews;  the  others 
were  sunk  or  run  ashore.  Twenty  thousand  men,'  the 
flower  of  the  Soman  army,  were  taken  prisoners.  Eight 
thousand  were  killed  in  battle,  and  many  of  those  who 
saved  themselves  from  the  wrecks  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  Carthaginians  when  they  reached  the  land.  It  was  a 
day  of  terror,  such  as  Rome  had  not  experienced  since  the 
Allia — the  first  great  decisive  defeat  by  sea  during  the 
whole  war,  disastrous  by  the  multiplied  miseries  which  it 
occasioned,  but  still  more  disastrous  as  causing  the  pro- 
longation of  the  war  for  eight  years  more.* 
Dictator-  The  consul  Claudius  escaped,  but  an  evil  reception 
AtUius  awaited  him  in  Eome.  It  was  not  customary,  it  is  true, 
Cdlatinus.  f^j.  ^jj^g  Romans  to  nail  their  unsuccessful  generals  to  the 
cross,  as  the  Carthaginians  often  did ;  on  the  contrary, 
like  Sulpicius  after  the  Allia,  and  like  Yarro,  at  a  later 
period,   after    Cann»,    they    were   treated    mostly  with 

^  Polybius  (i.  51)  does  not  state  the  total  of  the  Roman  fleet,  but  mentions 
only  the  number  of  the  ships  that  escaped  (30),  and  of  those  that  were  taken 
with  their  crews  (93).  This  makes  123  in  all.  Orosius  (iv.  10)  gives  in 
round  numbers  120  ships  as  the  strength  of  the  Roman  fleet,  reckoning  90  as 
taken  and  30  as  saved.  But  Diodonis  (xziv.  fr.  1)  states  the  numberof  Roman 
▼easels  as  210,  and  Eutropius  (ii.  26)  even  at  220.  The  latter  writer  agrees 
with  FolybiuM  and  Orosius  in  giving  90  and  30  as  the  numbers  of  the  captured 
and  saved  vessels  respectively.  The  rest,  he  says,  were  sunk.  According  to 
his  calculation  they  amounted  to  100.  It  is  strange  that  Polybius  does  not 
refer  to  these,  and  it  is  not  likely  that  he  includes  them  among  the  93  vessels 
taken.  He  also  omits  all  mention  of  the  number  of  killed  and  of  the  prisoners 
taken,  which  we  borrow  from  Orosius. 

«  Polybius,  i.  49-61. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR. 


93 


indulgence,  and  sometimes  with  honom*.  But  Claudius 
belonged  to  a  house  which,  although  one  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguished among  the  Boman  nobility,  had  many  enemies, 
and  his  pride  could  not  stoop  to  humility  and  conciliation. 
With  haughty  mien  and  lofty  bearing  he  returned  to 
Bome;  and  when  he  was  requested  to  nominate  a  dictator, 
as  the  necessities  of  the  republic  were  urgent,  he  named, 
in  utter  contempt  of  the  public  feeling,  his  servant  and 
client  Glicia.*  This  was  too  much  for  the  Eoman  senate. 
Glicia  was  compelled  to  lay  down  the  dictatorship,  and 
the  senate,  setting  aside  the  old  constitutional  pra<^tice, 
and  dispensing  with  the  nomination  by  the  consul,  ap- 
pointed A.  Atilius  Calatinus,  who  made  Metellus,  the  hero 
of  Panormus,  his  master  of  the  horse.  After  the  ex- 
piration of  his  year  of  office,  Claudius  was  accused  before 
the  people  on  a  capital  charge,  and  only  escaped  con- 
demnation by  the  timely  outburst  of  a  thunderstorm, 
which  interrupted  the  proceedings.'  It  seems,  however, 
that  he  was  afterwards  condemned  to  pay  a  fine.'  Hence- 
forth he  disappears  from  the  page  of  history.  It  is  un- 
certain whether  he  went  into  exile,  or  whether  he  soon 
died.  At  any  rate  he  was  not  alive  three  years  later,  for 
it  is  reported  that  at  that  time,  his  sister,  a  Claudian  as 
proud  as  himself,  said  once,  when  annoyed  by  a  crowd  in 
the  street,  she  wished  her  brother  were  alive  to  lose 
another  battle,  that  some  of  the  useless  people  might  be 
got  rid  of.* 

The  hypocritical  piety  of  a  time  in  which  the  whole  of 
religion  was  nothing  but  an  empty  form,  attributed  the 
defeat  at  Drepana  to  the  godlessness  of  Claudius.  On 
the  morning  of  the  battle,  when  he  was  informed  that 
the  sacred  fowls  would  not  eat,  he  ordered  them,  it  is  said, 
to  be  cast  into  the  sea,  that  at  least  they  might  drink. 
It  is  a  pity  that  anecdotes  such  as  these  are  so  related  by 


^CHAP. 
IIL 

FOUBTH 

Period, 
250-249 

B.C. 


Alleged 
profanity 
of 
Claudinfl. 


'  Livy,  epit.  19  ;  Saetonius,  Tib.  2.  '  Valerius  Mazimus,  viii.  1,  4. 

*  PolybiuB,   i.   62,   J  3.— Scholia  Bobiensia  ad  Cicer.  De  Natura  Deorvm^ 
ii.  3,  7. 

*  Gelliufl,  z.  6 ;  Suetoniu*,  Tib.  2. 


94  BOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  Cicero  as  to  leave  the  impression  that  he  himself  recog- 
_i^  Bised  the  wrath  of  the  avenging  gods  in  the  fate  of 
ClandiuB.  Perhaps  the  story  is  not  true,  but  like  so  many 
similar  tales  it  was  inspired  by  pious  terror'  after  the  day 
of  the  misfortune.*  If  it  could,  however,  be  proved  to  be 
true,  it  would  show  that  the  national  faith  had  dis- 
appeared among  the  higher  classes  of  the  Eoman  people 
in  the  first  Punic  war.  For  a  single  individual  would 
never  venture  on  such  ridicule  of  the  popular  super- 
stitions if  he  were  not  sure  of  the  approval  of  those  on 
whose  opinion  he  lays  great  weight.  That  the '  sacred 
fowls  and  the  whole  apparatus  of  auspices  had  not  the 
smallest  share  in  determining  the  result  of  the  battle,  the 
Bomans  knew,  in  the  time  of  Claudius  and  of  Cicero,  as 
well  as  we  do.  The  reason  of  the  defeat  lay  in  the 
superiority  of  the  Carthaginian  admiral  and  seamen,  and 
the  inexperience  of  the  Boman  consul  and  crews.  The 
Iloman  nation  ought  to  have  accused  itself  for  having 
placed  such  a  man  as  Claudius  at  the  head  of  the  fleet, 
and  for  having  manned  the  vessels  with  men  who  for  the 
most  part  could  work  with  the  plough  and  the  spade,  but 
who  knew  nothing  of  handling  an  oar.  The  misfortune 
of  Eome  is  attributable  to  the  cumbersome  Eoman  ships, 
and  to  the  10,000  newly  levied  rowers,  who  were  sent  by 
land  to  Shegium,  and  from  Messana  to  Lilybseum,  and 
who  probably  knew  nothing  of  the  sea.' 
Energy  of  The  Carthaginians  made  the  best  use  of  their  success, 
thaginians.  Immediately  after  their  victory  at  Drepana,  a  division 
of  their  fleet  sailed  to  Panormus,  where  Roman  transport 

'  It  was  a  consolation  to  feel,  as  Floras  (ii.  2)  says,  'that  Claudius  was 
overthrown,  not  by  the  enemy,  but  by  the  gods  themselves,  whose  auspices  he 
had  despised/ 

•  The  first  who  reports  it  is  Cicero,  De  Natvra  Deorum^  ii.  3,  7. 

'  This  confirms  our  hypothesis  that  in  the  first  Roman  fleet  the  great 
majority  of  the  crews  coosisted,  not  of  landsmen,  but  of  veteran  seamen. 
These  also  manned  the  Roman  fleet  that  was  victorious  at  Ecnomus.  The 
los^j  of  thrse  men  in  war  and  shipwrecks  explains  the  failure  of  the  second 
expedition  in  the  African  Syrtis,  and  the  great  disasters  on  the  coast  of  Sicily 
and  Italy  (255  and  253  b.c.)i  whilst  tlie  aseiduous  practice  of  the  rowers  in 
241  B.C.  accounts  for  the  victoiy  at  the  iEgatian  Islands. — ^Polybius,  i.  59,  ]  12. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR.  96 

ships  lay  with  provisions  for  the  army  before  Lilybseum.     CHAP. 
These  now  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Carthaginians,  and  , — , '  ^^ 
served  to  supply  the  garrison  of  Lilybseum  abundantly,     p^^^ 
while  the  Romans  before  the  walls  were  in  want  of  the    250-249 
merest  necessaries.     The  remainder  of  the  Boman  fleet 
was  now  attacked  at  Lilybeeum.     Many  ships  were  burnt, 
others  were   drawn   from  the   shore   into  the   sea,   and 
carried  away;    at  the  same  time  Himilco  made  a  sally 
and  attacked  the  Boman  camp,  but  had  to  retreat  without 
accomplishing  his  purpose. 

The  disaster  of  Drepana  was  soon  after  almost  equalled  Dostruc- 
by   another  calamity.      Whilst  the  consul  P.  Claudius  p^man 
attacked  the  Carthaginian  fleet  with  such  bad  success,  his  fleet  and 
colleague  L.  Junius  PuUus,  having  loaded  eight  hundred  shlps^° 
transports  in  Italy  and  in  Sicily  with  provisions  for  the  "°^?^  ^• 
army,  had  sailed  to  Syracuse.     With  a  fleet  of  a  hundred  '  " 

and  twenty  ships  of  war,  he  wished  to  convoy  this  great 
number  of  vessels  along  the  south  coast  of  Sicily  to  Lily- 
beeum.  But  the  provisions  had  not  yet  all  arrived  in 
Syracuse  when  the  necessities  of  the  army  compelled  him 
to  send  off  at  least  a  part  of  the  fleet  under  the  protection 
of  a  proportionate  number  of  war  ships.  These  now  sailed 
round  the  promontory  of  Pachynus  (Cape  Passaro),  and  had 
advanced  as  far  as  the  neighbourhood  of  Ecnomus,  where 
the  Bomans  seven  years  before  had  gained  their  most 
brilliant  naval  victory  over  the  Punians,  when  they  sud- 
denly found  themselves  face  to  face  with  a  powerful  hostile 
fleet  consisting  of  a  hundred  and  twenty  ships.  There  was 
nothing  left  for  them  but  to  shelter  their  vessels  as  well 
as  they  could  along  the  shore.  But  this  could  not  be 
effected  without  much  loss.  Seventeen  of  their  war  ships 
were  sunk,  and  thirteen  were  rendered  useless ;  of  their 
ships  of  burden,  fifty  went  down.  The  others  kept  close  to 
the  shore,  under  the  protection  of  the  troops  and  of  some 
catapults  from  the  small  neighbouring  town  of  Phintias. 
After  this  partial  success  the  Carthaginian  admiral 
Carthalo  waited  for  the  arrival  of  the  consul,  hoping  that 
he,  with  his  ships  of  war,  would  accept  battle.     But  when 


96 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Seizure  of 
the  temple 
of  the 
Eiycinian 
VenuB  by 
the  consul 
Junius. 


Junius  became  aware  of  the  state  of  things,  he  immediately 
turned  back,  to  seek  shelter  in  the  harbour  of  Syracuse 
for  himself  and  his  great  transport  fleet.  Himilco  fol- 
lowed him  and  overtook  him  near  Camarina.  Just  at  this 
time  signs  were  seen  of  a  storm  gathering  from  the  south, 
which  on  this  exposed  coast  involves  the  greatest  danger. 
The  Carthaginians,  therefore,  gave  up  the  idea  of  atta-cking, 
and  sailed  in  great  haste  in  the  direction  of  the  promontory 
Pachynus,  behind  which  they  cast  anchor  in  a  place  of 
safety.  The  Boman  fleet,  on  the  other  hand,  was  overtaken 
by  the  storm,  and  suffered  so  terribly  that  of  the  trans- 
port ships  not  one  was  saved,  and  of  the  hundred  and 
five  war  ships,  only  two.  Many  of  the  crew  may  have 
saved  themselves  by  swimming  to  land,  but  the  provisions 
were  certainly  all  lost.* 

The  destruction  of  this  fleet  crowned  the  series  of  mis- 
fortunes which  befell  the  Eomans  in  the  year  249  b.o.,  the 
most  dismal  time  of  the  whole  war.  It  seemed  impossible 
to  fight  against  such  adverse  fate,  and  voices  were  heard 
in  the  senate  urging  the  termination  of  this  ruinous  war.' 
But  pusillanimity  in  trouble  had  no  place  in  the  Eoman 
character.  A  defeat  only  acted  as  a  spur  to  new  exertions 
and  more  determined  perseverance.  Immediately  after 
the  great  losses  at  Drepana  and  Camarina,  the  consul 
Junius  resumed  the  attack,  as  though  he  would  not  allow 
the  Carthaginians  time  to  be  aware  of  having  gained 
any  advantage.  A  large  portion  of  his  crew  had  been 
saved.     He  was  able  therefore  to  bring  reinforcements  into 


'  The  report  of  Diodorus  (xxiv.  fr.  1)  is  more  full,  and  sf^ems  more  accurate 
than  that  of  Polybius  (i.  52-54),  who  betrays  the  wish  to  attribute  the  losses 
of  the  Romans  more  to  the  action  of  the  elements  than  to  the  courage  of  the 
Carthaginians.  Moreover,  Folybius  is  here  guilty  of  an  error,  in  calling  the 
consul  Junius  the  successor  of  Claudius,  instead  of  his  colleague,  and  there- 
fore placing  the  destruction  of  the  Roman  fleet  at  Camarina  in  the  year  248 
instead  of  249. 

'  Zonaras  (viii.  1 5)  reports  that  a  senator  who  spoke  in  favour  of  peace  was 
immediately  killed  in  the  senate-house.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that 
this  is  an  invention.  Perhaps  it  came  from  a  Carthaginian  source,  for  no  one 
acquainted  with  the  dignity  and  sobriety  of  the  Boman  senate  could  have 
thought  such  an  act  possible. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR.  9t 

the  camp  before  Lilybseum,  and  he  succeeded  in  establish-     CHAP, 
ing  himself  at  the  foot  of  Mount  Eryx,  not  far  from  Drepana,  s.^^ — ,-1^^ 
which  town  he  partially  blockaded  in  the  hope  that  he     p^^™ 
might  thus  prevent   the  Carthaginians  sallying  thence    260-249 
and  overrunning  the  country.     Hamilcar  had  destroyed       ^'^'  _ 
the  old  town  of  Eryx  some  years  before,^  and  had  settled 
the  inhabitants  in  Drepana.    On  the  summit  of  the  moun- 
tain, looking  over  a  vast  extent  of  sea,  stood  the  temple  of 
the  Erycinian  Venus,  which,  according  to  a  Eoman  legend, 
was  founded  by  ^neas,  and  was  one  of  the  richest  and 
most  celeb;rated  of  ancient  temples.     This  was  a  strong 
position,  easily  defended;  and,  after  the  destruction  of  the 
town  of  Eryx  by  the  Carthaginians,  it  had  remained  in 
their  possession  and  was  used  as  a  watch  tower.     Junius, 
by  a  surprise,  seized  this  temple,  thus  securing  a  point 
which,  during  the  subsequent  years  of  the  war,  was  of 
great  importance  to  the  Romans. 

Another  undertaking  of  Junius  was  less  successAil  in  its  Captnre  of 
result.     He  endeavoured  to  establish  himself  on  the  coast  f^Q^r^^ 
between  Drepana  and  Lilybseum  on  a  promontory  stretch-  thaginians. 
ing  out  into  the  sea,   called  ^githallus.     Here  he  was 
surrounded  by  the  Carthaginians  in  the  night,  and  taken 
prisoner,  with  part  of  his  troops.* 


Fifth  Period,  248-241  B.C. 

HAMILCAR  BARCAS.   BATTLE  AT  THE  iBGATIAN  IBLANBS. 

PEACE. 

Prom  this  time  the  character  of  the  war  changes.     The  Ravages  of 
great  enterprises  of  the  previous  years  were  succeeded  by  ^Linkin 
hostilities  on  a  small  scale,  which  could  not  lead  to  a  final  fleet, 
decision.     The  Bomans  again   gave  up  the  naval  war, 
and  determined  to  confine  themselves  to  the  blockade  of 
Lilybseum  and  Drepana.     These  were  the  only  two  places 

*  See  above,  p.  60. 

'  Zonaras,  yiii.  15.  If  it  be  true,  as  Cicero  reports  {De  Divin,  ii.  33,  21), 
that  Jonins  destroyed  himself,  this  statement  may  still  be  reconciled  witJi 
that  of  2iOnara9. 

VOL.  II.  H 


98  ItOMAN  HISTOBY. 

BOOK     remaining  in  Sicily  for  ihem  to  conquer.    If  they  could 
-    ^7'    ^  only  succeed  in  blocking  up  the  Carthaginians  in  these 
places,  Sicily  might  be  regarded  as  a  Boman  possession, 
and  the  object  of  the  war  would  be  attained.   This  blockade 
demanded,  it  is  true,  continued  sacrifices  and  exertions. 
But  during  the  whole  of  the  war  the  Carthaginians  had 
hardly  made  any  attempt  to  issue  from  their  strongholds 
and  to  overrun  Sicily,  as  in  former  times.    A  comparatively 
small  force,  therefore,  was  sufiScient  to  observe  and  to 
restrain  them.     The  Carthaginian  fleet,  which  had  had 
undisputed  rule  of  the  sea,  could  not  be  warded  off  in  the 
same  way.    It  could  not  be  confined  and  watched  in  one 
place.'     The  whole  extent  of  the  Italian  and  Sicilian  coast 
was  at  all  times  exposed  to  its  attacks.    To  meet  these 
numerous  attacks  colonies  of  Boman  citizens  had  been 
established  in  several  sea  towns.    The  number  of  these 
was  now  augmented  by  the  colonies  Alsium  and  Fregellse 
— a  sign  that  even  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  Bome 
was  not  safe  from  Carthaginian  cruisers.     The  coast  towns 
were,  however,  not  entirely  helpless,  even  without  the  assist- 
ance of  Boman  colonists.    As  the  instance  of  the  small 
town  Fhintias,  on  the  south  coast  of  Italy,  shows,^  they  had 
catapults  and  ballistee,  which  they  used  as  strand  batteries 
to  keep  off  the  enemy's  ships.     The  larger,  especially  the 
Greek  towns,  were  protected  by  walls,  and  the  peasants  in 
the  open  country  found  in  them  a  temporary  refuge,  with 
their  goods  and  chattels,  until  the  enemy  had  retreated. 
In  time  the  Bomans,  Greeks,  and  Etruscans  also  practised 
this  kind  of  privateering,  which,  like  the  piracy  of  antiquity 
in  general,  and  of  the  middle  ages,  occupied  itself  not  so 
much  with  the  taking  of  vessels  on  the  high  seas  as  with 
pillaging  the  coasts.    War  began  now  to  be  an  occupation 
on  the  Boman  side,  which  enriched  a  few  citizens,  whilst 
the  community  at  large  was  impoverished.      To  what 
extent  this  privateering  was  gradually  carried  we  learn 

>  Orosius,  IT.  10. 

*  Here  the  Bomans  drew  their  ships  on  shore  and  defended  them  vith 
aitillezy  from  Phintias.    See  above,  p.  95. 


THE  FIRST  PTJNIO  WAB.  99' 

from  the  story  of  an  attack  on  the  African  town  Hippo.*     chap. 

TTT 

The  Boman  adventurers  sailed  into  the  harbour,  plundered         . '  _  -■ 
fmd  destroyed  a  great  part  of  the  town,  and  escaped  at  la«t,     ^^ 
though  with  some  trouble,  over  the  chain  vdth  which  the    248-241 
Carthaginians  had  in  the  meantime  attempted  to  close       ^'^* 
the  harbour. 

Two  events  belonging  to  the  years  248  and  247  may  en*  Renewal  of 
able  us  to  form  an  idea  of  the  situation  of  the  Boman  *  nce^Tth 
republic  at  this  time.    These  are'  the  reneYra.1  of  the  alliance  Hiero. 
with  Hiero,  and  the  exchange  of  Boman  and  Carthaginian 
prisoners.    In  the  year  263,  Borne  had  granted  to  Hiero 
only  a  truce  and  an  alliance  for  fifteen  years.     During^  this 
lon^  and  trying  period  HieK>  proved  hLelf  a  faithf^  and 
indispensable   ally.     More  than  once  circumstances  had 
occurred  in  which,  not  merely  enmity,  but  even  neutrality 
on  the  part  of  Hiero  would  have  been  fatal  to  Bome.    The 
Bomans  could  not  afford  to  dispense  with  such  a  friend. 
They  therefore  now  renewed  the  alliance  for  an  indefinite 
period,  and   Hiero  was    released    from    all  compulsory 
service  for  the  future. 

The  second  event,   the  exchange  of  the  Boman  and  Exchange 
Carthaginian  prisoners,*  would  not  be  surprising  if  it  were  prisoners 
not  for  the  tradition  that  such  a  measure  had  been  proposed  with 
by  Carthage  three  years  before  (250  B.C.),  and  rejected  by    "  '^^ 
Bome  on  the  advice  of  Begulus.     Be  this  as  it  may,  the 
exchange  of  prisoners  in  the  year  247  cannot  be  denied, 
and  it  follows  that  the  losses  of  the  Bomans,  especially  in 
the  battle  of  Drepana,  were  sensibly  felt.      The  consul 
Junius  was  probably  among  the  prisoners  now  set  free.' 

In  Sicily  the  war  was  now  locally  confined  to  the  ex-  Arrival  of 
treme  west.     The  chief  command  over  the  Carthaginians  Jamiicar 
was  given  in  the  year  247  to  Hamucar,  surnamed  Barcas, 
that  is  ^  Lightning,'  the  great  £a.ther  of  a  still  greater  son — 

'  Zonaias,  viii.  16. 

*  Zonaraa,  viii.  16,    Livy,  epitr.  W. 

'  It  looks  reiy  much  like  an  empty  boast,  if  the  Boman  historians  reported 
that  the  number  of  the  Carthaginian  prisoners  was  much  laiger  than  that  of 
the  Romans.  It  seems  unlikely  that  the  Carthaginians  ever  ransomed  their 
mercenaries.    It  was  probably  easier,  cheaper,  and  safer  to  engage  new  ones. 

e2 


100 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


His  treat- 
ment of 
the  Gallic 
merce- 
naries. 


Operations 
of  Hamil- 
car. 


of  Hannibal,  wlio  made  this  name  above  all  others  a  terror 
to  the  Eomans,  and  crowned  it  with  glory  for  all  time. 
Hamilcar,  though  still  a  young  man,  showed  at  once  that 
he  was  possessed  of  more  brilliant  military  tnlent  than 
any  oflScer  whom  Carthage  had  hitheiix)  placed  in  com- 
mand of  her  troops.  He  was  not  only  a  brave  soldier  but 
an  accomplished  politician.'  With  the  small  means 
which  his  exhausted  country  placed  at  his  disposal,  he 
was  able  so  to  carry  on  the  war  for  six  years  longer  that 
when  at  last  the  defeat  of  the  Carthaginian  fleet,  oc- 
casioned by  no  fault  of  his,  compelled  Carthage  to  make 
peace,  this  peace  was  made  on  conditions  which  left 
Carthage  an  independent  and  powerful  state. 

When  Hamilcar  arrived  in  Sicily,  he  found  the  Gallic 
mercenaries  in  a  stat«  of  mutiny.  The  prayers,  promises, 
and  donatives  by  which  three  years  before  Himilco  had 
purchased  the  fidelity  of  his  mercenaries  in  Lilybseum, 
were  more  likely  to  encourage  them  in  their  insubordina- 
tion than  to  keep  them  in  strict  discipline.  DiflFerent 
and  more  efficient  means  were  now  applied  to  coerce 
them.  The  mutineers  were  punished  without  mercy.  Some 
were  sent  to  Carthage  or  exposed  on  desert  islands,  others 
thrown  overboard,  and  the  remainder  surprised  and  mas- 
sacred by  night. 

In  a  war  carried  on  with  such  soldiers,  even  the  best 
general  had  hardly  any  prospect  of  success  against  a 
national  army  like  the  Boman.  So  much  the  more 
brilliant  appears  the  genius  of  the  Carthaginian  leader, 
who  made  his  own  personal  influence  among  the  troops 
supply  the  place  of  patriotic  enthusiasm.  He  could 
not  carry  on  the  war  on  a  grand  scale.  Neither  the 
numbers  nor  the  fidelity  and  skill  of  his  troops  were  such 
that  he  could  venture  to  attack  the  Boman  armies,  which 
from  their  fortified  oamps  were  threatening  Lilybseum 

and  Drepana.    Compelled  to  conduct  the  war  differently, 

. 

>  Biodorus  (zxir.  1),  following,  probably,  Fhilinns,  applies  to  bim  the 
Homeric  Terse — 

ofjL^tpov  /Soo'tAc^s  T*  it.yct$hs  Kpartpds  i^  cuxfi'hrfis. 


■^  ■■■  r" 


^.-i-W-r'-^ 


-  1^" 


«.l   w 


■J«i 


■^  I" 


THE  FTRST  FUNIC  WAB. 


101 


lie  took  possession  of  Mount  Heircte  (now  Monte  Pelle- 
grino),  near  Panormns,  whose  precipitous  sides  made  it 
a  natural  fortress,  while  on  its  level  summit  some  ground 
was  left  for  cultivation,  and  its  nearness  to  the  sea  secured 
immediate  communication  with  the  fleet.  While,  there- 
fore, the  Bomaus  lay  before  the  two  Carthaginian  for- 
tresses, Hamilcar  threatened  Panormus,  now  the  most 
important  possession  of  the  Romans  in  the  whole  of  Sicily ; 
for  not  only  had  the  reinforcements  and  supplies  of  their 
army  to  be  forwarded  from  it,  but  it  was  the  only  place 
through  which  direct  communication  with  Italy  by  sea 
was  kept  up.  By  the  Carthaginian  garrison  at  Heircte, 
not  only  was  the  importance  of  Panormus  neutralised,  but 
its  safety  was  endangered,  and  Rome  was  compelled  to 
keep  a  large  garrison  in  it. 

For  three  years  this  state  of  things  continued.  From 
his  impregnable  rocky  citadel,  Hamilcar,  as  irresistible 
as  the  lightning  whose  name  he  bore,  attacked  the  Romans 
whenever  he  chose,  by  sea  or  by  land,  in  Italy  or  in  Sicily. 
He  laid  waste  the  coasts  of  Bruttium  and  Lucania,  and 
penetrated  northwards  as  far  as  Cumse.  No  part  of  Sicily 
was  secure  from  his  attacks.  His  adventurous  raids  extended 
as  far  as  Mount  ^tna.  When  he  returned  from  such  expe- 
ditions he  made  the  Romans  feel  his  presence.  The  task 
of  describing  the  almost  iminterrupted  fighting  between 
the  Romans  and  the  Carthaginians  before  Panormus 
seemed  to  Polybius  almost  as  impossible  as  to  follow  every 
blow,  every  parry,  and  every  turn  of  two  pugilists.^  The 
detail  of  such  encounters  escapes  observation.  It  is  only 
the  bearing  of  the  combatants  in  general  and  the  result 
of  which  we  become  aware.  Hamilcar,  with  his  mercenaries, 
supported  gloriously  and  successfully  the  unequal  struggle 
with  the  Roman  legions.  The  war  thus  waged  by  him 
was  a  prelude  to  the  battles  which  his  illustrious  son  was 
to  fight  on  Italian  soil.  At  length  in  the  year  244  he  left 
Heircte  unconquered,  and  chose  a  new  battle-field  in  a 


CHAP. 

III. 
— — « — — ' 

Fifth 
Period, 
248-241 

B.C. 


Occupa- 
tion of 
Eryxby 
Hamilcar. 


"  Polybius,  i.  67, 1 1. 


102 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Sufferings 
of  the 
Roman 
allies. 


much  more  difficult  situation  on  Mount  Eryx,  in  the 
immediate  neighbourhood  of  Drepana.*  The  reason  for 
this  change  is  not  reported.  Perhaps  it  may  haye  been 
the  precarious  position  of  Drepana,  which  the  Romans 
continued  to  besiege  with  increasing  vigour.  Close  by 
Drepana,  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain,  the  Somans  had 
an  intrenched  camp.  On  the  summit  they  held  the 
temple  of  Venus.  Half  way  up  the  hiU,  on  the  slope  to- 
wards Drepana,  lay  the  ancient  town  of  Eryx,  demolished 
by  the  Carthaginians  in  the  fifth  year  of  the  war,*  but 
now  partly  restored  and  converted  into  a  Itoman  fortifica- 
tion. This  post  Hamilcar  surprised  and  stormed  in  a 
night  attack,  and  then  took  up  a  strong  position  between 
the  Romans  at  the  foot  and  those  at  the  top  of  the  moun- 
tain. He  kept  open  his  communication  both  with  the 
sea  and  with  the  garrison  ut  Drepana,  though  on  difficult 
roads.  It  is  easy  to  conceive  how  dangerous  such  a 
position  was  in  the  midst  of  the  enemy.  Predatory  excur- 
sions could  hardly  be  undertaken  from  this  point.  Instead 
of  gain  and  spoil  the  soldiers  encountered  dangers  and 
privations  ;  the  fidelity  of  the  mercenaries  again  wavered, 
and  they  were  on  the  point  of  betraying  their  position  and 
surrendering  to  the  Bomans,  when  the  watchfulness  of 
Hamilcar  anticipated  their  intentions  and  compelled  them 
to  fiy  to  the  Boman  camp  to  escape  his  revenge.  The 
Bomans  did  what  they  had  never  done  before.  They  took 
these  Grallic  troops  as  mercenaries  into  their  pay.'  We 
need  no  other  evidence  to  prove  the  extremity  to  which 
Bome  was  now  reduced. 

The  war  now  really  began  to  undermine  the  Boman 
state.  It  is  impossible  to  ascertain  the  weight  of  the 
burdens  which  fell  upon  the  allies.  Of  their  contri- 
butions and  their  services,  their  contingents  for  the 
army  and  the  fleet,  the  Boman  historians  purposely  tell 


»  Polybius,  i.  68,  S  2. 
•  DiodoruB,  xxiii.  fr.  9.    See  above,  p.  60. 
'  After  the  war  they  got  rid  of  this  band, 
sent  them  out  of  Italy. — Poly  bins,  ii.  7»  §  10. 


They  disarmed  the  men  and 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR.  108 

US  nothing.     But  we  know,  without  any  such  record,  that     CHAP, 
they  furnished  at  least  one-half  of  the  land  army,  and       ™' 


almost  all  the  crews  of  the  fleet.     The  thousands  who    _f^^^™ 

Pbbiod, 

perished  in  the  battles  at  sea  and  in  the  wrecks  were,  248-241 
for  the  most  part,  maritime  allies  {socii  navales)  who  had  ^'^' 
been  pressed  into  the  Soman  service.  Nothing  is  more 
natural  than  that  the  extreme  misery  and  horror  of  the 
hated  and  dreaded  service  should  have  excited  them  to 
resistance,  which  could  only  be  quelled  with  great  diffi- 
culty. What  Italy  sufiFered  by  the  predatory  incursions  of 
the  Carthaginians  is  beyond  our  calculation.  But  an 
idea  of  the  losses  which  this  war  caused  to  Italy  is  given 
by  the  census  of  this  time.  While  in  the  year  252  b.o. 
the  number  of  Eoman  citizens  was  297,797,  it  fell  to 
251,222  in  the  year  247  B.C.,  being  reduced  in  five  years 
by  one-sixth. 

The  prosperity  of  the  people  suffered  in  proportion.  General 
The  trade  of  Eome  and  of  the  maritime  towns  of  Italy  J^ment  of 
was  annihilated.     The  union  of  so   many  formerly  in-  the  Roman 
dependent  political    communities   into  one  large   state, 
which,  by  putting  down  all  internal  wars  seemed  so  likely 
to  promote  peaceful  development  and  progress,  involved 
them  all  in  the  long  war  with  Carthage,  and  exposed 
them  all  alike  to  the  same  distress.      One  sign  of  this 
distress  is  the  debasement  of  the  coin.     Before  the  war 
the  old  Boman  As  was  stamped,  or  rather  cast,  fiill  weight. 
But  by  degrees  it  sank  down  to  one-half,  one-third,  a 
quarter,   and  in  the  end  to  one-sixth  of    the  original 
weight,  so  that  a  coin  of  two  ounces  in  weight  was  sub- 
stituted, at  least  in  name,  for  the  original  As  of  twelve 
ounces,'  by  which,  of  course,  a  proportionate  reduction  of 

*  Asses  of  the  full  weight  of  twelve  ounces  hare  not  been  preserved.  It 
is  supposed  that  they  were  never  struck  of  the  faU  nominal  value,  to  keep 
them  from  being  melted  .down  for  other  purposes,  and  to  cover  the  cose  of 
minting  (Mommsen,  Horn,  Muneweaeny  p.  261).  It  seems,  however,  that  a 
very  slight  reduction  from  the  full  weight  would  have  answered  these  purposes. 
If,  therefore,  Asses  of  eleven  and  even  of  nine  ounces  are  called  heavy  or  full 
Asses,  the  term  is  applicable  only  fh>m  the  contrast  of  the  later  Asses,  which 
ranged  between  five  and  a  half  and  two  ounces.    It  would  seem  that,  in  reaUty, 


104 


ROMAN  mSTOEY. 


BOOK     debts — in  otlier  words,  a  general  bankruptcy — was  caused. 
IV'        It  was  natural  that  in  this  gradually  increasing  poverty 
of  the  state,  some  individuals  should  become  rich.    War 
has  always  the  effect  of  injuring  general  prosperity  for 
the  benefit  of  a  few ;  just  as  diseases,  which  waste  the 
body,  often  swell  the  growth  of  one  particular  part.     In 
war,  certain  branches  of  industry  and  trade  flourish.     Ad- 
venturers, contractors,  capitalists  make  their  most  success- 
Ail  speculations.   In  antiquity,  the  booty  of  war  constituted  . 
a  source  of  great  profit  for  a  few,  particularly  because  the 
prisoners  were  made  slaves.     The  armies,  accordingly, 
w^e  followed  by  a  great  number  of  traders  who  under- 
stood how  to  turn  the  ignorance  and  recklessness  of  the 
soldiers  to  their  own  advantage,  in  buying  their  spoils 
and    purchasing    slaves    and    articles  of   value  at    the 
auctions  which  were  held  from  time  to  time.     Another 
mode  of  acquiring  wealth  called  forth  by  the  war  after 
the  destruction  of  peaceful  industry  and  trade  was  pri- 
vateering, a  speculation  involving  risks,^  like  the  slave 
trade  and  the  blockade-running  of  modern  times.     This 
kind  of  private  enterprise  had   the   further  advantage 
of  injuring  the  enemy,  and  formed  a  naval  reserve,  de- 
stined at  no  distant  period  to  be  of  the  most  important 
.service. 
Tedious  The  war  in  Sicily  made  no  progress.     The  siege  of 

tionofthe  XilybfleTun,  which  had  now  continued  for  nine  years,  was 
^"'*  carried  on  with  considerably  less  energy  since  the  failure 

of  the  first  attack,  and  its  object  was  plainly  to  keep  the 
Caxthagimans  in  tiie  town.  The  lingering  siege  of  Dre- 
pana  was  equally  ineffectual.  The  sea  was  free,  and  the 
garrisons  of  both  towns  were  thus  furnished  with  all 
necessaries.  It  was  not  possible  to  dislodge  Hamilcar  from 
Mount  Eryx.  The  Boman  consuls,  who  during  the  last 
six  years  of  the  war  had  successively  commanded  in 

.eren  the  older  Assen  of  eleran  or  nine  onncee  were  minted  in  consequence  of 
an  intentional  reduction  of  the  standard  equivalent  to  a  reduction  of  debts. 
i  Old  PolyphemuB  says  of  pirates  (Homers  Odysuy,  iz.  255) — 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAK.  105 

Sicily,  could  boast  of  no  success  whicli  might  warrant     CHAP. 

ITT 

them  in  claiming  a  triumph,  in  spite  of  the  easy  con- 


ditions on  which  this  distinction  might  be  obtained.  ^^^^ 

^^  ,  Period, 

At  length  the  Boman  government  determined  to  try     248-241 
the  only^  means  by  which  the  war  could  be  brought  to       ^'^' 
an  end,   and    once  more  to   attack  the    Carthaginians  ^*^*^^ 
by  sea.     The  finances  of  the  state  were  not  in  a  condition  Lutatius 
to  furnish  means  for  building  and  equipping  a  new  fleet,  ^^j^  ^^ 
.  The  Romans  therefore  followed  the  example  of  Athens,  and  fleet  to 

Sicily 

caUed  up  the  richest  citizens,  in  the  ratio  of  their  property, 
either  to  supply  ships  or  to  unite  with  others  in  doing  so. 
The  Boman  historians  were  pleased  to  extol  this  manner 
of  raising  a  new  fleet  as  a  sign  of  devotion  and  patriotism. 
It  was,  however,  in  reality  only  a  compulsory  loan,  which 
the  state  imposed  upon  those  who  had  suffered  least  from 
the  war,  and  had  probably  enjoyed  great  gains.  The 
owners  of  privateers  had  the  obligation  and  the  means  of 
supporting  the  state  in  the  manner  just  described.  A  new 
fleet  of  two  hundred  ships  was  thus  fitted  out  and  sent  to 
Sicily  under  the  consul  C.  Lutatius  Catulus  in  the  year  242. 
The  Carthaginians  had  not  thought  it  necessary  to  main- 
tain a  fleet  in  the  Sicilian  waters  since  the  defeat  of  the 
Boman  navy  in  the  year  249.  Their  ships  were  otherwise 
engaged  in  the  very  lucrative  piratical  war  on  the  coasts 
of  Italy  and  Sicily.  Lutatius  therefore  found  the  harbour 
of  Drepana  unoccupied.  He  made  some  attacks  on  the 
town  from  the  sea  and  the  land  side,  but  his  chief 
energies  were  directed  to  the  training  and  practising  of 
his  crews,  thus  avoiding  the  mistake  by  which  the  battle 
of  Drepana  was  lost.  He  exercised  his  men  during  the 
whole  of  the  summer,  autumn,  and  winter  in  rowing,  and 
took  care  that  his  pilots  should  be  minutely  acquainted 
with  the  nature  of  a  coast  singularly  dangerous  from  its 
many  shallows.  Thus  he  anticipated  with  confidence  a 
struggle  which  could  no  longer  be  delayed  if  Carthage  did 
not  wish  to  sacrifice  her  two  fortresses  on  the  coast.^ 

'  Poljbitts,  i.  59.   Zonaras,  yiii.  17. 


106 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 

Defeat  of 
the  Car- 
thaginians 
at  the 
.^atian 
Islands. 


Negotia- 
tions for 
peace. 


The  die  was  cast  in  March  the  following  year  (241).  A 
Carthaginian  fleet,  heavily  laden  with  provisions  for  the 
troops  in  Sicily,  appeared  near  the  ^gatian  Islands.  The 
object  of  the.  commander  was  to  land  the  provisions,  to 
take  Hamilcar,  with  a  body  of  soldiers,  on  board,  and  then 
to  give  battle  to  the  Bomans.  This  object  was  frustrated 
by  the  promptness  of  Catnlus,  who,  although  wounded, 
took  part  in  the  battle  after  having  handed  over  the  com- 
mand to  the  prsetor  Q.  Valerius  Paltx).  When  the  Cartha- 
ginians approached  with  full  sail,  favoured  by  a  strong 
west  wind,  the  Roman  ships  advanced,  and  compelled  them 
to  give  battle.  It  was  soon  decided.  A  complete  and 
brilliant  yictory  crowned  the  last  heroic  exertions  of  the 
Eomans.  Tifty  ships  of  the  enemy  were  sunk,  seventy  were 
taken  with  their  crews,  amounting  to  10,000  men ;  the  rest, 
favoured  by  a  sudden  change  of  wind,  escaped  to  Carthage. 

The  defeat  of  the  Carthaginians  was  not  so  great  as  that 
of  the  Bomans  had  been  at  Drepana.  But  Carthage  was 
exhausted  and  discouraged.  Perhaps  she  was  alarmed  by 
the  premonitory  signs  of  the  terrible  war  vdth  the  mer- 
cenaries which  soon  after  brought  her  to  the  very  brink  of 
ruin.  Sicily  had  now  been  for  several  years  as  good  as 
lost  to  the  Carthaginians.  The  continuation  of  the  war  held 
out  to  them  no  prospect  of  winning  back  their  former  pos- 
sessions in  that  island.  Carthage  therefore  decided  on  pro- 
posing terms  of  peace,  and  she  might  entertain  the  hope 
that  Borne  would  be  not  less  ready  to  bring  the  war  to  a 
close.  The  negotiations  were  carried  on  by  Hamilcar  Barcas 
and  the  consul  Lutatius  as  plenipotentiaries.  At  first 
the  Bomans  insisted  on  dishonourable  conditions.  They 
demanded  that  the  Carthaginians  should  lay  down  their 
arms,  deliver  up  the  deserters,  and  pass  under  the  yoke. 
But  Hamilcar  indignatly  refused  these  terms,  and  declared 
he  would  rather  die  in  battle  than  deliver  up  to  the  enemy 
the  arms  with  which  he  was  intrusted  for  the  defence  of 
his  country.  Lutatius  therefore  waived  this  claim,  the 
more  readily  as  he  wished  to  bring  the  negotiations 
speedily  to  an  end,  in  order  to  secure  for  himself  the  credit 


THE  FIBST  PUNIC  WAR.  107 

of  having  brought  the  long  war  to  a  close.    The  prelimi-     CHAP. 

naries  of  peace  were  thus  settled.     Carthage  engaged  to  > — r^ ^ 

evacuate  Sicily ;  not  to  make  war  upon  Hiero  of  Syracuse ;  ;|^^^^ 
to  give  up  aH  Soman  prisoners  without  ransom,  and  to  pay  248-241 
a  sum  of  2,200  talents  in  twenty  years.  On  the  whole 
the  Soman  senate  and  people  approved  of  these  terms. 
The  formal  conditions  of  the  treaty  involved  the  abandon- 
ment by  Carthage  of  the  smaller  islands  between  Sicily 
and  Italy  (which  was  a  matter  of  course),  as  well  as  the 
mutual  obligation  that  each  should  refrain  from  attacking 
and  injuring  the  allies  of  the  other,  or  entering  into 
an  alliance  with  them ;  but  the  war  indemnity  imposed 
on  Carthage  was  raised  by  1,000  talents,  to  be  paid  at 
once. 

Thus  ended  at  length  the  war  for  the  possession  of  Position  of 
Sicily,  which  had  lasted  uninterruptedly  for  three-and-  mans  at 
twenty  years, — the  greatest  struggle  known  to  the  genera-  the  dose 
tion  then  living.  The  most  beautiful  island  of  the 
Mediterranean,  the  possession  of  which  had  been  contested 
for  centuries  by  Greeks  and  Punians,  was  wrested  from 
them  both  by  a  people  who  till  quite  lately  had  lain  beyond 
the  horizon  of  the  civilised  nations  of  the  ancient  world, 
which  had  exercised  no  influence  on  their  political  system 
and  international  dealings,  and  had  never  been  even  taken 
into  account.  Before  the  war  with  Pyrrhus,  Rome  was 
among  the  Mediterranean  states  of  antiquity  what  Russia 
was  in  Europe  before  Peter  the  Great  and  the  war  with 
Charles  XII.  By  her  heroic  and  successful  opposition  to 
the  interference  of  Pyrrhus  in  the  affairs  of  Italy,  Borne 
emerged  from  obscurity,  and  made  herself  known  to  the 
rulers  of  Egypt,  Macedonia,  and  Syria  as  a  power  with 
which  they  might  soon  have  to  deal. 

After  the  departure  of  Pyrrhus  (273  b.o.)  an  Egyptian  Embawics 
embassy  was  sent  to   Some,  to  offer,  in  the   name  of  from 
King  Ptolemy  Philadelphus,  a  treaty  of  amity,  which  the  ^^^^ 
Roman  senate  willingly  accepted.'    About  the  same  time 

I  Zonaras,  yiii.  6  :    Kal  Hro\€fuuos  9k  6  ^lAiiScX^or  r6tf  rt  Hhppov  Ktut&t 


108  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     messengers  came  to  Eome  from  Apollonia,  a  flourishing 


IV. 


.  Greek  town  on  the  Adriatic,  perhaps  for  the  same  purpose. 
This  was  the  time  when  the  Greek  world  was  opening  to 
the  flomans,  when  Greek  art,  language,  and  literature  made 
their  first  entry  into  Italy — an  event  which  sixteen  centuries 
afterwards  was  to  be  followed  by  a  second  invasion  of 
Greek  learning.     The  Sicilian  war  was  to  a  great  extent  a 
Greek  war.     For  the  first  time  all  the  western  Greeks 
united  in  one  great  league  against  an  ancient  foe  of  the 
Hellenic  name ;  and  Rome,  which  was  at  the  head  of  this 
league,  appeared  to  the  Greeks  in  the  mother  country,  in 
Asia  and  Egypt,  more  and  more  as  a  new  leading  power 
whose  friendship  it  was  worth  while  to  secure.     No  wonder 
that  the  history  of  this  people  began  now  to  have  the 
greatest  possible  interest  for  the  Greeks,  and  that  the  first 
attempts  of  the  Romans  in  writing  history  were  made  in 
the  Greek  language,  and  were  intended  for  the  Greek 
people. 
Changes  in       While  Rome,  by  the  conquest  of  Sicily,  gained,  with 
taV^nsti-    regard  to  other  powers,  a  position  of  importance  and  in- 
tutions  of    fluence,  it  became  unmistakeably  clear  for  the  first  time 
that  old  institutions,  suited  for  a  town  community  and 
for  the  simplicity  of  ancient  life,  were  insuflScient  for  a 
more  extended  field  of  political  and  military  operations. 
The  Roman  military  system  was  organised  for  the  defence 
of  narrow  boundaries,  and  not  for  aggressive  warfare  in 
distant  parts.    The  universal  duty  of  military  service  and 
the  periodical  formation  of  new  armies,  which  was  a  con- 
sequence of  it,  had  not  appeared  prejudicial  in  the  wars 
with  the  Italian  nations,  who  had  the  same  institutions, 
and   as  long  as  the  theatre   of  war  was  the  immediate 
neighbourhood  of  Rome.     When,  however,  it  became  no 
longer  possible  to  dismiss  every  legion  after  the  summer 
campaign,  it  was  at  once  seen  that  a  citizen  army  on  the 
old  plan  had  great  military  and  economical  disadvantages. 
The  peasants,  who  were  taken  from  their  homesteads,  grew 

SfutXaylaif  hrotfuraro,    Valerius  Mazimus,  iy.   3,   10;   Liyy,  epit.    14;  Dion 
Cassius,  fr.  121. 


B.C. 


THE  FIEST  PUNIC  WAB.  109 

impatient  of  prolonged  service,  or  if  they  were  ordered  into     CHAP. 

distant  countries  like  Africa.*     It  was  necessary  to  steer  ^ 

a  middle  course,  and  to  let  at  least  one  consular  army     ^ifth 

'  ,      •'       Period, 

return  annually  from  Sicily  to  Rome.*  Only  two  legions  248-241 
wintered  regularly  at  the  seat  of  war,  to  the  great  injury 
of  military  operations.  Thus  the  time  of  service  of  the 
Soman  soldiers  was  lengthened  out  to  a  year  and  a  half. 
Even  this  for  a  continuance  caused  great  difficulty.  It 
was  necessary  to  offer  the  soldiers  some  compensation  for 
their  long  absence  &om  home.  This  was  effected  in  two 
ways,  first  by  allowing  them  the  spoils  taken  in  war,  and, 
secondly,  by  offering  them  a  reward  after  the  expiration  of 
their  time  of  service.  The  prospect  of  booty  operated  on 
them  much  as  their  pay  influenced  the  mercenaries.  It 
was  a  means  for  making  the  universal  military  service  less 
onerous,  for  it  could  not  fail  to  draw  volunteers  into  the 
army.'  The  granting  of  lands  to  veterans  also  served  to 
render  service  in  the  legions  less  obnoxious.  These  military 
colonies,  the  traces  of  which  are  even  now  apparent,*  are  not 

'  The  same  causes  are  in  operation  even  now,  and  make  it  impossible  in  a 
oonntry  like  England  to  introduce  the  conscription  for  military  service. 
Englishmen  will  never  submit  to  be  forced  into  military  semce  abroad, 
especially  in  the  colonies.  They  acknowledge  only  the  general  obligation  of 
defending  their  own  country.  For  the  same  reason  the  French  law  of  con- 
scription admits  of  substitutes.  Even  in  France,  the  sons  of  the  first  fiimilies 
would  not  go  to  serve  on  compulsion  as  common  soldiers  in  Algiers  or 
Cochin  China.  During  the  Crimean  war,  one-third  of  the  men  liable  to  be 
draughted  paid  for  substitutes.  In  Q«rmany,  the  universal  obligation  of  serving 
in  the  army  can  be  carried  out  only  because  Germany  has  no  colonies  and 
carries  on  no  wars  in  distant  parts.  But  even  in  Germany,  the  system,  if  tested 
by  a  long  war,  would  probably  break  down ;  and  it  is  modified  to  a  considerable 
extent  by  the  law  which  enables  young  men  of  higher  education  to  go  through 
their  military  duties  in  a  single  year  instead  of  three. 

'  This  appears  to  have  been  the  rule,  and  it  was  applied  even  to  the  corps 
which  was  sent  to  Africa  under  Regulus. 

'  This  had  always  been  the  practice.  But  it  depended  on  the  decision  of 
the  general  whether  the  booty  was  to  be  given  to  the  troops  or  to  be  reserved 
for  the  exigencies  of  the  state. 

*  According  to  Pliny  [Hist  Nat.  vii.  45),  L.  Metellns,  the  victor  of  Panormus, 
was  once  a  member  of  a  commission  of  fifteen  men  for  the  division  of  land 
(quindecimviri  agris  dandis).  We  do  not  know  when  this  commission  waa 
appointed ;  perhaps  it  was  during  the  last  years  of  the  war.  An  extensive 
assignation  of  land  to  veteran  soldiers  took  place  after  the  end  of  the 
Hannibalian  war. — lavy,  zxxi.  41,  49. 


110 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Constitu- 
tion of  the 
Roman 
army. 


Evil  of 
annually 
elected 
generals. 


therefore  to  be  regarded  as  a  symptom  of  tlie  disorders  of 
the  state  consequent  upon  the  civil  wars.  They  were  a 
necessary  result  of  the  Eoman  military  system ;  *  and  as 
long  as  there  was  unoccupied  unculfcivated  land  at  the 
disposal  of  the  state,  such  a  measure,  far  from  being 
hurtful,  might  even  possess  great  advantages  for  the  well- 
being  of  the  state,  as  well  as  for  the  veterans.^ 

Considering  the  military  training  of  the  Soman  soldiers, 
and  the  simplicity  of  the  old  tactics,  the  frequent  change 
of  the  men  in  the  legions  was  of  less  consequence  than 
we  might  suppose,  especially  as  the  officers  did  not,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  leave  the  service  vdth  the  disbanded 
troops.  When  the  rank  and  file  were  released  from  their 
military  duty,  the  staflF  of  the  legion,  it  is  true,  did  not 
remain ;  but  it  was  in  the  nature  of  things  that  the  cen- 
turions and  military  tribunes  of  a  disbanded  legion  should 
be  for  the  most  part  chosen  again  to  form  a  new  one. 
The  military  service  is  for  the  common  soldiers  only  a 
temporary  duty,  but  it  constitutes  a  profession  for  the 
officers.  The  Eoman  centurion  was  the  principal  nerve  of 
the  legions,  and  for  the  most  part  repaired  what  the  in- 
experience of  the  recruits  and  the  want  of  skill  in  the 
commanders  had  spoilt.  Begular  promotion,  according  to 
merit,  secured  the  continuance  of  the  centurions  in  the 
army,  and  placed  the  most  experienced  of  them  at  the 
head  of  the  legion,  as  military  tribunes.  They  were  to 
the  army  what  the  paid  clerks  were  to  the  civil  magistrates 
— the  embodiment  of  professional  experience  and  the 
guardians  of  discipline. 

Such  men  were  the  more  necessary  as  the  Bomans  con- 
tinued the  practice  of  annually  changing  their  commanders- 

1  In  a  similar  manner,  in  Prussia,  and  other  countries  .where  the  Prussian 
military  system  is  adopted,  the  need  is  felt  of  proriding  civil  employments  for 
those  soldiers  who  voluntarily  serve  in  the  army  beyond  the  term  fixed  by  law. 
These  men  form  the  staff  of  non-commissioned  officers.  They  are  eminently 
qualified  for  the  lower  grades  of  the  civil  service'. 

'  After  the  Crimean  war  the  attempt  was  made  by  the  Brjliish  government  to 
establish  the  Oerman  Leg;ion  as  colonists  in  South  Africa.  The  failure  of  this 
attempt  does  not  prove  the  system  to  be  vrong. 


B.C. 


THE  FIEST  PUNIC  WAR.  Ill 

in-chief.  There  was  no  greater  obstacle  to  the  military  CHAP, 
successes  of  the  Sonians  than  this  system.*  It  suited  — , — ' 
only  the  old  time  when  the  dimensions  of  the  state  were  ^^^ 
small.  In  the  annual  campaigns  against  the  ^quians  248-241 
and  the  Volscians,  which  often  lasted  only  a  few  weeks, 
a  commander  needed  no  especial  military  education.  But 
in  the  Samnite  wars,  a  perceptible  lack  of  experience,  and 
more  particularly  of  strategic  skill,  on  the  part  of  the 
consuls,  delayed  the  victory  for  a  long  time.  These 
defects  were  far  more  deeply  felt  in  Sicily.  Before  a  new 
commander  had  had  time  to  become  acquainted  with 
the  conditions  of  the  task  before  him,  even  before  he 
was  on  an  intimate  footing  with  his  own  troops,  or  knew 
what  sort  of  enemy  he  had  to  oppose,  the  greatest  part  of 
his  time  of  office  had  probably  expired,  and  his  successor 
might  perhaps  be  on  his  way  to  relieve  him.  If,  urged 
by  a  natural  ambition,  he  sought  to  mark  his  consul- 
ship by  some  brilliant  action,  he  was  apt  to  plunge  into  de- 
sperate undertakings,  and  reaped  disgrace  and  loss  instead 
of  the  hoped-for  victory.  This  was  the  inevitable  result, 
even  if  the  consuls  elected  were  good  generals  and  brave 
soldiers.  But  the  issue  of  the  elections  was  dependent  on 
other  conditions  than  the  military  qualities  of  the  can- 
didates, and  the  frequent  election  of  incapable  ofiScers  was 
the  inevitable  result.  Only  when  there  was  an  urgent 
cause,  the  people  of  necessity  elected  experienced  generals. 
Under  ordinary  circumstances,  the  struggle  of  parties,  or 
the  influence  of  this  or  that  family,  decided  the  election 
of  consuls.  The  power  of  the  nobility  was  fuUy  established 
in  the  first  Punic  vrar.  We  find  the  same  families  re- 
peatedly in  possession  of  the  highest  magistracies;  and 
the  fact  that  military  ability  was  not  always  required  of  a 
candidate  is  proved  above  aU  by  the  election  of  P.  Claudius 
Pnlcher,  who,  like  most  of  the  Claudians,  seems  to  have 
been  a  man  unworthy  of  high  command. 

*  Zonaras,  yiii.  16 :  fi(yurro»  ^hp  ol  *P«/Mubi  icipdXXoPTOf  tri  Kon^  ivuunhp 
$X\ovf  fW  Mpovs  tipxovras  hrtfitroyf  Jkprt  8^  r^v  irrpaniyieiy  luufBdjfovras  t^j 
hpxht  Ihrcuiov,  &ffwtp  tit  UtrKTifftp  <r^as  &aV  o^k  th  XP^^f  alpo^fitpou 


112 


ROMAN  HISTOIty. 


BOOK 
IV. 


TheEo- 
n^  nary 


If,  in  spite  of  these  deficiencies,  the  result  of  the  war  was 
favourable  to  the  Bomans,  it  must  be  ascribed  to  their 
indomitable  perseverance  and  the  keen  miUtary  instinct 
which  enabled  them  always  to  accommodate  themselves  to 
new  circumstances.  Of  this  we  have  the  clearest  evidence 
in  the  quickness  and  facility  with  which  they  turned  their 
attention  to  the  naval  war  and  to  siege  operations.  The 
successes  of  the  Bomans  at  sea  may,  it  is  true,  be  attributed 
chiefly  to  the  Greek  shipbuilders,  and  to  the  Greek 
sailors  and  captains  who  served  on  their  ships.  The 
Greeks  were  also  their  instructors  in  the  art  of  be- 
sieging towns  with  the  newly  invented  machines,  but  the 
merit  of  having  applied  the  new  means  with  courage  and 
skill  belonged  nevertheless  to  the  Eomans.  The  extrava- 
gant praise  which  has  been  lavished  on  them  on  account 
of  their  naval  victories,  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  repeat, 
they  did  not  deserve;  and  it  is  a  disgrace  to  them, 
heightened  by  the  contrast  of  former  times,  that  they  never 
afterwards  equipped  fleets  like  those  which  fought  at  Mylaa 
and  Ecnomus,  and  that,  at  a  later  period,  when  their  power 
was  supreme,  they  allowed  the  pirates  to  gain  the  upper* 
hand,  until  the  supplies  of  the  capital  were  cut  off,  and  the 
nobility  were  no  longer  safe  in  Campania,  in  their  own 
country  seats.  This  weakness,  which  became  conspicuous 
at  a  later  period,  confirms  our  hypothesis  of  the  prominent 
share  which  the  Italian  and  Sicilian  Greeks  had  in  the 
first  organisation  of  the  Boman  navy.  It  is  at  least  a 
significant  fact  that  the  Hellenic  nationaliiy  in  Italy  and 
Sicily  declined  with  the  decay  of  the  maritime  power  of 
Some. 

The  merits  and  defects  of  the  Carthaginian  manner  of 
HarthL?^  conducting  the  war  were  very  different.  The  Carthaginians 
had  standing  armies,  and  they  allowed  their  generals  to 
keep  the  command  as  long  as  they  possessed  their  confi- 
dence. In  both  these  respects  they  were  superior  to  the 
Bomans.  But  the  materials  of  their  armies  were  not  to  be 
compared  to  those  of  their  antagonists.  •  Their  soldiers 
were  mercenaries,  and  mercenaries  of  the  very  worst  kind; 


Constitn- 
tion  of  t 
Caithdgi 
nian 
armies. 


THE  FIBST  PUNIC  WAR.  118 

not  native  but  foreign,  a  motley  mixture  of  Greeks,  Gauls,     CHAP. 
Libyans,   Iberians,  and  other  nations,   of  men  without  >^ 


B.C, 


either  enthusiasm  or  patriotism,  urged  only  by  a  desire  of  ^^^^^ 
high  pay  and  booty.  In  the  fickleness  of  these  mercena-  248-241 
ries,  amongst  whom  the  Gauls  seem  to  have  been  the  most 
numerous  and  the  least  to  be  trusted,  lay  the  greatest 
weakness  of  the  Carfchagmian  militaay  system.  The  very 
best  of  their  generals  did  not  succeed  in  educating  these 
foreign  bands  to  be  faithful  and  steady.^  From  the 
beginning  of  the  war  to  its  close,  examples  abound  of 
insubordination,  mutiny,  and  treachery  on  the  part  of  the 
mercenaries;  and  of  ingratitude,  faithlessness,  and  the 
most  reckless  severity  and  cruelty  on  the  part  of  the 
Carthaginians.  If  the  mercenaries  entered  into  negotia- 
tions  with  the  enemy,  betrayed  the  posts  confided  to  them, 
deUvered  up  or  crucified  their  ofiacers,  the  Carthaginian 
generals  intentionally  exposed  them  to  be  cut  to  pieces  by 
the  enemy,  left  them  on  desert  islands  to  die  of  hunger, 
jthrew  them  overboard  into  the  sea,  or  massacred  them  in 
cold  blood.  The  relation  of  commander  and  soldier, 
which  calls  on  both  sides  for  the  greatest  devotion  and 
fidelity,  was  with  the  Carthaginians  the  cause  of  continued 
conspiracy  and  internal  war.  The  weapon  which  Carthage 
wielded  in  the  war  against  Bome  threatened  either  to 
break  with  every  blow  or  to  wound  her  own  breast.  We 
know  probably  only  a  small  part  of  the  disasters  which 
befell  Carthage,  owing  to  the  fickleness  of  her  troops.  How 
many  undertakings  failed,  even  in  the  design,  owing  to 
want  of  confidence  in  the  mercenary  troops,  how  many  failed 
in  the  execution,  we  cannot  pretend  to  ascertain.  So 
much,  however,  is  proved  to  our  satisfaction,  £rom  isolated 
statements  preserved  to  us,  that  the  bad  faith  of  the 
Carthaginian  mercenaries  was  their  chief  weakness,  and 

'  Not  even  Hamilcar  Barcas  did  tliis,  though  he  is  especially  extolled  for 
his  great  influence  over  the  minds  of  his  soldiers,  and  is  said  to  have 
succeeded  in  inspiring  them  with  deyotion  to  his  own  person,  as  a  snhstitnte 
for  the  patriotism  which  they  lacked  (Mommsen,  Bdm,  Geseh.,  i.  537). 
The  mercenaries  uuder  his  command  mutinied  (Zonaras,  riii.  16;  Polybius, 
i-  77*  S  ^)>  '^^^  ^®  ^^  ^^^  possess  their  confidence  (^PolybiuSi  i.  68,  §  12). 
VOL.  II.  I 


114 


KOMAN  mSTOEY. 


BOOK 
IV. 

TheCar- 
thafinian 
genlrals. 


Carthagi* 
nian 

inferiority 
at  sea. 


spoiled  all  that  by  their  experience  and  their  skill  as 
veteran  soldiers  they  might  hare  accomplished. 

We  know  little  of  the  Carthaginian  generals.  But 
it  is  clear  that  on  the  whole  they  were  superior  to  the 
Boman  consuls.  Among  the  latter,  not  one  appears  to  be 
distinguished  for  military  genius.  They  could  lead  their 
troops  against  the  enemy  and  then  fight  bravely;  but  they 
could  do  nothing  more.  Metellus,  who  gained  the  great 
victory  at  Panormus,  was  perhaps  the  only  exception;  but 
even  he  owed  his  victory  more  to  the  faults  of  his  opponent 
and  his  want  of  skill  in  managing  the  elephants  than  by 
the  display  of  any  military  talent  on  his  own  part ;  and 
when  he  commanded  the  second  time  as  consul,  he  accom- 
plished nothing.  On  the  other  hand,  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  Hannibal,  the  defender  of  Agrigentum,  Himilco,  who 
had  the  command  for  nine  years  in  LUybseum,  Adherbal, 
the  victor  at  Drepana,  and  Carthalo,  who  attacked  the 
Soman  fleet  at  Camarina  and  caused  its  destruction,  and 
above  all  HamUcar  Barcas,  were  great  generals,  who  under- 
stood not  only  the  art  of  fighting,  but  also  the  conduct 
of  a  war,  and  by  their  personal  superiority  over  their 
opponents  outweighed  the  disadvantages  involved  in  the 
quality  of  their  troops.  Among  the  Carthaginian  generals 
some,  of  course,  were  incapable ;  as,  for  instance,  those  who 
lost  the  battles  of  Panormus  and  the  ^gatian  Islands. 
K  the  Carthaginians  punished  these  men  severely,  we  may 
perhaps  be  entitled  to  accuse  them  of  harshness,  but  not 
of  injustice ;  for  we  find  that  other  unfortunate  generals, 
Hannibal,  for  instance,  after  his  defeat  at  Mylee,  retained 
the  confidence  of  the  Carthaginian  government ;  and  thus 
they  punished,  it  would  seem,  not  the  misfortune  of  the 
generals,  but  some  special  fault  or  offence. 

The  defeats  of  the  Carthaginians  at  sea  are  most  sur- 
prising. The  Roman  boarding-bridges  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  the  single,  or  even  as  the  chief,  cause  of  this. 
The  only  explanation  which  we  can  offer  has  been  already 
given — ^that  the  Boman  fleet  was  probably  for  the  most  part 


THE  FIBST  PUNIC  WAR.  115 

built  and  manned  hj  Greeks ;  *  and  even  then  it  is  still 
astonishing  that  the  Carthaginians  were  only  once  deci- 
dedly victorious  at  sea  in  the  course  of  the  whole  war.      ^^fth 

Fbbiod 

Nor  can  we  understand  why  they  did  not  fit  out  larger  24S-241 
and  more  numerous  fleets,  to  shut  out  the  Bomans  from  ''^- 
the  sea  altogether  at  the  very  beginning,  as  England  did 
with  regard  to  Prance  in  the  revolutionary  war.  That 
they  sent  no  second  fleet  after  the  defeat  of  Ecnomus  to 
oppose  the  Bomans,  and  to  prevent  their  landing  in  Africa, 
and  that  after  their  last  defeat  they  broke  down  all  at 
once,  must,  from  our  imperfect  acquaintance  with  the 
internal  affairs  of  Carthage,  remain  incomprehensible. 
Perhaps  the  financial  resources  of  this  state  were  not  so 
inexhaustible  as  we  are  accustomed  to  believe. 

The  peace  which  handed  over  Sicily  to  the  Bomans  Effect  of 
affected  the  power  of  Carthage  but  little.  Her  possessions  ^^^^ 
in  Sicily  had  never  been  secure,  and  could  scarcely  have  power  of 
yielded  a  profit  equal  to  the  cost  of  their  defence.     The  "^' 

value  of  these  possessions  lay  chiefly  in  the  commerce 
with  Sicily ;  and  this  commerce  could  be  carried  on  with 
equal  ease  under  Boman  rule.  Spain  offered  a  rich  and 
complete  compensation  for  Sicily,  and  in  Spain  Carthage 
had  a  much  fairer  prospect  of  being  able  to  found  a  last- 
ing dominion,  as  there  she  had  not  to  encounter  the 
obstinate  resistance  of  the  Greeks,  and  as  Spain  was  so 
distant  from  Italy  that  the  Boman  interests  were  not 
immediately  concerned  by  what  took  place  in  that 
coimtry. 

>  In  saying  this  we  of  course  do  not  pretend  to  affirm  that  no  Romans  and 
other  Italians  were  employed  on  board  the  fleet.  On  the  contrary,  we  know 
not  only  that  the  socii  navales  were  numerous,  but  that  the  naval  service  was 
utterly  detested  by  the  Italian  allies,  and  drove  them  to  mutiny  and  desertion 
in  large  numbers  (Livy,  xxiv.  23,  10).  But  as  the  Romans  required  thousands 
of  sailors  for  their  transports,  it  is  probable  that  they  first  employed  the 
untrained  landsmen  in  this  department  of  the  service,  and  thus  gradually 
trained  them  to  be  fit  for  manning  war  vessels.  As  for  practising  rowing  on 
land,  it  may  be  as  feasible  as  learning  to  swim  without  going  into  the  water. 


z  a 


116 


ROMAN  HISTORY- 


CHAPTER  IV. 


THE   WAR  OF  THE   MEBGENARIES,   241-238  B.C. 


BOOK 
IV. 

Rerolt  of 
tbe  Car- 
thaginian 
allicsw 


Cause  of 


As  sometimes  the  strongest  men,  when  they  hare  strained 
every  nerve  and  have  kept  np  bravely  in  fighting  against 
some  threatening  danger,  succumb  suddenly  at  last  when 
calm  and  quiet  are  re-established,  and  seem  doomed  to 
perish  from  some  internal  suffering,  so  Carthage  at  the 
end  of  the  long  war  with  Home  was  threatened  by  a 
much  more  serious  evil  than  that  which  she  had  just  gone 
through.  The  bad  humours  in  the  body  of  the  state, 
no  longer  absorbed  by  exertion  and  activity,  attacked  the 
inner  parts,  and  threatened  sudden  death.  A  mutiny  of  the 
mercenaries  of  Carthage,  in  connection  with  a  revolt  of 
all  the  allies  and  subjects,  followed  close  on  the  Sicilian 
war.  Tor  more  than  three  years  there  raged  a  fearful 
strife,  accompanied  by  horrors  which  show  that  man  can 
sink  lower  than  the  beasts.  The  cause  of  this  war  was 
the  great  weakness  of  the  Carthaginian  state,  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  consisted  in  the  want  of  a  uniform  popu- 
lation animated  by  the  same  sentiments.  The  mixture  of 
races,  over  which  Carthage  ruled,  felt  only  the  increased 
burdens  of  the  war  with  Borne,  and  not  the  patriotic  en- 
thusiasm which  lightens  every  sacrifice.  A  decisive  victory 
on  the  side  of  Carthage  might  have  inspired  her  subjects 
with  the  respect  and  fear  which  with  them  had  to  take  the 
place  of  devoted  attachment.  But  Carthage  was  conquered. 
She  had,  in  the  eyes  of  her  subjects,  lost  the  right  to  govern. 
It  required  but  a  slight  cause  ^  make  the  whole  proud 
edifice  of  Carthaginian  power  totter  to  its  foundation. 
This  cause  was   the  exhaustion  of  the  Carthaginian 


241-238 

B.C. 


the 


THE  WAR  OF  THE  MERCENARIES.  117 

finances.  When  the  mercenaries  returned  from  Sicily,  CHAP, 
and  vainly  looked  for  their  overdue  pay  and  the  presents 
which  had  been  promised  to  them,  discontent  and  defiance 
arose  among  them,  and  they  made  higher  and  more  ex-» 
travagant  demands  when  they  saw  that  Carthage  was  mutiny. 
not  in  a  position  to  oppose  them  by  force.  It  was  now 
as  difficult  to  pacifj'  them  as  to  bring  them  back  to  obe- 
dience. Open  rebellion  broke  out,  the  mutineers  and  the 
allies'  made  common  cause  together,  and  in  a  short  time 
all  the  towns  of  Libya  were  in  revolt.  TJtica  and  Hippo 
Zaritas  alone  remained  faithful.  Tunes  was  in  the  hands 
of  the  mutineers,  who  were  commanded  by  the  Libyan 
Matho,  by  the  Campanian  Spendius,  and  by  the  Gkkul 
Autaritus.  The  general  Hanno,  who  as  their  favourite 
had  been  selected  by  the  mercenaries  as  umpire  to  decide 
the  quarrel,  was  taken  prisoner  and  detained  as  hostage. 
Carthage  was  surrounded  by  her  numerous  enemies,  and 
seemed  hopelessly  lost.  But  the  spirit  of  the  Carthagi- 
nian population  now  rose.  An  army  was  formed  from  the 
citizens  and  those  mercenaries  who  had  remained  faithful, 
and  Hamilear  Barcas  took  the  command.  The  superiority 
of  a  true  general  over  such  chiefs  as  Matho  and  Spendius 
soon  became  apparent.  The  mutineers,  although  rein- 
forced, according  to  report,  by  70,000  Libyans  and  Numi- 
dians,  were  surprised  and  defeated  again  and  again. 
Hamilear  tried  demency.  He  only  demLded  a  promise 
from  the  prisoners  not  to  make  war  upon  Carthage,  and 
then  set  them  free.  But-ihe  leaders  of  the  mutineers, 
fearing  a  universal  rebellion  among  their  accomplices, 
decided  on  rendering  peace  with  Carthage  impossible  by 

*  It  is  not  at  all  likely  that  the  towns  subject  to  Carthage  were  in  an 
enviable  position.  It  was  the  general  practice  in  antiquity,  and  even  in  modem 
times  down  to  a  recent  period,  for  a  governing  country  to  treat  dependencies 
and  colonies  as  inferiors,  and  to  aim  chiefly  at  deriving  from  them  the  largest 
possible  profit.  If  the  Carthaginians,  as  is  reported  (Appian,  v.  3),  caused 
3,000  of  their  subjects,  who  had  joined  Regulus,  to  be  crucified,  it  seems 
natural  that  the  Libyans  should  now  make  common  cause  with  the  mutinous 
soldiers.  There  seems  to  be,  however,  no  sufficient  ground  for  charging  the 
Carthaginians  with  unusual  and  exceptional  cruelty  (Mommsen,  S&m, 
Gesch,,  i.  547). 


118  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     an  act  of  barbarous  treachery.    They  caused  the  im* 


IV. 


'  prisoned  Hanno  and  seven  hundred  Carthaginians  to  die 
a  cruel  death,  and  even  refused  to  give  up  the  bodies  for 
burial.  The  war  had  now  assumed  its  real  character,^ 
and  only  the  complete  overthrow  of  the  one  or  of  the  other 
party  could  put  an  end  to  it. 
Suppres-  Carthage  was  indebted  for  its  deliverance  out  of  all 
mutiny.  this  trouble  to  Hamilcar  Barcas.  Inspired  by  his  per- 
sonal quaUties  and  the  renown  of  his  name,  a  Numidian 
chief  called  Naravas,  with  some  thousands  of  horse- 
men, went  over  to  his  side.  The  enemy  was  beaten 
many  times,  thousands  of  prisoners  were  thrown  under 
the  elephants  and  trodden  to  death;  and  their  leaders, 
Spendius  and  Autaritus,  were  nailed  to  the  cross.  Al- 
though the  war  was  not  uniformly  successful ;  although 
Hippo,  and  even  Utica,  the  oldest  and  most  faithful 
ally  of  Carthage,  revolted ;  although  a  fleet  with  pro- 
visions was  destroyed  by  a  storm,  while  on  the  way  from 
the  coast  of  the  Emporisd  to  Carthage;  although,  in 
consequence  of  a  dispnte  l)etween  Hamilcar  and  Hanno 
the  second  in  command,  the  enemies  recovered  them- 
selves, and  in  a  sally  from  Tunes  defeated  Hannibal,  a 
lieutenant  of  Hamilcar,  took  him  prisoner,  and  naUed 
him  to  the  same  cross  on  which  Spendius  had  ended  his 
Ufe ;  yet  the  whole  rebellion  gradually  collapsed,  and  after  a 
reconciliation  had  taken  place  between  Hamilcar  and 
Hanno  at  the  instance  of  the  senate,  Carthage  soon 
{^ined  the  ascendancy,  and  stifled  all  further  revolt  in  the 
blood  of  the  mutineers.  The  Libyan  towns  submitted 
again,  and  Carthage  was  perhaps  wise  enough'  not  to 
punish  the  misguided  masses  for  the  crimes  of  the  ring- 
leaders. Even  Hippo  and  Utica,  which  had  marked  their 
revolt  by  the  massacre  of  the  Carthaginian  garrison,  seem 
to  have  received  mild  conditions.  Carthage  was  once 
again  ruler  in  Africa. 
Conduct  of      The  conduct  of  the  Bomans  in  this  war  is  one  of  the 

*  It  became,  in  the  terms  of  Polybiua  (i.  65,  §  6),  a  96Xtfios  &tfiror8os. 

*  Polybiua  does  not  state  how  the  revolted  towns  were  treated. 


THE  WAB  OF  THE  MERCENAETES.  119 

greatest  stains  on  their  history.    The  conditions  of  peace     CHAP, 
which  had  terminated   the  Sicilian  war  had  not  been  > — ' — - 


241-238 

B.C. 


the 


equal  to  their  expectations.  They  had  tried  to  get  more 
out  of  the  Carthaginians,  but  were  obliged  to  content  them- 
selves with  raising  the  contribution  of  war  by  1,000  talents.  Romans. 
There  was  now  an  opportunity  of  repairing  their  neglect, 
and  Borne  was  not  slow  in  making  use  of  this  opportunity. 
The  Eoman  senate  seems  to  have  thought  it  unnecessary 
to  interfere  and  to  take  part  in  the  war  of  the  mercenaries. 
It  was  enough  to  assist  the  rebels  with  the  requisites  of  war. 
This  was  done  by  mercantile  adventurers.  Perhaps  the 
Boman  officials,  even  if  they  had  wished  it,  would  have 
found  it  difficult  to  prevent  the  sailing  of  ships  which  had 
provisions  on  board  for  the  enemies  of  Carthage.  But 
what  view  the  senate  took  of  such  private  speculations  we 
shall  soon  see.  A  great  number  of  blockade-runners  ^ 
were  captured  by  the  Carthaginians.  Bome  had  no  plea 
or  justification  for  interceding  on  behalf  of  these  people. 
Nevertheless  she  did  so,  and  there  was  nothing  lefb  for 
Carthage  to  do  in  her  difficulty  but  to  set  the  prisoners  free. 
In  acknowledgment  of  this  the  Boman  senate  gave  up 
all  the  Carthaginian  prisoners  who  were  still  in  Italy,* 
and  allowed  its  subjects  in  future  to  send  the  necessaries 
of  war  only  to  the  Carthaginians,  not  to  their  enemies — a 
concession  which  one  would  suppose  was  a  matter  of  course. 
It  was  expected  that  if  Carthage  had  opposed  the  de- 
mands of  Bome  for  the  release  of  the  blockade-breakers, 
the  Bomans  would  at  once  have  declared  war.  Carthage 
yielded,  and  the  Bomans  were  thus  debarred  from  fol- 
lowing up  their  hostile  policy ;  they  were  even  obliged  to 
permit  their  friend  and  ally  King  Hiero  of  Syracuse  to 
come  forward  of  his  own  accord  to  the  assistance  of  the 
Carthaginians.  This  wise  statesman  *  saw  plainly  that  the 
Carthaginians,  after  their  expulsion  from  Sicily,  were  no 
longer  his  natural  enemies — that  they  were  on  the  contrary 

>  PolybioB,  i.  83,  %  7*  states  that  there  were  500. 

»  Polybius,  i.  88,  %  8. 

'  Polybius,  i.  83,  §  3 :  irdbv  ^poviftms  kcU  rovyfX^i  Kayi(j&iit»Qt, 


120 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Revolt  of 
the  Car- 
thaginian 
mercen- 
aries in 
Sardinia. 


able  to  render  him  the  most  valuable  services  by  keeping 
in  check  to  some  extent  the  excessive  power  of  Eome.  He 
therefore  supported  them  with  necessaries  at  a  time  when 
the  mutineers  blockaded  Carthage  by  land  and  all  sup- 
plies were  cut  off.  Perhaps  he  also  sent  troops  or  allowed 
the  Carthaginians  to  enlist  mercenaries  in  his  kingdom,' 
and  his  aid  doubtless  contributed  materially  to  .the  final 
overthrow  of  the  rebels. 

But  while  the  insurrection  was  still  raging  in  Africa, 
the  Carthaginian  mercenaries  in  Sardinia  had  imitated 
the  example  of  their  comrades,  had  murdered  their  officers, 
and  had  taken  possession  of  the  island.  Unable  to  keep 
their  position  among  the  natives,  they  sought  aid  from 
Bome.  At  first,  as  it  is  said,  the  Bomans  resisted  this 
temptation ;  they  disdained  to  unite  themselves  with  the 
mutinous  troops,  and  to  make  use  of  the  momentary  dis- 
tress of  Carthage  for  violating  the  conditions  of  peace 
which  they  had  just  sworn  to  observe.  But  when  Car- 
thage came  out  victorious  from  the  doubtful  struggle,  the 
old  jealousy  of  the  Bomans  revived,  and  they  decided  to 
take  the  mutinous  mercenaries  of  Sardinia  under  their 
protection.  Boman  politicians  justified  themselves  pro- 
bably with  the  sophistry  that  Sardinia  no  longer  belonged 
to  Carthage,  since  Carthaginian  authority  in  the  island 
had  come  to  an  end,  and  there  was  no  longer  a  Carthaginian 
garrison  in  it.  War  therefore  was  not  carried  on  against 
Carthage,  when  the  island  was  taken,  but  against  the 
Sardinian  natives,  who  were  now  an  independent  nation. 
But  Carthage  protested  against  this  view  of  the  case,  and 
made  preparations  for  the  reduction  of  the  revolted  island. 
The  Bomans  now  openly  declared  their  intentions.  They 
interpreted  the  Carthaginian  armaments  as  a  menace  of 

'  This  is  probably  the  extent  of  the  concession  reported  by  Appian,  v.  3 :  iral 
^troKoylay  iK  t^j  *lra\la5  h  fi6yotf  r6p9€  rhv  wSKtfjLoy  Mrp^t^v. — Appian,  Tiii.  6. 
No  more  than  this  is  implied  by  Zonaras,  yiii.  17 :  koI  fAioBoipopovi  in  r^t 
olKtias  ffvfifMxi^os  abrois  hroryayiirOcu  hcirpe^ay.  The  Romans  could  never 
have  allowed  any  foreign  power,  least  of  all  the  Carthaginians,  to  raise  troops 
in  their  own  immediate  dominions  in  Italy,  and  this  was  expressly  stipulated 
in  the  treaty  of  peace. — ^Folybius,  iii.  27,  i^;  Appian,  viii.  6. 


241-238 
Interfep- 


THE  WAB  OF  THE  MERCENARIES.  121 

war  and  complained  of  the  intermption  of  Italian  com-     CHAP, 
merce  by  Carthaginian  cmisers. 

These  complaints  probably  show  that  smuggling  and 
the  blockade-mnning  of  Italian  traders  had  not  been 
discontinned,  in  spite  of  the  promise  of  Borne.  ^  For  Car-  ence  of  the 
thage  there  was  left  no  choice,  but  either  to  engage  in  a  ^^f^^^^ 
war  with  Bome,  or  to  agree  to  such  conditions  as  Bome, 
in  contempt  of  aU  justice  and  relying  on  her  superior 
power,  thought  fit  to  propose.  Carthage  was  too  much 
exhausted  to  take  the  former  alternative.  She  was  obliged 
to  purchase  peace  by  resigning  Sardinia,  and  by  the  pay- 
ment of  twelve  hundred  talents.  Thus  did  the  Bomans  of 
the  old  time  show,  as  Sallust  remarks  in  tones  of  praise, 
*  that  they  understood  how  to  restrain  their  passions,  and 
listened  to  the  demands  of  right  and  justice ;  that  especi- 
ally in  the  Punic  wars,  in  spite  of  the  repeated  treachery  of 
the  Carthaginians,  they  never  allowed  themselves  to  act  in 
a  similar  way,  and  were  alone  guided  in  their  actions  by 
a  sense  of  what  was  worthy  of  them.'  * 

The  revolting  treatment  of  her  humbled  rival  was  an  Surrender 
evil  seed  destined  to  spring  up  soon  in  a  luxuriant  crop,  ^  ^^  ^* 
and  to  bear  as  its  fatal  fruit  the  devastation  of  Italy  in  the  Romans. 
Hannibalian  war.     The  bitterness  of  soul  with  which  the 
noble   Hamilcar   submitted   indignantly  to    unjustifiable 
wrong  explains   the   inextinguishable   hatred  of    Bome 
which  he  cherished  as  long  as  he  lived,  and  bequeathed  as 
a  sacred  trust  to  his  great  son  Hannibal.^   For  the  present 

'  According  to  Appian  (yiii.  6)i  the  Carthaginians  took  Roman  merchant 
vessels  and  drowned  the  crews  to  escape  detection.  If  there  is  any  truth  in 
this  statement,  the  merchant  vessels  so  treated  must  have  carried  supplies  to 
the  rebels  or  attempted  to  run  the  blockade.  But  in  their  present  helpless 
condition,  the  Carthaginians,  unless  they  were  demented,  could  not  have 
committed  acta  so  foolish  and  so  calculated  to  give  the  Bomans  provocation 
for  war. 

«  Sallust,  CaiU.,  61.  Very  different  is  the  opinion  of  Poly  bins  (iii.  28), 
who  says  that  f<  r  the  proceedings  of  the  Komans,  oirr§  wpd^aaiy  oth^  cdrlcv 
§tipot  Tit  tty  tHKoyoy  &AA*  6f»a\oyovfi4yus  rohs  Kapxn^oylovs  iiyayKoafUyovs  xapii 
irdyra  rk  Bixaia  iik  rhy  Kcuphy  iKx^fffjcat  yi^w  lapZ6yo5f  i^weyKuy  ih  rh 
vpo€i(nifi4yop  v\ri$os  r&y  xpfUfAdmy, 

*  Compare  Folybios,  iii.  9,  §  6;  and  10,  {{  4,  5. 


122  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  might  trinmplied  over  right.  The  island  of  Sardiaia 
• — ,-1—^  became  a  Roman  province.  But  it  was  a  long  time  before 
the  wild  inhabitants  of  the  mountains  were  subdued  and 
in  some  measure  became  accustomed  to  an  orderly  govern- 
ment. For  many  years  Sardinia  was  the  scene  of  the  most 
savage  wars^  and  the  most  temble  civil  strife,  in  which 
the  descendants  of  the  Boman  nobility  obtained  inglorious 
triumphs,  and  slaves  for  their  ever-increasing  estates.  The 
neighbouring  island  of  Corsica  had  never  been  permanently 
in  the  possession  of  the  Carthaginians.  The  Bomans  now 
established  themselves  there,  and  united  it  to  the  province 
of  Sardinia.  But  here,  as  in  Sardinia,  the  natives  with- 
drew into  the  impenetrable  mountains  of  the  interior, 
beyond  the  rea^h  of  Roman  dominion,  and  resisted  Roman 
customs  and  political  order.  The  resources  of  the  two 
islands  remained  undeveloped.  It  was  only  in  the  small 
coast  towns  and  near  the  sea  that  the  original  barbarism 
gave  way  to  civilisation  and  the  dominion  of  Boman  law. 
The  interior  remained  barbarous ;  and  among  the  many 
islands  of  the  Mediterranean,  Sardinia  and  Corsica  alone, 
up  to  almost  the  present  time,  have  never  been  the  seats 
of  political  order  and  prosperity. 

*  Even  bloodhoundB  were  employed  to  host  down  the  nativoB. — Zonaras, 
viii.  18. 


THE  WAB  WITH  THE  GAULS.  123 


225-222 

B.C. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE   WAB  WITH   THE   GAULS,   226-222   B.C. 

The  twenty-four  jeaxs  of  war  with  the  great  power  of  CHAP. 
Carthage  were  followed  by  a  six  days'  war  with  Falerii,  if 
the  collision  between  the  colossal  power  of  Borne  and  the 
pnny  town  of  Falerii  can  really  be  termed  a  war.  How  it 
happened  that  the  Faliscans  provoked  the  Romans,  how  tion  of 
they  could  venture  to  think  of  opposition,  we  cannot  ^*^«"*- 
understand.  The  town,  which,  even  at  the  time  of  Camillus, 
was  constrained  to  submit  to  the  superior  strength  of  Rome, 
was  without  difficulty  taken  and  destroyed.  The  Roman 
consuls  were  not  ashamed  to  make  this  event  the  subject 
of  a  triumph,  which  is  chronicled  in  the  Roman  Fasti  by 
the  side  of  the  triumphs  of  Catulus  and  the  Scipios. 

Putting  aside  this  incident,  the  period  between  the  first  Gallic  and 
and  the  second  Punic  wars  (from  241  till  218  B.C.)  was  ^^^"^ 
occupied  with  wars  of  a  more  serious  character — one  in  Italy 
with  the  Gauls,  and  two  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
Adriatic  with  the  Illyrians.  In  the  order  of  time  the  first 
Ulyrian  war  preceded  the  war  with  the  Gauls ;  but  for  the 
sake  of  greater  clearness  we  will  follow  in  our  narrative  a 
geographical  rather  than  a  chronological  order,  and  speak 
first  of  the  war  waged  in  Italy  against  the  Gauls,  and  then 
of  the  two  Ulyrian  wars  conjointly. 

After  the  defeat  of  the  Senonian  Gauls  in  the  year  283  Causes  for 
B.O.,  and  after  the  establishment  of  the  colony  of  Sena  in  luaction  of 
their  desolated  territory,  the  Gallic  races  in  Northern  the  Gauls 
Italy  remained  quiet  for  forty-five  years.     This  long  pause,  ^* 

which  was  most  advantageous  to  the  Romans  during  the 
wars  with  Pyrrhus  and  the  Carthaginians,  may  in  part  be 


124  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     ascribed  to  the  impression  made  among  the  Ganls  by  the 
>. — rl — '  defeat  on  the  Yadimonian  Lake  and  by  the  destruction  of 
the  Senonians.^     It  seems,  however,  that  besides  the  ex- 
haustion of  the  Ganls  and  their  fear,  another  circumstance 
contributed  to  keep  them  thus  long  quiet ;  and  this  was 
probably  the  fact  that  during  that  long  period  they  found 
occupation   as  mercenaries  in  the  Carthaginian  armies. 
The  ending  of  the  war  in  Sicily,  while  it  stopped  the 
employment  of  Gallic  adventurers,  was,  therefore,  a  cause 
of  renewed  attacks  on  Italy.     Bome  accordingly  could  not 
fail  soon  to  meet  on   another  battle-field  those  Gallic 
warriors  whom  she  had  so  long  encountered  in  Sicily. 
^^®  P?®^        The  greater  part  of  Italy,  north  of  the  chain  of  the 
Gallic         Apennines,  at  that  time  justly  called  Cisalpine  Gktul,  had 
^^'         been  for  a  course  of  years  in  the  possession  of  several  Gallic 
tribes.    In  the  modern  district  of  Emilia  were  the  Boians, 
the  neighbours  and  allies  of  the  conquered  Senonians,  and 
the  smaller  tribes  of  the  Lingonians  and  Anarians ;  north 
of  the  Po,  in  the  country  about  Milan,  dwelt  the  great 
people  of  the  Insubrians,  while  to  the  east  of  these  on  the 
Mincio  and  the  Adige  lay  the  Cenomanians ;  but  these  tribes, 
little  inclined,  seemingly,  to  make  common   cause  with 
their  countrvmen,  remained  neutral  in  all  the  hostilities 
against  Eome.     Besides  these  Gallic  races,  there  were  in 
the  north  of  Italy  two  totally  different  nations :  in  the  east 
and  about  the  Adriatic  Sea,  the  Veneti,  while  in  the  west, 
where  the  Alps  and  the  Apennines  join,  the  Ligurians 
were   scattered   about  on  both  sides  of  the  Apennines 
almost  as  far  as  the  valley  of  the  Arno,  and  towards  the 
north  in  Piedmont  along  the  upper  course  of  the  Po  and 
its  tributary  streams. 
Attack  on        Four  years  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  with  Carthage 
of^iiSm?-^    (268  B.C.)   the   Romans   founded   the  colony  Ariminum 
num.  (Rimini),  on  the  Adriatic  Sea,  as  the  most  northern  bul- 

wark of  the  Italy  of  that  time.     This  town  was  exposed 
to  the  first  attacks  of  the  enemy  whom  it  was  intended 

<  Folybios,  il.  21,  f  2. 


THE  WAE  WITH  THE  GAULS.  125 


to  control.    In  the  year  238  (in  the  third  year,  therefore,     CHAP, 
after  the  conclusion  of  peace  with  Carthage),  a  Gallic  >  _    / 
army,  which  we  are  told  had  been  called  by  the  chiefs    225-222 


B.C. 


of  the  Boians  from  Transalpine  Gaul,  encamped  before 
Ariminum.  However,  before  hostilities  began,  a  dis- 
pute arose  between  the  Boians  and  their  troublesome  and 
unwelcome  guests,  whose  rapacity,  it  may  be  presumed, 
made  but  little  distinction  between  friends  and  foes. 
The  Boian  chiefs  were  murdered  by  their  own  people, 
the  strangers  were  attacked,  conquered  in  open  war,  and 
compelled  to  return  to  their  homes. 

Thus,  for  this  time,  the  danger  passed  away.'  Still,  the  Proposed 
attention  of  the  Romans  had  been  drawn  to  their  north-  of  the 
east  boundary,  where  new  means  of  defence  against  their  ^^^^7- 
unruly  neighbours  seemed  necessary.  The  colonists  of 
Ariminum  were  clearly  unable  by  themselves  to  resist  the 
Gauls.  Nothing  was  more  suited  to  the  needs  of  the  case 
than  an  increase  of  the  Boman  population  in  those  partes. 
This  could  easily  be  effected,  and  was  desirable  also  on 
many  other  accounts.  The  whole  country  of  the  Seno- 
nians  round  about  Ariminum,  and  south  in  Picenum,  was 
depopulated  and  laid  waste  since  the  war  of  extirpation  of 
288,  and  was  probably  left  for  the  use  of  the  large  Soman 
families  only  as  pasture  land.  A  better  opportunity 
could  not  present  itself  for  rewarding  Boman  veterans  for 
their  military  service,  for  making  impoverished  peasants 
landowners  of  small  estates,  for  peopling  again  a  country 
which  had  become  desolate,  for  bringing  together  on  the 
endangered  frontier  a  warlike  and  faithful  population, 
and  by  the  extension  of  the  Latin  race  and  the  Latin 
tongue  to  Romanise  the  land  conquered  by  force  of  arms. 
The  only  thing  which  was  opposed  to  so  wholesome  a 
measure  was  the  private  interest  of  the  Boman  nobles 
who  had    taken   possession  of   and  used  the    land  in 

'  At  least  according  to  the  report  of  PolybioB,  ii.  21.  Other  writers  related 
serious  battles  with  the  Gatds  and  their  allies  the  Ligurians  (Zonaras,  riii.  18 ; 
Orositts,  iy.  12),  in  one  of  which  14,000  Gaols  were  killed  and  2,000  taken  by 
P.  Valerius  Falto,  consul  of  the  year  238,  and  brother  of  the  praetor  Q.  Valerius 
Falto.    See  p.  106.  Can  this  be  an  extract  from  the  Valerian  family  chronicle? 


126  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     question  as  if  it  were  their  own.    They  had  no  legal  right 


IV. 


.  to  the  land.  They  were  only  possessors  on  sufferance 
until  the  state  should  think  fit  to  make  a  different  arrange- 
ment. They  could  lay  no  claim  even  to  compensation  if 
the  land  should  be  taken  from  them.  But  this  tsCct  only 
added  virulence  to  the  opposition  with  which  the  Roman 
nobility  resisted  any  measure  for  dividing  the  state  lands  in 
the  interests  of  the  whole  community  rather  than  their 
own. 
Agrarian  We  have  unfortunately  only  very  imperfect  accounts  of 
CaiuB  tl^6  disputes  which  arose  in  Bome  between  the  nobles  and 
Flaminius.  the  popular  party  relating  to  the  allotment  of  the  land 
in  Picenum.  Even  Polybius  gives  us  no  help  here,  and 
appears  to  have  judged  the  measures  from  a  narrow  and 
aristocratic  point  of  view.  The  champion  of  the  popular 
party  and  of  the  public  interest  was  the  tribune  C. 
Flaminius.  In  spite  of  all  opposition  on  the  part  of  the 
senate,  he  obtained  the  sanction  of  the  people  for  his 
proposal  (232  b.c.).^  The  nobility,  blind  and  obstinate  m 
their  selfishness,  carried  their  opposition  to  the  utmost 
limits,  and  thus  forced  their  opponents  to  take  their  stand 
on  the  formal  constitutional  law,  to  set  aside  the  usual 
practice,  and  to  cause  the  agrarian  law  to  be  passed  by  a 
vote  of  the  assembly  of  tribes,  without  a  previous  reso- 
lution or  the  subsequent  approbation  of  the  senate.  It 
was  very  much  to  be  regretted  that  the  co-operation  of 
the  senate  was  set  aside,  and  that  the  popular  leaders 
were  enabled  to  become  conscious  of  their  power.  But 
the  senate  could  only  attribute  the  loss  of  its  influence  to 
itself.  It  had  taken  up  a  position  which  it  could  not 
maintain,  and  hazarded  the  strength  of  its  moral  weight, 
which,  till  now,  had  been  unimpaired ;  although,  legally, 
since  the  Hortensian  law  in  287  B.C.,  a  resolution  of  the 
tribes  needed  no  confirmation  from  the  senate.  It  is 
therefore  not  without  a  good  reason  that  from  the 
acceptance  of  the   agrarian  law  of   Flaminius  by  the 

^  Polybius,  ii.  21.    Cicero  {De  Senect  4)  difiezs  from  Polybius  in  placing 
the  law  four  years  later. 


THE  WAR  WITH  THE  GAULS.  127 

assembly  of  tribes  against  the  opposition  of  the  senate     CHAP. 
Poljbius  dates  a  change  for  the  worse  in  the  Eoman  ^    ^' 


constitution.^  220-222 


B.C. 


If   the   nobles  were  not  able  to  prevent  the  useful 
measure  of  Plaminius,  they  knew  at  least  how  to  avenge  the  patri- 
themselves.     The  hatred  of  his  enemies  pursued  him  to  S?"^**^ 

*  xlazninius. 

his  death  on  the  bloody  battle-field  of  Thrasymenus ;  nay, 
it  even  survived  him,  and  endeavoured,  by  venomous  and 
false  representations  in  the  Boman  annals,  to  blacken  the 
name  of  the  popular  leader.' 

The  agrarian  law  of  Flaminius  did  not  remain  a  dead  The  great 
letter,  but  was  fully  carried  out.  The  country  along  the  piamhiius. 
Adriatic  Sea,  through  which  formerly  the  barbarous 
Senonians  had  roamed,  was  filled  with  Soman  settlers.' 
This  extreme  outpost  of  Boman  civilisation  was  connected 
with  the  centre  of  the  empire  by  the  Flaminian  road  (Via 
Flaminia),  which  crossed  the  Apennines  in  TJmbria,  and 
owed  its  name  as  well  as  its  origin  to  the  founder  of  the 
settlement  in  the  land  of  the  Senonians.  It  was  the  second 
great  highway  through  Italy,  connecting  Bome  with  the 
eastern  coast,  its  terminus  being  at  Ariminum  on  the 
Adriatic,  as  that  of  the  Appian  way  was  Brundusium. 
These  two  roads  opened  the  mountainous  interior  of 
the  country  to  commerce,  and  united  the  seas  on  the 
east  and  on  the  west. 

Before  these  works  could  be  completed,  the  neighbour-  Move- 
ing  Gauls   showed  great  uneasiness  about  the   further  ^oMthe 
advance  of  the  Bomans.^    The  extension  of  civilisation  is  f^^ic 
always  an  attack  on  surrounding  barbarism ;  and  as  it  was 
at  that  time  in  Italy,  so  is  it  now  at  the  present  day  in 
North  America.    The  Boians  looked  forward  to  the  time 
when  their  country,  like  that  of  the   Senonians,  would 
be    seized   by    Boman   settlers;    they    saw    that   they 
were  doomed  to  extermination,  and  they  determined  to 

>  PolybiuB,  ii.  21.  •  PolybiuB,  ii.  81  ff. 

'  Unfortunately  we  have  receired  no  information  regarding  the  number  of 
the  settlers,  and  the  extent  of  the  portions  of  land  allotted  to  them. 
•  Polybius,  ii.  21,  §§  8,  9. 


tribes. 


128 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Feare  of 
the  Ro- 
mans. 


try  and  avert  the  threatened  danger  by  an  attack  on 
Borne.  They  organised  a  military  alliance  of  all  the. 
various  Cisalpine  Gallic  tribes  with  the  single  exception  of 
the  Cenomanians,  and  they  drew  swarms  of  adventurers 
across  the  Alps  by  the  prospect  of  rich  spoils.  The  latter, 
called  Gsesatians,  were  not  a  peculiar  Gallic  tribe,^  but 
volunteers  from  all  parts  of  the  country,  such  as  for  many 
years  had  been  accustomed  to  enter  into  foreign,  and 
mostly  into  the  Carthaginian,  service.  They  united  to- 
gether to  form  voluntary  companies  under  separate  leaders, 
a  custom  which  prevailed  for  centuries  among  the  Gauls 
and  their  neighbours  the  Germans. 

The  bringing  together  of  these  forces,  with  the  mani- 
fest preparations  for  a  war  with  Bome,  roused  again, 
not  in  Rome  alone,  but  in  the  whole  of  Italy,  that  fear  of 
the  Gauls  which  had  never  quite  disappeared  since  the 
battle  on  the  Allia.  The  Romans  had  certainly  overcome 
their  rude  enemies  in  many  engagements,  but  not  without 
having  suflFered  many  reverses  on  their  own  part.  The  brave 
Roman  soldiers  trembled  at  the  thought  of  the  Gauls,  and 
shook  with  terror  at  the  sight  of  the  huge,  half-naked, 
defiant  forms.  Their  minds  were  alarmed  by  supernatural 
appearances  of  all  kinds.  A  three-fold  moon,  or  a  sudden 
bright  light  in  the  midnight  sky,  flowing  blood,  and 
similar  threatening  signs  were  reported  on  all  sides,  and 
seemed  to  show  that  the  gods  were  exasperated  and  must 
be  solemnly  appeased.*  Superstition  is  always  apt  to  do 
violence  to  human  feelings;  and  although  the  Romans 
had  long  since  given  up  ascribing  to  their  deities  a  Satanic 
thirst  for  human  blood,*  fear  so  troubled  their  thoughts 
that,  to  avert  the  impending  evil,  human  beings  were  sacri- 
ficed on  the  public  market  in  Rome.^    A  male  and  a 


m 


"  Plutarch,  Marcdl,  3. 

<  Zonaras  (viii.  20)  and  Plutarch  (MarcelL  4)  place  these  'prodigia'  in 
the  year  223  b.c. 

•  They  were,  according  to  Plutarch  (Mareell.,  8),  irpifus  UtoKtifityoi  Tphs 
T&  9c7a. 

*  The  Forum  Boariuxn,  OrosiuB,  it.  18.    Plutarch,  MarceU,  3. 


THE  WAH  WITH  THE  GAULS.  129 

female  Gaul,  and  a  male  an^  a  female  Greek,  wQre  buried     CHAP, 
alive,  in  order  that  thus,  without  injury  to  the  Boman  ^  ,    ,   _- 
people,  a  prophecy  might  be  fulfilled  which  promised  the    226-222 
possession  of  Boman  soil  to  the  Gauls  and  Greeks*^ 

At  length,  iji  the  year  225,  the  storm  burst*  An  army  oi  March  of 
Gauls,  consisting  of  50,000  fcot,  and  20,000  mounted  on  ^^^  ^*^*- 
horses  or  war  chariots,  marched  towards  the  south.  The 
(Consul  L.  iSmilius  Papus  cominaoded  ^>  consular  army  of 
two  legions  and  the  proportionate  number  of  allies — from 
^/IfiOO  to  23,000  men  in  all — and  was  posted  in  Arimjgaum, 
from  which  side  the  attack  wa^  e^xpected*  A  res^ry^ 
corps  of  50,000  TJmbrians  and  Sabines^  with  4»000  horse, 
was  destined  to  protect  Etruria  under  a  pmtor,  and  w.a9 
probably  stationed  in  the  north-eastern  part,  somewhere  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Arretium  or  Fsesulee.  The  second 
consul,  Atilius  Begulus,  was  engaged  in  Sardinia  in  the 
int^minable  petty  wars  with  the  natives.  On  the  i^fcelli- 
gence  of  the  advance  of  the  GqiuIs,  he  was,  it  appears, 
immediately  recalled ;  a^d  th^  rapid  and  glorious  is^ue  of 
the  campaign  ^ay  pnbgicipaUy  be  attributed  to  his  timely 
appearance  on  the  scene  of  action. 

The  Gauls  deceived  all  the  calculations  of  the  Boman  Betreat  of 
generals.    They  took  neither  the  road  through  Picenum,  ^  ^*^® 
nor  the  road  through  north-eastern  Etruria  by  Fsesulse,  ciusium, 
but,  marching  close  to  the  western  coast,  had  arrived  already  ^^  ^^-^^^ 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Clusium,  only  three  days'  mpjrch  mon. 
from  Some,  bef<»e  the  Bomans  really  knew  where  they 
were.    When  the  preetor  followed  them  with  the  reserve 
corps^  they  turned  suddenly  round,  enticed  their  enemy 
into  an  ambuEdi,  and  completely  defeated  theuu^    Six 

1  ZoDazas,  viii.  19.  Aceovding  to  Platarch  (MarwU,  3),  this  piophecy  was 
eontaiiwd  in  the  SibyllixiA  books.  It  is  more  probable  that  it  vas  found  in  thjQ 
'  libri  fatales '  of  Etruscan  origin.  The  Etruscans  were  from  old  the  enemies 
of  the  Gauls  and  the  Greeks.  The  genuine  Sibylline  books/  which  weria 
Greek,  would  not  haye  demanded  the  immoUtion  of  Greeks.  But  the  con- 
fusion between  the  native  or  Etruscan  prophecies  and  those  of  the  so-called 
Sibylline  books  was  general  in  Bome. — See  vol.  i.  p.  80. 

'  This  defeat  must  havp  taken  place  in  the  neighbonrhood  of  Clusium. 
Polybius  (.IL  25)  does  not  name  the  place.  He  merely  says  that  the  Gauls 
marched  from  Clusium  in  the  direction  of  Fsesulse  {its  M  it6\uf  ^uff6\M^), 

VOL.  n,  K 


130  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     thousand  men  were  cut  down.    The  remainder  took  refuffe 

IV        •  . 

/  ._-  in  a  strong  position  on  a  hill,  where  they  were  surrounded 

by  the  Gauls,  and  would  have  been  compelled  to  surrender 
if  the  consul  ^milius  had  not,  in  the  meantime,  come  to 
their  assistance  from  Picenum.  The  Gauls,  heavily  laden 
with  spoil,  and  encumbered  by  the  task  of  watching 
thousands  of  prisoners,  gave  up  the  idea  of  a  further 
advance  towards  Rome.  They  endeavoured  also  to  avoid 
meeting  with  the  consulai'  army.  Their  object  was,  first, 
to  place  their  spoils  in  safety,  to  collect  new  forces,  and 
then  to  renew  the  profitable  raid.  They  marched,  there- 
fore, northwards  *  along  the  coast  on  the  same  road  by 
which  they  had  come.  The  Eoman  army  followed  close 
upon  their  heels,  but  ventured  on  no  serious  attack.  By 
a  happy  coincidence,  the  consul  C.  Atilius  Begulus,  who 
had  brought  back  his  legions  from  Sardinia,  and  had 
landed  in  Pisa,^  marched  southwards  on  the  same  road 
which  the  Guuls  were  following  on  their  retreat  north- 
wards. Thus  it  happened  that  the  enemies  found  them- 
selves in  the  midst  of  the  two  Roman  armies  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Telamon.  It  was  now  no  longer 
possible  for  them  to  evade  a  battle.  They  prepared  to 
encounter  both  Roman  armies  at  once.     One  front  they 

whereupon  they  were  followed  and  overtaken  by  the  Romans,  who  defeated  them. 
As  Fsesulse  lies  in  the  neighbourhood  of  one  of  the  well-known  passes  over 
the  Apennines,  the  expression  '  in  the  direction  of  Fsesulse '  is  appropriate  even 
if  Fsesulse  was  still  a  long  way  off.  The  Gauls  broke  up  in  the  night  and  marched 
probably  round  the  Roman  army,  which  had  followed  them  from  north  to 
Routh.  Their  cavalry  did  not  start  till  the  following  morning,  and  was 
intended  to  draw  the  Romans  after  them.  It  is  not  at  all  probable  that  (as 
Rospatt  surmises  in  Feldzuge  des  Hannibal^  p.  115),  Polybius  confounded 
Fsesulae  with  Clunium. 

*  But  they  did  not  follow  the  straight  road.  When  they  were  met  by  the 
two  Roman  armies  they  were  at  Telamon,  to  the  south-west  of  Clusium. 
How  they  got  there  we  do  not  know.  Perhaps  they  were  driven  back  so  far 
by  the  consul  Atilius,  whom  they  met  on  their  northward  march ;  perhaps 
they  were  induced  by  the  prospect  of  more  plunder  to  move  in  that  direction. 

■  The  consul's  return  from  Sardinia  was  probably  not  fortuitous,  but  ordered 
by  the  senate.  Moreover,  the  consul,  in  landing  so  far  north  as  Pisa,  may 
have  intended  to  block  up  the  neighbouring  passes  over  the  Apennines,  and  to 
act  in  co-operation  with  the  other  Roman  armies,  which  he  expected  to  find 
'there. 


THE  WAR  WITH  THE  GAUI^.  131 

directed  northwards  against  the  army  of  Begulus,  the  CHAP, 
other  southwards  towards  ^milius.  Thus  they  stood  ...,  /  ,. 
back  to  back,  each  flank  covered  by  a  barricade,  the  226-222 
carnages,  baggage,  booty,  and  prisoners  being  separated 
from  the  combatants,  and  strongly  guarded  on  a  hill.  In 
the  front,  which  faced  ^Shnilius,  the  place  of  honour  was 
taken  by  the  Transalpine  Gsesatians,  in  comparison  with 
whose  ferocious  bearing  the  appearance  of  the  Grauls  who 
were  settled  in  Italy  had  a  colouring  of  polish  and  civili- 
sation. The  Insubrians  and  Boians  wore  coats  and 
trowsers.  The  Gaesatians,  on  the  other  hand,  cast  aside  all 
dress  as  an  encumbrance  and  fought  naked,  retaining  only 
their  ornaments.  Heavy  collars  and  bracelets  made  of 
twisted  gold  wire  distinguished  the  most  valiant  warriors, 
who  stood  in  the  foremost  ranks  challenging  their  foes  to 
the  fight.  They  presented  a  strange  sight  to  the  Eoman 
soldiers,  and  by  their  savage  manners  and  gestures,  by 
their  insu£Scient  arms  for  offence  and  defence,  and  by  the 
richness  of  their  ornaments,  inspired  awe,  confidence,  and 
cupidiiy  at  the  same  time.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
battle  the  hosts  of  Gauls  uttered  a  tremendous  war  cry, 
mingled  with  the  sound  of  horns  and  trumpets.  A  mo- 
mentous hour  had  arrived,  which  might  well  fill  the  breast 
of  many  a  brave  Soman  with  not  unmanly  anxiety.  A 
victory  for  the  enemy  would  renew  terrors  that  followed 
the  day  of  the  Allia,  a  day  which  was  registered  in  the 
Roman  calendar  as  a  never-to-be-forgotten  day  of 
mourning. 

The  first  encounter  was  between  the  horse.     The  consul  Annihiia- 
Begulus  led  the  Roman  cavalry  in  person,  but  fell  at  the  q^^-°     ® 
very  onset,  and  his  head  was  a  fit  trophy,  though  fortu-  army- 
nately  the  only  one,  which  the  barbarians  could  boast  of. 
Their  horse  drew  back,  and  the  fight  between  the  infantry 
began.       The   superiority  of  Roman  discipline    and  of 
Roman  arms  became  immediately  apparent.     The  shields 
of  the  Gauls  were  too  small  to  protect  them  from   the 
missiles  with  which  the  Romans  assailed  them  from  a  safe 
distance.     Their  only  weapon  for   attack  was  a  sword, 

K  2 


132 


KOMAN  HISTOBY. 


BOOK 
IV, 


Devasta- 
tion of  the 
Boinn 
territory 
by  the 
consul 
^miliui. 


suitable  for  a  blow  but  not  for  a  stab,  and  of  snob  bad 
steel  tbat  it  bent  at  the  first  blow.  Driven  to  despair  they 
rashed  madly  against  the  Roman  ranks,  as  if  seeking  a 
voluntary  death,  or  cast  themselves  in  wild  flight  on  their 
hindmost  ranks,  thus  throwing  them  into'  confusion. 
The  legions  now  closed  in  on  both  sides,  pressing  the  army 
of  the  Gkuls  nearer  and  nearer  together,  and  then  cut 
them  down  almost  to  the  last  num.  Forty  thousand  were 
killed ;  ten  thousand  were  taken  prisoners ;  only  the  horse- 
men escaped.  Of  the  two  kings  of  the  Gauls,  Ooncolitanus 
fell  alive  into  the  hands  of  ilie  conquerors ;  the  other, 
Aneroestus,  fell  by  his  own  hand.  The  whole  of  the  booty, 
the  herds  of  cattle,  the  prisoners  which  the  Qauls  had 
dragged  with  them,  all  came  into  the  possession  of  the 
victors,  who,  as  far  as  it  was  possible,  restored  the  booty 
to  the  plundered.* 

After  this  glorious  victory  ^milius  invaded  the  country 
of  the  Boians,  and  marched  through  it,  plundering  and 
laying  it  waste  in  all  directions.  Then  he  led  his  troops 
to  Borne  laden  with  rich  booly,  and  ascended  in  a  well- 
deserved  triumph  the  Capitol,  to  offer  due  thanks  to  the 
gods  for  their  deliverance  of  Bome.  This  triumphal  pro- 
cession was  made  memorable  by  the  captured  arms,* 
military  ensigns,  and  golden  chains  of  the  Oauls,  but  above 
ail  by  the  line  of  captive  chiefii  who  preceded  the  victor 
arrayed  in  complete  armour.  They  had  taken  an  oath 
not  to  lay  down  their  arms  till  they  had  ascended  the 
Capitol.  This  oath  was  now  fulfilled  amid  the  derisive 
shouts  of  the  Beman  people.' 

*  The  description  which  Folybins  (ii.  28-81)  gives  of  this  battle  has  quite 
the  stamp  of  truth.  Zonanis  (yiii.  SO)  relates  tbat  JEtegaltiB  was  not  only 
killed,  bnt  also  defeated  before  the  ekaet  battle  was  fought  This  seems  an 
error,  arising  from  the  preceding  deiaai  of  the  Boman  reserve  annj,  wkiefa  he 
confounded  with  that  of  Begulus. 

*  These  arms  were  partly  hung  up  in  Boman  temples,  partly  giren  to  Hiero 
of  Syracuse,  as  his  irham  of  the  spoils.  After  the  «uider  of  Hieraoymus,  the 
grandson  of  Hiero,  the  people  of  Syracuse  armed  themselTes  with  thesa 
Gallic  weapons. — Livy,  xziy.  21.  It  is  on  this  occasion  that  we  hear  in- 
cidentaUy  of  the  part  which  Hiero  had  in  repelling  the  Gallic  invasion. 

■  Zonaras,  viii.  20. 


of  Tela- 
mon. 


THE  WAK  WITH  THE  GAXTLS.  183 

The  victory  at  Telamon  was  one  of  the  most  important     CHAP. 

which  the  Bomans  had  thns  &r  gained.     It  put  an  end  ._    / « 

to  the  fiercest  of  all  the  attacks  of  the  (Jauls,*  and  restored    ^^t'^^^ 
to  the  Boman    soldiers  that  confidence  in  their    own  ^     ,^    ^ 

BesuiU  of 

strength  which  they  had  almost  lost  when  they  faced  these  the  battlo 
barharons  enemies.  The  ultimate  results'  of  this  victory 
we  can  appreciate  only  when  we  bear  in  mind  that  but 
seven  years  later  Hannibal  with  his  Funic  army  stood  in 
Cisalpine  Gaid  to  organise  the  whole  of  the  Grallic  race 
for  a  war  of  extermination  against  Rome.  With  how 
much  more  brilliant  success  would  this  great  general 
have  borne  down  the  Boman  armies  if  the  strength  and 
courage  of  the  Gauls  had  not  first  been  broken  I  Apart 
from  its  influence  on  the  progress  of  events,  the  battle 
of  Telamon  has  for  us  an  especial  and  peculiar  interest, 
because  we  discern  in  the  description  of  Folybius  the 
impressions  of  an  eye-witness  and  a  combatant,  who 
was  no  other  than  the  venerable  Fabius  Fictor,  the  oldest 
Boman  historian.'  The  entire  Boman  forces,  both  the 
consular  armies  and  the  reserve  army,  were  engaged  in 
the  battle  of  Telamon.  We  may  therefore  safely  conclude 
that  Fabius,  who  served  in  this  war,  was  present,  and  that 
the  impression  which  the  Gh.llic  warriors  made  on  the 
Bomans  was  drawn  in  so  g^phic  a  manner  because  he 
himself  received  it  on  the  spot. 

After  the  victory  at  Telamon,  the  Bomans  resolved  to 

'  Pol^bins,  ii.  31,  §7:4  f^*^  ^^^  fiapurdrii  r&v  KtXrw  f^o8or  otirus  Ktd 
roir^  rfrp^w^  9tul»$dpri'  Tatriiji^p  'IreAiiirair,  fiiKurra  8)  *P«/Aaro<i,  fiiyay  Ka\ 
pofitphw  4vucp§fiiaaira  kMvvow, 

'  That  Folybius  (ii.  28,  §  11,  and  29,  J  2)  had  before  him  the  report  of  a 
man  who  had  retUIy  taken  part  in  the  battle,  we  eee  from  the  lively  description 
of  the  engagement,  but  still  more  clearly  from  the  words  with  which  he 
refers  to  the  personal  impreeeions  and  of^nions  of  an  eye-witness.  He  says, 
'  When  the  combatants  were  near  each  other,  it  was  a  strange  and  wonderful 
sight  for  those  who  were  present  at  the  moment,  and  it  remained  in  the 
imagination  of  those  who  heard  the  narrative  afterwards.*  He  continues, 
'  Even  now  one  may  well  doabt  not  less  than  the  combatants  did  themseWes 
whether  the  battle  array  of  the  Gaols  was  safe  or  unsafe  for  them.'  This 
doubt  of  a  combatant  at  the  time  can  only  have  been  expressed  in  the  work 
of  Fabins.  We  know  thus  much,  that  Fabius  served  in  that  war  with  the 
Gauls. 


134  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  prevent  any  further  invasions  of  the  Gauls  by  the  con- 
^.^ — r^ — '  quest  of  the  whole  region  of  the  Po  valley.  In  the  year 
SubjTiea-  immediately  following  the  Boians  were  without  any  diffi- 
tion  of  the  culty  reduced  to  complete  subjection.  In  the  next  year 
brians.  (^^^  B.C.)  the  consuls  crossed  the  Po,  and  attacked  the 
most  powerful  Cisalpine  people,  the  Insubrians,  in  their 
own  country.  One  of  these  two  consuls  was  C.  Flaminius, 
the  recognised  leader  of  the  popular  party,  who  as  tribune 
had  effected  the  allotment  of  the  territory  of  Picenum  to 
Itoman  settlers,  and  who  was  now  raised  to  the  consulship 
and  intrusted  with  the  conduct  of  the  war,  to  the  great 
vexation  of  the  nobility.  Although  he  was  not  wanting  in 
courage  and  ability,  it  appears  that  he  wa«  greater  as  a 
statesman  than  as  a  general.  His  first  military  under- 
takings were  failures.  In  crossing  the  Po  he  suffered 
a  defeat,  and  when  he  had,  either  by  an  armistice  or  by 
the  offer  of  peace,  extricated  himself  from  his  difficulty,  he 
was  obliged  to  seek  refuge  in  the  country  of  the  Ceno- 
manians.  But  from  this  region  he  very  soon  advanced 
again  to  the  attack.  The  Insubrians,  seeing  that  peace 
and  friendship  with  Rome  were  an  impossibility,  sum- 
moned together  all  the  fighting  men  of  their  country,  and 
marched  towards  the  enemy  with  an  army  of  50,000 
warriors.  Acquainted  as  they  were  with  the  peculiarities 
of  the  country,  they  had  a  great  advantage  over  the  Ro- 
mans, to  whom  Cisalpine  Gaul  at  that  time  was  as  un- 
known as  Germany  was  to  the  legions  at  the  time  of 
Tiberius.  Flaminius  soon  found  himself  in  a  very  critical 
position.  In  his  Gallic  allies  he  had  no  ^confidence,  and 
he  separated  himself  from  them  by  breaking  down  the 
bridges  across  a  river  which  flowed  between  his  army  and 
their  auxiliary  force.  In  front  of  this  river,  which  in  case 
of  defeat  shut  off  all  hopes  of  retreat,  he  was  compelled  to 
accept  a  battle ;  but  the  bravery  of  the  Roman  soldiers 
made  good  the  faults  of  the  general.  Obliged  to  conquer 
or  to  perish,  they  gained  a  signal  victory,  and  with  this 
victory  the  war  was  practically  at  an  end.  The  obsti- 
nate Insubrians,  it  is  true,  still  refused  to  submit  to  the 


B.C. 


THE  WAR  WITH  THE  GAULS.  135 

authority  of  Rome.  They  made  one  last  eflEbrt,  with  the 
help  of  30,000  mercenaries  from  Transalpine  Gaul,  But 
in  the  following  year  their  capital,  Mediolanum,  was  taken,  ^^^^^^ 
and  their  subjection  thus  completed.  Rome  was  now  the 
mistress  of  the  whole  country  from  the  Apennines  to  the 
Alps,  and  two  new  colonies,  Placentia  and  Cremona,  were 
destined  permanently  to  secure  the  newly-conquered  lands. 
The  Cenomanians  retained  their  nominal  freedom  and  the 
friendship  of  the  Roman  people.  The  Veneti  did  the  same. 
The  Ligurians,  with  whom  the  Romans  had  since  238 
almost  year  after  year  carried  on  petty  warfare,  remained, 
at  least  on  their  mountains,  unconquered.*  But  whatever 
measure  of  independence  these  tribes  might  still  retain,  it 
was  certain  that  they  could  not  retain  it  long.  The  thinly 
peopled  country,  once  subdued  by  the  Roman  sword,  was 
in  the  act  of  being  made  the  seat  of  order  and  civilisation 
by  the  Roman  plough  when  the  war  with  Hannibal  sud- 
denly broke  out,  and  threw  back  for  many  years  the 
development  of  Northern  Italy. 

'  liyy,  Epit.  20 ;  Eatropius,  iii.  2;  Zonaras,  yiii.  18,  19. 


186  EOMAN  HlSTOltY. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

TfiE   FIBSl*  ILLTBIAK  WAlb,   229-228  H^O* 

BOOK     After  the  Boman  dominion  had  penetrated  as  far  as  the 
_    .'    -  Adriatic  Sea,  aild  was  there  fortified  by  the  foundation  of 


Roman       ^^  colonies  of  Hatria,  Gastrum  Novnm,  Pirmum,  Sena, 
colonies  on  anc[  Ariminum,  to  which  was  added  before  the  end  of  the 

the 

Adriatic.  Sicilian  war  (244  B.C.)  the  important  town  of  Bnindnsinm, 
Borne  came  for  the  first  time  into  immediate  contact  with 
the  countries  and  the  peoples  of  the  opposite  coast. 
The  war  with  Pyrrhus  would  no  doubt  have  led  to 
the  immediate  interference  of  the  Bomans  in  the  politics 
of  Greece,  if  Carthage  had  not  for  many  years  engrossed 
their  attention.  After  the  victorious  conclusion  of  the 
war  in  Sicily,  it  was  to  be  expected  that  Bome  would  seek 
to  exercise  in  the  East  the  influence  which  her  recent 
accession  of  power  had  given  her. 
The  But  the  weight  of  her  arm  was  to  fall  in  the  first  in- 

fiiyiiCTim.  staJ^ce,  not  ou  the  Greeks  proper,  nor  even  on  half  Greeks 
like  the  Epirots  of  Pyrrhus,  but  on  the  Illyrian  pirates,  the 
primeval  inhabitants  of  the  mountainous  coast  lands  on 
the  Adriatic  Sea,  which  seem  destined  by  nature  to  be 
the  seat  of  inextinguishable  barbarism.  The  lUyrians  of 
that  time,  like  their  present  successors  on  the  mountains 
of  Dalmatia  and  Montenegro,  were  peculiarly  fitted  for  a 
life  of  robbery.  The  much  indented  coast,  with  its  nume- 
rous islands  and  headlands,  surrounded  by  steep  and 
wild  mountains,  was  highly  favourable  for  piratical  enter- 
prise. As  long,  however,  as  the  Greek  colonies  in  the 
Ionian  Sea,  especially  Corcyra  and  Epidamnus,  flourished, 
the  Illyrian  pirates  had  not  ventured  far  out  of  their 


B.C. 


THE  FIRST  ILLYRIAN  WAR.  137 

retreats ;  at  least  theyhacl  not  ventured  into  Greek  waters  CHAP. 
in  large  nnmbers  and  with  open  violence.  It  was  only  -  .  - 
when  the  Greek  states  had  become  so  weakened  by  ever-  229-228 
lasting  wars  and  revolutions  as  to  be  scarcely  able  to  pro- 
tect themselves,  that  the  piracy  of  the  lUyrians  assumed 
larger  proportions.  They  acted  now  like  the  Scandinavian 
sea-kings  of  the  middle  ages.  With  their  small,  quick* 
sailing  Libumian  ships,  they  intercepted  not  only  the 
merchant  vessels  which  traded  in  those  seas,  but,  sailing 
in  fleets,  sometimes  of  a  hundred  ships,  along  the  coast 
of  the  Adriatic  and  Ionian  Seas  as  far  as  Messenia  in 
Peloponnesus,  landed  where  they  pleased,  took  possession 
of  towns  and  villages,  carried  away  spoils  and  prisoners, 
and  before  it  was  possible  to  bring  any  force  against  them 
they  were  on  board  again  and  gone.  These  piratical  ex- 
peditions gradually  assumed  the  character  of  regular  wars. 
Thus  a  band  of  Ulyrians  attacked  the  flourishing  Epirotic 
town  Phoenice,  which  had  a  garrison  of  eight  hundred  Gallic 
mercenaries,'  made  common  cause  with  the  Gauls,  sacked 
the  town,  fought  a  regular  battle  with  the  people  of  the 
country  who  rushed  to  the  defence  of  their  city,  and  at 
length  returned  unhurt  to  their  own  land  with  all  the 
spoils.  No  wonder  that  Epirus  and  Acamania  found  it 
advisable  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  the  Ulyrians 
by  which  they  secured  for  themselves  the  protection  of 
the  robber  state.     The  Ulyrians  now  extended  their  raids 

>  Polybins  (ii.  7)  gives  a  detailed  and  interestiDg  aceovmt  of  this  band,  from 
which  we  can  form  an  opinion  of  the  adventures  and  the  character  of  the 
Gallic  mercenaries  of  the  time.  They  had  been  expelled  ^m  their  own 
country  on  account  of  their  treachery,  and  3,000  of  them  had  taken  service 
under  the  Carthaginians  in  Sicily.  Quarrelling  with  their  employers  about  the 
amount  of  pay,  they  formed  the  plan  of  plundering  the  town  of  Agrigentum, 
of  which  they  formed  the  garrison ;  but  this  plan  was  discovered  and  pre- 
rented.  At  a  later  period  of  the  war  they  entered  into  a  plot  for  delivering 
over  the  town  of  Eryz  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans  (see  above,  p.  102); 
but  they  were  foiled  by  the  vigilance  and  vigour  of  Hamilcar  Barcas.  They 
then  deserted  in  a  body  and  took  service  under  the  Bomans,  who  employed 
them  till  the  end  of  the  war.  But  the  Bomans  would  have  nothing  to  do  with 
them  after  the  conclusion  of  peace.  They  were  disarmed  and  sent  out  of 
Italy.  Thereupon  they  crossed  over  to  Epiros,  and  continued  their  lawless 
practices  in  that  country. 


138  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  to  other  parts.  The  towns  and  islands  of  those  parts — 
s- — r^ — '  Issa,  Pharos,  Apollonia,  and  Epidamnus — were  in  constant 
terror.  Epidamnus  was  treacherously  attacked  by  a 
number  of  men  who  had  asked  permission  to  fetch  drink- 
ing water  for  their  ships,  and  when  they  were  hos- 
pitably admitted  drew  forth  hidden  knives,  and  cutting 
down  the  guards,  took  possession  of  the  gate  till  the  re- 
mainder of  the  band  came  from  the  ships  and  pressed  into 
the  town.  The  inhabitants  succeeded  only  with  the 
greatest  difficulty  in  overcoming  the  robbers,  and  in  driving 
them  back  to  their  ships.*  The  CorcyrsBans  were  less  fortu- 
nate. The  niyrians,  in  league  with  the  Acamanians,  fought 
a  regular  battle  with  them  and  their  countrymen  the  Achse- 
ans,  and  compelled  them  to  give  over  the  island  to  them. 
Corcyra  seemed  destined  to  be  thrown  like  a  ball  from  the 
hand  of  one  conqueror  to  that  of  another.  The  lUyrians 
gave  over  the  government  to  a  Greek  from  the  island  of 
Pharos,  called  Demetrius,  who,  judging  by  the  little  we 
know  of  him,  appears  to  have  been  a  reckless  and  unprin- 
cipled adventurer.  By  such  successful  undertakings  the 
robber  state  of  the  Illyrians  gradually  became  a  consider- 
able power.  Their  king  felt  himself  to  be  a  potentate  not 
unlike  the  successors  of  Alexander  the  Great ;  and  indeed 
he  seemed  fully  entitled  to  consider  himself  the  equal  of 
Pyrrhus  or  the  king  of  Macedonia,  who  was  obliged  to 
ask  his  assistance  against  the  Achseans.^ 
Roman  The  commerce  of  the  Italian  towns  had  long  suffered 

Uiyricum.  Under  the  scourge  of  the  lUyrian  pirates.  At  length  the 
Koman  senate  sent  two  brothers,  Caius  and  Lucius  Corun- 
canius,  to  Scodra  (Scutari),  the  seat  of  the  lUyrian  kings, 
complaining  of  their  doings  and  asking  for  redress.  At 
that  time  a  queen  called  Teuta  was  governing  in  the  place 
of  her  young  son  Pinnes.  She  promised  that  she,  as  queen 
of  the  Illyrians,  would  avoid  all  hostility  against  Rome  in 
political  matters,  but  she  declared  at  the  same  time  that  she 
was  not  in  a  position  to  oppose  the  private  undertakings 

»  Polybius,  ii.  9.  «  Polybius,  ii.  2. 


THE  FIRST  rLLYRIAN  WAR.  139 

of  her  subjects.     According  to  Ulyrian  law  she  said  that     CHAP, 
every  man  was  free  to  carry  on  war  with  another  on  his  own 


229-228 

B.C. 


account.  Upon  this  the  younger  Coruncanius  answered 
that  it  was  customary  among  the  Bomans  for  the  state  to 
punish  the  transgressions  of  individuals.  They  would 
take  good  care  to  make  the  Illyrians  also  observe  this 
custom.  The  queen  made  no  answer  to  this  ill-timed 
reply,  but  on  the  return  of  the  brothers  she  caused  them 
to  be  waylaid,  and  the  younger  one  was  killed. 

War  was  now  unavoidable.  In  the  year  229  a  fleet  Successful 
of  two  hundred  ships  sailed  across  the  Adriatic  Sea  under  campaigns 
the  command  of  the  consul  Cn.  Fulvius  Centumalus,  while  S,    . 

\  lUyncum. 

a  land  army  of  20,000  men  and  2,000  horse  marched  to 
take  ship  at  Brundusium  under  the  second  consul,  L. 
Postumius  Albinus.  It  was  high  time  that  a  strong  arm 
should  interfere.  The  recently  completed  conquest  of 
Corcyra  had  made  the  Illyrians  so  confident  and  daring 
that  they  contemplated  nothing  less  than  the  reduction 
of  all  the  independent  Greek  states  of  that  neighbourhood. 
They  besieged  at  the  same  time  Epidamnus  and  Issa,  and 
threatened  Apollonia.  But  one  summer  campaign  sufficed 
to  put  an  end  to  their  encroachments.  When  the  Soman 
fleet  appeared  before  Corcyra,  the  shrewd  Demetrius  saw 
at  once  with  what  sort  of  people  he  had  to  deal.  To 
sacrifice  himself  in  a  hopeless  contest  for  the  Queen  Teuta 
was  not  to  his  mind.  He  delivered  the  island  over  to  the 
consul  Fulvius,  and  offered  his  services  in  the  prosecution 
of  the  war  against  the  Illyrians.  The  fleet  now  sailed 
northwards  under  his  guidance.  Epidamnus  and  Issa 
were  delivered  without  difficulty.  The  legions  had  in  the 
meantime  crossed  from  Italy.  The  strongholds  and  hiding- 
places  of  the  Illyrians  fell  one  after  another  into  the  power 
of  the  Romans.  Now  and  then  there  was  a  serious  struggle, 
but  on  the  whole  the  Soman  arms  were  irresistible.  The 
Atintanians  and  Parthinians,  two  nations  subjected  by  the 
Illyrians,  joined  the  Bomans.  The  Queen  Teuta  took 
refuge  in  the  citadel  of  Bhizon,  where  for  the  time  she  was 
safe. 


140  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK         In  the  autumn  Fulvius  was  able  to  return  with,  the 

IV 

...^ ^l .   greater  part  of  the  army  and  the  fleet.     His  colleague 

Postumius  remained  in  Illyria  with  forty  ships  and  a  few 
troops,  formed  an  army  out  of  the  native  people,  and  thus 
kept  the  Illyrians  in  check  during  the  winter.  In  the  fol- 
lowing spring  (228  b.g.)  the  lUyrian  queen  gave  up  further 
resistance  and  accepted  the  conditions  of  peace  which  Borne 
prescribed.  All  the  conquests  of  the  Illyrians  were  re- 
stored, and  the  nations  which  had  been  subjected  again 
became  independent.  The  Illyrians  pledged  themselves 
to  sail  no  armed  vessels  further  south  than  Lissus  (Alessio), 
and  even  to  pay  a  yearly  tribute.  After  the  enemy 
had  been  thoroughly  humbled,  the  relations  of  the  east 
coast  of  the  Adriatic  Sea  were  regulated  according  to  the 
interests  of  Borne.  Demetrius  of  Pharos,  who  had  shown 
himself  a  valuable  ally,  received,  under  Boman  supremacy, 
one  part  of  Illyria  and  the  guardianship  of  the  youth- 
ful king  Pinnes.  The  Greek  towns  retained  their  inde- 
pendence. All  the  peoples  and  towns  which  were  freed 
from  the  Illyrians  entered  into  an  alliance  with  Bome, 
which,  after  the  Boman  custom,  was  a  sort  of  mild  subjec- 
tion. It  was  announced  to  the  Greeks  in  Hellas  proper 
that  the  Bomans  had  crossed  the  sea  to  release  them  from 
their  foes.*  There  was  unbounded  joy  at  the  receipt  of 
this  news.  The  Athenians  determined  to  make  the  Bomans 
honorary  citizens  and  to  admit  them  to  the  mysteries  of 
Eleusis.^  The  Corinthians  invited  them  to  take  part  in 
the  Isthmian  games.  Perhaps  the  just  gratitude  felt  by 
the  degenerate  successors  of  the  conquerors  of  Salamis 
stifled  their  feelings  of  shame,  and  caused  them  to  for- 
get the  difiTerence  between  the  former  times,  when  the 
Greeks  defied  the  whole  power  of  the  Persian  empire,  and 
the  present,  when  they  suffered  foreign  barbarians  to  pro- 
tect them  from  despicable  robber  hordes. 

*  Folybius,  ii.  12.  *  Zonaras,  viii.  19. 


THE  SKCOND  ILLYKIAN  WAK.  141 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE   SECOND  ILLTBIAN   WAB,  219    B.O. 

Shobtly  after  the  settlement  of  affairs  in  Hljria,  the  war     CHAP, 
with  the  Gauls  broke  out  in  Italy,  which  occupied  Borne 
for  a  few  years.      The    restless  Demetrius  of  Pharos 
thought  this  a  favourable  time  to  free  himself  from  a  Alliance  of 
troublesome  subjection  to  Borne.    He  was  already  before  of  Pharos 
this  time  in   close  friendship  with  Antigonus,  king  of  ^^  ^^^' 
Macedonia,  who  was  the  first  of  all  liie  Greek  princes  to  king  of 
find  the  neighbourhood  of  Bome  an  inconyenience,  and  ^^^^^ 
to  feel  the  duty  of  resisting  Boman  encroachments  on  the 
Greek  continent.     Belying  on  this  connexion,  and  hoping 
that  Bome  would  soon  be  engaged  in  a  new  war  with 
Carthage,  he  began  to  attack  the  Boman  allies,  and  to 
treat    the   conditions  of   peace  of   228    generally  with 
contempt.     He   sailed  with  fifty  ships    so  far  even  as 
the   ^gean     Sea,    plundering    and    laying   waste    the 
islands.      Bome  could  not  tolerate   these  acts,   if   she 
cared  to  retain  the  gratitude  or  respect  of  the  Greeks. 
Nor  was  it  the  dignity  of  Bome  alone,  but  her  interests 
also,  which  demanded  the  prompt  chastisement  of  Deme- 
trius.     A  new  war  with  Carthage  had  by  this  time 
become  inevitable.     If,  before  its  outbreak,  the  quarrel 
with  lUyria  was  not  settled,  the  east  coast  of  Italy  would 
be  threatened,  not  merely  by  Demetrius,  but  also  by  his 
friend   and  ally,  the  king  of  Macedonia,  whose  interest 
peremptorily  demanded  a  union  with  Hannibal  and  a 
common  war  with  Bome. 

Under  these   circumstances  the    Bomans  hastened  to  Capture  of 
settle  the  Ulyrian  difficulty  as  speedily  as  possible,  that     ^^  ^^ 


142  ROMAN  mSTOBY. 

BOOK     they  miglit  the  sooner  oppose  Hannibal  in  Spain.     In  the 
-  ^^'    ^   spring  of  the  year   219  B.C.   they  sent  the   consul  L, 


JEmilius      -^niilius  PauUufl  to  lUyria.     He  discharged  his  duty  with 

Paullus.      ability  and  success,  took  in  a  short  time  the  fortress  of 

Dimalon,  which  had  been  considered  impregnable,  and  by 

combining  stratagem  and  bravery  made  himself  master  of 

the  town  and  island  of  Pharos.     Demetrius,  flying  to  the 

king  of  Macedonia,  sought  to  prcYail  on  him  to  declare 

war  against  Eome,  and  fell  some  years  later  in  an  attack 

on  the  fortress  of  Ithome,  in  Peloponnesus. 

Position  of      Thus  the  danger  of  a  greater  war  in  the  East  was 

theGalli/  happily  averted.     The  town  of  Pharos  was  destroyed,  that 

^°^  .  it  might  no  longer  serve  as  a  refuge  for  pirates.     The 

wars.  former  state  of  things  was  restored,  and  Bome,  now  free 

from  all  care,  could,  afber  the  conclusion  of  the  wars  with 

Gaul  and  Ulyria,   look  forward  with  confidence  to  the 

struggle  which  Hannibal  for  some  years  paat  hail  pre- 

pared,  and  which  was  now  on  the  point  of  breaking  out. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAK. 


US 


CILkPTER  Vni. 


THE   SECOND   PUNIC   OE  HANNIBALIAN   WAB,  218-201   B.C. 


First  Period,  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  the  battle  of 

CanncBy  218-216  B.C. 

The  treaty  of  peace  which  had  put  an  end  to  the  first 
Punic  war  in  241  B.C.  was  the  inevitable  result  of  the 
exhaustion  of  both  the  belligerent  nations.  It  was  satis- 
factory to  neither.  After  the  immense  efforts  and  sacri- 
fices which  Rome  had  made  in  the  twenty-three  years  of 
war,  she  found  that  the  eracuation  by  the  Carthaginians 
of  a  few  fortresses  in  Sicily,  and  the  payment  of  a  sum  of 
money,  was  a  result  not  in  accordance  with  the  high 
hopes  which  seemed  justified  after  the  landing  of  Eegulus 
in  Africa,  and  after  his  first  brilliant  and  unexpected 
victories.  Yet  the  senate  and  the  Boman  people  were 
not  able  to  alter  the  terms  of  peace  materially.  By  re- 
fusing to  ratify  the  negotiations  of  the  generals  they 
succeeded  in  extorting  from  the  Carthaginians  a  few 
thousand  talents  more,  but  nothing  else.  A  further 
demand  might  have  roused  the  spirit  of  the  Carthaginians 
and  have  continued  the  war  to  an  indefinite  period.  Ac- 
cordingly, Borne  contented  herself  with  what  she  could  get, 
and  what  was  after  all  a  great  gain.  When  the  war  of  the 
mercenaries  broke  out  in  Africa,  she  availed  herself  of 
the  distress  of  Carthage  to  extort  the  cession  of  Sardinia, 
and  an  additional  payment  of  1,200  talents. 

The  disastrous  termination  of  the  Sicilian  war  could 
not  fail  to  produce  a  great  effect  on  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
Carthaginian  republic.  Unfortunately  we  have  but  a  very 
imperfect  knowledge  of  the  public  institutions  of  Carthage, 


CHAP. 

VIU. 
. , ^ 

First 

Period, 

218-216 

B.C. 

Besults  of 
the  first 
Punic  war. 


Effects  of 
the  war  on 
the  inter- 
nal consti- 
tution of 
Carthage. 


144 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


B(K)K     and  we  can  only  guess  wliat  must  have  taken  place  on  the 
— ^ — '  occasion  in  question.     But  thus  much  seems  certain,  that 
the  war  with  Eome,  and  still  more  the  mutiny  of  the 
mercenaries,  shook  the  power  of  the  aristocracy.*     A  war 
is,  under  all  circumstances,  a  severe  test  for  the  constitu- 
tion of  a  state.     Whatever  is  unsound  in  the  administra- 
tion and  governmeut  comes  to  light,  and  an  unsuccessful 
war  is  frequently  the  cause  of  reforms,  provided  a  people 
has  still  vital  energy  enough  left  to  discover  and  to  apply 
the    remedies  which  it   needs.*     This  was  the  case   in 
Carthage.     In  the  war  with  the  mercenaries,  when  the 
state  could  only  be  saved  by  the  arms  of  its  own  citizens 
when  the  people  of  Carthage  were  obliged  to  fight  their 
own  battles,  they  were  justified  in  claiming  for  themselves 
a  greater  share  in  the  government.    A  democratic  move* 
ment  took  place,  at  the  head  of  which  we  find  Hamilcar 
Barcas,  the  most  eminent  statesman  and  soldier  that 
Carthage  possessed  at  that  time.    It  is  perfectly  clear, 
even  from  the  scanty  reports  preserved  in  the  extant 
writers,  that  at  the  end  of  the   Sicilian  war  Hq^milcar 
found  himself  in  opposition  to  the  party  which  was  then 
in  possession  of  the  government.     He  ceased  to  be  eom^ 
mander-in-chief.     In  the  perils  of  the  war  with  the  mer- 
cenaries, he  again  entered  the  service  of  the  state.    It  was 
he  to  whom  Carthage  owed  her  deliverance  from  a  ruin 
that  seemed  inevitable.   BKs  triumph  in  the  field  gave  him 
the  ascendancy  over  the  aristocratic  party  and  its  leader 
Hanno,  sumamed  the  Great.     It  appears  that  from  this 
time  forward  Hamilcar  practically  directed  the  government 
of  Carthage,  somewhat  ux  the  way  in  which  Pericles  had 

>  Polybius,  vi.  51.  The  policj  of  the  house  of  Barcas  is  called  a  ^iifiowria 
and  a  irtupi/av&if  rotn^pordrw  MpAwmp.  (Appian,  vi.  6 ;  Diodoros,  xxv.  p.  96, 
TauchnitE.)  Such  a  misrepresentation  is  not  surprising ;  it  is  similar  to  the 
account  of  the  revolution  in  Volsinii  (see  vol.  1.  p.  479),  which  exhibits  the 
spite  and  mendacity  of  suristocratic  historians. 

■  It  will  not  be  necessary  to  ^ve  many  instances.  The  regeneration  of 
Prussia  after  the  disustrous  war  with  Napoleon  in  1806;  the  abolition  of 
slavery  in  Kussia  after  the  Crimean  war ;  the  establishment  of  parliamentary 
government  in  Austria  after  Sadowa,  are  among  the  most  striking  iilustiutions 
of  the  historical  law  referred  to  in  the  te;(t. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  145 

governed  Athens,  without  interfering  materiallj  with  the     CHAP, 
forms  of  the  republican  constitution.      His  accession  to 


N^^ 


power  was  not  unlike  a  change  of  ministry  in  a  modem     ^^^^ 


Prbiod,  I 

state.  The  party  which  had  governed  the  state  before,  now  218-216 
formed  the  Opposition ;  as  a  matter  of  course,  it  became  ^'^' 
the  party  of  peace  when  Hamilcar  and  his  sons  looked 
upon  the  renewal  of  the  war  with  Rome  as  an  inevitable 
necessity,  and  as  the  only  chance  for  the  preservation  of 
liberty  and  independence.  It  is  a  proof  no  less  of  the 
high  political  qualities  of  the  Carthaginians  than  of  the 
magnanimity  of  Barcas  and  his  house,  that,  under  such 
circumstances,  Carthage  preserved  her  republican  liberties, 
and  was  not  overwhelmed  by  a  military  despotism. 

The  mutiny  of  the  mercenaries  was  scarcely  suppressed.  Policy  of 
and  the  revolted  African  subjects  brought  back  to  obe-  ^^^' 
dience,  when  Hamilcar  directed  his  attention  to  a  country 
where  he  could  hope  to  find  compensation  for  the  loss  of 
Sicily  and  Sardinia.  This  country  was  Spain,  to  which, 
from  the  remotest  antiquity,  Phoenician  traders  and 
settlers  had  been  attracted,  but  which  had  hitherto 
not  been  conquered  by  the  Carthaginian  arms,  or  made 
subject,  to  any  considerable  extent,  to  Carthaginian 
authority. 

The  island  town  of  Gades,  situated  beyond  the  pillars  Phcenician 
of  Hercules  in  the  outer  sea,  was  older  perhaps  than  ^ennjin 
Carthage  herself.     Its  national  sanctuary  of  the  Phoe-  Spain, 
nician    Melkarth    (Hercules)    vied    in    importance    and 
dignity  with  the  temples  of  the  mother  country.     The 
fertile  plain  of  Andalusia,  the  old  land  of  Tartessus,  was 
celebrated  for  its  wealth,  and  enriched  at  an  early  period 
the  merchants  of  Tyre  and  Sidon.     The  abundance  of 
precious  metals  in  Spain  attracted  the  skilful  Phoenician 
miners,  who  knew  how  to  work  the  mines  with  profit. 
No  doubt  Spain  had  been  for  ages  of  the  greatest  impor- 
tance for  the  trade  of  Carthage  ;  but  as  long  as  her  posses- 
sions in  Sicily  and  Sardinia  absorbed  her  attention  and 
her  energies,  it  seems  that  Spain  was  not  so  much  the 
object  of  the  public  as  of  the  private  enterprise  of  the 

VOL.  n.  li 


146 


ROMAN  mSTOEY. 


BOOK 

IV, 

*- — . ' 

Hapid 
growth  of 
Carthagi- 
nian power 
in  Spain. 


Attitnde 
of  the 
Roman 
state. 


Carthaginian  citizens,  and  that  conquests  in  that  country 
were  not  contemplated. 

This  was  changed  now  after  the  war  with  Eome.  Car- 
thage began  to  extend  her  power  and  dominion  in  Spain, 
as  Enghind  did  in  India  after  the  loss  of  the  American 
plantations.  With  an  astounding  rapidity  she  spread 
her  possessions  from  a  few  isolated  places  on  the  coast 
oyer  the  southern  half  of  the  peninsula,  and  she  appeared 
destined  to  establish  the  ascendancy  of  the  Semitic  race, 
and  of  Semitic  culture,  in  a  country  where,  nearly  a  thou- 
sand years  later,  the  Arabs,  a  kindred  Semitic  people,  suc- 
ceeded in  gaining  a  footing,  and  in  reaching  a  high  degree 
of  civilisation.  At  the  time  of  the  Carthaginian  conquest 
it  seemed  that  Spain  was  about  to  be  for  ever  separated 
politically  from  Europe,  and  to  be  united  with  North 
Africa,  with  which  it  has  much  in  common  through  its 
geographical  situation  and  its  climate.  Yet,  owing  to  the 
events  which  we  are  now  about  to  relate,  the  Punic  con- 
quest of  Spain  was  of  short  duration,  and  left  no  traces 
behind  except  a  few  geographical  names,  like  Cadiz  and 
Carthagena ;  but  the  Moorish  dominion,  which  lasted  for 
more  than  seven  hundred  years,  has  Teft  a  stamp  on  the 
Spanish  people  which  can  even  now  be  recognised,  and  not 
least  in  the  religious  fanaticism  of  which  it  was  the 
principal  cause. 

For  nine  years  Hamilcar  worked  with  great  success  for 
the  realisation  of  his  plan,  and  a  considerable  portion  of 
Spain  was  already  subjected  to  the  dominion  of  Carthage 
when  he  lost  his  life  in  battle.  His  son-in-law,  Hasdrubal, 
raised  to  the  command  of  the  army  by  the  voice  of  the 
soldiers  and  by  the  approval  of  the  people  of  Carthage,* 

'  We  do  not  Icnow  in  what  manner  the  preliminaty  election  of  the  general 
by  the  rotes  of  the  army  waa  condncted.  It  could  not  have  been  an  illegal 
usurpation  of  authority  by  the  soldiers,  nor'a  Tiolation  of  discipline.  Perhaps 
the  committee  of  Carthaginian  senators,  which,  as  we  know,  accompanied  the 
army,  selected  the  most  popular  and  able  officer,  conferred  on  him  the  pre- 
liminary command,  and  reported  to  Carthage,  to  obtain  the  consent  of  the 
home  authorities.  Some  such  arrangement  must  have  bceu  necessary,  unless 
a  general  was  named  from  the  first  as  second  in  command,  and  as  successor  in 
case  of  the  death  of  the  commander-in-chief.    At  any  rate,  it  ia  not  likely 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  147  ' 

prOTed  himself  a  worthy  successor  of  Hamilcar,  though  he      CIIAP. 
extended  and  secured  the  dominion  of  Carthage  less  by  force      ^^^^'  ^ 
of  arms  than  by  persuasion  and  peaceful  negotiations  with    ^^^ 
the  native  races.  He  founded  New  Carthage  (Carthagena),    218-216 
which  he  destined  to  be  the  capital  of  the  new  empire,  as       **^' 
it  was  more  favourably  situated  than   Gades,  and  well 
suited  to  be  a  depot  of  arms  and  munitions  of  war  for 
military  undertakings  in  the  central  and  eastern  parts  of 
Spain.    The  power  and  the  influence  of  Carthage  ex- 
tended more  and  more  northwards,  and  excited  at  last  the 
attention  and  jealousy  of  Borne,  which  had  for  a  time 
been  apparently  indifferent   to    the  proceedings   of  the 
Carthaginians  in  the  Pyrensean  peninsula.  Hasdrubal  was 
obliged  to  declare  that  Carthage  would  not  extend  her 
conquests  beyond  the  river  Ebro.     At  the  same  time  the 
Romans    entered    into    friendly   relations   with    several 
Spanish  tribes,  and  concluded  a  formal  alliance  with  the 
important  town  of  Saguntum,^  which,  though  situated  a 
good  way  to  the  south  of  the  Ebro,  was  intended  to  oppose, 
under  Boman  protection,  a  barrier  to  the  further  progress 
of  the  Carthaginians. 

This  was  the  state  of  affairs  in  Spain  when  in  221  B.C.  Death  of 
Hasdrubal  was  cut  off  prematurely  by  the  hand  of  an  ^*®^™  *  • 
assassin.     The  universal  voice  of  the  Spanish  army  ap- 
pointed as  his   successor  Hannibal,    the  eldest  son  of 
Hamilcar  Barcas,  then  only  twenty-eight  years  old. 

The  Carthaginian  people  confirmed  this  choice,  and  by  Hannibal 
doing  so  placed  their  fate  in  the  hands  of  an  untried  iiamiicar 

Barcas. 

that  the  foreign  mercenaries  had  any  influence  in  the  election.  If  the  Cartha- 
ginian citizens  serving  in  the  army  expressed  their  wishes  as  to  the  choice  of 
a  successor,  and  even  if  they  possessed  a  formal  right  of  election,  it  would  hare 
been  a  proceeding  differing  not  very  widely  from  the  election  of  a  Eoman  consul 
by  the  comitia  centuriata,  and  it  could  be  justified  more  easily  than  civil 
legislation  by  an  army  in  the  field,  such  as  is  reported  of  Bome  (Livy,  vii.  16). 
That  the  Carthaginians  intentionally  left  to  their  armies  a  voice  in  the  election 
of  generals  Ir  clear  from  a  proceeding  in  the  war  with  the  mercenaries,  when  the 
army  is  allowed  to  decide  whether  Hamilcar  or  Hanno  is  to  command  it — 
See  Polybius,  i.  82. 

^  The  site  of  Saguntum,  on  the  coast  north  of  Valencia,  is  now  known  as 
Hoiviedio,  or  the  Old  Walls. 

l2 


148 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


/ 


young  man,  of  whom  they  might  hope,  but  could  not 
know,  that  he  had  the  spirit  of  his  father.     But  of  one 
thing  the  Carthaginians  might  well  be  assured,  that  the 
son  had  inherited  his  father's  glowing  hatred  of  Bome, 
and  that  with  his  ardent  spirit  he  held  as  his  sacred  duty 
the  task  of  avenging  past  wrongs,  and  of  establishing 
the  security  and  power  of  his  native  country  on  the  ruins 
of  the  rival  city.     There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  people 
of  Carthage  shared  the  sentiments  of  Hamilcar's  family — 
that  the  loss  of  Sicily  and  Sardinia,  whilst  prompting 
feelings  of  revenge,  convinced  them  that  a  lasting  peace 
with  Eome  was  impossible.     They  saw  that  even  the 
twenty-four  years  of  war  in  Sicily  had  not  sufficed  to  fight 
out  their  quarrel,  and  that,  sooner  or  later,  the  contest 
must  be  renewed.   Every  danger  in  which  Carthage  might 
possibly  be  involved,  every  war  with  foreign  enemies,  and 
every  civil  disturbance,  might,  to  the  faithless  and  un- 
generous enemy,  offer  an  opportunity  for  coming  forward 
with  new  demands,  and  for  extorting  humiliating  con- 
cessions.    If  this  was  the  conviction  of  the  Carthaginian 
people  (and  we  have  no  reason  to  doubt  it),  they  could  not 
make  a  happier  choice  than  in  appointing  Hannibal  to  the 
command  in  Spain.     Never  has  a  nation  found  a  more  fit 
and  worthy  representative.     Never  has  the  national  wiU 
and  spirit  been  embodied  so  completely  and  so  nobly  in 
one  person,  as  in  Hannibal  was  embodied  the  spirit  and  the 
will  of  Carthage.     Even  the  low  passion  of  hate  seemed 
ennobled  in  a  man  who,  in  a  lifelong,  almost  superhuman 
struggle  with  an  overwhelming  force,  was  animated  and 
fired  by  it  to  persevere  in  a  hopeless  cause.     No  Eoman 
ever  gathered  up  and  concentrated  in  himself  so  fully  the 
great  qualities  of  his  nation  as  Hannibal  did  those  of 
Carthage.    We  should  only  insult  him  if  we  were  to  com- 
pare him  with  Scipio,  or  any  other  of  his  contemporaries.^ 
Bome  has  produced  but  one  man  who  can  compare  with 
Hannibal.     And  this  Hannibal,  so   great  and  powerful, 
so  nearly  fatal  to  the  greatness  and  the  very  existence  of 

*  See  Arnold,  History  of  Bome^  iii.  64. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  149 

Eome,  is,  though  a  stranger,  the  first  person  we  meet  with  \  CHAP, 
in  the  history  of  Borne  who  inspires  us  with  the  feeling  of  v,    ,  '.. 
personal  interest,  and  with  whose  doings  and  sufferings  /  r^^^"^ 
we   can  sympathise.      Before  Hannibal  appears  on  the/  218-216 
historic  stage,  the   shadowy  figures  of  the  Valerii,  the]      "'°' 
Claudii,  the  Pabii,  and  hosts   of  other  much-bepraised 
Eoman  heroes  of  the  good  old  time,  leave  us  cold  and 
indifferent.     They  have  too  little  reality  and  too  little  in- 
dividuality about  them.  They  are  eclipsed  by  the  foreigner 
Pyrrhus.     But  the  adventures  of  Pyrrhus  belong  only  in 
part  to  the  history  of  Eome.    Hannibal's  whole  life,  on  the 
contrary,  was  absorbed  by  his  contest  with  the  Boman 
people.     He  knew  no  other  aim  and  aspiration  than  to  lay 
Bome  in  the  dust.     Hence  even  the  ancients  have  justly 
called  the  war,  of  which  he  was  the  life  and  soul,*  th^ 
^  Hannibalian  war,'  and  almost  reluctantly  have  extolled 
his  name,  and  inscribed  it  in  imperishable  letters  on  the 
tablets  of  history. 

A  more  dangerous  antagonist  than  Hannibal  the  Bomans^  Hatred  of 
never  encountered.  A  high-minded  people,  able  to  appre-  tohus  for 
ciate  true  greatness,  would,  at  least  after  his  fall,  have  HannibaL 
been  generous  or  just  to  such  an  enemy,  and,  by  acknow- 
ledging his  greatness,  would  have  honoured  itself.  The 
Bomans  acted  otherwise.  Bitterly  as  they  hated,  reviled, 
and  persecuted  Carthage,  the  most  deadly  poison  of  their 
hatred  they  poured  upon  Hannibal ;  they  did  not  hesitate 
to  blacken  his  memory  by  the  most  revolting  accusations, 
and  they  went  so  far  as  to  hold  him  alone  personally 
responsible  for  the  calamities  which  the  long  war  brought 
over  Italy.  This  feeling  of  hostility  to  Hannibal  suggested 
or  confirmed  the  account  which  Fabius  Pictor,  the  oldest 
Boman  historian,  gave  of  the  origin  of  the  war.*  Hannibal, 
It  was  said,  began  the  war  on  his  own  responsibility,  with- 
out the  consent,  nay,  even  against  the  wish  of  the  govem- 

'  Polybius,  ix.  22 :  rmv  iKordpoiSf  'Vwfiolots  ^tffii  Kot  Kapxn^ovlotSf  'npoffirijrr6rrmr 
Hal  <rvfA0tUi^6yrwy  cfs  ^y  &>^p  dCrtos  Koi  fila  ^vx^t  ^^•^  ^^  ^V  *Awlfiov, 
*  Poljbius,  iii.  8. 


150  EOJrUN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     ment  of  Carthage.  ^  He  began  it  for  merely  selfish  purposes, 
.. ^_L^  to  put  an  end  to  impeachments  which  his  political  oppo- 
nents were   at  that  time  bringing  forward  against  the 
friends  of  his  father  and  his  brother-in-law.*    The  war 
was  therefore  not  a  war  of  the  Carthaginian  people  with 
Bome,  but  a  war  of  Hannibal  and  his  party,  undertaken 
in  the  interest  of  this  party  and  of  the  family  of  Hamilcar 
Barcas.     Even  the  expedition  to  Spain  had,  according  to 
this  yiew,   been  undertaken  by  Hamilcar,  without  the 
approbation  and  authority  of  the  goyemment,  for  the 
purpose  of  avoiding  and  baffling  the  impending  inquiry 
into  his  conduct  in  Sicily.'     Hasdrubal  showed  the  same 
contempt  of  the  constituted  authorities.     He  founded  for 
himself  an  empire  in  Spain,  independent  of  Carthage,  and 
he  entertained  the  design  of  overthrowing  the  republic, 
and  of  making  himself  king.*    The  government  was  not 
strong  enough  to  curb  and  control  the  men  of  the  house 
of  Barcas.     It  was   dragged  into  the  war  with  Rome 
against  its  will,  and  in  spite  of  its  conviction  that  the  war 
would  be  pernicious  to  the  state ;  but,  though  unable  to 
prevent  the  war,  the  government  of  Carthage  punished 
Hannibal  by  refusing  or  stinting  the  supplies  or  reinforce- 
ments which  he  wanted  to  carry  his  Italian  campaign  to  a 
victorious  end. 
Heal  Poly  bins  *  has,  in  a  few  words,  exposed  the  utter  absurdity 

position  of 

*  This  is  perhaps  the  echo  of  the  excuses  by  which,  after  the  disastrous 
termination  of  the  war,  the  Carthaginians  endeavoured  to  cast  the  blame  on 
Hannibal.  Livy  (xxx.  22)  puts  the  following  words  into  the  mouth  of  the 
Carthaginian  ambassadors :  '  £um  iniussu  Senatus  non  Alpes  modo  sed  Iberum 
quoque  transgressum,  nee  Romanis  solum,  sed  ante  etiam  Saguntinis  privato 
eonsUio  bellum  intulisse/  (Conf.  ibid.  s.  16,  c.  42.)  Yet  this  speech  itself  is 
perhaps  based  upon  the  erroneous  supposition  of  HannibaVs  guilt,  and  is  not 
a  true  report  of  the  words  used  by  the  Carthaginian  ambassadors.  For  we 
shall  see  that,  when  peace  was  concluded,  Hannibal  was  still  at  the  head  of 
affairs  in  Carthage,  and  he  would  hardly  hare  tolerated  such  arguments  as 
those  reported  by  Livy.  Napoleon  I.,  after  his  fall,  was  in  a  similar  manner 
made  responsible  for  the  wars  in  which  he  had  involved  France ;  but  with 
more  justice,  for  he  was  an  absolute  sovereign,  and  his  will  was  law  in  France. 
Carthage  was  a  republic,  and  no  individual  could  force  the  majority  of  the 
senate  and  the  people  to  adopt  a  policy  which  they  condemned. 

■  Appian,  vi.  9,  vii.  3.  •  Appian,  vii.  2. 

*  Polybius,  iii.  8,  §  2.  •  Polybius,  iii.  8. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAK.  151 

of  a  view  like  this.     *  If/  he  says,  *  Hannibal  had  been  a     CHAP, 
mutinous  general,  and  determined,  for  his  own  personal  ^^ 


interests,  to  involve  his  country  in  a  war  which  the  govern-     p^R^n 
ment  was  anxious  to  avoid,  how  did  it  happen  that  the    218--216 
latter  did  not  seize  the  opportunity  of  getting  rid  of  such 
a  dangerous  citizen,  when,  after  the  fall  of  Saguntum,  the  ^^^  Car- 
Eomans  demanded  that  he  should  be  given  up  to  them  ?  thaginian 
But  the  Carthaginian  senate,  far  from  sacrificing  or  even  ^^^^ 
disowning  him,  approved  his  actions  as  with  one  voice,  ac- 
<;epted  and  returned  with  enthusiasm  the  Koman  declara- 
tion of  war,  and  carried  on  this  war  for  seventeen  years,  until 
the  state  was  exhausted  and  compelled  to  sue  for  peace.** 
When,  after  the  war  with  the  mercenaries,  Carthage 
was  enfeebled  and  crippled,  and  Rome,  in  utter  defiance  of 

'  It  is  a  matter  of  some  surprise  that,  after  such  a  confutation,  Mommsen, 
in  his  History  of  Borne  (vol.  i.  chap,  iv.),  should  return  to  the  false  representa- 
tion of  Fabius  Pictor.  He  dwells  with  a  censorial  pleasure  on  the  alleged 
hostility  between  the  house  of  Hamilcar  Barcas  and  ihe  Carthaginian  govern- 
ment. He  speaks  of  a  predilection  (' Hinneigung ')  of  the  Carthagiuiaa 
oligarchy  {i.e.  Hannibal's  political  opponents)  for  Rome,  of  an  'understanding 
between  them  and  the  Eomans  which  bordered  upon  treason/  of  a  *pro- 
Koman  government'  in  Carthage.  When  Hannibal  succeeded  to  the  command 
of  the  army,  '  the  peace  party  was  in  power  at  Carthage,'  and  *  they  had  no 
intention  to  allow  the  young  man  to  indulge  in  freaks  of  youthful  patriotism 
at  the  public  cost ; '  but  Hannibal  paid  no  attention  to  their  wishes  or  com- 
mands ;  '  he  reported  that  he  was  obliged  to  punish  Saguntum  for  some  act  of 
hostility  to  Carthaginian  subjects,  and,  without  waiting  for  an  answer,  began 
the  siege,  i.e.  the  war  with  Rome.  The  Carthaginian  senate  were  more  afraid 
of  their  own  army  and  the  populace  than  of  Rome,  or  they  saw  that  it  was 
too  late  to  undo  what  had  been  done,  or  else  they  lacked  energy  for  decisive 
action  and  resolved  at  last  to  resolve  upoti  nothingy  andy  without  waging  the  war, 
to  suffer  it  to  be  waged*  This  view  is  sufficiently  condemned  by  its  intrinsio 
improbability,  and  has  therefore  been  rejected  in  antiquity  by  Polybiua 
(iii.  8 ;  iii.  13,  §§  1,  2),  and  in  modem  times  by  Heeren  (Ideen,  ii.  1,  8),  Vlncke 
(Der  £weite  punische  Krieg,  1841,  pp.  142-170),  and  C.Peter  (Studien  eur 
rim,  Gesch.  pp.  19-27).  It  assumes  a  political  situation  in  Carthage  such 
as  can  only  be  brought  about  by  a  total  wreck  of  order,  by  anarchy  and 
confusion.  It  describes  the  government  as  venal,  timid,  listless,  without 
decision,  trembling  before  its  own  army,  split  into  factions,  opposed  to  the 
noblest  patriots,  partial  to  the  enemies  of  the  country,  drifting  hopelessly  into 
a  tremendous  war,  which  it  condemned  and  vainly  tried  to  avoid.  How  such 
a  government  was  able  to  carry  on  the  war  for  seventeen  years,  and  almost  ta 
overthrow  the  most  warlike  and  powerful  state  of  the  ancient  world,  is  a 
miracle  which  defies  our  understanding,  and  which  can  be  believed  only  by  a 
blind  unreasoning  faith. 


152 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Resources 

of 

Carthage. 


justice,  had  availed  herself  of  the  distress  of  her  old  rival  to 
deprive  her  of  Sardinia,  then  it  was  that  Hamilcar  Barcas 
devoted  himself  and  his  house  to  the  service  of  the  avenging 
goddess,  and  planned  the  war  with  Borne  J  He  lefb  his 
native  town  to  lay  in  Spain  the  foundation  of  a  new  colonial 
empire  of  Carthage,  and  when  he  was  offering  up  sacrifice 
at  the  altar  of  the  tutelary  god  of  the  Carthaginian  people 
and  was  praying  for  his  divine  protection,  he  bade  his  son 
Hannibal,  then  a  boy  of  nine  years,  lay  his  hands  on 
the  altar  and  swear  that  he  would  always  be  the  enemy 
of  Bome.  He  took  him  to  Spain ;  he  brought  him  up  in 
his  camp,  to  prepare  him  for  the  task  for  which  he  had 
destined  him,  and  he  sacrificed  his  life  to  save  that 
of  his  son.^  Tor  eight  years  Hannibal  served  under  his 
brother-in-law  Hasdrubal.  His  military  bearing  made 
him  the  idol  of  the  army.  Then,  in  the  full  vigour  of  life, 
and  still  in  all  the  freshness  of  youth,  he  was  summoned, 
by  the  confidence  of  his  comrades,  and  by  the  unanimous 
voice  of  the  Carthaginian  people,*  to  take  the  command  of 
the  army  and  to  carry  out  the  policy  of  his  father. 

Twenty  years  had  elapsed  since  the  peace  of  241  B.C. 
With  wonderful  energy  and  success  Carthage  had  recovered 
jfrom  her  misfortunes.  The  government  was  no  longer  in 
the  hands  of  the  oligarchy ;  the  popular  party  was  at  the 
head  of  affairs,  and  was  led  by  the  men  of  the  house  of 
Barcas.  An  extensive  territory  had  been  conquered  in 
Sp.;..  The  Iberia  trib«,  s.b^  ij  force  o?  a™,  or 
conciliated  by  peaceful  negotiations  and  readily  submitting 
to  Carthaginian  authority,  fiirniahed  for  the  armj  an  abnn- 
dant  supply  of  volunteers  or  compulsory  recruits*  in  place 
of  the  inconstant  Gallic  mercenaries,  of  whom  the  Cartha- 
ginian army  was  mainly  composed  in  the  first  war.  The 
Libyan  subjects  were  reduced  to  obedience,  and  famished 
excellent  foot  soldiers.  The  Numidians,  more  closely 
united  with  Carthage  than  ever  before,  by  the  military 
genius  and  the  policy  of  Hamilcar  and  Hasdrubal,  sup* 

'  Polybius,  iii,  10.  $§  3  and  4 ;  iii.  13,  §  1.  «  Diodoms,  xxv.  fir.  2. 

•  Polybius,  iii.  18,  §  4.  *  Livy,  xxl  11,  21. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR,  153 


plied  a  light  cavalry  that  could  not  be  matched  by  the     CHAP. 
Romans.     The  finances  had  to  some  extent  recovered,  ..    .  '.^ 
in  spite  of  the  heavy  contributions  of  war  exacted  by    p^^ 
Borne,  amounting  to  4,400  talents.^    The  time  was  come    2ia-2i6 
when  Carthage  might  hope  to  renew  the  contest  with       ^'^' 
a  fair  hope  of   final  victory.      The   Romans,   like  the  poiicyof 
Carthaginians,  looked  upon  the  peace  of   241   B.C.   as  ^® 
only  an  armistice,  but  they  very  much  underrated  the  delaying 
strength  of  their  conquered  rival.     They  regarded  Car-  ^^^^^^  ^r 
thage  as  so  thoroughly  broken  and  exhausted  that  they  the  war. 
might  at  pleasure  resume  the  war  at  any  time  most  con« 
venient  for  them.     They  were  prepared  to  do  so  after  the 
termination  of  the  war  with  the  mercenaries;  but  the 
readiness  with  which  Carthage  in  that  time  of  depression 
submitted  to  the  humiliating  conditions  imposed  as  the 
price  of  peace  averted  an  open  rupture,  while  the  resig- 
nation of  the  Carthaginians  being  interpreted  as  an  un- 
mistakeable  sign  of  weakness  strengthened  the  conviction 
that  for  the  future  also  Carthage  would  be  unable  to 
offer  a  long  or   determined   resistance.      The  Romans 
had,  probably,  but  an  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  great 
advance  which  the  Carthaginian  power  had  made  by  its 
conquests  in  Spain,  still  less  were  they  informed  of  the 
invigoration  of  the  political  system  of  Carthage  by  the 
triumph  of  the   democracy  and  the   ascendancy  of  the 
family  of  Barcas.     Jtome  was  therefore  in  no  hurry  to 
follow  up  the  policy  struck  out  in  the  first  Punic  war. 
She  was  the  more  inclined  to  delay  as  this  war  had  dealt 
severe  blows  to  Italy,  and  had  caused  losses  which  time 
had    not    yet    repaired.      Moreover,   the    acquisition  of 
Sardinia  was  followed  by  almost  uninterrupted  hostilities 
with  the  stubborn  inhabitants  of  that  island,   and  by 
similar  petty  wars  in  Corsica  and  Liguria — wars  which, 
though  unimportant  in  themselves,  were  yet  sufficient  to 
withdraw  the  attention  of  the  Romans  from  other  quarters. 
The  Illyrian  war  (229  B.C.)  was  a  far  more  serious  affair, 

•  Upwards  of  1,100,000/. 


154 


ROMAN  mSTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Alliance 
of  Sagun- 
tum  with 
Home. 


Prepara- 
tions of 
Hannibal. 


especiallj  as  it  engaged  the  whole  Boman  fleet.  But  it 
was  more  especially  the  long  threatened  war  with  the 
Gauls  (225  B.C.)  which  procured  for  Carthage  a  temporary 
respite  and  a  continuance  of  the  peace  with  Borne.  This 
war  lasted  for  four  years.  It  came  to  an  end  just  before 
the  death  of  Hasdrubal,  and  even  then  it  was  ended  only 
in  appearance.  The  resistance  of  the  Gauls  in  the  valley 
of  the  Po  was  broken  in  221  B.C.,  and  the  Romans 
set  about  securing  the  possession  of  the  land  by  esta- 
blishing the  two  colonies  of  Placentia  and  Cremona  on  the 
Po.  Now,  at  last,  the  time  seemed  to  have  arrived  when 
Bome  could  devote  herself  to  the  settlement  of  her  old 
dispute  with  her  rival  for  supremacy  in  the  western 
Mediterranean. 

During  the  last  few  years  the  attention  of  the  Bomans  had 
been  drawn  to  the  progress  of  the  Carthaginians  in  Spain. 
Spanish  tribes  and  towns  which  dreaded  annexation  to 
the  Carthaginian  province  applied  for  assistance  to  Bome. 
The  result  of  this  application  was  the  treaty  by  which 
Hasdrubal  had  pledged  himself  to  confine  his  conquests 
within  the  Ebro.  Another  result  was  the  alliance  between 
Bome  and  Saguntum.  According  to  the  conditions  of  the 
peace  of  241  b.o.  the  allies  of  either  of  the  two  contracting 
states  were  not  to  be  molested  by  the  other.  It  is  true 
that  Saguntum  *  was  not  the  ally  of  Bome  at  the  time  when 
that  peace  was  concluded.  But,  nevertheless,  it  was  evi- 
dent  that  Bome  could  not  be  debarred  from  concluding 
new  alliances,  and  it  appeared  a  matter  of  course  that  she 
must  and  would  afiPbrd  her  protection  no  less  to  her  new 
allies  than  to  the  old.  If  the  Carthaginians  questioned 
or  disregarded  this  claim  of  Bome,  the  peace  was  broken, 
and  no  appeal  was  left  but  to  arms.  No  doubt  could  exist 
on  this  subject  either  at  Bome  or  at  Carthage. 

Immediately  upon  his  appointment  to  the  command  of 
the  army,  Hannibal  was  anxious  to  begin  the  war  with 
Bome,  and  the  time  would  have  been  extremely  favourable, 
as  in  the  year  221  B.C.  Bome  was  still  sufficiently  occupied 
with  the  Gauls.    But  he  was  obliged  to  make  ample  pre- 

1  See  p.  147. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  155 

parations  before  undertaking  so  serious  an  enterprise,  and  CHAP. 

moreover  the  Carthaginian  possessions  in  Spain  had  to  be  > ^— L-^ 

enlarged  and  secured,  so  as  to  serve  as  a  proper  basis  j^™^ 

for  his  operations.     He  also  wished,  no  doubt,  to  feel  and  218-216 


B.C. 


try  the  extent  of  his  power  over  the  army  and  of  his  autho- 
rity at  home ;  to  familiarize  himself  with  the  troops  who 
were  destined  to  carry  out  his  bold  conceptions — ^to  seat 
himself  firmly  in  the  saddle  and  to  try  the  mettle  of  his 
steed.  He  therefore  devoted  the  years  221  and  220  to  the 
task  of  subduing  some  tribes  south  of  the  Ebro,  training 
his  army,  inspiring  his  men  with  confidence  in  his  com- 
mand, enriching  them  with  booty  and  thus  heightening 
their  zeal,  and  finally  of  providing  for  the  security  of 
Spain  and  Africa  during  his  absence. 

All  these  preparations  were  made  by  the  beginning  of  the  impor- 
year  219  b.o.  The  first  object  of  his  attack  was  Saguntum,  Saguntum. 
the  rich,  powerful,  and  weU-fortified  town  to  the  south 
of  the  Ebro,  which  had  lately  sought  and  obtained  the 
Soman  alliance.  The  Saguntines  boasted  of  Greek  origin, 
and  called  themselves  descendants  of  colonists  from  the 
island  of  Zakyuthos — an  assertion  for  which,  in  all  pro- 
bability, they  had  no  authority  beyond  the  similarity  of  the 
two  names.  They  appear  to  have  been  genuine  Iberians, 
like  the  other  nations  in  Spain,  and  to  have  had  no  more 
af&nity  with  the  Greeks  than  could  be  claimed  by  the 
Romans.  At  that  time,  when  the  Eomans  acted  as  pro- 
tectors and  liberators  of  the  Greeks  in  the  Adriatic  and 
Ionian  Seas,  and  when  they  began  to  pride  themselves 
on  their  assumed  descent  from  Homeric  heroes,  the  Grecian 
name  was  a  welcome  pretext  and  a  means  for  obtaining 
political  advantages.  But  even  without  this  pretext  the 
alliance  of  Saguntum  was  of  sufficient  importance  to  Rome. 
It  was  admirably  situated  and  adapted  for  a  base  of 
operations  against  the  Carthaginian  possessions  in  Spain, 
and  could  answer  the  purpose  which  Messana  had  served  in 
Sicily.  At  any  rate  it  might  be  made  a  barrier  against 
the  further  advance  of  the  Carthaginians,  and  with  this 
view  it  had  been  received  into  Roman  protection  while 
Hasdrubal  commanded  in  Spain. 


156 


KOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 

Roman 
embassy 
tx> 
Hannibal. 


Siege*  of 
SnguDtum 
by 
Hannibal. 


The  Boman  senate  felt  convinced  that  a  warning  would 
at  once  be  followed  by  an  abandonment  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian designs  on  Sagnntum,  which  of  late  had  become 
more  manifest,  and  of  which  the  Saguntines  had  repeatedly 
informed  the  senate.*  It  accordingly  dispatched  an  em- 
bassy to  Hannibal  (in  219  B.C.)  to  point  out  the  conse- 
quences if  he  persisted  in  hostilities  against  the  friends 
and  clients  of  the  Boman  people.  But  Hannibal  made  no 
secret  of  his  intentions.  He  told  the  ambassadors  that 
the  alliance  between  Saguntum  and  Bome  was  no  reason 
why  he  should  not  treat  the  former  as  an  independent 
state ;  that  he  had  as  much  right  as  the  Bomans  to  inter- 
fere in  the  internal  affairs  of  Saguntum,  and  in  case  of 
necessity  to  defend  that  town  from  the  usurped  protec- 
torate of  Bome.*  A  similar  answer  was  given  to  the 
ambassadors  by  the  senate  of  Carthage,  whither  they  had 
proceeded  from  Hannibal's  camp.' 

The  Bomans  knew  now  that  they  had  no  longer  to  deal 
with  the  peace-loving,  yielding  Hasdrubal,  nor  with  a 
broken-spirited  people  who  recoiled  with  terror  from  even 
the  threat  of  war.  Now  was  the  time,  if  they  meant 
seriously  to  stand  up  for  their  new  allies,  to  send  forth- 
with a  fleet  and  an  army  to  Spain,  and  this  was  demanded 
by  their  own  interest  as  well  as  by  that  of  the  Saguntines. 
But  they  did  not  stir  during  the  whole  of  this  year,  and 
left  the  despairing  Saguntines  to  their  fate.  Hannibal, 
at  no  loss  for  a  pretext  to  declare  war  against  Saguntum, 
laid  regular  siege  to  the  town  in  the  spring  of  the  year 


>  Polybins,  iii.  16.  §  1.    Livy,  xxi.  6. 

'  Polybius,  iii.  14,  15.  The  Romans  had  put  an  end  to  a  civil  var  in 
Sa^ntum,  and  had  killed  the  leaders  of  the  party  opposed  to  them.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  this  party  was  a  Carthaginian  party.  The  situation  in 
Saguntum  was  therefore  similar  to  that  which  had  existed  in  Messana  at 
the  commencement  of  the  first  Punic  war,  when  a  Roman  and  a  Carthaginian 
party  divided  the  town.  Perhaps  Hannibal  hoped  by  means  of  his  adherents  to 
get  possession  of  Saguntum,  without  employing  force.  If  he  had  l)een  successful 
in  this,  he  might  have  begun  his  campaign  a  whole  year  earlier,  whilst  the 
Romans  were  still  occupied  in  lUyria,  and  whilst  the  situation  in  the  north  of 
Italy  was  far  more  favourable  for  Carthage  than  afterwards. 

*  Livy,  zzi.  11.    Folybius,  iii.  16,  §  12. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAS.  157 

219  B.C.     But  the  Saguntines  resisted  with,  the  obstinacy     C&ap. 
and  determination  which  have  at  all  times  characterised  ^    ^^^'_- 
Spanish  towns.     For  eight  months  all  the  eflPorts  of  the     ^^^^ 
besiegers  were  in  vain.     Hannibal's  military  genius  was    218-216 
of  little  avail  in  the  slow  operations  of  a  regular  siege,       ^'^* 
where  success  depends  not  so  much  on  rapid  resolutions 
and  bold  combinations  as  on  stubborn  perseverance  in  a 
methodical  plan.     The  eight  months  of  tedious,  harassing, 
and  bloody  fighting  for  the  possession  of  Saguntum  were 
calculated  to  disgust  Hannibal  with  aU  siege  operations, 
and  we  find  that  during  all  his  campaigns  in  Italy  he 
undertook  them  unwillingly,  and  persevered  only  in  one 
with  any  degree  of  firmness.     It  is  probable  that  the  hope 
of  Boman  succour  braced  the  courage  of  the  Saguntines 
and  protracted  their  defence.     But  as  this  hope  in  the 
end  proved  vain,  the  resistance  of  the  brave  defenders  of 
the  doomed  town  was  borne  down.     Saguntum  was  taken 
by  storm,  and  suffered  the  fate  of  the  conquered.     The 
surviving  inhabitants  were  distributed  as  slaves  among  the 
soldiers  of  the  victorious  army,  the  articles  of  value  were 
sent  to  Carthage,  the  ready  money  was   applied  to  the 
preparations  for  the  impending  campaign.* 

Now  that  the  war  had  in  fact  begun,  the  Romans  sent  Second 
another  embassy  to  Carthage,  as  if  they  still  thought  it  o^^f^*^^ 
possible  to  preserve  peace.      But  their  demands  were  Romans  to 
such  that  they  might  safely  have  dispatched  an  army  at  thaginians. 
the  same  time,  for  they  could  not  expect  that  the  Cartha- 
ginians would  listen  to  them.   The  Roman  ambassadors  re- 
quired that  Hannibal  and  the  committee  of  senators  which 
accompanied  the  army  should  be  given  up  to  them  as  a 
sign  that  the  Carthaginian  commonwealth  had  taken  no 
part  in,  and  did  not  approve  of,  the  violence  done  to  the 
allies  of  Rome.     But  the  authorities  at  Carthage  were  far 
from  ignominiously  sacrificing  their  general,  and  submit- 
ting themselves  to  Roman  mercy  and  generosity.     They 
endeavoured  to  show  that  the  attack  on  Saguntum  did  not 
involve  a  rupture  of  the  peace  with  Rome,  because,  when 

'  Polybiufl,  iii.  17,  §  10.    Livy,  m.  16. 


158  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     that  peace  was  concluded  by  Hamilcar  and  Catulus  in  241 
-  _  ^^'       B.O.,  Saguntum  was  not  yet  numbered  among  the  allies  of 


Borne,  and  could  not  therefore  be  included  among  those 
whom  Carthage  had  undertaken  to  leave  unmolested. 
The  Boman  ambassadors  declined  to  discuss  the  question 
of  right  or  wrong,  and  insisted  on  the  simple  acceptance 
of  their  demands.  At  last,  after  a  long  altercation,  the 
chief  of  the  embassy,  Quintus  Fabius  Maximus,  gathering 
up  the  folds  of  his  toga,  exclaimed :  *  Here  I  carry 
peace  and  war;  say,  ye  men  of  Carthage,  which  you 
choose.'  *  We  accept  whatever  you  give  us,'  was  the 
answer.  *  Then  we  give  you  war,'  replied  Fabius,  spreading 
out  his  toga ;  and  without  another  word  he  lefb  the  senate- 
house,  amid  the  boisterous  exclamations  of  the  assembly 
that  they  welcomed  war,  and  would  wage  it  with  the  spirit 
which  animated  them  in  accepting  it.^ 
Character  Thus  the  war  was  resolved  upon  and  declared  on  both 
second  sidcs — a  war  which  stands  forth  in  the  annals  of  the 
Punic  war.  ancient  world  without  a  parallel.  It  was  not  a  war  about 
a  disputed  boundary,  about  the  possession  of  a  province, 
or  some  partial  advantage ;  it  was  a  struggle  for  existence,' 
for  supremacy  or  destruction.  It  was  to  decide  whether 
the  Greco-Roman  civilisation  of  the  West  or  the  Semitic 
civilisation  of  the  East  was  to  be  established  in  Europe, 
and  to  determine  its  history  for  all  future  time.  The 
war  was  one  of  those  in  which  Asia  struggled  with  Europe, 
like  the  war  of  the  Greeks  and  Persians,  the  conquests 
of  Alexander  the  Great,  the  wars  of  the  Arabs,  the  Huns, 
and  the  Tartars.  Whatever  may  be  our  admiration  of 
Hannibal,  and  our  sympathy  with  heroic  and  yet  defeated 
Carthage,  we  shall  nevertheless  be  obliged  to  acknowledge 
that  the  victory  of  Rome — the  issue  of  this  trial  by  battle 
— ^was  the  most  essential  condition  for  the  healthy  develop- 
ment of  the  human  race. 

»  Polybius,  iii.  20,  33.    Livy,  xxi.  18. 

*  Polybius,  ii.  14:  'Aw(/Baj  hrtfid\9T0  KoraXimiv  tV  *P»/ta(«r  Zwaffr^iw, 
K.r,K  Appian  (vi.  4)  erroneously  calls  the  second  Punic  war  a  war  for  the 
possession  of  Spain.    See  Vincke,  Der  ztoeite  punische  Krieg,  pp.  16,  124. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  169 

Since  the  first  war  with  Carthage,  the  strength  of  Rome     CHAP, 
had  materially  increased.     At  the  time  when  the  war  >      ,  '^^ 
broke  out  in  Sicily,  ten  years  had  scarcely  passed  since     ^^^ 
the  completion  of  the  conquest  of  Italy.     In  Samnium,    21 8-21 6 
Lucania,  and  Apulia  the  generation  still  lived  which  had       ^'^' 
measured  its  strength  with  Eome  in  the  long  struggle  ^^^{j^^^ 
for  supremacy  and  independence.    The  memory  of  all  the  Roman 
sufferings  during  the  war,  the  humiliation  of  defeat,  the  °*  ^^^' 
old  animosity  and  hatred  were  yet  alive  in  their  hearts. 
Now,  however,  after  the  lapse  of  sixty  years,  a  new  genera- 
tion had  grown  up  in  Italy,  which  was  a  living  part  of 
the  body  of  the  Roman  people,  and  had  given  up  all  idea 
of  carrying  on  a  separate  existence.     In  a  hundred  battles 
the  conquered  nations  of  Italy  had  fought  and  bled  by  the 
side  of  the  Eomans.    An  Italo-Eoman  national  feeling 
had  grown  up  in  the  wars  in  which  Bomans  and  Italians 
had   confronted  Libyans,  Gauls,  and  Illyrians.      Where 
could  the  peoples  of  Italy  find  the  enjoyments,  hopes,  and 
blessings  of   national  life,  except  in  their  union  with 
Borne? 

In  an  economical  point  of  view,  the  supremacy  of  Borne  Gain  tx) 
was,  for  the  Italians,  a  compensation  for  the  loss  of  their  '^l^^,^ 
independence.  It  had  put  a  stop  to  an  intolerable  evil —  tribes. 
the  endless  disputes  and  wars,  which  appear  to  be  insepar- 
able from  small  communities  of  imperfect  civilisation.  The 
calamities  of  a  great  war^  like  that  in  Sicily  between  Bome 
and  Carthage,  strike  the  imagination  by  the  great  battles, 
the  sacrifices,  and  losses  on  a  large  scale  which  charac- 
terise them ;  but  the  everlasting  paltry  feuds  of  neighbours, 
accompanied  by  pillage,  burning,  devastation,  and  murder 
in  every  direction,  cause  a  much  larger  amount  of  human 
suffering,  especially  where,  as  in  Italy  at  that  time,  every 
man  is  a  warrior,  every  stranger  an  enemy,  every  enemy  a 
robber,  and  all  look  upon  war  as  a  source  of  profit.  This 
deplorable  state  of  things  had  ceased  in  Italy  after  the 
supremacy  of  Bome  was  established.  Henceforth,  it  was 
alone  the  Boman  people  that  waged  war,  and  the  theatre 
of  war  had  mostly  been  beyond  the  confines  of  Italy. 


160 


EOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


BnrdenB 
of  the 
Eoman 
allies. 


Population 
of  Italy. 


When  the  nations  of  Italy  had  furnished  their  contin- 
gents  and  contributed  their  share  to  the  expenses  of  the 
war,  they  could  till  their  fields  in  peace,  without  fearing 
that  a  hostile  band  would  suddenly  break  in  upon  them, 
set  fire  to  the  standing  com,  cut  down  the  fruit  trees, 
drive  away  the  cattle,  and  carry  off  their  wives  and 
children  into  slavery.  Only  the  districts  near  the  coast 
had  been  alarmed  by  the  Carthaginians  during  the  first 
war;  but  the  interior  regions  had  been  quite  exempt 
from  hostile  attacks ;  and,  even  on  the  coast,  the  numerous 
Boman  colonies  had  offered  protection  from  the  worst  evils 
of  war. 

The  public  burthens  which  the  allies  of  Rome  had  to 
bear  were  moderate.  They  paid  no  direct  taxes.  The 
military  service  was  no  hardship  for  a  warlike  population, 
especially  as  there  was  always  a  chance  of  gaining  booty. 
The  Greek  cities  were  principally  charged  with  furnishing 
ships.  The  other  allies  sent  contingents  to  the  Boman 
army,  which,  in  the  aggregate,  seldom  amounted  to  a 
greater  number  of  men  than  were  furnished  by  Bome 
itself.  In  the  field  these  troops  were  victualled  by  the 
Boman  state,  and  were  therefore  no  source  of  expense  to 
the  allies.  If  we  bear  in  mind  that  the  different  Italian 
communities  enjoyed,  for  the  most  part,  perfect  freedom 
and  self-government  in  the  management  of  their  own 
affairs,  and  that  everywhere  the  leading  men  found  their 
authority  increased  by  their  intimate  connexion  with  the 
Boman  nobility,  we  can  easily  understand  that,  in  the 
beginning  of  the  Hannibalian  war,  the  whole  of  Italy  was 
firmly  united,  and  formed  a  striking  contrast  to  the 
Carthaginian  state  with  its  discontented  subjects  and 
inconstant  allies. 

Of  the  state  of  the  population  of  Italy  in  the  period 
before  the  second  Punic  war,  we  are  tolerably  well  in- 
formed. Polybius  relates  *  that  at  the  time  when  the 
Gauls  threatened  to  invade  Etruria  (in  225  e.g.)  a  general 


*  Polybius,  ii.  24. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIO  WAE.  161 

census  was  taken  of  the  military  forces  of  wliicli  Borne     CHAP. 

VIII 

might  dispose  in  case  of  war,  and  that  the  number  of  >^ — »-^ 
men  capable  of  bearing  arms  amounted  to  770,000.    If    pg^^ 
this  statement  is,  on  the  whole,  to  be  trusted,  not  only  for    218-216 
the  accuracy  of  the  information  originally  obtained  by  the 
officers  employed  in  the  census,  but  for  the  faithful  pre- 
servation of  the  official  numbers  by  the  historians,'  we 
can  infer  from  it  that  at  the  time  in  question,  i.e,  shortly 
before  the  appearance  of  Hannibal  in  Italy,  the  population 
of   the  peninsula  was  nearly  as   great  as  it  is  at   the 
present  day,  and  that  it  amounted  to  about  9,000,000  in 
those  parts  which  then  were  included   in  the  name  of 
Italy,  '1.6.  the  peninsula  south  of  Liguria  and  Transalpine 
Guul,  and  exclusive  of  the  islands.^ 

The  Carthaginian  statesmen  had  a  just  appreciation  Naval 
of  the  dangers  involved  in  a  war  with  Home.     The  Eoman  ^J®'  ^^ 
armies  were  composed  of  citizens  accustomed  to  the  use  Bomans 
of  arms,  and  of  faithful  allies  equally  warlike  and  equally  ^^^gixJianB. 
brave.     Forces  like  these  they  could  not  match,  either  in 
quantity  or  quality.  The  citizens  of  Carthage  were  neither 
so  numerous  as  those  of  Bome,  nor  available  for  service 
beyond  Africa.     The   subjects  and  allies  were  not  very 
trustworthy.     The  Libyans  and  Ifumidians  had  only  just 
been  reduced  again  to  submission,  after  a  sanguinary  war ; 
the  Spaniards  were  hardly  broken  to  the  yoke,  and  served 
rather  the  generals  than  the  commonwealth  of  Carthage. 
The  ancient  undoubted  superiority  of  the  Carthaginian 
navy  was  gone.     Bome  was  now  mistress  of  the  western 
Mediterranean,  as  well  by  her  fleets  as  through  the  posses- 
sion of  all  the  harbours  in  Italy,  Sicily,  Sardinia,  Corsica, 

'  A  few  variations  occur,  indeed,  but  they  are  not  material.  Eutropius 
(iii.  5),  on  the  authority  of  Fabius  Pictor,  gives  800,000  as  the  right  num- 
ber; Pliny  (Hist.  Nat.  iii.  24)  gives  780,000.  Livy's  statement  (epit.  20), 
giving  the  number  as  300,000,  must  arise  from  an  error  in  transcribing  the 
text. 

'  The  population,  in  1865,  of  the  former  kingdom  of  Naples,  of  the  States  then 
belonging  to  the  Church,  the  Marches,  Umbria,  and  Tuscany,  was  10,694,252 
(according  to  Kolb's  Staiutik),  Compare  Zumpt,  Udier  den  Stand  der  Bevolk- 
erung  im  Alterthum  {Ahhandlungen  der  Berliner  JJsademie,  1812,  p.  19),  and 
the  Appendix  at  the  end  of  the  present  volume. 

VOL.  n.  M 


162 


BOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Alliance 
of  the  Car- 
thaginians 
with  the 
Gauls. 


and  even  on  the  coast  of  Ulyria.  In  the  basin  of  the 
Tyrrhenian  Sea,  in  the  Adriatic  and  Ionian  Seas,  maritime 
operations  on  a  large  scale  were  veiy  hazardous  for 
Carthage,  as  nowhere  was  a  single  port  open  to  them. 
They  could  interrupt  the  Boman  communications,  capture 
transports  and  trading  vessels,  harass  and  alarm  the  coasts 
of  Italy ;  but  this  kind  of  piratical  warfare  could  not  lead 
to  great  results.  In  her  finances  Carthage  was  no  longer 
what  she  had  been.  Her  resources  had  been  drained  in 
the  long  wars  in  Sicily  and  Africa,  and  the  war  indemni- 
ties exacted  by  Bome  were  felt  even  by  the  wealthy  state 
of  the  Punic  merchants  to  be  a  heavy  burden.  The  new 
conquests  in  Spain,  it  is  true,  had  brought  some  relief. 
But  the  loss  of  Sicily  and  the  hostility  of  Bome  had,  to  a 
great  extent,  paralysed  trade.  Even  before  the  end  of  the 
Sicilian  war,  it  is  clear  that  the  financial  resources  of 
Carthage  had  begun  to  fail.  The  equipment  of  the  fleet, 
which  was  routed  at  the  iBgatian  Islands,  had  absorbed 
all  the  means  left  at  the  disposal  of  the  state.  When  this 
great  and  supreme  effort  had  failed,  peace  had  become 
absolutely  necessary.  The  war  with  the  mercenaries  was 
provoked  by  the  unseasonable  but  necessary  illiberality 
with  which  the  claims  of  the  soldiers  for  overdue  pay  and 
promised  compensations  were  met.  If  Spain  had  not 
yielded  a  rich  return  beyond  paying  for  the  military 
enterprises  of  Hamilcar  and  Hasdrubal,  it  would  have  been 
hard  for  Carthage  to  recover  strength  for  a  new  contest. 
As  it  was,  her  financial  weakness  must  have  been  the 
principal  cause  of  the  slowness  and  inefficiency  which  she 
displayed  in  sending  reinforcements  to  Hannibal. 

Thus,  with  her  own  strength  alone,  Carthage  could 
scarcely  hope  to  meet  her  hated  and  dreaded  antagonist 
on  equal  terms.  It  was  necessary  to  secure  allies,  and 
the  events  of  the  last  few  years  seemed  in  the  highest 
degree  favourable  for  organising  in  different  quarters  a 
combined  action  against  Bome.  Above  all  Hannibal 
reckoned  upon  the  co-operation  of  the  Gauls  in  the  north 
of  Italy.     In  spite  of  their  defeats  in  Etruria  and  on  the 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


163 


Po,  they  were  far  from  being  broken,  dispirited,  or  re- 
conciled. On  the  contrary,  the  attempt  of  the  Bomans 
to  establish  colonies  in  their  country  provoked  their 
renewed  hostility.  If  these  Grauls,  with  their  rude  un- 
disciplined, ill-armed  hordes  alone,  were  able  to  jeopardize 
the  Boman  supremacy  and  to  shake  the  foundations  of 
the  Boman  empire,  what  might  not  Hannibal  expect  to 
accomplish  with  their  aid,  if  he  regulated  their  impetuous 
bravery,  and  ranged  them  among  his  highly  disciplined 
Libyan  and  Spanish  soldiers  P  The  Gauls  had  not  yet 
ceased  to  be  the  terror  of  southern  Europe.  Even  as 
mercenaries  they  excelled  in  many  military  qualities. 
Fighting  in  their  own  cause,  defending  their  own  homes, 
they  might,  in  a  good  military  school,  become  invincible. 

These  hopes  hastened  the  resolution  of  Carthage  to 
renew  the  war,  and  determined  the  plan  of  the  campaign. 
The  land  of  the  Gauls  in  the  north  of  Italy  was  to  be  the 
basis  of  Hannibal's  operations,  and  the  Gaulish  warriors 
were  to  fight  under  his  standards.  The  spoliation  and 
plunder  of  Italy  was  to  pay  for  the  expenses  of  the  war. 
It  was  this  consideration  which  determined  Hannibal  to 
march  across  the  Pyrenees  and  the  Alps  into  the  country 
of  the  Insubrians  and  Boians,  on  the  Po,  where  he  was 
expected  with  impatience.  He  had  for  some  time  past 
been  in  negotiation  with  these  peoples.  They  had  sup- 
plied him  with  information  regarding  the  Alpine  passes,  and 
had  promised  guides ;  and  he  reckoned  on  their  strenuous 
assistance  when  he  undertook  that  enterprise  which  filled 
the  whole  world  with  astonishment  and  admiration. 

The  Gauls  were  not  the  only  allies  that  Hannibal  hoped 
to  find  in  Italy.  He  knew  that  a  hostile  army  was  sure  to 
be  welcomed  in  Africa  by  the  discontented  subjects  of 
Carthage.  At  the  time  of  Agathokles,  during  the  invasion 
of  Begulus,  and  during  the  mutiny  of  the  mercenaries,  the 
Libyans  and  Numidians — nay,  on  one  occasion,  even  the 
kindred  citizens  of  TJtica — had  made  common  cause  with 
the  enemies  of  Carthage.  Hannibal  hoped  in  like  manner 
to   gain  the  adhesion  of  the  Marsians,  the   Samnites, 

M  2 


CHAP. 
VIII. 

— — » — — 

First 
Period, 
218-216 

B.C. 


Expected 
revolt  of 
the  Italian 
allies. 


164  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     Campanians,  Lncanians,  and  Bruttians,  perhaps  even  of  the 
_   . '    -   LatinSy  if  he  should  be  able,  by  brilliant  victories,  to  banish 
their  fear  of  the  power  and  vengeance  of  Borne.     He  did 
not  know  how  firmly  these  peoples  were  united  with  Borne, 
and  perhaps  he  forgot  that  his  alliance  with  the  Gauls, 
the  common  enemies  of  all  Italy,  was  calculated  to  make 
his  friendship  suspected. 
Attitude  of      Not  in  Italy  alone,  but  also  beyond  the  confines  of  Italy, 
doniwtt^^'    *^®  Carthaginians  hoped  to  find  allies  for  an  attack  upon 
govern-       Bome.     Antigonus,  the  king  of  Macedonia,  watched  with 
™®°  '  uneasiness  the  aggressive  policy  of  the  Bomans,  and  their 

interference  in  the  affairs  of  the  Greek  states.  A  Boman 
party  in  these  states  could  not  but  be  hostile  to  Macedonia. 
It  was  natural,  therefore,  that  he  should  be  ready  to  op- 
pose the  Bomans.  He  had  already  instigated  Demetrius 
of  Pharos  to  the  war  with  Bome,  and  after  his  expulsion 
from  niyria  he  had  received  him  at  his  court,  and  refiised 
to  surrender  him  to  the  Bomans.  Messengers  went  back- 
wards and  forwards  between  Macedonia  and  Carthage, 
and  Hannibal  was  justified  in  hoping  that  the  first  great 
victory  would  secure  his  active  co-operation  in  a  war  with 
Bome. 
ProTisioiiB  These  plans,  negotiations,  and  preparations  occupied 
^ii»rf  r  Hannibal  during  the  period  from  the  winter  of  219  to 
the  defence  218  B.C.  He  had,  moreover,  to  provide  for  the  military 
and  Africa,  defence  of  Spain  and  Africa  during  his  absence.  He  sent 
a  body  of  15,000  Spaniards  to  Carthage,  and  an  equal 
force  of  Libyans  from  Africa  to  Spain,  making  the  troops 
serve  at  the  same  time  as  hostages  to  guarantee  the 
fidelity  of  their  countrymen.  On  the  approach  of  winter 
he  had  allowed  his  Spanish  troops  to  go  home  on  furlough, 
feeling  sure  that  they  would  be  the  more  ready  to  join 
him  again  for  the  following  campaign  in  spring.  The 
plunder  of  Saguntum  had  stimulated  their  eagerness  to 
serve  under  the  Carthaginian  general,  and  they  were 
ready  to  try  again  the  fortune  of  war  under  such  a 
victorious  and  liberal  leader. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  165 

When  in  the  spring  ^  of  218  B.C.,  Hannibal  had  again     CHAP, 
collected  his  army  and  made  all  the  necessary  prepara- 


tions, he  set  out  on  his  march  from  New  Carthage,  rather  p^^^ 
later,  it  may  be  supposed,  than  he  had  originally  intended  218-216 
— ^in  the  beginning  of  summer.*  His  force  consisted  of  ^'^' 
ninety  thousand  foot,  twelve  thousand  horse,  and  thirty-  ^^^u^i 
seven  elephants.'  Until  he  reached  the  Ebro,  his  road  from  New 
passed  through  the  territory  of  tribes  that  had  already  2irB^®* 
submitted  to  Carthage.  But  the  land  between  the  Ebro 
and  the  Pyrenees  was  inhabited  by  independent  and 
hostile  peoples,  who  resisted  the  advance  of  the  Carthagi- 
nian army.  Hannibal,  who  had  no  time  to  lose,  sacrificed 
a  considerable  portion  of  his  army  for  the  purpose  of 
quickly  forcing  his  way  through  this  country,  and  he 
succeeded  in  his  plan,  at  the  cost  of  losing  twenty 
thousand  men.  Having  reached  the  Pyrenees,  he  left  his 
brother  Hasdrubal  and  ten  thousand  men  to  defend  the 
newly  conquered  territory.  An  equal  number  of  Spanish 
soldiers  he  dismissed  to  their  homes,  finding  that  they 
were  reluctant  to  accompany  him,  and  preferring  to  take 
with  him  a  smaller  army  of  chosen  and  devoted  warriors 
than  a  large  discontented  host.  Thus  his  forces  were  re- 
duced to  fifty  thousand  foot  and  nine  thousand  horse  with 
the  elephants,  when  he  crossed  the  Pyrenees  by  some  pass 
near  the  Mediterranean,  apparently  without  encountering 
any  serious  diflBiculty.  The  Gaulish  tribes  living  between 
the  Pyrenees  and  the  Rhone  did  not  oppose  the  march. 
It  was  only  when  Hannibal  arrived  at  the  Ehone  that  he 
encountered  any  resistance.  The  Grauls  in  that  part  of 
the  country  had  assembled  a  force  on  the  left,  or  eastern, 
bank  of  the  river,  and  endeavoured  to  prevent  the  passage. 
Hannibal  was  obliged  to  halt  a  few  days  before  he  could 
cross.  He  sent  a  detachment  under  Hanno  higher  up 
the  river  to  an  undefended  place,  where  they  crossed 
without  difficulty  on  rapidly  constructed  rafts  ;  meanwhile 
he  collected  all  the  vessels  that  could  be  procured,  caused 

»  Polybius,  iii.  34,  §  6. 

*  PolybiuB,  V.  1,  §  3 :  ipx'^f^*^'  ^'  O^p^tas.  *  Polybiua,  iii.  35. 


166  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     trees  to  be  felled  and  hollowed  out  for  canoes,  and  when, 

> r^ '   on  the  third  day,  the  fire  signals  of  Hanno  annoonced  that 

he  had  arrived  in  the  rear  of  the  Ganls,  he  forced  the 
passage.  The  Grauls,  attacked  in  front  and  rear,  made  no 
long  resistance.  On  the  fifth  day  after  his  arrival  on  the 
Bhone,  Hannibal  had  gained  the  left  bank,  and  caused  the 
elephants  and  heavy  baggage  to  be  ferried  over  on  rafts, 
landing  of  The  passage  of  the  Rhone  was  not  yet  quite  accom- 
army  at  plished  when  intelligence  arrived  which  showed  that  the 
Mii88ilia.  utmost  dispatch  was  necessary,  unless  the  whole  plan  for 
the  ensuing  campaign  was  to  be  upset  at  the  very  begin- 
ning. A  Roman  army  had  landed  at  Massilia,  and  was 
now  only  four  days'  march  from  the  mouths  of  the  Rhone. 
A  collision  with  the  Romans  in  Gaul,  even  if  it  had  led  to 
the  most  brilliant  victory,  would  have  detained  Hannibal 
so  long  that  the  passage  of  the  Alps  would  have  been 
impossible  before  the  winter  had  set  in.  It  was  already 
the  beginning  of  October,  and  in  a  short  time  the  moun- 
tains would  be  impassable ;  and  if  the  Alps  were  not 
crossed  before  the  winter,  the  Romans  would  probably 
block  up  the  passes,  and  Africa,  instead  of  Italy,  would 
become  the  theatre  of  war. 
Inade-  The  Roman  embassy  which  had  demanded  satisfaction 

prepam-  in  Carthage  for  the  attack  on  Saguntum,  and  had  formally 
tions  of  declared  war,  had  not  been  dispatched  from  Rome,  as 
Romans,  might  have  been  expected,  immediately  after  the  fall  of 
Saguntum  in  the  course  of  the  year  219,  but  in  the  follow- 
ing spring.  The  same  slowness  which  the  Romans  had 
exhibited  in  their  diplomatic  action  they  showed  in  the 
actual  preparations  for  war.  They  had  evidently  no  con- 
ception of  Hannibal's  plan  for  the  ensuing  campaign,  nor 
of  the  rapidity  with  which  his  ardent  spirit  worked.  The 
Romans  flattered  themselves  with  the  idea  that  they 
would  be  able  to  choose  their  own  time  to  begin  hostilities, 
and  to  select  the  theatre  of  war.  They  waited  quietly  for 
the  return  of  the  ambassadors  from  Spain,  whither  they 
had  proceeded  from  Carthage,  for  the  purpose  of  making 
themselves  acquainted  with   the   state  of  afPairs  and  of 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  167 

encouraging  the  friends  of  Eome  to  persevere  in  their     CHAP, 
fidelity.     Then  the  two  customary  consular  armies  were  '   - 

levied  in  the  usual  manner ;  the  one  destined,  under  the     p^^^ 
command  ofTiberius  Sempronius  Longus,  to  be  sent  to    2i8-i2i6 
Sicily,  and  from  thence  to  cross  over  into  Afirica  to  attack       **^' 
the  Carthaginians  in  their  own  country ;  the  other,  under 
Publius  Cornelius  Scipio,  to  act  against  Hannibal  in  Spain. 
The  Bomans  hoped  to  carry  on  the  war  with  four  legions, 
little  thinking  that  twenty  would  not  suffice. 

Meanwhile  they  were  busily  engaged  in  completing  the  Rimng  of 
conquest  of  Northern  Italy.^  Two  new  strongholds,  the  o-aulH.*^ 
colonies  of  Placentia  and  Cremona,  had  been  established 
there  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  the  country  in  subjection. 
Each  of  them  had  received  a  garrison  of  six  thousand 
colonists.  Three  commissioners,  among  them  the  con- 
sular Lutatius,  who  had  gained  the  decisive  victory  at  the 
iBgatian  Islands  (in  241  B.C.),  were  engaged  in  assigning 
the  land  to  the  colonists,  and  in  making  the  necessary 
arrangements  for  the  administration  of  the  new  communi- 
ties, when  they  were  suddenly  surprised,  in  the  spring  of 
218  B.C.,  by  a  new  rising  of  the  Boians.*  These  people, 
who  saw  their  land  distributed  to  Roman  colonists,  felt  in 
the  highest  degree  alarmed  and  exasperated,  and  could 
not  restrain  their  impatience  nor  wait  for  the  arrival  of 
Hannibal.  They  fell  upon  the  colonists  in  different  parts 
of  the  country,  forced  them  to  take  refuge  in  the  fortified 
town  of  Mutina,'  and  laid  siege  to  the  town.  Under  the 
pretext  of  wishing  to  negotiate,  they  succeeded  in  inducing 
the  three  commissioners  to  come  out  of  the  town  for  a 
conference,  seized  them  treacherously,  and  held  them  as  a 
security  for  the  safety  of  the  hostages  which  they  had 
been  obliged  to  give  to  the  Bomans  on  the  conclusion  of 
peace. 

Upon   the  news  of  these  events,   the  prsetor  Lucius  Additional 

Roman 
>  We  prefer  calling  Gallia  Cisalpina  bj  the  name  used  in  the  text,  though,   levies. 

properly  speaking,  it  was  not  yet  included  in  the  term  Italy. 

•  Poly  bins.  iii.  40. 

'  Polybius  (iii.  40,  {  8)  calls  Mutina  a  Koman  colony.    This  is  a  mistake, 
for  it  was  not  till  183  b.c.  that  Mutina  was  made  a  colony  in  due  form. 


168 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Voyage 
and  march 
of  Scipio. 


Manlins,  who  commanded  a  legion  at  Ariminum,  marched 
in  all  haste  towards  Mntina;  but  he  was  surprised  in  the 
midst  of  the  dense  forests  which,  at  that  time,  covered 
those  plains/  was  repulsed  with  great  loss,  and  block- 
aded in  a  Tillage  called  Tanetum,  on  the  Po,  where  he 
threw  up  earthworks  for  his  defence.  Thus  the  whole-  of 
Northern  Italj  was  again  in  a  state  of  insurrection.  The 
Somans  had  not  succeeded  in  extinguishing  the  fire  in 
their  own  house  before  the  enemy  attacked  it  from  with- 
out. The  danger  within  was  even  more  alarming  than 
the  foreign  war,  which  might  possibly  be  delayed.  It  was 
therefore  resolved  at  Eome  to  send  the  two  recently  levied 
legions,  which  Scipio  was  to  have  led  into  Spain,  imme- 
diately to  the  Po,  and  to  raise,  in  their  place,  two  new 
legions  for  the  service  in  Spain  against  Hannibal.'  This 
measure  tended,  of  course,  to  delay  the  departure  of  Scipio 
considerably,  and  it  enabled  Hannibal  to  gain  a  start,  and 
to  carry  out  his  original  plan  of  avoiding  a  collision  with 
the  Romans  until  he  should  have  reached  Italy. 

When  at  length,  probably  late  in  the  summer  of  218  b.o.,' 

'  Livy,  xxi.  25:  'Silyse  tunc  circa  viam  erant,  plerisque  incultis.' 

•  Polybius,  iii.  40,  §   14.    According  to  Livy  (xxi.  26),  only  one  of  the 

two  legions  of  Scipio,  with  5,000  allies,  was  sent  to  reinforce  the  praetor 

C.  Manlius  in  Cisalpine  Gaul. 

'  Polybius  (iii.  41,  §  2)  says :  ol  9h  ffrpannrfoX  r&y  'Pw/udw^  ^roifuurdntyot  rh, 

This  statement,  vague  as  it  is  with  regard  to  time,  cannot  be  intended  to 
mean  that  both  consuls  left  Home  precisely  at  the  same  time.  Nothing 
prevented  the  departure  of  Sempronius  for  Sicily  as  soon  as  his  two  legions 
were  formed.  But  Scipio,  whose  legions  were  dispatched  to  the  Po,  was 
obliged  to  wait  until  new  legions  were  raised,  a  process  that  could  hardly  take 
less  than  one  or  two  months.  It  is  not  likely  that  during  all  this  time 
Sempronius  remained  idle  at  Rome,  merely  for  the  purpose  of  starting 
simultaneously  with  his  colleague  in  the  opposite  direction.  His  task  was 
quite  different  from  that  of  Scipio,  and  quite  independent  of  it.  He  intended 
to  cross  from  Sicily  into  Africa,  and  made  extensive  operations  to  carry  out 
this  enterprise  in  the  course  of  the  year  218  b.c.  (Polybius,  ibid.  §  3).  The 
expression  of  Polybius,  irwh  t^v  itpaUvj  is  therefore  no  sufficient  evidence  to 
show  that  Scipio,  as  Mommsen  says  {Rom.  Hist.  i.  585),  started  early  enough 
from  Home  to  reach  Massilia  by  the  end  of  June.  If,  as  appears  from  a 
comparison  of  dates,  Scipio  arrived  at  the  Rhone  about  the  middle  of  September, 
he  must  have  left  Rome  in  August ;  Sempronius  had  left  in  the  beginning  of 
«ummer  for  Sicily.  The  expression  dir^  r^v  &ptdav  may  therefore  be  vaguely 
applied  to  both  events. 


B.C. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  169 

Scipio's  legions  were  formed,  he  embarked  and  sailed  along     chap. 

the  coast  of  Etruria  and  Liguria  to  the  mouths  of  the  v.. ,  '-. 

Bhone,  on  his  way  to  Spain.  Bnt  on  reaching  Massilia  p^^ 
he  was  surprised  by  the  news  that  Hannibal,  whom  he  218-216 
expected  to  encounter  in  Spain,  had  crossed  the  Ebro  and 
the  Pyrenees,  and  was  on  his  march  towards  the  Bhone. 
This  was  the  first  intimation  which  the  Bomaus  had  of 
Hannibal's  plan.  But  even  yet  Scipio  was  in  doubt.  If 
Hannibal  intended  to  attack  Italy  from  the  north,  the 
coast  road  to  G^noa,  and  through  the  country  of  the 
Ligurians,  was  the  nearest.  Scipio  knew  not  for  certain 
that  Hannibal  intended  to  cross  the  Alps,  nor  which  pass 
he  would  choose.  To  make  sure  about  this  he  sent  a 
squadron  of  horse  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Bhone  to  look 
out  for  Hannibal.  If  he  had  arrived  in  Gaul  only  a  few 
days  earlier,  so  as  to  be  able  to  dispute  the  passage  of  the 
Bhone,  he  might  have  baffled  Hannibal's  plan.  As  it  was, 
his  horsemen  soon  met  a  party  of  Ifumidian  cavalry 
coming  down  the  river  to  reconnoitre.  A  skirmish  took 
place,  and  the  Bomans,  on  their  return,  boasted  that  they 
had  had  the  better  against  superior  numbers.  The  news 
they  brought  sufficed  to  show  that  Scipio  had  come  too 
late,  and  that  Hannibal  had  already  gained  the  left  bank 
of  the  river.  Nevertheless,  Scipio  marched  northwards 
with  his  whole  force,  hoping  perhaps  that  Hannibal  would 
turn  southwards  to  meet  him.  But  when  he  had  reached 
the  spot  where  Hannibal  had  crossed  the  Bhone,  and 
heard  that  the  Carthaginian  army  had  marched  towards 
the  interior  of  Gaul,  he  saw  that  it  was  useless  to  advance 
farther,  and  was  no  longer  doubtful  about  the  plan  of  his 
opponent  to  penetrate  across  the  Alps  into  Northern  Italy.' 
He  therefore  returned  forthwith  to  Massilia,  ordered  his 
brother  Cneius  to  continue  with  the  legions  the  voyage  to 
Spain,  and  returned  himself  with  a  small  detachment  to 

'  Polybius,  iii.  19,  }  1 :  i^tfUrBji  fi^y  &s  Mix^ioL  fjJXta-TOf  xcircur/i^yof 
M4ir<yr^  t»  abrobt  reXfi^ffcu  r^8«  iroiiia-atrBat  i^v  eis  *lra\Uuf  woptiay  .... 
BntpAp  tk  rvroXiutiKiraty  Mis  M  ras  povs  iiwtlyrro  k.t A.  Compare  Polybius, 
iii.  61,  {  5. 


170  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     Genoa,  whence  he  hastened  to  the  Po  to  take  the  command 


IV. 


.  of  the  troops  assembled  there,  and  to  attack  Hannibal 
immediately  after  his  descent  from  the  mountains. 
Boldness  Nothing  proves  more  the  boldness  and  grandeur  of 
domT/'  Hannibal's  enterprise  than  the  fact  that  the  Bomans  did 
Hannibal's  not  suspect  it  Until  he  had  all  but  reached  the  foot  of  the 
^  Alps.     In  spite  of  the  repeated  warnings  and  the  varied 

information  which  they  had  received  from  their  friends  in 
Spain,  from  the  Massaliots  and  the  neighbouring  Gauls, 
it  had  never  occurred  to  them  that  Hannibal  might 
possibly  venture  upon  such  a  plan.  It  was,  indeed,  well 
known  to  them  that  the  Alps  were  not  absolutely  im- 
passable. The  numerous  swarms  of  Gauls  that  had  in- 
vaded Italy  had  found  their  way  across  the  mountains. 
But  the  Gauls  dwelt  on  both  sides  of  the  Alps ;  they  were 
at  home  among  the  precipitous  rocks  and  the  snow  moun- 
tains ;  and  if  irregular  troops,  unencumbered  with  heavy 
baggage,  might  find  their  way  through  these  wild  regions, 
it  by  no  means  followed  that  an  amy  of  Spaniards, 
Libyans,  Numidian  horse,  and  even  elephants  would 
attempt  to  scale  those  mountain  walls,  where  they  would 
have  to  encounter  the  terrors  of  nature  and  of  hostile 
tribes  at  the  same  time.  When  Hannibal,  nevertheless, 
undertook  the  enterprise,  and  carried  it  to  a  successful 
end,  the  impression  he  produced  was  deep  and  lasting, 
and  the  exploit  was  looked  upon  as  hardly  short  of  mira- 
culous. Historians  delighted  in  painting  and  exaggerating 
the  obstacles  with  which  Hannibal  had  to  contend,  the 
savage  character  of  the  mountaineers  no  less  than  the 
terrors  of  nature.  Polybius*  censures  these  descriptions, 
which,  as  he  remarks,  tend  to  represent  Hannibal,  not  as 
a  wise  and  cautious  general,  but  as  a  reckless  adventurer. 
Before  carrying  out  his  plan,  says  Polybius,  he  made 
earefiil  inquiries  respecting  the  nature  of  the  country 
through  which  he  had  to  march,  the  sentiments  of  the 
inhabitants,  and  the  length  and  condition  of  the  road. 

*  PolybiuB,  iii.  47. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  171 

Hifl  conviction  that  the  enterprise  would  be  difficult  and     CHAP. 
dangerous,  bat  not  impossible,  was  justified  by  the  event.  .  ^^'  ^ 
But  it  seems  certain  that  if  Hannibal,  as  no  doubt  he     _^'*" 

Period 

expected,  had  been  able  to  commence  his  march  a  month    21 8-21 6 
earlier,   his  loss  in  crossing  the  Alps  would  have  been       ^•^• 
considerably  less. 

As  soon  as  Hannibal  had  the  whole  of  his  army,  in*  Hannibal 
elusive  of  the  elephants  and  the  baggage,  on  the  left  bank  ^jiobro- 
of  the  Bhone,  he  marched  northwards,  and  reached  in  gi&ns. 
four  days  the  confluence  of  the  Ehone  and  the  Isere.'     The 
country  lying  between  these  two  rivers  was  called  the 
^  Island,'  and  was  inhabited  by  the  Allobrogians,  one  of 
the    largest  and  bravest  Gallic  tribes.*     On  his  arrival 
Hannibal  found  the  natives  engaged  in  a  dispute  between 
two   brothers  for  the  chieftainship.      He  favoured  the 
claims  of  the  elder  brother,  and  by  his  interference  quickly 
settled  the  dispute,  gaining  thereby  the  fiiendship  and 
support  of  the  new  chief.     His  army  was  amply  supplied 
with  food,  shoes,  warm  clothing,  and  new  arms,  and  was 
accompanied  by  the  friendly  tribe  until  it  reached  the 
foot  of  the  Alps. 

It  is,  even  to  the  present  day,  an  unsolved  question  by  Passage  of 
which  road  Hannibal  marched  to  and  across  the  Alps,  ^  ^    ^"* 
although  Folybius  describes  it  at  full  length,  and  was 
well    qualified  to  do   so,  having,  only  fifty  years  after 
Hannibal,  travelled  over  the  same  ground,  with  a  view  of 

*  It  appears  from  this  that  Hannibal  must  have  crossed  the  Khone  about 
half  way  between  the  sea  and  the  Isere.  But  it  has  not  been  possible  to 
identify  the  exact  spot.  It  appears  that  the  most  likely  place  is  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Roquemaure. — See  Qttarterli/  Review,  vol.  cxxiii.  p.  198. 

'  It  is  perhaps  doubtful  if  in  Hannibars  time  the  AUobroges  dwelt  in  the 
more  level  part  of  the  country  between  the  Bhone  and  Isere,  to  the  west  of 
the  higher  mountains.  Polybius  does  not  mention  the  name  of  the  in- 
habitants of  the  *  Island ; '  but  he  opposes  them  to  the  AUobroges  who 
molested  Hannibal*B  march  as  soon  as  he  reached  the  Alps.  We  might  never- 
th«>les8  assume  that  the  lowlanders  belonged  to  the  same  race  as  the  AUobroges 
of  the  mountains,  and  that  the  latter  formed  independent  communities.  But 
the  narrative  of  Polybius  (especially  iii.  49,  §  13)  tallies  far  better  with  the 
assumption  that  Hannibal's  friends  in  the  western  part  of  the  '  Island '  were 
not  AUobroges. 


172 


ROMAN  msTony. 


BOOK 
IV. 


giving  a  description  of  it  in  his  great  historical  work.^ 
But  the  descriptions  which  the  ancient  writers  give  of 
localities  are,  for  the  most  part,  exceedingly  defective  and 
obscure.  Even  from  Caesar's  own  narrative  we  cannot 
make  out  with  certainty  where  he  crossed  the  Bhine  and 
the  Thames,  and  where  he  landed  on  the  coast  of  Britain* 
The  imperfect  geographical  knowledge  possessed  by  the 
ancients,  their  erroneous  notions  of  the  form  and  extent 
of  countries,  of  the  direction  of  rivers  and  mountain- 
ranges  with  regard  to  the  four  cardinal  points,^  in  some 
measure  account  for  these  inaccuracies.  Not  being  accus- 
tomed, from  their  youth  upwards,  to  have  accurate  maps 
before  their  eyes,  they  grew  up  with  indistinct  conceptions, 
and  were  almost  accustomed  to  a  loose  and  incorrect 
mode  of  expression  when  speaking  of  such  matters.' 
But  it  seems  that,  apart  from  this  imperfect  knowledge 
of  geography,  they  lacked  the  keen  observation  of  nature 
which  distinguishes  the  modems.  As  they  seem  all  but 
insensible  to  the  beauties  of  landscapes,  they  were  careless 
in  the  examination  and  study  of  nature ;  and  their  de- 
scriptions of  scenery  are  seldom  such  that  we  can  draw  an 
accurate  map  or  picture  after  them,  or  identify  the 
localities  at  the  present  time.  Moreover,  the  permanent 
features    of    landscapes — ^the    mountains,  rivers,    glens, 

'  According  to  Appian  (rii.  4),  the  pass  hj  which  Hannibal  crossed  was 
afterwards  called  the  Pass  of  Hannibal  (koI  Kokweu  ilo^os  *Ayytj3ov).  If  this 
statement  is  true,  the  designation  most  have  been  invented  at  a  very  late 
period,  and  was  based  on  mere  conjectures.  Neither  Polybius  nor  even  Livy 
knew  anything  of  it.  In  Livy's  time  the  question  was  already  controversial, 
and  he  would  no  doubt  have  referred  to  the  designation  as  an  argument,  if  he 
had  known  it. 

'  Thus  (iii.  47.  §  2)  Polybius  fiincies  the  source  of  the  Khone  to  be  due 
north  of  the  Adriatic,  and  its  course  from  east  to  west  Livy*8  account  of 
Hannibal*s  marches  in  Italy  is  frequently  confused  and  at  variance  with 
geographical  facts  (Livy,  xxii.  3).  Appian  (vi.  6)  makes  the  Ebro  flow  into 
the  Atlantic,  and  places  Saguntum  between  the  Ebro  and  the  Pyrenees. 

'  What  can  be  more  vague  than  such  expressions  as  9v<rx»piai  and  etficaipoc 
r^roi,  which  Polybius  uses  (iii.  50,  §  3).  Again,  when  he  describes  a  locality 
as  situated  fji^ra^h  rov  HciSotf  irot  rod  Tptfila  iroroftoi),  he  loaves  it  undecided 
whetlier  it  is  on  the  right  or  the  left  bank  of  the  Trebia,  and  thus  he  has 
given  rise  to  the  controversy  about  the  situation  of  the  battle-field  in  question. 
See  below,  p.  189,  note  2. 


TUE  SEeONB  PUNIC  WAE.  178 

lakes,  and  plains — had  seldom  names  universally  known     CHAP, 
and  generally  eurren V  as  is  the  case  at  present ;  nor  were         ,    _  - 
there  accurate    measurements  of   distances,  heights  of    j£™*J, 
mountains,  the  width  of  passes,  and  the  like.    Where,  in    218-216 
addition  to  these  defects,  there  were  even  wanting  human       ^^' 
habitations,  towns  or  villages  with  well-known  and  re<- 
cognisable  names,  it  became  impossible  to  describe  a 
route  like   that  of  Hannibal  across  the  Alps  with  an 
accuracy  that  excludes  all  doubts. 

Thus  it  has  happened  that  every  Alpine  pass,  from  that  G«og^plii- 
of  Mont  Genevre  to  the  Simplon,  has  in  turn  been  declared  ^y^jes 
to  have  been  the  one  by  which  Hannibal  crossed  into  Italy .^ 
Nobody  can  settle  this  question  satisfactorily  who  has  not 
travelled  over  every  pass  himself.  We  must  leave  this  inves- 
tigation to  an  Alpine  traveller  with  sufficient  leisure  and  en- 
thusiasm, and  meanwhile  confine  ourselves,  under  the  guid- 
ance of  Poly  bins,  the  oldest  and  most  trustworthy  witness, 
to  find  a  road  which  has  possibility  and  probability  in  its 
favour,  though,  perhaps,  absolute  certainty  is  unattainable. 

The  distances  given  by  Polybius  leave,  in  reality,  only  a  March  to 
doubt  whether  Hannibal  crossed  by  the  Little  St.  Bernard  g^*^^^® 
or  by  the  Mont  Cenis.'    It  is  becoming  now  more  and  narcL 

*  PolybiTis,  iii.  36,  §  2 :  *'?trriQw  V  chK  abrhs  rits  irofuurlas  r&¥  rSrwv  Koi 
wvn/A&y  Koi  v6\H»y  Sircp  tvioi  iroiowrt  rHy  (rvyypap4vy  ^oKofifidvoym  kv  irtwrl 
vphs  yv&viv  Kol  trcb^v^uuf  odnortX\s  cfvcu  rovro  rh  fx^pos,  OJfuu  8*  M  fiky 
yrvpiCofi4tfwr  r6Tmv  oh  fUKpd,  fitydKa  8)  W^t«c  wphs  h^dfun/itriif  ^  r&y  iroftdrwp 
vapiB^civ  M  S)  rSiv  kytfooufidww  us  t4Xos  6ntUa9  lx<'  ''^'^  S^rafur  ^  r&0 
ht^ofidrtty  i^iiy^ffis  rms  ^topo^ots  Ktd  KpovafioTiKais  A^(c<rty. 

'  Eren  Liry  (xxi.  38)  notices  the  contradictory  opinions  and  donbts  of  the 
historians,  and  expresses  his  astonishment  at  them,  as,  in  his  opinion,  the 
question  should  be  decided  by  the  testimony  of  L.  Cincius  Alimentus,  who 
professed  to  have  heard  from  Hannibal  himself  that,  on  descending  from  the 
Alps,  he  came  into  the  country  of  the  Taun'ni — a  statement  in  which  all 
historians  agreed.  But,  in  spite  of  Livy's  confidence.  Polybius  makes  a  dififerent 
statement.  Moreover,  the  authority  of  Cincius  is  very  questionable,  as,  in 
giving  the  strength  of  Hannibal's  army  with  which  he  crossed  the  Alps,  he 
includes  the  Gauls  and  Ligurians  that  joined  him  near  the  river  Po. 

'  Hence  the  route  by  the  Great  St.  Bernard  and  that  by  tbe  Simplon  are 
altogether  out  of  the  question.  The  Great  St.  Bernard,  it  seems,  would  never 
have  been  thought  of  if  the  Alps  in  that  neighbourhood  had  not  been  called 
the  Pennine  range.  This  name  was  supposed  to  be  derived  from  the  Pceni  or 
Carthaginians.  By  a  similar  etymological  ingenuity,  the  Graian  Alps  were 
said  to  be  the  locality  where  the  Greek  (Grains)  Hercules  crossed. 


174  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  more  the  universal  opinion  that  Hannibal  made  use  of  the 
.-  /  _.  former  of  these  two  routes.  This  was  the  usual  road  by 
which  the  Gallic  tribes  in  the  valley  of  the  Po  communi- 
cated with  their  countrymen  in  Transalpine  Graul.  By 
this  pass  alone  they  could  obtain  auxiliaries,  as  they  often 
did  from  beyond  the  Alps ;  for  the  territory  of  the  Salas- 
sians,  their  friends  and  allies,  extended  to  the  foot  of  this 
pass  on  the  Italian  side,  whilst  the  Mont  Cenis  pass  led 
into  the  country  of  their  enemies,  the  Ligurian  tribe  of 
the  Taurini.^  The  guides  whom  the  Insubrians  had  sent 
to  Hannibal,  and  who  had  promised  to  conduct  him  by  a 
safe  road,  could  not  possibly  advise  him  to  take  the  road 
of  Mont  Cenis.  It  seems  therefore  highly  probable  that 
Hannibal  marched  over  the  pass  of  the  Little  St.  Bernard. 
But  now  another  difficulty  arises,  viz.,  that  of  determining 
by  which  road  he  reached  this  pass  from  the  *  Island '  of 
the  Allobrogians.  The  shortest  and  easiest  way  seems  to 
be  that  along  the  river  Isere,  which  leads  almost  to  the 
foot  of  the  pass.  But  the  distances  given  by  Polybius  are 
at  variance  with  this  route  ;*  and,  moreover,  when  he  says 
that  Hannibal  marched  ^  along  the  river,*  he  can  only 
have  meant  the  Rhone,'  and  not  the  Isere.  It  seems 
therefore  the  most  probable  view,  that  Hannibal  followed 
the  course  of  the  Ehone,  avoiding,   however,  the  sharp 

'  Polybius,  iii.  44,  §  7. 

•  Polybius,  iii.  61,  §  1.  The  800  stadia  to  the  ascent  of  the  Alps,  it 
appears,  must  be  computed  from  the  point  where,  after  a  four  days'  march 
along  the  Khone  (iii.  49,  §  5),  Hannibal  reached  the  '  Island  ; '  and  this  agrees 
with  the  statement  (iii.  39,  §  9)  which  makes  the  distance  between  the  place 
of  crossing  the  Bhone  to  the  ascent  of  the  Alps  to  be  1,400  stadia.  If 
Hannibal  had  marched  along  the  Isere,  the  800  stadia  would  have  taken  him 
considerably  beyond  Grenoble ;  and  yet  this  is  the  only  place  where  he  could 
find  the  ^wrx^picu  mentioned  by  Polybius  as  favouring  the  attacks  of  the 
mountaineers. 

■  This  expression  iraph  rhv  T0Tafi6v  must,  however,  not  be  taken  literally, 
as  the  Rhone  makes  a  sharp  angle  at  Lyons,  which  Hannibal  no  doubt  cut  off; 
but  it  is,  on  the  whole,  not  inappropriate — at  least,  not  more  so  than  the  com- 
parison of  the  *  Island '  with  a  triangle  similar  to  the  Egyptian  Delta.  If 
Polybius  had  only  taken  the  trouble  to  designate  the  spot  where  Hannibal 
left  the  valley  of  the  Rhone,  almost  all  doubts  would  have  been  removed.  But 
he  says  not  a  wozd  about  it.    Compare  above,  p.  172,  note  3. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  175 

bondings,  until  lie  reached  the  spot  where  the  mountains     CHAP, 
of  Savoy  (the  Mont  du  Chat)  approach  the  river — that  he  .^    ,  '_. 
crossed  this  chain  of  mountainsy  and  marched  past  the  pre-     xZ^f^ 
sent  town  of  Chambery  in  a  southern  direction  until  he    218-216 
reached  the  Isere  again  at  Montmelian,  and  followed  its       ^'^' 
course  to  the  foot  of  the  Little  St.  Bernard.^ 

For  ten  days  the  army  marched  over  level  ground  Hostility 
without  encountering  any  difficulty.  The  AUobrogian  xnoim- 
chiefs,  who,  as  it  seems,  were  not  averse  to  plunder,  dreaded  taineers. 
the  cavalry  of  Hannibal  and  his  Gaulish  escort.  But 
when  the  latter  had  returned  home,  and  Hannibal  entered 
the  defiles  of  the  mountains,  he  found  the  road  blocked  up 
by  the  mountaineers  in  a  place  where  force  could  avail 
nothing.^  He  was  informed  by  his  guides  that  the  enemy 
were  accustomed  to  keep  the  heights  guarded  only  by  day, 
and  to  retire  in  the  night  to  their  neighbouring  town.  He 
therefore  caused  his  light-armed  troops  to  occupy  the  pass 
in  the  night.  The  attacks  of  the  barbarians,  who  returned 
on  the  following  day  and  harassed  the  slowly  advancing 
long  line  of  march,  were  repulsed  without  much  difficulty. 
Yet  Hannibal  lost  a  number  of  beasts  of  burden  and  a  good 
deal  of  his  baggage,  the  latter  being  no  doubt  the  principal 
object  of  the  barbarians.  Fortunately  many  of  the  animals 
and  some  prisoners  were  recovered  in  the  town  which  lay 
near  the  pass,  and  which  contained  also  provisions  for  a 
few  days.' 

>  This  Tiew  is  supported  by  Cramer  and  Wickbam  {Dissertation  on  the 
Passage  of  Hannibal  over  the  AlpSt  1820),  and  lately  again  confirmed  by 
W.  J.  Law  {Quarterly  Review^  vol.  czxiii.  art.  8).  The  only  doubt  suggested 
by  this  theory  is  the  crossing  by  Hannibal  of  the  Mont  dn  Chat  near  Cheyeln. 
On  this  road  Hannibal  would  have  passed  by  the  Lake  of  Bourget.  Is  it 
likely  that  Polybius  would  not  have  mentioned  this  lake?  This  difiSculty 
would  be  lemoved  if  we  might  suppose  that  Hannibal  reached  the  mountains 
and  the  first  hwrxj^picu  at  the  town  of  Les  Echelles.  But  I  am  not  aware 
whether  in  that  locality  there  is  a  road  practicable  for  horses  and  elephants. 

*  This  locality  was,  according  to  Cramer  and  Wickham,  in  the  Chevelu  Pass 
over  the  Mont  du  Chat. 

'  Polybius  does  not  mention  its  name ;  and,  if  he  had  been  able  or  willing 
to  do  so,  it  would  have  been  to  his  readers  one  of  the  hliw6ni\joi  kcX  KpowyMn- 
icol  Xi^M  (iii.  36,  %  3),  i.«.  gibberish ;  they  would  not  have  been  any  the 
wiser.    If  Hannibal's  march  went  over  the  Mont  du  Chat,  the  town  was  the 


176  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  Having  given  his  troops  one  day  of  rest,  Hannibal  con- 
.  •  -  tinned  his  marcli.  On  the  fourth  day  the  natives  met  him 
Treachery  ^^^  branches  of  trees  in  their  hands  as  a  sign  of  friend- 
of  the  liness,  and  requested  him  to  march  through  their  land 
without  doing  them  any  injury.  They  brought  cattle,  and 
offered  hostages  as  proofs  of  their  sincerity.  Hannibal 
suspected  that  all  these  signs  of  devotion  were  insincere, 
and  intended  to  lull  him  into  security.  Therefore,  though 
he  accepted  their  offers,  he  provided  against  treachery, 
sent  his  baggage  and  cavalry  in  advance,  and  covered  the 
march  with  his  infantry.  Thus  the  cumbersome  portion 
of  the  army  passed  through  the  most  difficult  places,  and 
was  in  tolerable  security,  when,  on  the  third  day,  the  faith- 
less barbarians  rushed  to  the  attack,  rolled  and  threw 
stones  from  both  sides  of  the  narrow  pass,  and  killed  a 
great  number  of  men  and  animals.  Hannibal  was  com- 
pelled to  spend  a  night  away  from  his  baggage  and 
cavalrv.^  But  this  was  the  last  time  that  the  mountaineers 
seriously  attempted  to  obstruct  his  march.  From  this 
time  forward  they  ventured  only  on  isolated  acts  of 
plunder,  and  soon  afber  Hannibal  reached  the  summit 
of  the  pass,  on  the  ninth  day  afber  he  had  commenced  the 
ascent. 
Descent  of  It  was  now  nearly  the  end  of  October,  and  the  ground 
^**  was  already  covered  with  fresh  fallen  snow.*  No  wonder 
that  the  men  born  under  the  burning  sun  of  Africa,  or  in 
the  genial  climate  of  Spain,  felt  their  hearts  sink  within 
them  in  those  chill  and  dreary  regions,  when  they  mea- 
sured the  hardships  that  still  awaited  them  with  those 
which  they  had  endured.'     Hannibal  endeavoured  to  raise 

present  Bourget ;  if  it  went  by  Les  Echelles,  it  was  Chambery ;  whereas,  if 
Hannibal  followed  all  along  the  Isere,  it  was  Cularo,  afterwards  <»Ued 
G-ratianopolis.  now  Grenoble. 

*  Polybius,  iii.  63,  {  6 :  irepf  tj  XcvK^crpof  hx^v.  Whether  this  was  a 
vnihiU  Tock^  the  Roche  Blanche,  which  is  at  the  foot  of  the  pass  over  the 
Little  St  Bernard,  or  whether  it  is  simply  an  ordinary  bare  rock,  I  dare  not 
decide. 

■  Polybius,  iii.  64,  §  1. 

'  Polybius,  loc.  cit. :  rit  rkii$7i  9v<r$6ftMS  9uucttfi9va  ical  Si&  i^y  irpo7t7cin|fi^inf» 
raXcuwmpituf  kcU  itik  r^p  In  vpoo9oKWfi4imiy. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE. 


177 


their  courage  by  directing  their  eyes  towards  Italy,  which 
lay  expanded  at  their  feet  like  a  promised  land,  the  goal 
of  their  hopes  and  the  reward  of  their  perseverance.  Then, 
after  a  rest  of  two  days,  the  downward  march  began.  This 
was  no  further  molested  by  any  hostile  attack ;  but  the 
obstacles  which  nature  presented  were  greater.  The  snow 
covered  dangerous  places,  and,  breaking  under  the  feet  of 
the  men,  hurled  many  into  precipices.  One  portion  of  the 
road  had  been  made  impassable,  and  was  partly  broken 
away,  by  avalanches.  In  the  attempt  to  pass  by  a  side-way 
over  a  glacier,*  the  tramp  of  the  army  soon  reduced  the 
recent  snow  to  a  slush,  and  on  the  ice  which  was  under  the 
snow  the  men  slipped,  whilst  the  horses  broke  through  with 
their  hoofs  and  remained  fixed  in  it.  Hannibal  was  obliged 
to  halt,  and  to  repair  the  broken  part  of  the  road.*  The 
whole  army  was  set  to  work,  and  thus  one  day  sufficed 
to  restore  the  road  sufficiently  for  horses  and  beasts  of 
burden  to  pass.  But  three  more  days  passed  before  the 
Nuinidians  succeeded  in  making  the  road  broad  and  firm 
enough  for  the  elephants.  When  at  length  this  last 
obstacle  was  overcome,  the  army  passed  from  the  region 
of  snow  into  the  lower  and  gentler  slopes,  and  in  three 
more  days  it  encamped  at  the  foot  of  the  Alps. 

Thus,  at  length,  Hannibal  accomplished  his  task,  but  at 
a  cost  which  made  it  doubtful  whether  it  would  not  have 
been  wiser  never  to  have  undertaken  it.  Of  the  59,000 
chosen  warriors  who  had  marched  from  Spain,  not  less 
than  33,000  had  been  carried  oflF  by  disease,  fatigue,  or 
the  sword  of  the  enemy.     Only  12,000  Libyan  and  8,000 

*  What  Polybius  dcacribes  (iii.  65)  appears  to  have  been  nothing  but  a 
glacier.  Whether  a  glacier  exists,  or  formerly  existed,  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
pass,  and  in  what  locality,  is  a  question  to  be  decided  by  members  of  an 
Alpine  Club. 

'  On  this  occasion  the  rocks,  according  to  Livy  (xxi.  37),  were  softened  by 
fire  and  vinegar.  What  are  we  to  think  of  such  a  story,  which  looks  almost 
like  a  joke  ?  The  effect  of  vinegar  on  heated  rocks  may  be  tried  by  experiment ; 
but  even  if  it  should  turn  out  to  be  what  Livy  says,  how  are  we  to  imagine 
Hannibal  in  possession  of  such  a  quantity  of  vinegar?  Nor  can  it  have  been 
easy  to  obtain  trunks  of  trees  (arboribus  circa  immanibus  deiectis  detnm- 
catisque)  in  the  region  of  snow  and  ice. 

VOL.  II.  N 


CHAP. 

vm. 

First 
Period, 
218-216 

B.C. 


Condition 
ofHan*   . 
nibal's 
army. 


178  ROMAIC  HISTORY. 

BOOK     Spiwish  foot  and  6,000  horsemen  had  reached  the  spot 

>,    ,  ■ '   where  the  real  struggle  was  not  to  end,  but  to  begin. 

And  these  men  were  in  a  condition  that  might  have  in- 
spired even  enemies   with  pity.      Countless   suflferings, 
miseries,  wounds,  hunger,  cold,  disease  had  deprived  them 
almost  of  the  appearance  of  human  beings,  and  had  bruta- 
Used  them  in  body  and  mind.^     With  our  admiration  of 
Hannibal's  genius  mingles  an  involuntary  astonishment 
that  he  thought  the  object  which  he  had  gained  worthy 
of  such  a  price,  and  that,  in  spite  of  his  losses,  he  was  able 
to  justify  the  wisdom  of  his  determination  by  the  most 
brilliant  success.     It  is  not  easy  to  banish  the  suspicion 
that  Hannibal  anticipated  less  difficulty  in  the  passage  of 
the  Alps  than  he  encountered.     Though  the  attacks  of 
the  mountaineers  were  probably  not  so  serious  as  they  are 
represented,  yet  they  added  materially  to  the  losses  of  the 
army.*     No  doubt  Hannibal   was  justified  in  expecting 
that  these  tribes  would  receive  him  as  the  friend  and  ally 
of  their  countrymen  on  the  Po,  and  we  may  suppose  that 
they  had  formally  promised  to  assist  instead  of  obstructing 
the  passage.     We  are  at  a  loss  to  account  for  their  hos- 
tility.    Perhaps  their  only  object  was  plunder.     The  ob- 
structions thus  caused  were  the  more  serious  as  Hannibal 
was  too  late  in  the  season  for  crossing  the  mountains  easily. 
But  it  is  impossible  to  determine  the  cause  of  this  delay 
— whether  Hannibal's  departure  from  New  Carthage  was 
postponed  unduly ;  whether  the  campaign  between  the 
Ebro  and  the  Pyrenees,  or  the  passage  of  these  mountains, 
or  the  march  through  Gaul,  or  the  crossing  of  the  Ehone 
and  the  transactions  with  the  Allobrogians  detained  him 
longer  than  he  had  calculated;   or  whether,  in  spite  of 
all  his  inquiries,  he  had  no  correct  knowledge  of  the 
distances   and  the  difficulties  of  the  road.     But  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the   cold,  added  to  the  fatigue  of 

'  Polybius,  ill.  60,  {  6 :  Of  -yf  fiV  fru04n^f  ited  reus  ^upw^iws  itol  Tp  Aocv^ 
•  Polybius,  iii.  60,  §{  3,  4. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  179 

mountain-climbing  among  ice  and  snow,  was  more  per-     CHAP, 
nicious  to  bis  men  tban  anything  else.     A   march   of 


fifteen  days  under  the  weight  of  arms  and  baggage,  p^^^ 
oyer  the  highest  and  steepest  mountains  of  Europe,  and  218-216 
on  such  roads  as  the  tramp  of  men  and  animals  alone,  ^*^* 
without  any  engineering  skill,  had  made,  and  fifteen 
nights'  bivouac  where  even  in  October  piercing  cold  winds 
sweep  down  from  the  snow-fields  and  glaciers,  were  alone 
sufficient  to  destroy  an  army.  What  must  have  been  the 
fate  of  those  who  fell  down  fi:om  exhaustion,  or  were  left 
behind  wounded  or  diseased  ?  Nothing  is  said  in  this  nar- 
rative (and  very  rarely  at  any  other  time  in  the  accounts 
of  ancient  warfare)  of  the  sick  and  wounded.  No  doubt 
every  serious  woand  or  illness  caused  death,  especially  on 
a  march  where  even  vigorous  men  experience  difficulty  in 
keeping  pace  with  their  comrades.  Becent  events  have 
shown  that  the  care  of  the  sick  and  wounded  in  war  is  a 
very  late  and  a  very  imperfect  product  of  civilisation  and 
philanthrophy. 

The  army  required  a  few  days  to  recover  from  their  Hannibal 
fatigue  before  Hannibal  could  venture  to  begin  the  cam-  55^.* 
paign,  at  a  season  when,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  nians. 
the  time  for  winter-quarters  had  arrived.     He  then  turned 
against  the  Taurinians,  a  Ligurian  tribe  which  was  hostile 
to  the  Insubrians,  and  had  rejected  his  proffered  alliance.' 
In  three  days  their  chief  town  was  taken,  their  fighting 
men  cut  down,^  and  it  was  made  evident  t*o  all  their  neigh- 
bours that  they  had  only  to  choose  between  destruction  and 
the  Carthaginian  alliance.     In  consequence  of  this,  all  the 
tribes   in  the  upper  valley    of    the  Po,   Ligurians    as 
well  as  Gauls,  joined  Hannibal.     The  tribes  living  further 
eastward  still  hesitated,  from  fear  of  the  Soman  armies 
that   occupied  their  country.'      Hannibal,   in   order  to 
enable  them  to  join  him,  found  it  necessary  to  march 

'  According  to  Appian,  Tiii.  6 :  robs  cdxiiak^ovs  iff^a^w  is  KoriMXri^iy  rtis 

*  PolybioB,  iii.  60,  §  12  :  rufh  M  koI  (rwrrpar^of  ^trayKdCorro  rois  *P»fudois, 

N  2 


180  ROMAX  HISTORY. 

BOOK     immediatelj  against  the  Bomans,  and  to  force  them  to 
^     /  ^  accept  a  battle. 

Alleged  We  may  presume  that  it  was  hardly  necessary  for 

Hannibal  Hannibal  to  urge  his  soldiers  to  bravery.  Their  conduct 
for  the  en-  up  to  this  time  was  a  sufficient  guarantee  for  the  future. 
mAt  of'his  Nevertheless,  as  we  are  told,*  Hannibal  placed  before  their 
Boldieps.  QjQQ  ^  spectacle  to  show  that  death  has  no  terrors  for  a 
man  if  death  or  victory  is  the  only  chance  of  deliverance 
from  unendurable  evils.  Before  the  assembled  army  he 
asked  his  Gallic  prisoners  if  they  were  prepared  to  fight 
with  one  another  unto  the  death,  provided  that  liberty  and 
splendid  arms  were  the  reward  of  victory.  When  with 
one  voice  they  all  professed  themselves  ready  to  stake  life 
for  freedom,  Hannibal  selected  by  lot  several  pairs  of 
combatants.  These  fought,  fell  or  conquered  like  heroes, 
and  were  envied  by  those  of  their  companions  who  had  not 
been  fortunate  enough  to  be  selected.  Thus  wretched 
barbarian  captives  showed  what  can  be  expected  of  soldiers 
fighting  for  the  highest  prize,  and  Hannibal's  men  were 
not  disposed  to  yield  to  them  in  military  spirit. 
March  and  It  would  almost  appear  that  the  issue  of  the  first  Punic 
Scipio.  war  had  produced  among  the  Romans  a  feeling  of  supe- 
riority over  the  Carthaginians.  They  had  no  conception 
of  the  change  that  had  taken  place  in  the  Carthaginian 
•  army,  and  that,  instead  of  Gallic  mercenaries,  Libyan  and 
Spanish  subjects  and  allies  formed  now  the  principal 
strength  of  their  old  enemies.  Of  course  they  were  still 
more  ignorant  of  the  military  genius  of  Hannibal.  They 
were  consequently  full  of  courage  and  confident  of  victory ; 
and  Scipio,  as  he  had  ventured  in  Gaul  to  advance  against 
Hannibal  with  an  inferior  force,  did  not  hesitate  now  to 
do  the  same.  Prom  Placentia  he  marched  westward  along 
the  left  bank  of  the  Po,  crossed  the  Ticinus,  and  found 
himself  suddenly  face  to  face  with  a  considerable  corps  of 
cavalry,  which  Hannibal,  advancing  on  the  same  bank 
down  the  river,  had  sent  before  the  main  body  of  his  army 

>  PolybinB,  iii.  62.    Dion  Cassias,  fr.  67,  4.    Li>7,  zxi.  42. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  181 

to  reconnoitre.     Thus  the  first  encounter  on  Italian  soil     CHAP, 
took  place  between  the  Po  and  the  Ticinns.     It  did  not  > — ,  *^ 
assume  the  dimensions  of  a  battle.     No  Eoman  infantry,     p^^^ 
except  the  light-armed  troops,  were  engaged ;    but  the    218-216 
conflict  was  severe,  and  terminated,  after  a  spirited  resist*       ^'^' 
ance,  in  a  decided  repulse  of  the  Romans.     Scipio  himself 
set  his  men  the  example  of  bravery.     Fighting  in  the 
foremost  ranks,  he  was  wounded,  and  owed  his  life  to  the 
heroism  of  his  son,  then  a  youth  of  seventeen  years,  but 
destined  to  become   the  conqueror  of  Hannibal,  and  to 
terminate  the  terrible  war  so  inauspiciously  opened  at 
the  Ticinus.*    After  this  check,  Scipio-  could  not  think  of 
venturing  on  a  regular  battle.     The  level  country  round 
about  was  too  favourable  for  the  superior  cavalry  of  the 
Carthaginians.    He  made  therefore  a  hasty  and  even  pre* 
cipitate  retreat,  sacrificing  a  detachment  of  600  men,  who 
covered  the  bridge  over  the  Po  until  it  was  destroyed  by 
the  retreating  army,  and,   less   fortunate  than  Horatius 
Codes  in  the  good  old  time,  were  all  made  prisoners  of 
war. 

In  order  to  cross  the  Po,  Hannibal  was  obliged  to  Passage  of 
ascend  its  bank  for  some  distance,  until  he  found  a  place 
where  the  elephants  and  the  cavalry  could  swim  the  stream, 
and  where  it  was  easy  to  construct  a  bridge  for  the  in- 
fantry. Then  he  advanced  towards  Placentia,  near  which 
city  the  consul  Scipio  had  constructed  a  fortified  camp. 
He  crossed,  as  it  appears,  the  small  river  Trebia,  which, 
running  down  from  the  Apennines  in  a  northerly  direc- 
tion, joins  the  Po  not  far  to  the  west  of  Placentia.  Thus 
the  two  armies  again  confronted  one  another,  and  Han- 
nibal was  anxious  to  bring  on  a  decisive  engagement, 
whilst  Scipio,  moderating  his  ardour  after  his  recent 
ill  success,  and  moreover  compelled  to  inactivity  by  his 
wound,  kept  within  his  lines.  It  was  most  fortunate  for 
the  Romans  that  they  had  completed  the  fortification  of 
Placentia  and  Cremona.     Without  these  two  strongholds 

*  Polybiug,x.  3.  Livy,  xxi.  46.  According  to  the  account  of  Coelius,  preserved 
by  Liyy  {loc.  cit.),  Scipio*8  life  was  saTed  by  a  Ligorian  slave. 


182  BOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  they  would,  after  Hannibal's  appearance,  have  been  un- 
•<s — r^ — '  able  to  keep  their  footing  in  the  valley  of  the  Po,  and  the 
Ganls  would  have  been  throughout  the  war  much  less 
hampered  in  their  offensive  operations  as  Hannibal's  allies, 
if  the  Boman  garrisons  in  those  two  fortresses  had  not 
kept  them  in  constant  alarm  for  the  safety  of  their  own 
country. 
Attitude  of  ^g  y^-^  ^j^g  Q-a^ils  had  not  unanimously  declared  them- 
tribes.  selves  for  Hannibal.  Most  of  them  were  ready  to  abandon 
the  cause  of  Kome,  others  wavered  in  their  fidelity,  a  few 
remained  steadfast  and  sent  auxiliaries.  But  Scipio  could 
not  rely  on  these  men.  In  one  night  more  than  2,000  of 
them  mutinied  in  the  Eoman  camp,  overpowered  the 
sentinels  at  the  gates,  and  rushed  out  to  join  Hannibal. 
They  were  received  kindly,  praised  for  their  conduct,  and 
dismissed  to  their  homes  with  great  promises  if  they 
would  persuade  their  countrymen  to  revolt  from  Rome. 
Hannibal  was  now  in  hopes  that  all  the  Gallic  tribes 
would  join  his  standard,  and  he  eagerly  wished  for  an 
opportunity  to  deal  the  Soman  army  a  decisive  blow, 
which  might  inspire  the  Gauls  with  confidence  in  his 
strength. 
Move-  Scipio,  on  his  side,  sought  to  avoid  a  conflict.     As  he 

the  Roman  did  not  feel  safe  enough  on  the  level  ground,  in  the  im- 
TeTbank  of  ^^^^^^^  viciuity  of  Placentia,  he  broke  up  his  camp  in 
the  Trebia.  the  night,  and,  using  the  utmost  silence,  marched  higher 
up  the  Trebia,  in  order  to  gain  a  more  favourable  locality 
for  a  camp  on  the  hills  which  form  the  last  spurs  of  the 
Apennines  running  northward  towards  the  Po.  As  Han- 
nibal's army  was  not  far  off,  this  movement  was  no  doubt 
hazardous,  especially  as  Scipio's  march  went  past  the  hostile 
camp.  In  spite  of  the  care  employed  to  avoid  noise,  the 
movement  of  the  Romans  was  perceived.  Hannibal's  horse- 
men were  immediately  at  their  heels,  and  had  they  not 
been  delayed  by  the  plunder  of  the  Boman  camp,  it  would 
have  been  difficult  for  Scipio  to  reach,  without  great  loss, 
the  left,  or  western,  bank  of  the  Trebia,  and  there  to  fortify 
a  new  camp.     As  it  was,  he  succeeded  in  gaining  a  strong 


THE.  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  18S 

position,  where  he  was  in  perfect  safety,  and  was  able  to     CHAP, 
await  the  arrival  of  his  colleague  Sempronius,  who,  with  ^     .  ^'_- 


his  army,  was  on  his  way  from  Sicily,  i^"^ 

As  we  have  seen  above,  Sempronius  had,  in  the  early  218-216 
part  of  the  summer,  sailed  with  two  legions  to  Sicily.  ^'^' 
Tn  that  province  he  had  made  preparations  for  a  landing  ^F^tions 
n  Africa,  but  had  been  detained  by  the  energy  with  which  nius  in 
he  Carthaginians  had  begun  hostilities  in  that  quarter.  ^^^^'  . 
Even  before  his  arrival,  a  Carthaginian  squadron  of 
twenty  vessels  of  war  had  appeared  in  the  Sicilian  waters. 
Three  of  them  had  been  driven  by  a  storm  into  the  Straits 
of  Messana,  and  had  been  captured  by  the  Syracusan 
fleet  with  which  the  old  king  Hiero  was  in  readiness  to 
join  the  Boman  consul.  From  the  prisoners,  Hiero  ascer- 
tained that  a  Carthaginian  fleet  was  on  its  way  to  surprise 
Lilybseum  and  to  promote  a  rising  of  the  Boman  subjects 
in  Sicily,  many  of  whom  regretted  the  change  of  masters, 
and  would  fain  have  returned  to  their  old  allegianoe.  This 
important  news  was  at  once  communicated  to  the  preetor, 
M.  ^milius,  who  at  that  time  commanded  in  Sicily; 
the  garrison  of  Lilybseum  was  warned,  and  the  Boman 
fleet  kept  in  readiness,  while  all  round  the  coast  a  strict 
look-out  was  kept  for  the  Carthaginians,  and  messengers 
were  dispatched  into  the  several  towns  to  enjoin  vigilance. 
Accordingly,  when  the  Punic  fleet,  consisting  of  thirty-five 
fsail,  approached  Lilybeeum,  it  found  the  Boman  garrison 
ready  to  receive  it.  There  was  no  chance  of  taking  the 
town  by  surprise.  The  Carthaginians  resolved,  therefore,  to 
ofler  battle  to  the  Boman  fleet,  and  drew  up  at  the  entrance 
of  the  port.  The  number  of  the  Boman  ships  is  not  given. 
Livy '  only  mentions  the  circumstance  that  they  were 
manned  with  better  and  more  numerous  troops  than  those 
of  the  Carthaginians.  The  latter,  therefore,  tried  to  avoid 
being  boarded,  and  relied  on  their  skill  in  using  the 
beaks  (rostra)  for  disabling  and  sinking  the  hostile  vessels. 
But  they  succeeded  only  in  a  single  instance,  whereas 

'  Livy,  xxi.  49. 


184  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  the  Boraans  boarded  several  of  their  vessels,  and  captured 
. — rL^  them,  with  their  crews,  amounting  to  1,700  men.  The 
rest  of  the  Carthaginian  ships  escaped.  Again  it  was 
shown  that  the  sea,  their  own  peculiar  element,  had 
become  unfavourable  to  the  Carthaginians;  whilst,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  genius  of  Hannibal  had  the  effect  of 
reversing  the  relative  strength  and  confidence  of  the  two 
nations  in  their  land  forces,  and  of  causing  the  superiority 
of  the  Boman  legions  over  the  Carthaginian  mercenaries 
to  be  forgotten. 
Zeal  of  Meanwhile,  Tiberius  Sempronius  had  arrived  in  Sicily 

Hiero.  with  his  fleet  of  one  hundred  and  sixty  sail  and  two 
legions,  and  had  been  received  by  King  Hiero  with  the 
respect  due  to  the  representative  of  the  majesty  of  Some. 
Hiero  placed  his  fleet  at  the  disposal  of  the  consul,  offered 
him  his  homage  and  his  vows  for  the  triumph  of  the 
Boman  people,  and  promised  to  show  himself  in  his  old 
age  as  faithful  and  persevering  in  the  service  of  the 
Boman  people  as  he  had  been  in  the  former  war,  when 
he  was  in  the  vigour  of  manhood.  He  promised  to  provide 
the  Boman  legions  and  crews,  at  his  own  expense,  with 
clothing  and  provisions,  and  then  reported  on  the  con- 
dition of  the  island  and  the  plans  of  the  Carthaginians. 
The  two  fleets  sailed  in  company  to  Lilybaeum.  They 
found  there  that  the  design  of  the  Carthaginians  on 
Lilybseum  had  failed,  and  that  the  town  was  safe.  Hiero 
therefore  returned  with  his  fleet  to  Syracuse ;  Sempronius 
sailed  to  Malta,  which  the  Carthaginian  commander 
Hamilcar,  the  son  of  Gisgo,  surrendered  with  the  garrison 
of  2,000  men.  These  prisoners,  as  well  as  the  men  cap- 
tured in  the  engagement  off  Lilybaeum,  were  sold  as  slaves, 
with  the  exception  of  three  noble  Carthaginians.  Sem- 
pronius then  sailed  in  search  of  the  hostile  fleet,  which, 
meanwhile,  committed  depredations  in  the  Italian  waters, 
and  which  he  thought  to  find  among  the  Liparian  Islands. 
He  was  mistaken,  and  on  his  return  to  Sicily  received  infor- 
mation that  it  was  ravaging  the  coast  of  Italy  near  Vibo. 
But  his  further  action  in  the  south  was  stopped  by  the 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  185 

news,  which  arrived  soon  after,  of  Hannibal's  march  across     CHAP. 

'w-r  VTTT 

the  Alps.'     He  prepared  immediately  to  join  his  col-  ^,   ,   1 . 
league   Scipio  in  Cisalpine   Gaul.     Placing  twenty-five    j^^^ 
ships  under  the  command  of  his  legate  Sextus  Pomponius    218-216 
for  the  protection  of  the  Italian  coast,  and  reinforcing  the       ^'^' 
squadron  of  the  prsetor  M.  ^milius  to  fifty  sail,  he  sent 
the  remainder  of  his  fieet  with  his  troops  to  Ariminum  in 
the  Adriatic.   Having  regulated  affairs  in  Sicily,  he  fol- 
lowed the  main  body  with  ten   ships.     The  rest  of  his 
army  which  could  not  be  taken  on  board  the  fleet  he 
ordered  to  proceed  to  Ariminum  by  land,  leaving  every 
soldier  free  to  find  his  way  as  best  he  could,  and  only 
bindmg  them  bjr  oath  to  appeor  at  Arimm^m  on  the 

From  Anminum  Sempronius  marched  to   the  Trebia,  Junction  of 
where  he  effected  his  junction  with  Scipio,  apparently  ^Z^^l), 
without  difficulty.*    The  Boman  army  now  amounted  to  Scipio. 

'  Probably  this  news  and  the  order  of  the  senate  to  leave  Sicily  were 
dispatched  from  Rome  as  soon  as  Scipio  had  reported  his  encounter  with  the 
Carthaginian  cavalry  hear  Hassilia.  When  Scipio  resolved  to  send  his  own  • 
legions  to  Spain,  it  was  natural  that  he  should  wish  to  have  in  their  place  the 
Sicilian  legions  of  Sempronius  for  joint  operations  against  Hannibal  on  the 
Po.  If  the  news  reached  Sicily  about  the  beginning  of  November,  Sempronius 
had  just  time  to  be  in  Ariminum  about  the  middle  of  December. 

*  Polybius  (iii.  61)  and  Livy  (xxi.  61)  give  contradictory  statementa  concern- 
ing the  mode  of  transporting  the  army  from  Sicily  to  Cisalpine  Gaul.  The 
former  relates  that  the  soldiers  proceeded  all  the  way  by  land ;  the  latter  speaks 
only  of  their  conveyance  on  board  the  fleet.  Both  writers  are  most  positive  and 
distinct  in  their  statements,  so  that  they  must  have  spoken  on  authority,  and 
cannot  be  supposed  to  have  indulged  in  unfounded  conjectures.  The  authority 
of  Polybius  is  very  high ;  yet  he  is  not  free  from  errors  and  omissions.  He 
touches  but  slightly  on  the  events  in  Sicily  in  the  year  218.  We  owe  our 
knowledge  of  them  to  Livy,  who  must  have  followed  a  well-informed  witness. 
His  statement  is  borne  out  by  the  reflection  that  we  cannot  understand  why 
Sempronius  should  not  have  made  use  of  the  ships,  nearly  one  hundred  in 
number  (Livy,  xxi.  17) — which  he  did  not  leave  in  Sicily— for  the  purpose  of 
conveying  his  troops  without  fatigue  to  Ariminum.  Perhaps  his  ships  did  not 
suffice  to  carry  all  the  men,  and  a  portion  of  them  were  obliged  to  march  on 
foot  through  the  whole  length  of  Italy,  as  we  have  assumed  in  the  t«xt. 

'  It  is  strange  that  he  accomplished  this  without  any  opposition  on  the 
part  of  Hannibal.  The  road  from  Ariminum  to  the  Trebia  traverses  an 
uninterrupted  plain,  and  must,  in  the  Ticinity  of  Placentia,  have  approached 
very  near  the  Carthaginian  camp.  This  circumstance  has  given  rise  to  the 
conjecture,  that  Hannibal*8  camp  was  on  tlie  western  side  of  the  Trebia,  and 


186  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  more  than  40,000  men,*  and  was  consequentlj  more 
/  ^  numerons  tlian  that  of  the  invaders.  But  the  position  of 
Hannibal  was  now  very  much  improved.  Bj  the  .treason 
of  a  Latin  officer  from  Brundusium,  he  had  gained  posses- 
sion of  the  fortified  place  of  Clastidium  (now  called 
CasteggiOy  near  Montebello),  where  the  Romans  had  col- 
lected their  supplies.  Thus  he  had  now  abundance  of 
provisions,  whilst  the  Soman  army,  swelled  by  the  arrival 
of  Sempronius  to  double  its  original  number,  felt,  no 
doubt,  most  keenly  the  loss  of  the  supplies  which  had 
been  destined  for  its  use.  Under  these  circumstances, 
Sempronius  naturally  wished  to  bring  on  a  battle.  He 
had  not  come  all  the  way  from  Sicily  to  shut  himself  up 
in  a  fortified  camp  on  the  Trebia,  and  to  look  on  quietly, 
whilst  tribe  after  tribe  in  Cisalpine  Graul  joined  Hannibal, 
and  swelled  the  hostile  army.  He  might  well  ask  for 
what  purpose  two  consular  armies  were  sent  out  against 
the  enemy,  except  to  attack  and  defeat  him.^  He  had 
been  successful  in  his  own  province  of  Sicily,  and  had 
been  crossed  and  thwarted  in  a  direct  attack  on  Carthage 
by  the  order  of  the  senate,  which  recalled  him  and  trans- 
ferred him  to  the  north  of  Italy.  If  he  should  be  so 
fortunate  as  to  destroy  Hannibal's  army,  he  would  have 
the  glory  of  having  quickly  brought  the  war  to  a  triumphant 
conclusion.  Nor  would  he  share  this  glory  with  anybody, 
as,  while  his  colleague  Scipio  was  disabled  by  his  wound, 

coneeqaently  that  of  Scipio  on  the  eastern,  contrary  to  the  statement  of 
Polybins  (see  below,  p.  IStl,  note  2).  Bat  the  difficulty  is  not  removed  by  this 
unjustified  assumption.  The  Trebia  offered  no  obstacle  to  the  hostile  cavalry. 
Even  when  it  was  swollen  high  by  sudden  rain  in  the  night  before  the  battle, 
which  took  place  soon  after,  the  Roman  infantry  were  able  to  wade  through  it. 
Supposing,  therefore,  that  Hannibal  had  been  stationed  on  the  left  bank  of 
that  river,  he  would  yet  have  been  able,  even  there,  to  obtain  information  of  the 
march  of  Sempronius,  and  to  advance  to  meet  him  before  his  junction  with 
Scipio.  Our  sources  give  no  explanation  of  the  unmolested  junction  of  the 
two  Roman  armies.  Perhaps  we  may  venture  on  the  supposition  that  it  waa 
effected  whilst  Hannibal  was  engaged  with  the  capture  of  Clastidium,  several 
miles  westward  of  the  Trebia. 

>  Polybius,  iii.  72,  {  H*  According  to  Livy  (xxi.  65),  18,000  Romans, 
20,000  allies,  4,000  horse,  and,  besides,  Cenomanian  auxiliaries, 

'  Compare  Livy,  xxi.  52  init 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  187 

he   had  the  undivided  command  of   the  two   consular     CHAP, 
armies.     Polybins,  refusing  to  regard  the  resolution  of        ^^'  ■ 
Sempronius  as  the  result  of  rational  calculation,  or  of  the     _^^^^ 

.  ...  .  .  Prriod, 

necessity  of  his  position^  charges  him  with  recklessness  218-216 
and  vanity/  contrasting  with  his  conduct  the  prudent  ^'^' 
caution  of  Scipio,  who  is  said  to  have  dissuaded  him  from 
risking  a  battle.  We  can  hardly  decide  whether  Polybius  is 
right  or  wrong.  It  is  possible  that  Sempronins,  just  like 
Scipio  at  first,  had  no  just  estimation  of  the  enemy  with 
whom  he  had  to  deal,  and  that,  thinking  victory  certain,  he 
was  over  anxious  to  secure  the  glory  for  himself.  At  the 
same  time  it  is  tolerably  evident  that  Polybius,  in  his 
partiality  to  Scipio,  endeavours  as  much  as  possible  to 
throw  upon  the  shoulders  of  Sempronius  the  blame  of 
the  defeat  on  the  Trebia.  He  was  the  friend  of  the 
Cornelian  house,  and  could  not  but  imbibe  in  the  family 
circle  of  the  Scipios  all  the  views  most  in  accordance  with 
the  reputation  of  that  family,  views  which  he  has  done 
his  best  to  propagate  and  to  back  by  his  authority. 

The  two  hostile  armies  were  encamped  at  a  short  distance  Prepan- 
from  one  another;  the  Carthaginians  nearer  to  Placentia,  Jl^^^^J^^ 
on  the  right,  or  eastern,  bank  of  the  Trebia,  the  Romans  of  the 
higher  up  the  river,  on  the  left  bank.     A  cavalry  engage- 
ment   took    place,    and,  terminating  apparently   to   the 
advantage  of  the  Romans,  had  increased  the  confidence 
of  Sempronius.     This  Hannibal  had  expected.     He  knew 
that  the   Bomans   would  not   defer  the   decision   much 
longer,*  chose  his  battle-field  with  the  unerring  eye  of  a 
consummate  general,  and  made  all  the  necessary  prepara- 
tions for  the  impending  struggle. 

Not  far  from  the  Roman  camp,  but  on  the  opposite  side  Tactics  of 
of  the  Trebia,  was  a  dried-up  watercourse  with  high  banks  ^*°°^^*i- 
overgrown  with  bushes,  high  enough  to  hide  infantry  and 
even  cavalry.     Here  Hannibal  ordered  his  spirited  young 
brother    Mago  *  to   proceed  before    daybreak   with   one 

'  Polybius,  iii.  70,  {  7  :    ^^  rris  <pt\oio^las  iXttvydfiwos  koX  icarairi<rrc^«y  roh 
wpdyfuuri  xapa?ii6yws  ItnrevSc  Kpiycu  8<'  aOrov  t&  t\a  fc.r.X. 
•  Polybius,  iii.  70,  §  13. 
'  Polybius,  iii.  71)  §  6:   6rra  viov  ijl\p  6pfijjs  9^  vA^pi?  ica2  watZofuiBri  vrpl  t& 

W0\9fUKd, 


188 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Defeat  of 

the 

Romans. 


tlionsand  chosen  horsemen  and  as  many  foot  soldiers,  and 
to  lie  in  ambush  until  the  signal  should  be  given.  Then 
he  sent  the  Numidian  cavalr  j  across  the  river  right  against 
the  Boman  camp  to  draw  them  out  to  battle.  What  he 
had  expected  took  place.  As  soon  as  the  Bomans, 
early  in  the  morning,  caught  sight  of  the  Numidians, 
Sempronius,  without  even  giving  his  men  time  to 
strengthen  themselves  by  the  usual  morning  meal,  ordered 
the  whole  of  his  cavalry,  four  thousand  strong,  to  advance 
against  them,  and  the  foot  to  follow.  The  Numidians 
retired  back  across  the  river,  closely  pursued  by  the 
Roman  cavalry  and  infantry.  The  day  was  raw,  damp, 
and  cold.  It  was  towards  mid-winter,  and  sleet  and  snow 
filled  the  air.  In  the  previous  night  a  copious  rain  had 
fallen  in  the  mountains,  and  the  river  Trebia  had  risen  so 
high  that  the  soldiers  in  fording  it  stood  breast  high  in 
the  icy  water.  Stiff  with  cold  and  faint  with  hunger  they 
arrived  on  the  right  bank,  and  immediately  found  them- 
selves in  front  of  Hannibal's  army,  which  was  drawn  up  in 
a  long  line  of  batfcle,  the  infantry,  20,000  strong,  in  the 
centre,  10,000  horsemen  and  the  elephants  on  the  wings* 
Hannibal  had  taken  care  that  his  men  should  have  a  good 
night's  rest,  and  be  prepared  for  the  work  of  the  day  by 
an  ample  breakfast. 

The  battle  had  hardly  begun  when  the  Romans  lost 
every  chance  of  victory.  The  superior  Carthaginian 
cavalry  drove  in  the  Roman  cavalry  on  both  wings,  and,  in 
combination  with  the  elephants,  attacked  the  legions  on 
the  flanks  whilst  Hannibal's  Libyan,  Spanish,  and  Gaulish 
infantry  engaged  them  in  front.  Nevertheless,  the 
Romans  kept  their  ground  for  a  while  with  the  utmost 
courage,  until  Mago-,  with  his  two  thousand  men,  brokp 
lorth  from  the  ambush  and  seized  them  in  rear.  Terror 
and  disorder  now  spread  among  them.  Only  ten  thousand 
men  in  the  centre  of  the  Roman  line  kept  their  ranks 
unbroken,  and,  cutting  their  way  through  the  Gauls 
opposed  to  them,  made  good  their  retreat  to  Placentia  j  the 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


189 


remainder  of  the  Boman  infantry,  in  helpless  confdsion, 
tried  to  regain  their  camp  on  the  western  side  of  the 
Trebia.  But  before  they  could  cross  the  river  the  greater 
porti<vi  were  cut  down  by  the  numerous  cavalry  of  the 
Carthaginians,  or  perished  under  the  feet  of  the  elephants. 
Many  found  their  death  in  the  river,  which  with  its 
BwoUen  and  icy  flood  cut  oflP  their  retreat.  Some  reached 
the  camp;  others,  especially  the  horse  which  had  been 
chased  off  the  field  on  both  flanks,  joined  the  corps  of  ten 
thousand  which  alone  effected  an  orderly  retreat  to  Pla- 
centia.  The  pursuit  lasted  until  showers  of  rain  mixed 
with  snow  compelled  the  conquerors  to  seek  the  shelter  of 
their  tents.  The  weather  was  so  bitterly  cold  and  tem- 
pestuous that  Hannibal's  army  suffered  severely,  and 
almost  all^  the  elephants  perished.^ 

The  tempest  continued  to  rage  all  night.  Under  its 
cover  Scipio  succeeded  in  crossing  the  river  Trebia  with 
the  remnants  of  the  defeated  army,  and  in  reaching  Pla- 
centia  unmolested  by  the  victorious  but  exhausted  Car- 
thaginians.^    In  this  town   and  in   Cremona,  under  the 

*  According  to  Polybius  (iii.  74,  §  11),  only  one  elephant  surviTed ;  according 
to  Livy  (xxi.  58),  Hannibal  had,  at  a  subsequent  period,  more  than  seven  left. 

*  It  is  slraage  that  doubts  could  arise  whether  the  battle  was  fought  on 
the  right  or  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Trebia.  The  narrative  of  Polybius  points 
distinctly  to  the  right  bank,  and  that  of  Livy  is  quite  unintelligible  under  any 
other  supposition.  (Compare  especially  Polybius,  iii.  66,  §  9  ;  iii.  67,  §  9 ;  iii.  68, 
§  5 ;  Livy,  xxi.  65).  Mommsen  {Rom.  Gesch.  i.  599  ;  English  translation,  ii.  117) 
maintains  that  the  battle  took  place  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Trebia,  but  his  argu- 
ments are  untenable,  as  shown  by  Peter  {Siudien  zur  rom.  Gesch.  p.  35  ff.).  The 
piBsibility  of  a  doubt  is  a  proof  of  our  remark  above  (p.  172),  that  the  ancient 
writers  are  deficient  in  accuracy  in  their  geographical  and  topogi'aphical  descrip- 
tions. If  modern  writers  (like  Rospatt,  Fddzuge  des  Hannibal^  p.  14)  sim ply- 
reject  the  statement  of  Polybius,  because  in  their  opinion  it  is  inconsistent  with 
strategical  laws,  they  are  guilty  of  an  unjustifiable  disregard  of  authority. 
We  fully  agree  with  a  remark  of  Arnold  {Hist,  of  Rome,  iii.  p.  96) :  '  It  is  not 
explained  by  any  existing  writer  how  Sempronius  was  able  to  effect  his 
Junction  with  his  colleague  without  any  opposition  from  Hannibal.'  This 
is  the  reason  for  the  assumption  that  Scipio's  camp  must  have  been  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Trebia  (see  above,  p.  1 85,  note  3).  '  But  so  much  in  war  depends 
upon  trifling  accident*,  that  it  is  vain  to  guess  where  we  are  without  information.' 

'  This  circumstance  is  mentioned  by  Livy  (xxi.  56),  and  is  in  itself  sufficient 
to  show  that  the  Roman  camp  was  not  on  the  right  side  of  the  Trebia,  on 
which  Placentia  lay,  but  on  the  left. 


CHAP. 

VIU. 

. ' 

FiBST 

Pkbiod, 
218-216 

B.C. 


Retreat  of 
Scipio  to 
Placentia. 


190 


ROMAN  mSTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Success 
and 

ability  of 
Hannibal. 


Effects  of 

Hannibal's 

victory. 


shelter  of  the  recently  constructed  fortifications,  the 
'  shattered  remains  of  the  four  legions  passed  the  rest  of 
the  winter  in  safety.  The  supplies  from  the  surrounding 
country  were  cut  ofif,  as  the  Gauls  had  by  this  tim«  risen 
in  mass  against  Borne,  and  as  HannibaFs  cavalry  ranged 
freely  all  over  the  vast  plain  about  the  Po.  But  the 
navigation  of  this  river,  it  seems,  was  still  open.  The 
fishing  boats  of  the  natives  coald  not  stop  the  armed 
vessels  of  the  Romans,  and  thus  the  Koman  colonists  and 
soldiers  received  the  necessary  supplies,  and  were  enabled 
to  hold  their  ground  at  this  most  critical  period. 

The  great  battle  of  the  Trebia  was  the  concluding  and 
crowning  operation  of  Hannibal's  campaign,  the  reward 
for  the  innumerable  labours  and  dangers  which  he  and 
his  brave  army  had  encountered.  The  march  from  New 
Carthage  to  Placentia  across  the  Ebro,  the  Pyrenees,  the 
Bhone,  the  Alps,  and  the  Po,  in  great  part  through 
hostile  nations,  and  on  wretched  roads,  with  an  army 
composed  of  different  races,  and  inspired  by  no  feeling  of 
patriotic  devotion,  is  not  matched  by  any  military  exploit 
in  ancient  or  in  modem  history.  But  that  which  raises  it 
above  the  sphere  of  mere  adventurous  daring,  and  qualifies 
it  as  an  achievement  worthy  of  a  great  general,  is  the 
splendid  victory  with  which  it  closed. 

This  victory  produced  the  most  importaht  results.    Even 
the  immediate  and  direct  gain  was  great.     The  two  con- 
sular armies  were  shattered.     The  number  of  the  slain 
and  the  prisoners  is  not  stated,  but  we  can  hardly  suppose 
it  to  have  been  less  than  half  of  the  whole  army  engaged. 
Still  greater  was  the  moral  eflfect.   From  this  time  forward 
the  name  of  Hannibal  was  terrible  to  the  Boman  soldier, 
just  as  the  name  of  the  Gauls  had  been  of  old.     And  these 
two  *  most  terrible  enemies  of  Bome  were   now  united, 
flushed  with  victory  and  ready  to  turn  their  arms  against 
the   devoted  city.     The  dreadful   calamity  which  came 
upon  the  republic  after  the  black  day  of  the  Allia  might 
now  not  only  be  repeated  but  surpassed.     At  that  time 
the  Capitol  at  least  had  broken  the  onset  of  the  barbarians^ 


THE  SECOND  PUMO  WAR.  191 

and  had  saved  the  Boman  nation  from  extinction.     But     CHAP, 
what  chance  was  there  now  of  resisting  the  man  who,   ^_    .   '_■ 
with '  but  small  support  from  the  Gallic  tribes,  had  de-     p^^^^ 
stroyed  a  superior  Boman  army,  and  was  now  leading  all    218-216 
the  hereditary  enemies  of  the  Boman  name  against  the       ^'^' 
city?     To  face  such  dangers,   without  despairing,  the 
Bomans  required  all  the  iron  firmness  of  their  character, 
which  never  was  more  formidable  than  when  veritable 
terrors  appeared  on  all  sides.* 

Such  firmness  was  the  more  necessary  as  Hannibal,  at  Hannibars 
this  early  period  of  the  war,  showed  that  it  was  his  inten-  o7hir^" 
tion  to  undermine  the  Boman  state  within,  whilst  he  was  prisoners. 
attacking  it  from  without.   After  his  victory  on  the  Trebia, 
he  divided  his  prisoners  into  two  classes.     Those   who 
were  Boman  citizens  he  kept  in  rigorous  captivity.     The 
Boman  allies  he  dismissed  without  ransom,  and  assured 
them  that  he  had  come  into  Italy   in  order  to  deliver 
them  from  the  Boman  yoke.     If  they  wished  to  recover 
their  independence,  their  lost  lands    and    towns,    they 
should  join  him,   and  with  united   strength   attack  the 
common  enemy  of  them  all.* 

In  spite  of  the  advanced  season,  and  the  severity  of  the  Winter 
winter,   Hannibal  showed  a  restless   activity.     He  was  of  Han- °^ 
busied  in  organising  the  alliance  of  the  Gaulish  tribes  °'^^ 
against  Bome.     The  Boians  brought  him,  as  a  pledge  of 
their  fidelity,  the  three  Boman  commissioners'  whom 
they  had  captured.     He  was  joined  also  by  the  Ligurians, 
who  had  year  after  year  been  hunted  and  harassed  by  the 
Bomans  like  wild  beasts,  and  who  brought  as  hostages 
some  noble  Bomans   whom  they  had  captured  in  their 
country.*     Still  the  Bomans  held  several  fortified  places 
on  the  Po.     One  of  these,  called  Victumvise,  was  stormed 

'  Polybius,  iii.  75,  §  8 :  t<(tc  7^  (pofitp^an'oi  "Pufuuoi  Kcd  Koivy  jroi  icar* 
iSW,  trav  ohrobs  yrepiffr^  tp6fios  iiX,riBw6s. 

•  Polybius,  iii.  77.  The  testimony  of  Polybiua  suffices  to  prore  that  the 
statement  of  Zonaras  (viii.  24),  that  Hannibal  caused  the  Boman  prisoners  to 
be  put  to  death,  is  a  falsification  of  history  due  to  the  national  hatred  of 
Roman  patriots. 

'  See  above,  p,  167.  *  Livy,  xxi.  OS* 


192  KOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     by  Hannibal,  and  the  defenders  were  treated  witb  all  the 
-_    ,•    ^   severity  of  the  laws  of  war ; '  the  attempt  to  take  another 


fort  bj  surprise  faUed.  The  two  principal  places,  Placentia 
and  Cremona,  could  not  be  taken  without  a  formal  siege ; 
for  besides  the  remains  of  the  beaten  army,  each  of  them 
had  a  garrison  of  six  thousand  colonists,  i.e.  veteran 
soldiers.  For  such  an  attempt  Hannibal  had  neither  time 
nor  means.  He  was  hastening  to  carry  the  war  into 
Southern  Italy.  The  Gauls  began  to  feel  the  pressure  of 
the  numbers  which  they  had  now  to  support,  and  they  were 
burning  with  impatience  for  the  plunder  of  Italy.  The 
fundamental  feature  of  their  character  was  inconstancy.* 
They  had  no  idea  of  fidelity  and  perseverance.  It  was 
nothing  but  their  own  advantage  that  united  them  with 
Hannibal.  Their  attachment  could  easily  be  changed  into 
hostility.  Hannibal's  own  life  might  be  exposed  to  danger 
if  the-  treacherous  disposition  of  these  barbarians  were 
stimulated  by  a  prize  oflPered  for  his  head.  His  brother- 
in-law,  Hasdrubal,  had  fallen  a  victim  to  assassination. 
Alexander  of  Epirus  had  been  killed  by  a  faithless  Luca- 
nian  ally.'  It  was  not  impossible  that  a  similar  fate 
awaited  HannibaL  If  we  can  trust  the  report  of  Polybius, 
such  apprehensions  induced  Hannibal  to  avail  himself  of  a 
*  Punic  deceit,'  *  by  assuming  different  disguises  and  wear- 
ing false  hair,  so  that  his  own  friends  could  not  recognise 
him.  Tet  we  can  hardly  think  such  a  device  worthy  of 
Hannibal,  nor  does  it  seem  probable  that  a  general  who 
was  worshipped  by  his  soldiers  should  have  been  com- 
pelled to  hide  himself  under  a  disguise  in  the  midst  of  his 
army,  in  order  to  protect  his  life  from  the  dagger  of  an 
assassin.  We  should  be  rather  inclined  to  think  that 
Hannibal  acted  as  his  own  spy,  to  sound  the  disposition  of 
his  new  allies. 
Unsuocess-  In  his  impatience  to  leave  Cisalpine  Gaul,  Hannibal 
iuUttempt  ^^^^  ^j^  attempt  to  cross  the  Apennines  before  the  end 

*  Livy,  xxi.  67.  •  oafffio,— Polybius,  iii.  78,  §  2. 

*  See  vol.  i.  p.  380. 

*  PolybiuB,  iii.  78,  §  1 :   *Zxp^^a>'''0  W  rivi  ico)  ^ivikik^  aTpaTnyfifieiTt. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  193 

of  Winter.*     But  he  was  foiled  in  this  undertaking.     The     CHAP, 
army  was  overtaken  in   the  mountains  by  so  terrific  a   .  ^^^'  - 
hurricane  that  it  was  unable  to  proceed.     Men  and  horses  *      ^'*^ 
perished  from  the  cold,  and  Hannibal  was  compelled  to     218-216 
return  to  his  winter-quarters  near  Placentia.  ^^' 

Simultaneously  with  the  stirring  events  which  accom-  ^(  ^°' 
panied  Hannibars  march,  Spain  also  had  been  the  theatre  cro8«  the 
of  serious  conflicts.     Publius  Scipio,  as  we  have  seen,  had  -^P®^'^'"®*- 
sent  from  Massilia  his  brother  Cneius  with  two  legions  to  Operations 
Spain,  whilst  he  himself  had  hastened  to  the  Po.   In  spite  ^^  ®P*'°' 
of  its  great  distance,  Spain  was  still  Hannibal's  only  base 
of  operations ;  and,  by  its  natural  wealth  and  its  warlike 
population,  it  was  a  chief  source  of  strength  for  Carthage. 
The  Eomans  therefore  could  not  leave  Spain  in  the  uniSs- 
turbed  possession  of  their  enemies,  though  they  were 
attacked  in  Italy  itself.     Moreover,  their  own  interest  as 
well  as  their  honour  bound  them  to  send  assistance  to 
those  Spanish  tribes,  between  the  Ebro  and  the  Pyrenees, 
who  had  espoused  their  cause  in  the  great  struggle  between 
the  two  rival  republics.     Hannibal  had  overthrown  them 
when  he  passed  through  their  country  on  his  march  to 
Italy,  but  he  had  not  had  time  to  reduce  them  to  perfect 
submission  and  peaceful  obedience.     It  was  still  possible 
to  gain  their  alliance  for  Rome.     The  dispatch  of  the 
two  legions  to  Spain  was,  therefore,  perfectly  justified; 
and  the  senate  showed  its  approval  of  it  by  continuing  the 
war  in  Spain  at  all  costs  throughout  the  greatest  distress 
caused  by  Hannibal's  victories  in  Italy.     Spain  was  for 
Eome  what    Cisalpine   Gaul  was   for  Hannibal.     Both 
countries  had  been  recently  and  imperfectly  conquered 
and  were  full  of  unwilling  subjects,  easily  roused  to  rebel- 
lion.    As  the  overthrow  of  Boman  dominion  in  the  north 
of  Italy  opened  a  way  for  an  attack  on  the  vital  parts  of 
her  empire,  so  the  conquest  of  Spain  promised  to  facilitate 

•  Livy,  xxi.  58 :  *  Ad  prima  ac  dubia  sigua  yens  profectus  ex  hibemis  in 
Etrariam  ducit/    Polybius  passes  this  over  entirely. 

•  It  was  on  this  occasion  that,  according  to  Livy  {loo,  cii.),  Hannibal  lost 
seven  of  the  elephants  which  were  left  after  the  battle  of  the  Trebia. 

VOL.  !!•  0 


194  BOKAN  mSTOBY. 

BOOK     a  transfer  of  the  war  into  Africa,  where  alone  it  conld  be 
\'    ^  brought  to  a  yictorions  conclnsion* 
Defeat  of        ^  ^^^  events  in  Spain  during  the  year  218  B.C.  we  hare 
Hanpo  by    not  much  to  report.     Cneios  Scipio  succeeded,  by  persua- 
sion  or  force,  in  gaining  for  the  Boman  alliance  most  of 
the  tribes  between  the  Pyrenees  and  the  Ebro ;  he  defeated 
Hanno,  whom  Hannibal  had  intrusted  with  ten  thousand 
men  for  the  defence  of  that  country,  and  he  took  up  his 
winter-quarters  in  Tarraco. 
Alarm  in         The  first  news  which  reached  Borne  of  the  battle  of  the 
Bome^on     Trcbia  was  contained  in  an  official  report  of  the  consul 
the  tidiiigB  Scmprouius,  which  bears  a  striking  resemblance  to  other 
nibai^s        official  reports  of  very  recent  times.    It  stated,  for  the 
tii^T^?    information  of  the  senate  and  the  Boman  people,  that  a 
battle  had  taken  place,  and  that  Sempronius  would  have 
been  victorious  if  he  had  not  been  prevented  by  inclement 
weather.'     But  soon  there  came  reports  which  were  not 
official,  and  stated  the  naked  truth.    The  alarm  in  Borne 
was  so  much  the  greater,  and  it  rose  to  positive  apprehen- 
sion for  the  safety  of  the  town.*    Since  the  great  disaster 
in  the  Caudine  passes,  more  than  a  century  before  this  time, 
no  similar  calamity  had  befallen  the  imited  legions  of  both 
consuls ;  and  on  that  memorable  occasion  the  army  had 
been  saved  from  destruction  by  the  short-sighted  con- 
fidence which  the  Samnite  general  had  placed  in  the  faith 
and  honour  of  the  Boman  people.     It  was  only  the  battle 
of  the  Allia  which  could  compare  in  disastrous  results  with 
the  recent  overthrow,  for  on  that  fatal  day  the  army  which 
was  destined  to  cover  Borne  had  been  completely  routed 
and  dispersed ;  and  the  memory  of  the  terrors  of  that  evil 
time  was  now  recalled  the  more  readily  as  the  dreaded 
Gauls  marched  in  Hannibal's  army  upon  the  ciiy  which 
they  had  once  already  burned  and  sacked.     To  the  terror 
of  the  foreign  enemy  were  added  apprehensions  from 
internal  discord.    After  a  long  peace  the  struggle  between 
the  two  opposite  parties  had,  a  few  years  before,  broken 

1  Polybins,  iiL  75,  |  1:   8ri  fidxn'  ytyofidrtis  rV  t'^tn*'  oMtr  6  x«1ft^ 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAB, 


195 


out  again.  The  comitia  of  centuries  had  in  241  B.C.  been 
remodelled  on  democratic  principles.  Whilst  the  nobility 
was  degenerating  more  and  more  into  a  narrow  oligarchy, 
a  popular  party  had  been  formed,  bent  on  invigorating  and 
renewing  the  middle  class,  and  on  checking  the  accumu- 
lation of  wealth  in  a  few  hands.  The  chief  of  this  party 
was  Cains  Flaminius.  He  had  in  his  tribuneship  encoun- 
tered the  violent  opposition  of  the  senate  in  passing  a  law 
for  the  division  of  public  land  in  Pieenum  amongst  Boman 
citizens ;  ^  he  had  connected  that  country  with  Bome  by 
the  Flaminianroad,  a  work  by  which,  like  Appius  Claudius 
with  his  road  and  aqueduct,  he  had  given  employment  to 
a  great  number  of  the  poorer  citizens,  and  had  gained  a 
considerable  following.  The  construction  of  a  new  race- 
course in  Bome,  the  Circus  Maminius,  was  another  measure 
designed  to  conciliate  the  favour  of  the  people.  At  the 
same  time  these  considerable  public  works  are  an  evidence 
of  a  stricter  and  growing  control  over  the  public  revenue, 
for  the  money  which  they  required  could  not  be  derived 
from  any  private  or  extraordinary  source.'  By  such  at- 
tention to  the  finances  of  the  state,  Flaminius  necessarily, 
incurred  the  hostility  of  the  rich  and  influential  men  of 
the  nobility,  who  were  in  the  habit  of  deriving  profit  from 
renting  public  domains,  saltworks^  mines,  and  the  like,  and 
from  farming  the  customs.  These  men,  from  the  nature  of 
their  occupation,  considered  it  their  privilege  to  rob  the 
public.  It  had  become  quite  customary  for  the  nobility  to 
violate  the  Licinian  law,  to  occupy  more  land  and  to  keep 
more  cattle  on  the  common  pasture  than  the  law  allowed. 
Occasionally  honest  and  fearless,  tribunes  or  sediles  ven- 
tured to  put  down  this  abuse  by  prosecuting  and  fining 
the  offenders ;  but  no  radical  cure  was  effected,  nor  was  it 
easy  to  effect  one.  Since  the  passing  of  the  Licinian  laws 
(in   366   B.C.)   Bome  had    conquered  Italy,   Sicily,  and 

'  See  aboTe,  p.  126. 

'  Plutarch  {Qua$t.  Roman.  66)  eoi\iecturefl  that  perhaps  fl^minitu  gaT« 
land  to  the  state,  from  the  pzodace  of  which  the  expense  was  defrayed.  This 
is  impossible.  Perhaps  Plutarch  had  read  something  of  the  reTeoues  of  public 
land  being  devoted  to  the  oljeet  in  question. 

o  3 


CHAP. 

vm. 

FiBST 

Pkriod, 
21S-216 

B.C. 


196  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  Sardinia,  and  had  confiscated  conqaered  lands  on  a  large 
^  , '  ->  scale.  How  was  it  possible  to  coerce  the  rapacity  of  the 
great  and  powerful  families  by  enforcing  a  law  which  was 
passed  when  Borne  was  not  even  mistress  of  the  whole  of 
Latium?  The  great  increase  in  the  number  of  slaves, 
which  was  one  of  the  results  of  the  wars  in  Southern  Italy, 
Sicily,  Corsica,  Liguria,  and  Illyria,  made  it  possible  to 
farm  large  estates,  and  to  keep  numerous  flocks  and  herds 
on  the  extensive  public  pastures.  The  increase  of  capital 
which  flowed  to  Some  from  the  conquered  districts  en- 
riched the  noble  families,  which  monopolised  the  govern- 
ment. When  the  first  province  was  acquired  beyond  the 
confines  of  Italy,  the  besetting  sin  of  the  Boman  aris- 
tocracy, their  ungovernable  rapacity,  coupled  with  cruelty 
and  violence,  shot  up  like  a  flame  which  has  reached  a 
store  of  new,  rich  fiiel.  The  great  danger  that  threatened 
the  Boman  commonwealth  became  more  than  ever  evident. 
The  lingering  fever  became  more  violent  and  malignant, 
and  it  was  high  time  for  a  vigorous  hand  to  interfere  and 
to  stop,  if  possible,  the  progress  of  the  disorder.  Flami- 
nius,  it  appears,  was  the  man  for  it ;  but  unfortunately  he 
was  almost  isolated  among  the  Boman  aristocracy.  His 
own  father,  it  is  said,  pulled  him  down  from  the  public 
platform,  when  he  was  speaking  to  the  people  to  recom- 
mend his  agrarian  law ;  and  when  the  tribune  C.  Claudius, 
who  was  probably  a  plebeian  client  of  the  great  Claudian 
family,  proposed  a  law  to  prevent  senators  and  the  sons  of 
senators  from  engaging  in  foreign  trade  and  from  possessing 
any  vessels  beyond  a  certain  moderate  size,'  Maminius  was 
the  only  man  in  the  senate  who  spoke  in  favour  of  the  pro- 
posal. He  was  therefore  opposed  by  the  whole  of  that 
powerful  party  which  monopolised  the  government  for  their 
own  benefit.  But  he  had  the  people  on  his  side ;  and  as  at 
that  time  the  Assembly  of  the  Tribes  was  independent  and 
competent  to  legislate  for  the  whole  republic,  he  was  in  a 
position  to  carry  his  reforms  by  the  votes  of  the  people, 

»  LiTy,  xxi.  68 :   *  Ne  quis  senator,  cuive  senator  pater  fuisset  niaritimam 
navem  quae  plus  quam  trecentarum  amphorarum  esset,  babereU* 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  197 

and  in  direct  opposition  to  the  senate.    Had  he  lived     chap. 
longer,  it  is  possible  that  the  economical  condition  of  the  ^^' 


Eoman  people  would  not  have  become  so  utterly  wretched     J^'^**^ 
and  hopeless  as  the  Gracchi  found  it  a  hundred  years  later.     218-216 

Flaminius  had  been  raised  to  the  consulship  as  early  as        ^^' 

223  B.C. — a  time  when  the  war  with  the  Insubrians  was  pPPJ«H®» 

to  Flami  • 

raging  with  all  its  force.  He  had  no  great  military  abili-  nius. 
ties ;  but  as  a  general  he  was  probably  not  inferior  to  the 
average  of  Boman  consuls.  It  was  therefore,  in  all  proba- 
bility, not  from  any  apprehension  of  his  incapacity,  nor  from 
superstition  caused  by  threatening  phenomena,  but  from 
political  animosity,  that  the  senate  sent  a  message  to  recall 
him  to  Bome,  pretending  that  his  election  was  vitiated  by 
some  defect  in  the  auspices,  and  calling  upon  him  to  resign 
his  office.'  Flaminius  had  got  into  difficulties,  but  he  was 
just  on  the  point  of  inflicting  a  severe  blow  on  the  enemy,* 
when  the  sealed  letter  of  the  senate  was  delivered  to  him. 
Guessing  the  contents,  he  left  it  unopened  until  he  had 
gained  the  victory.  Then  he  answered  that,  as  the  gods 
themselves  had  clearly  fought  for  him,  they  had  sufficiently 
ratified  his  election ;  and,  thus  setting  the  authority  of  the 
senate  at  defiance,  he  continued  the  war.  On  his  return 
to  Bome  the  people  voted  him  a  triumph,  in  spite  of  the 
opposition  of  the  senate,  and  when  Flaminius  had  cele- 
brated this  triumph  he  laid  down  his  office.  In  one  of  the 
succeeding  years  he  was  made  master  of  the  horse  by  the 
dictator  Minucius,  but  was  obliged  to  resign  this  command 
because  at  his  nomination  a  mouse  had  been  heard  to 
squeak.'  The  nobility,  as  it  appears,  carried  on  against 
him  a  sort  of  holy  war.  They  marshalled  heavenly  signs 
and  auspices  on  their  side ;  but  these  weapons  were  evi- 
dently becoming  antiquated,  for  they  produced  very  little 
effect,  as  was  shown  in  the  sequel. 

'  Zonaras,  viii.  20 :  9id  re  yovy  rh  ripvra  ravra  kqHL  Sri  rtvks  irapei96fU9S 
Ixryoy  rohs  6wdrovs  o/pct^veu,  iirrinwfif^eof  ainoCs.  Poljbiiis  does  not  mention 
this  undignified  mancenvre  of  the  nobility.  Being  an  enlightened  man,  he  was 
probably  ashamed  to  report  such  a  thing  of  his  friends.  He  also  passes  orer 
the  miracles  that  happened  in  217.    See  below,  p.  206. 

'  See  abore,  p.  134.  '  Plntarch,  Marcell.  ii. 


198 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 

' 1 

EfibrtB  to 
proYent  the 
re-election 
of  Flami- 
nios. 


Flaminius 

elected 

conaul. 


When,  after  the  defeat  on  the  Trebia,  the  consular 
elections  for  the  ensuing  year  were  at  hand,  and  the 
confidence  of  the  people  seemed  to  be  turning  in  favour 
of  the  popular  leader  Flaminius,  as  the  first  Boman 
that  had  signally  beaten  the  Gauls  in  their  own  country 
beyond  the  Po,  the  oligarchical  party  worked  hard  to 
prevent  his  election.  Universal  fear  had  seized  the  minds 
of  men,  and  made  them  see  in  every  direction  images  of 
terror,  and  miraculous  phenomena  of  evil  foreboding. 
Livy '  has  preserved  an  interesting  list  of  these  *  prodigies,' 
which  illustrates  the  peculiar  mode  of  superstition  do- 
minant at  that  time  among  the  vulgar : — In  the  vegetable 
market  a  child  of  six  months  called  out  '  Triumph ; '  in 
the  cattle  market  a  bull  ran  up  into  the  third  story  of  a 
house,  and  leaped  into  the  street ;  fiery  ships  were  seen  in 
the  sky ;  the  Temple  of  Hope  was  struck  by  lightning ;  in 
Lanuvium  the  holy  spear  moved  of  its  own  accord;  a 
raven  flew  into  the  temple  of  Juno,  and  perched  on  the 
pillow  of  the  goddess ;  near  Amitemum  there  were  seen,  in 
many  places,  human  forms  in  white  robes ;  in  Picenum  it 
rained  stones ;  in  Csere  the  prophetic  tablets*  shrank ;  in  Gaul 
a  wolf  snatched  the  sword  of  a  sentinel  from  its  sheath. 

To  propitiate  the  anger  of  the  gods,  manifested  by  these 
numerous  signs,  the  whole  people  were  for  several  days 
engaged  in  sacrifices,  purifications,  and  prayers.  Dedicatory 
offerings  of  gold  and  bronze  were  placed  in  the  temples;  lec- 
tisternia,  or  public  feastings  of  the  gods,*  were  ordered,  and 
solemn  vows  were  made  on  the  part  of  the  Boman  people. 

If  the  priests  intended,  in  the  interest  of  the  nobility, 
to  keep  the  people  by  religious  terrors  from  electing 
Elaminius,^  who,  as  a  notorious  free-thinker,  scoffed  at 
the  national  superstition,    their    pains    were    lost,    for 

»  LiTj,  xxi.  62. 

*  Livy,  loc,  cit. :  '  Caere  sortes  extennatas.*  These  '  sortes '  were  tablets  or 
stavfs  of  wood  or  other  materials,  with  prophetic  signs,  letters,  or  words 
engraved  on  them.     Compare  Cicero,  Be  Divinatione,  ii.  41,  85;  Lirj,  xxii.  1. 

*  See  Tol.  i.  p.  386. 

*  That  such  was  indeed  their  intention  is  evident  from  the  comparison  of 
Iheir  former  measures  in  the  year  223  b.c.  Compare  especially  Zonaras* 
viu.  20. 


B.C. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAB,  199 

Flaminius  was  elected  to  tlie  consulship  in  spite  of  all     ^^^' 

opposition.      It  was  customary  tliat  the  newly-elected »— ^ 

consul,  on  the  day  of  entering  on  his  ofSce,  should  dress  Pbriod, 
himself  in  his  house  in  his  ofScial  robe  (the  praetexta  or  ^^^"^^^ 
purple-bordered  toga),  ascend  the  Capitol  in  solemn  pro- 
cession, perform  a  sacrifice,  convene  a  meeting  of  the 
senate,  in  which  the  time  was  fixed  for  the  Latin  festival 
(ferisB  Latinse)  on  the  Alban  Mount  by  the  temple  of 
Jupiter  Latiaris,  and  that  he  should  not  start  for  his 
province  before  the  termination  of  this  festival,  which  at 
the  period  of  the  Hannibalian  war  lasted  several  days.^ 
In  order  to  avoid  the  chicanery  of  his  opponents,  who 
might  have  retained  him  in  the  city  or  compelled  him  to 
resign,  under  some  futile  pretext  of  a  bad  omen  *  or  of  an 
irregularity  in  the  ceremonies,  Flaminius  disregarded 
the  usual  formalities,  and  left  Some  abruptly,  in  order  to 
enter  on  his  office  in  his  camp  at  Ariminum.  The  senate, 
greatly  exasperated,  resolved  to  recall  him,  and  sent  an 

1  See  Becker,  Handbuch  der  rom,  AlierthuTner,  ii.  122  ;  iy.  440. 

*  Livy,  zxi.  63 :  '  Flaminius  ratus  auspiciis  ementiendis,  Latinaramque 
fenarum  mora,  et  consularibus  aliis  impedimentis  retenturos  se  in  urbe, 
simulato  itinere  privatus  clam  in  proTinciam  abiit.'  Livy  (xxii.  1)  gives  a 
fonnidable  list  of  these  'prodigia/  -which  were  eyidentlj  intended  to  keep 
Flaminius  from  taking  the  field :— 'In  Sicily  the  spears  of  soldiers  were  seen 
to  be  on  fire ;  in  Sardinia  the  staff  which  a  Soman  knight  carried  burnt 
away  in  his  hand  whilst  he  was  on  his  round  to  inspect  the  sentinels  on  the 
wall  of  a  town ;  frequent  fires  lighted  up  the  sea-coast ;  from  two  shields 
blood  exuded ;  seTeral  soldiers  were  struck  by  lightning ;  the  orb  of  the  sun 
appeared  to  grow  smaller ;  in  Prseneste  fiery  stones  fell  from  the  sky ;  at 
Arpi  shields  were  seen  in  the  sky,  and  the  sun  appeared  to  be  fighting  with  the 
moon ;  at  Capena  two  moons  were  seen  by  day ;  at  Csere  the  water  of  a  stream 
was  mixed  with  blood,  and  spots  of  blood  even  appeared  on  the  water  that 
flowed  from  the  fountain  of  Hercules ;  at  Antium  bloody  ears  feU  into  the 
baskets  of  reapers ;  at  Falerii  the  heavens  seemed  to  be  rent  asunder,  and  from 
the  gap  a  bright  light  shone  forth ;  the  prophetic  tablets  shrank,  and  one  of 
them  fell  on  the  ground,  containing  the  words :  "  Mavors  shakes  his  spear ;  ** 
sweat  appeared  on  the  statue  of  Mars  in  the  Appian  road,  and  on  those  of  the 
sacred  wolves ;  at  Capua  the  heavens  seemed  to  be  on  fire,  as  also  the  moon, 
which  set  amidst  a  shower  of  rain ;  goats  were  bom  covered  with  wool ;  a 
hen  was  changed  into  a  cock,  and  a  cock  into  a  hen/  The  list  of  expiatory 
rites  and  sacrifices  is  equally  interesting.  In  it  are  comprised  the  dedication  to 
Jupiter  of  a  golden  thunderbolt  fifty  pounds  in  weight,  several  other  offerings, 
lectistemia,  and  a  public  feast  (convivium  publicum). 


200  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  embassy  to  insist  on  his  immediate  return.  Flaminins 
%—  y ' — '  paid  no  attention  to  the  order  of  the  senate,  which  he 
knew  to  be  of  no  legal  force,  and  assumed  the  command 
of  the  army  at  Ariminum  without  the  observance  of  the 
usual  religious  formalities.  But  signs  of  warning  oc- 
curred even  now.  At  the  sacrifice  a  calf,  already  struck, 
but  not  killed  by  the  axe,  escaped  from  the  hands  of  the 
attendant,  sprinkled  many  persons  with  its  blood,  and 
disturbed  the  solemn  proceedings  by  the  terror  which  such 
an  evident  sign  of  the  divine  displeasure  produced.  The 
great  calamity  that  was  to  befall  Italy  was  hastened  by 
the  wickedness  of  men  like  Flaminiua,  who  disregarded 
the  warnings  of  the  gods. 
Marches  of       The  internal  disputes  did  not  prevent  the  Bomans  from 

the  two 

consuls.       inaking  their  preparations  for  the  ensuing  campaign  with 
circumspection  and  care.*     The  military  strength  of  Italy 
was   sufficient,   not   only  once    more  to   encounter    the 
principal  enemy  with  perfect  confidence,  but  amply  to 
provide  for  the  safety  of  the  distant  parts  of  the  Boman 
dominion.  Troops  were  sent  to  Sicily,  Sardinia,  Tarentum, 
and  other  places.     Sixty  quinqueremes  were  added  to  the 
fleet.     The  faithful  Hiero  of  Syracuse,  as  indefatigable  in 
the  service  of  Bome  as  ever,  sent  SOO  Cretans  and  1,000 
light- armed  infantry.*    Four  new  legions  were  raised,  and 
magazines  of  provisions  were  established  in  the  north  of 
Etruria  and  in  Ariminum,  by  one  of  which  two  routes  the 
advance  of  the  Carthaginians  was  expected.     In  the  latter 
place  the  remnants  of  the  army  beaten  at  the  Trebia  were 
collected,'  and  hence  Flaminius  led  his  men  by  cross  and 
by-roads  over  the  Apennines  into  northern  Etruria,*  to 

'  Polybius,  lii.  75. 

•  The  Cretans  were  probably  archers ;  they  were  as  much  in  repute  for  their 
skill  in  the  use  of  the  bow  as  the  Balearians  for  their  ezpertness  in  using 
the  sling.    The  Bomans  used  neither  of  these  weapons. 

»  Probably,  as  Mommsen  suggests,  conveyed  by  water  from  Placentia  and 
Cremona. 

*  Livy,  xxi.  62 :  'Per  tramites  Apennini.'  Probably  the  cavalry  of  these  four 
legions  remained  at  Ariminum ;  for,  in  the  first  place,  the  mountain  roads 
would  be  very  difficult  to  pass  with  cavalry ;  secondly,  the  caraliy  was  of  more 
importance  in  the  plain  near  Ariminum  than  in  the  hilly  country  of  Etruria^ 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


201 


join  them  to  the  two  new  legions  which  had  been  directed 
there  straight  from  Some.^ 

The  second  consul,  Cn.  Servilius,  proceeded  to  Ariminum 
with   the  two  other    newly-levied    legions.*    His   army 

thirdly,  the  anny  of  Seryilins  at  Ariminum  must  have  been  uDnsually  strong 
in  cavalry,  as  a  detachment  of  4,000  horse  could  be  dispatched  to  intercept 
Hannibal  (see  p.  204). 

>  Thus  the  divergent  statements  of  Polybius  (iii.  77)  and  Livy  (xxi.  62)  can 
be  made  to  agree. 

'  Polybius  is  not  sufficiently  explicit  in  his  statements  concerning  the 
armaments  end  the  strength  of  the  military  force  in  217  B.C.  It  seems  almost 
that  he  purposely  avoids  expressing  himself  clearly.  He  says  (iii.  75)  that 
the  Komans  sent  two  armies  {a-rparrSirtia)  to  Sardinia  and  Sicily,  garrisons  to 
Tarentum  and  other  places,  that  they  fitted  out  sixty  penteres,  and  that  the 
consuls  raised  new  armies  {arpon-Surt^a).  It  is  especially  important  to  under- 
stand the  latter  expression,  irvvrjyoy  rohs  avfifjidxovs  Kcti  KoriyfKupoy  rh  irap* 
ainois  (Trpar^cda.  Mommsen,  as  it  seems,  infers  that  the  consuls  did  not 
raipe  any  new  legions,  but  only  completed  those  that  had  been  defeated  on  the 
Trebia.  This  cannot  be  right.  The  words  of  Polybius  do  not  admit  such  an 
interpretation.  Moreover,  it  does  not  agree  with  the  statements  of  the 
strength  of  the  army  of  Flaminius  in  the  battle  on  Lake  Thrasymenus,  nor  with 
a  report  of  Appian  (vii.  8).  In  the  battle  on  the  Thrasymene  the  Komans  lost, 
according  to  Polybius,  30,000  men,  i.e,,  their  whole  army,  the  strength  of 
which  Appian  also  gives  at  30,000  men.  This  was  in  round  numbers  the  two 
new  kgions  (20,000  men),  and  10,000  men  more,  i.e.  the  remnants  of  the 
legions  from  Transalpine  Gaul.  Accordingly,  of  the  42,000  men  who  fought 
at  the  Trebia,  only  10,000  men  were  disposable  for  the  campaign  of  217  b.c.,  a 
result  which  is  in  perfect  accordance  with  all  that  we  know  of  the  disastrous 
battle  on  the  Trebia.  The  statement  of  Appian  (vii.  8)  is  to  this  effect,  that  in 
217  B.a  the  Romans  had  on  foot  thirteen  legions.  This  number  cannot  be 
made  up,  if  we  suppose  that  the  consuls  of  217  had  not  formed  four  new 
legions,  but  simply  replenished  the  legions  of  the  preceding  year.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  number  of  thirteen  legions  agrees  with  the  assumption  that  in 
217  B.C.  four  new  legions  were  raised.  There  were  in  Spain  two  legions,  in 
Sicily  and  Sardinia  one  each,  in  Tarentum  and  the  rest  of  Italy  one,  on  the 
Po  the  remnants  of  four  legions,  and,  lastly,  four  new  ones.  Apart  from  the 
objections  which  these  positive  statements  cause  against  Mommsen's  unsup- 
ported assumption,  the  course  of  events  seems  to  show  that  the  Komans  did 
not  confine  themselves  to  supplementing  the  remnants  of  the  defeated  legions, 
and  thus  expose  themselves  to  the  risk  of  another  defeat  by  HannibaFs 
victorious  army,  which  was  now  considerably  swelled  by  Gauls.  This  view  is 
hardly  borne  out  by  the  expressions  of  Polybius  (iii.  7^»  §  4),  9ih  iral  irapaB6^ou 
^wtivros  aJurois  rov  xpdyfxaros  vepl  riis  Xofwks  wapoffKtviis  iiuupfp6ifr«»s  iyiyvovro : 
1 7 :  Tdtrra  Z\  kcU  irarrax<^c*'  itftpy&s  iirolfiufov.  Polybius  is  silent  on  the  circum- 
stance related  by  Livy,  that  Flaminius  entered  on  his  office  at  Ariminum. 
Following  his  narrative  alone,  we  might  fancy  that  Flaminius  had  proceeded 
from  Kome  straight  to  Arretium  in  Etruria.  This  silence  is  perhaps  inten- 
tional. Polybius,  as  a  free-thinker,  was  disgusted  with  the  use  which  the 
Koman  aristocracy  made  of  the  popular  superstition,  but  instead  of  reproving* 


CHAP. 

vni. 

■ 1 -* 

First 
Period, 
218-216 

B.C. 


202 


BOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Misealcu- 
Istion  of 
the 
Bomans; 


March  of 
the  Car- 
thaginiaDS. 


coBsisted,  according  to  Appian,  of  40,000  men  in  all.  If 
this  statement  is  to  be  trusted,  ServiUas  must  have  had, 
besides  the  two  new  legions  and  the  nsual  number  of 
allies,  a  body  of  20,000  auxiliaries,  who  were  perhaps 
Cenomanians.  The  cavalrj  of  his  armj  was  verj  strong 
if,  as  Foljbius  reports,^  Servilius  dispatched  4,000  of  them 
into  Etruria  as  soon  as  he  was  informed  of  Hannibal's 
march  in  that  direction. 

The  situation  was,  upon  the  whole,  identical  with  that 
of  225  B.C.,  eight  years  before,  when  the  Romans  expected 
that  the  Gauls  would  advance  either  bj  the  eastern  road 
through  Picenum,  or  on  the  western  side  of  the  Apennines 
from  the  Upper  Arno.  Thej  had  then  divided  their  armies 
between  Ariminum  and  Arretium,  in  order  to  cover  both 
roads  to  Borne.  But  as  they  were  then  deceived  by  the 
Grauls,  who  crossed  the  Apennines,  not  near  the  Upper  Arno, 
but  £ax  westward  near  the  sea-coast,  and  suddenly  appeared 
in  Etruria  without  having  encountered  any  opposition, 
80  they  were  now  a  second  time  surprised  by  Hannibal. 

On  the  first  appearance  of  spring  the  Carthaginian 
army  broke  up  from  the  plain  of  the  Po.  It  had  been 
considerably  strengthened  by  Gauls.  Crossing  the  Apen* 
nines,  probably  by  the  pass  which  is  now  called  that  of 
Pontremoli  and  leads  from  Parma  to  Lucca,'  Hannibal 
had  reached  the  Arno,  while  Servilius  was  still  expecting 
him  at  Ariminum.  The  march  to  FsesulsB,  through  the 
low  ground  along  the  Arno,  was  beset  with  great  diffi* 
culties.  The  country  was  flooded  by  the  spring  rains  and 
the  melting  of  the  snow  on  the  mountains,  and  had  in 
several  places  assumed  the  aspect  of  vast  lakes.  Men  and 
beasts  sank  deep  into  the  soft  ground ;  many  of  the  horses 

Ids  frienda,  he  Demamed  sUent.  But  this  silance  eannot  inTalidate  the  positive 
teatimony  of  Livj. 

»  Polybius,  iii.  86. 

'  The  locality  where  Hannibal  crossed  the  Apennines  cannot  be  fixed  with 
more  certainty  than  his  passage  over  the  Alps,  as  Polybius  mentions  no  names 
and  does  not  describe  the  country  accurately.  Nissrn  (Rhein.  MuMum, 
xxii.  674)  is  in  favour  of  the  road  from  Modena  or  Bologna  to  Pistoja,  and 
thinks  the  inundated  country  was  the  valley  of  the  Ombrone  between  Pistoja 
and  Fiesole. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  203 

lost  their  hoofs  and  perished.    A  portion  of  the  army  was     CHAP, 
obliged  to  wade  through  the  water  for  three  days,  and  to 


pass  the  nights  without  being  able  to  find  dry  spots  on  j^^^ 
which  they  might  rest  or  sleep,  except  the  bodies  of  fallen  218-216 
animals,  and  heaps  of  the  abandoned  baggage.  The  damp 
and  variable  weather,  together  with  excessive  fatigue, 
and  especially  the  want  of  sleep,  caused  sickness  and 
terrible  havoc  among  the  troops.  Hannibal  himself  lost 
one  of  his  eyes  by  inflammation.  The  Gauls  suffered 
most.  They  formed  the  centre  in  the  line  of  march,  and 
if  Hannibal  had  not  taken  the  precaution  of  causing  the 
cavalry,  under  hia  brave  brother  Mago,  to  close  the  rear, 
they  woxdd  have  deserted  in  crowds,  for  they  were  near 
home,  and,  as  Gauls,  they  had  no  perseverance  to  bear  up 
against  continued  hardships. 

Having  reached  the  Upper  Arno,  Hannibal  allowed  his  Move- 
army  to  repose.     Then  he  marched  southwards,  passing  n^^iwi 
by  the  camp  of  Flaminius  near  Arretium,  in  the  direction  of  towards 
Cortona.    To  attack  the  fortified  camp  of  the  consul  would 
have  been  hopeless.     Even  at  the  Trebia  Hannibal  had 
left  the  defeated  and  wounded  Scipio  and  his  discouraged 
army  unmolested  in  his  camp,  and  had  preferred  to  engage 
two  united  consular  armies  in  the  field  rather  than  attack 
one  within  its  intrenchments.     It  was  therefore  natural 
that  he  should  now  try  to  provoke  Flaminius  to  leave  his 
camp  and  fight  a  battle.^     If  he  marched  further  south 
towards  Bome,  it  was  impossible  for  Flaminius  to  remain 
stationary  at  Arretium.      Between  Hannibal  and  Home 
there  was  now  no  Koman  army.     Who  would  take  the 
responsibility  of  letting  the  enemy  march  unopposed  upon 
Bome  ?    Whether  Hannibal  would  attack  the  city,  and 
whether  an  attack  would  succeed,  nobody  could  tell.     At 
any  rate  the  apprehensions  in  Rome  were  great.     It  was 
the  duty  of  the  two  consuls  to  beat  the  enemy  in  the  field.^ 

*  According  to  Polybius  (iii.  82),  Flaminius  was  aggrarated  and  offended 
because  Hannibal  inarched  past  him  as  &om  contempt.  This  is  surely  a  mis- 
representation, like  many  others,  intended  to  cast  a  blemish  on  the  character 
of  Flaminius,  and  it  owes  its  origin  probably  to  his  political  opponents. 

'  The  same  Tiew  is  expressed  by  Nissen  {Bheinisches  Museum^  xzii.  665). 


204 


EOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 

IV. 

^ 1 " 

Move- 
ments of 
Flaminiua. 


On  no  account  could  they  think  of  remaining  in  the  north 
of  Italy  whilst  the  capital  was  threatened.* 

Flaminius   accordingly  hroke  up  from  Arretium  and 
followed  Hannibal  closely.     It  is  not  at  all  probable  that 
he  had  any  idea  of  oflfering  or  accepting  battle  before 
his  colleague,  whom  he  had  now  every  reason  to  expect 
in  Etruria,  should  arrive  from  Ariminum.     Perhaps   he 
contemplated  a  repetition  of  the   campaign  in  the  late 
Gallic   war,  which  eight  years  before  had  led  to   such 
brilliant  results.*    At  that  time  a  Gallic  army,  followed 
by  the  army  of  one  Boman  consul,  suddenly  encountered 
the  other  consul  in  front,  and  was  cut  to  pieces  by  a 
combined  attack  of  the  two  colleagues.     Now,  if  Servilius 
marched  rapidly  by  the  Flaminian  road  from  Umbria,  and 
succeeded  in  placing  himself  between  Hannibal  and  Rome, 
the  two  consuls  could,  as  on  the  previous  occasion,  fall 
upon    the    enemy    from    two    sides.      It    appears    that 
Servilius  acted  upon  such  a  plan  as  this.     He  dispatched 
a  body  of  4,000  horse,  under  C.  Centenius,  in  advance,  and 
followed  with  the  infantry  on  the  Flaminian  road.'    It 
was  therefore  the  duty  of  Flaminius  to  keep  as  close  as 
possible  to  the  Carthaginians,  in  order  to  be  near  enough, 
on  the  expected  approach  of  the  second  Boman  army,  for 
a  combined  action.     He  was  strong  enough  for  this,  for  he 
had  more  than  30,000  men.   This  force  sufficed  to  hamper 
the  movements  of  the  invaders,  and  even  to  protect  the 
country  to  some  extent  fi^m  devastation.     In  a  few  hours 
Boman  soldiers  could  make  a  fortified  camp,  in  which  they 
would  be  safe  from  a  surprise,  and  even  from  an  attack  in 
due  form.   For  this  reason  a  Eoman  general  C/Oxdd  venture 
close  to  an  enemy,  without  exposing  himself  to  any  extra- 
ordinary risks.'*     The  plan  of  Flaminius  cannot  therefore 

*  Thus  the  Koman  legions  followed  Pyrrhus  when  he  marched  upon  Borne. 
See  vol.  i.  p.  623.  •  See  above,  p.  129. 

'  These  marched  on  the  Flaminian  road  (see  Nissen,  Shein,  Miueum,  xx. 
228),  and  had  probably  left  it  at  Mevonia  to  turn  to  the  right  towards 
Perusia,  when  the  battle  on  the  Lake  Thrasymenus  forced  them  to  return.  On 
this  retreat  they  were  overtaken  and  defeated  by  Maharbal.   See  below,  p.  210. 

*  This  was  usual  in  the  strategical  operations  of  the  Bomans.    A  weU- 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAB.  205 

be  called  rash.     But  he  had  in  his  calculation  overlooked     CBAP. 
one  item,  or  rated  it  at  too  low  a  figure.     The  enemy  he         .  '^ 
had  to  deal  with  was  not  a  horde  of  barbarian  Gauls,  but     p^^^ 
a  disciplined  army  of  veteran  soldiers,  led  by  Hannibal.         21 8-21 6 

The  unfortunate  are  seldom  treated  with  justice  by       ^'^' 
their  friends,  never  by  their  enemies.      Flaminius  was  t^©\fo^e^ 
recognised  leader  of  the  popular  party,  and  the  history  of  jcensures 
Eome  was  written  by  the  adherents  and  clients  of  the  Ij^^  yi&- 
nobility.     Thus  Flaminius  has  experienced,  even  at  the  pnias. 
hands  of  Polybius,  an  ungenerous,  nay,  unjust,  treatment.  / 
But,  in  truth,  if  he  committed  faults  in  his  command,  if  he 
allowed  himself  to  be  outwitted  and  surprised  in   an 
ambush  by  a  superior  antagonist,  he  is  not  more  guilty 
than  many  other  Boman  consuls  before  and  after  him, 
whose  faults  were  forgiven  because  they  belonged  to  the 
ruling  party.  And  yet  few  of  these  have  an  equal  claim  to 
consideration  and  forgiveness  with  Flaminius,  who  atoned 
for  his  fault  with  his  life.^     Nevertheless,  party  hatred 
survived  him,  and  delighted  in  making  him  responsible 
for  the  whole  misfortune  which  the  genius  of  Hannibal 
inflicted  on  his  ill-fated  army. 

Polybius  disdains  repeating  the  silly  charge  brought  Charges 
against  Flaminius,  that  he  rushed  into  misfortune  through  j^^^^^ 
his    contempt  of   the    gods.      Livy,  however,   is   more  Flaminius. 
punctilious  in  preserving  traits  which  are  characteristic 
of  Boman  manners  and  sentiment.     He  relates,  therefore, 
that,  on  starting  from  Arretium,  he  was  thrown  from  his 
horse,  but  disregarded  not  only  this  warning  of  the  gods, 

known  illustration  is  the  campaign  of  Fabius  Mazimus  in  the  following  year. 
Compare  Livj,  xxii.  12:  'Fabins  per  loca  alta  agmen  ducebat  modico  ab 
ho0t«  intervallo,  ut  neque  omitteret  eum,  neque  congrederetur.' 

'  Arnold  {History  of  Home,  iii.  110)  says  most  justly  and  eloquently: 
*  Flaminius  died  bravely,  sword  in  hand,  having  committed  no  greater  military 
error  than  many  an  impetuous  soldier  whose  death  in  his  country's  cause  has 
been  felt  to  throw  a  veil  over  his  rashness,  and  whose  memory  is  pitied  and 
honoured.  The  party  feelings  which  have  so  coloured  the  language  of  the 
ancient  writers  respecting  him  need  not  be  shared  by  a  modem  historian. 
Flaminius  was  indeed  an  unequal  antagonist  to  Hannibal ;  but,  in  his  previous 
life,  as  consul  and  as  censor,  he  had  served  his  country  well ;  and  if  the 
defile  of  Thrasymenus  witnessed  his  rashness,  it  also  contains  his  honourable 
grave.* 


206  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     but  another  also  which  still  more  plainly  bade  him  stay. 
An  ensign-bearer  being  unable  with  all  his  strength  to 
pull  the  ensign  out  of  the  ground,  Flaminius  ordered  it  to 
be  dug  out.*     On  the  other  hand,  Polybius'  prefers  a 
graver  charge  against  the  unfortunate  general.     He  says 
that  he   was  urged  by  political  considerations — ^by  the 
fear  of  losing  the  popular  favour;   that  he  wished  to 
appropriate  to  himself  the  glory  of  defeating  Hannibal 
without  sharing  it  with  his  colleague ;  that  he  was  puffed 
up  with  vanity,  and  considered  himself  a  great  general ; 
and  that  for  these  reasons  he  was  anxious  to  hurry  on  an 
engagement  with  Hannibal,  and  rushed   heedlessly  into 
danger.     We  hold  these  charges  to  be  unjust,  and  to  be 
refuted  by  the  events  themselves.'    K  Flaminius  had  been 
foolishly  eager  to  bring  on  an  engagement,  he   would 
surely  not  have  waited  till  Hannibal  had  advanced  as  faf 
as  Arretium,  still  less  would  he  have  allowed  him  to  pass 
by  his  camp.     He  would  have  gone  to  meet  him,  and  he 
would  have  been  able  to  attack  the  Punic  army  before  it 
had  recovered  from  the  fatigues  and  hardships  of  &  long 
march  across  the  Apennines  and  through  the  lands  inun- 
dated by  the  Amo.    He  would,  then,  if  he  had  been  victo- 
rious, have  prevented  the  devastation  of  northern  Etruria^ 
and  have  secured  for  himself  the  glory  which  he  is  said  to 
have  so  much  coveted.    Instead  of  doing  this,  he  remained 
quietly  in  his  camp;  and  the  &.tal  battle  on  the  Thrasymene 
was  not  offered  by  him,  but  accepted,  because  he  had  no 
chance  of  avoiding  it.     It  is  no  less  an  invention  of  his 
political  enemies  that,  as  Polybius  says,  Hannibal  built 
his  plan  on  his  knowledge  of  the  inconsiderate  ardour, 
audacity,  and  vainglorious  folly  of  Flaminius.     His  faults 
were  too  much  the  general  faults  of  most  Boman  consuls 
to  make  it  necessary  for  Hannibal  to  devise  peculiar 
stratagems  against  this  particular  leader. 

'  Livy,  xxii.  3.  •  Polybius,  iii.  81, 

'  The  statement  of  Polybius  (iii.  82,  §  8),  that  the  number  of  soldiers  in 
the  army  of  Flaminius  was  less  than  that  of  the  unarmed  crowd  attracted 
by  the  hope  of  booty,  is  a  self-eyident  and  unpardonable  exaggeration. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  207 

When,  on  his  march,  Hannibal  had  passed  Cortona,  and     CHAP 
reached  the   Lake  Thrasymenns   (Lago   di   Perugia),  he  ^ — ,-L^ 
resolved  to  halt  and  to  wait  for  the  Romans,  who  were     pg"*^ 
closely  following    him;    and  then,   having    chosen   his     218-216 
ground,  he  made  his  dispositions  for  the  coming  struggle. 
On  the  northern  side  of  the  lake,  where  it  is  skirted  by  Disposi- 
the  road  from  Cortona  to  Perusia,  a  steep  range  of  hiQs  g^^nnfbal's 
approaches  near  to  the  water's  edge,  so  that  the  road  (from  forces. 
Borghetto  to  Magione)  passes  through  a  defile,  formed  by 
the  lake  on  the  right  and  the  mountains  on  the  left.    In  one 
spot  only  (near  the  modem  village  of  Tuoro)  the  hills  recede 
to  some  distance,  and  leave  a  small  expanse  of  level  ground, 
bordered  on  the  south  by  the  lake,  and  everywhere  else  by 
steep  heights.  On  these  heights  Hannibal  drewup  his  army. 
With  the  best  portion  of  his  infantry,  the  Libyans  and 
Spaniards,  he  occupied  a  hill  jutting  out  into  the  middle  of 
the  plain.     On  his  lefb  or  eastern  side  he  placed  the  slingers 
and  other  light  troops ;  on  his  right  he  drew  up  the  Gauls, 
and  beyond  them  his  cavalry,  on  the  gentler  slopes  as  far 
as  the  point  where  the  defile  begins  and  where  he  expected 
the  advance  of  the  Bomans.     Probably  the  ground  near 
the  lake  waa  marshy,  and  consequently  the  road  wound 
along  the  foot  of  the  hills,  where  they  receded  from  the 
water.* 

Late  in  the  evening  of  the  day  on  which  these  arrange-  The  battle 
ments  were  made  (it  was  still  April),  Flaminius  arrived  in  ^^^ 
the  neighbourhood,  and  encamped  for  the  night  not  far  meneiake.. 
from  the  lake.    Early  the  next  morning  he  continued  his 
march,  anxious  to  keep  close  up  to  the  enemy,  and  not 
suspecting  that  the  lion  whose  track  he  was  following  was 
crouching  close  by  and  was  prepared  to  leap  upon  him  with 

>  This  is  the  description  of  the  battle-field  given  by  Nissen  {fiKein^  Museum, 
zxiii.  580  ff.).  But  it  is  evident  that  Polybius  (iii.  83)  imagined  it  to  be 
different.  He  seems  to  have  thought  that  the  road  on  which  Flaminius  was 
attacked  ran  right  through,  and  not  past,  the  vallej,  the  two  sides  of  which 
Hannibal  had  lined  with  his  troops.  But,  as  the  road  from  Cortona  to  Perusia 
passes  through  no  such  valley  near  the  lake  (see  Arnold,  Hist,  of  Home, 
iii.  106),  we  have  no  alternative  but  to  adapt  to  the  locality,  as  well  as  we 
can,  the  description  of  the  battle  given  by  Polybius. 


208  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     a  sudden  bound.     A  thick  mist  had  risen  from  the  lake 

IV 

< ^ — ^  and  covered  the  road  and  the  foot  of  the  hills,  while  their 

'   summits   were   shining  in  the  morning  sun.      Nothing 
betrayed  the  presence  of  the  enemy.     With  the  feeling  of 
perfect  security,  in  regular  marching  order,  laden  with  their 
baggage,  the  soldiers  entered  the  fatal  ground,  and  the 
long  line  of  the  army  wound  along   slowly  between  the 
lake  and  the  hills.     The  head  of  the  column  had  already 
passed  the  small  plain  on  their  left,  and  was  marching 
along  that  part  of  the  road  where  the  mountains  came 
close  to  the  water's  edge.    The  rear-guard  had  just  entered 
the  defile^  when  suddenly  the  stillness  of  the  morning  was 
broken  by  the  wild  cry  of  battle,  and  the  Eomans,  as  if 
they  were  attacked  by  invisible  enemies,  were  struck  down 
without  being  able  to  ward  oflf  or  return  a  blow.     Before 
they  could  throw  down  their  cumbersome  baggage  and 
seize  their  arms,  the  enemy  was  among  them.     They 
rushed  in  masses  from  all  the  hills  at  the  same  timOk 
There  was  no  time  to  form  into  order  of  battle.  Every  one 
had  to  rely  on  the  strength  of  his  own  arm  and  strike  for 
life  as  well  as  he  could.     In  vain  Flaminius  tried  to  rally 
and  form  his  men.     They  rushed  in  all  directions  upon  the 
enemy  or  upon  each  other,  wild  with  dismay  and  despair. 
It  was  no  battle,  but  a  butchery.    The  office  of  the  general 
could  no  longer  be  to  lead  his  men,  and  to  superintend  and 
control  the  fight,  but  to  set  the  example  of  individual 
courage,  and  to  discharge  the  duty  of  the  meanest  soldier. 
This  duty  Plaminius  performed,  and  he  fell  in  the  midst 
of  the  brave  men  whom  he  had  led  to  their  death.     The 
Bomans  were  slain  by  thousands,  showing  in  death  that 
unwavering  spirit  which  so  often  led  them  to  victory.     A 
few,  pushed  into  the  lake,  tried  to  save  their  lives  by 
swimming,  but  the  weight  of  their  armour  pressed  them 
down.     Others  waded  into  the  water  as  far  as  they  could, 
but  were  mercilessly  cut  down  by  the  hostile  cavalry,  or 
died  by  their  own  hands.   Only  a  body  of  6,000  men,  which 
had  formed  the  head  of  the  line  of  march,  cut  their  way 
through  the  Carthaginians  and  reached  the  top  of  the  hills. 


B.C. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  209 

from  which,  after  the  mist  was  dispersed,  they  beheld     CHAP, 
the  terrible  carnage  below,  and  saw  at  the  same  time  that  v.. — ,—1^ 
they  were  nnable  to  assist  their  perishing  comrades.  They    p^^ 
therefore  moved  forward,   and    took  up   a   position    in    218-216 
a  neighbouring  village.     But  they  were  soon  overtaken  by 
Hannibal's  indefatigable  cavahy,  under  the  command  of 
Maharbal,  and  were  compelled  to  lay  down  their  arms  and 
surrender. 

In  three  short  hours  the  work  of  destruction  was 
finished.  Fifteen  thousand  Bomans  covered  the  bloody 
field.  The  prisoners  were  equally  numerous.  It  appears, 
from  the  account  of  Polybius,  that  none  escaped.'  The 
Boman  army  was  not  only  defeated  but  annihilated.  The 
loss  of  the  Carthaginians,  on  the  other  hand,  was  small. 
Fifteen  hundred  men,  for  the  most  part  Gauls,  had  fallen. 
Hannibal  honoured  thirty  of  the  more  distinguished  of 
them  by  a  solemn  frmeral.  He  searched  also  for  the  body 
of  the  unfortunate  Flaminius,  to  give  him  a  burial  worthy 
of  his  rank.  But  among  the  heaps  of  the  slain,  the  Boman 
consul,  stripped,  no  doubt,  and  despoiled  of  his  insig^a, 
could  not  be  identified.  A  hostile  fate,  which  exposed  him 
to  the  reviling  tongue  of  his  political  opponents  and 
blackened  his  memory,  deprived  him  also  of  the  respect 
which  a  generous  enemy  was  ready  to  bestow.  The 
prisoners  were  treated  by  Hannibal  as  on  the  previous 
occasion.  Those  of  them  who  were  Bomans  were  kept  in 
chains.     The  Boman  allies  obtained  their  freedom  without 

'  In  Liv^'s  account  we  can  perceive  the  intention  to  make  the  Roman  loss 
appear  smaller  than  it  was,  and  to  exaggerate  that  of  the  Carthaginians, 
^though  be  protests  against  such  an  intention,  and,  in  tmth,  does  not  on  this 
occasion  indulge  to  an  undue  extent  in  that  national  sin  of  the  Boman 
historians  (Livy,  xxii.  7).  He  admits  that  15,000  Eomans  fell  in  the  battle, 
and  that  6,000  were  taken  by  Maharbal  after  the  battle  was  over ;  but  he  says 
nothing  of  any  prisoners  made  in  the  battle,  which  is  an  evident,  if  not  an 
intentional,  omission.  According  to  Polybius,  the  number  of  prisoners 
amounted  altogether  to  15,000.  He  says  nothing  of  Aigitives.  But  Livy 
states  that  10,000  Romans  escaped,  which,  if  true,  would  go  far  to  modify  the 
character  of  the  calamity.  Livy,  moreover,  states  the  number  of  slain  in  the 
Carthaginian  army  at  2,500  (1,000  more  than  Polybius),  and  he  adds,  evidently 
for  the  purpose  of  soothing  the  soreness  of  Roman  patriotism,  that  many 
died  afterwards  of  their  wounds. 

VOL.  n.  p 


210 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Dismay  in 
the  city  of 
Rome  on 
the  tidings 
of  the 
battle. 


Defeat  of 
Centeniufl. 


ransom,  and  were  assured  that  Hannibal  waged  war  only 
with  Eome,  and  had  come  to  free  them  from  the  Roman 
yoke. 

The  news  of  the  terrible  slaughter  at  Lake  Thrasymenus 
reached  Rome  in  the  course  of  the  following  day.*  This 
time  no  attempt  was  made  to  hide  or  to  colour  the  truth. 
Already  fugitives  had  hastened  to  Rome,  and  reported 
what  they  had  seen  or  what  they  apprehended.  The  Forum 
was  thronged  with  an  anxious  crowd  that  pressed  round 
the  senate-house,  impatient  to  know  what  had  happened. 
When  at  length,  towards  evening,  the  praetor  Marcus 
Pomponius  ascended  the  public  platform,  and  announced, 
with  a  loud  voice,  *  We  are  beaten  in  a  great  battle,  our 
army  is  destroyed,  and  Maminius,  the  constd,  is  slain,' 
the  people  gave  themselves  up  to  their  grief  without  re- 
serve, and  the  scene  was  more  affecting  than  even  the 
carnage  of  the  battle.*  The  senate  alone  preserved  its 
dignity,  and  calmly  consulted  on  the  measures  necessary 
for  the  safety  of  the  town. 

Three  days  later  fresh  tidings  of  evil  arrived.  The  4,000 
horse  under  the  proprsetor  Centenius,  whom  the  consul  Ser- 
vilius  had  dispatched  from  Ariminum  to  retard  the  advance 
of  Hannibal  until  he  could  follow  with  the  bulk  of  his 
troops,  had  fallen  in  with  the  victorious  army,  and  were 
either  cut  to  pieces  or  captured  by  Maharbal's  cavalry  and 
light  troops.*    By  this  reverse  the  army  of  the  second 


*  This  may  be  inferred  from  Livy,  xxii.  6,  7, 

«  PolybiuB,  iii.  86,  §  8. 

'  The  spot  where  this  happened  is  not  mentioned  by  Polybius  (iii.  86). 
Zonaras  names  Spoletium,  and  Livy  (xxii.  8)  agrees  with  him  in  so  far  as  he 
refers  it  to  Umbria.  Appian  (vii.  9)  says  the  engagement  took  place  near  a 
lake  called  Pleistine,  which  is  otherwise  quite  unknown.  Appian's  account, 
however,  is  very  incorrect  and  confused.  He  makes  the  force  of  Centenius  to 
be  8,000  strong,  and  says  he  was  sent  from  Rome.  Kissen  (Rhein,  Museum, 
XX..  224)  thinks  that  the  Lake  Pleistine,  like  several  other  lakes  that  existed 
formerly  in  Central  Italy,  is  now  dried  up,  and  that  its  bed  is  to  be  recognised 
in  the  valley  of  Pistia,  between  Colfiorito,  Serravalle,  and  Dignano,  on  the  road 
from  Foligno  to  Camerino.  This  view  is  very  plausible.  It  would  prove,  moreover, 
that  Servilius,  with  the  second  consular  army,  to  which  the  4,000  horse  be- 
longed, was  marching  southwards,  on  the  Via  Flaminia,  evidently  with  the  inten- 
tion of  placing  himself  between  Hannibal  and  Borne,  or  of  joining  the  army  of 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  211 

consul,  being  deprived  of  its  cavalry,  was  disabled,  and  CHAP, 
could  no  longer  ofifer  any  resistance  to  Hannibal's  advance.  ^ .  .  ' ._ 
The  Punic  horsemen  now  rangred  without  control  through    J^^^^ 

°  ^         Pebiod, 

southern  Etruria,  and  showed  themselves  actually  at  218-216 
Namia,  scarcely  two  days'  march  from  Rome.*  ^^* 

The  most  serious  apprehensions  for  the  safety  of  the  Finnness 
city  appeared  not  unfounded.  Between  Hannibal  and  J^^®^ 
Eome  there  now  intervened  no  army  in  the  field.  One  army  senate, 
was  destroyed  and  the  other  wa*  fer  away  in  Umbria, 
crippled  and  unable  to  oppose  the  enemy.  The  boldest 
resolutions  could  be  expected  of  a  general  like  Hannibal. 
Nothing  seemed  to  be  able  to  stop  or  retard  the  progress 
of  the  man  who  passed  through  Italy  like  a  devastating 
element,  crushing  all  resistance  and  setting  all  obstacles  at 
nought.  Nevertheless  the  men  of  Bome  did  not  despair. 
The  senate  remained  united  for  several  days  in  a  perma- 
nent  consultation  from  morning  xmtil  evening,  and,  by 
its  gravity  and  firmness,  gradually  inspired  the  terri- 
fied people  with  some  degree  of  confidence  and  hope. 
Measures  were  taken  immediately  for  the  defence  of  the 
city.  The  bridges  over  the  Tiber  and  other  rivers  were 
destroyed,^  stones  and  projectiles  accumulated,  and  the 
walls  put  in  a  state  of  defence.  The  arms  which  were 
hung  up  in  the  temples  as  trophies  of  war  were  taken 
down  and  distributed  to  old  soldiers.'  Above  all  things, 
a  new  head  was  given  to  the  state.  The  times  were 
i*emembered  when  men  like  Ciucinnatus  and  Camillus, 
invested  with  unlimited  authority^  had  saved  the  republic 
from  imminent  danger.  The  ancient  office  of  the  dictator- 
ship had  almost  fallen  into  oblivion.  The  living  genera- 
tion of  younger  men  knew  of  it  only  from  the  tales  of  their 
fathers.  Thirty-two  years  had  passed  since,  in  the 
darkest  period  of  the  first  Punic  war,  after  the  great  defeat 
at  Drepana,  a  dictator  had  been  chosen.     Now,  in  the 

his  colleague.  This  plan  must,  of  course,  have  been  concerted  between  the  two 
consuls  as  soon  as  Hannibal  had  appeared  in  Etruria,  and  in  it  lies  a  further 
justification  of  Flaminius. 

>  Zonaras,  viii.  26, 

*  Livj,  zzii.  8.    Zonaras,  Till.  26.  '  Appian,  TiL  11. 

F  2 


212 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Prodic- 
tutorship 

of  a 

Fabius 
Mttximus. 


overwlielming  violence  of  the  tempest,  this  often  tested 
sheet  anchor  was  tried  again.  Bat  it  was  not  possible  to 
appoint  a  dictator  according  to  the  forms  and  rales  of  the 
old  law.  A  consul  ought  to  nominate  the  dictator ;  but 
Flaminius  was  dead,  and  between  Servilius  and  Borne 
stood  the  hostile  army.  A  mode  of  appointing  a  dictator 
was  therefore  adopted  which  had  never  been  resorted  to 
before,  and  waa  never  applied  again.  A  pro-dictator  and 
a  master  of  the  horse  *  were  elected  by  popular  suffrage. 
The  man  selected  was  Q.  Fabius  Maximus,  who  had  served 
the  state  honourably  in  many  public  functions,  and  who 
belonged  to  a  noble  and  at  the  same  time  moderate  patri- 
cian house,  which  from  the  earliest  ages  of  the  republic, 
and  especially  in  the  Sanmite  wars,  had*  proved  its  warlike 
abilities.  Q.  Fabius  was  not  a  bold,  enterprising  general, 
but  a  man  of  firmness  and  intrepidity ;  and  it  was  precisely 
such  a  man  that  Bome  required  at  a  time  when  adversity 
was  threatening  on  all  sides. 

The  first  task  of  the  dictator  was  to  restore  the  shaken 
faith  in  the  national  gods.  There  was  no  hope  of  salva- 
tion from  the  present  calamity,  unless  the  gods  were  duly 
propitiated.  It  was  clear  that,  not  the  sword  of  the 
enemy,  but  the  contempt  of  the  gods,  which  Flaminius  had 
been  guilty  of,  was  the  cause  of  the  great  reverses.  Now 
the  impious  scoffers  had  been  put  to  shame,  and  the 
forfeited  favour  of  the  outraged  deity  could  only  be  regained 
by  penitence  and  submission  to  the  sacred  rites  of  the 
national  religion.  The  Sibylline  books  were  consulted. 
On  their  advice  the  dictator  vowed  a  temple  to  the  Erycinian 
Venus,  and  the  praetor  T.  Otacilius  promised  a  temple  to 
the  goddess  Beason  (Mens).  For  the  celebration  of  the 
public  games  the  sum  of  thirty-three  thousand  three 
hundred  and  thirty-three  and  one-third  pounds  of  copper 
was  voted  ;^  white  oxen  were  slaughtered  as  an  atoning 

>  Polybius,  iii.  87.  Livy,  xxii.  8.  According  to  Plutarch  {FiUt.  Mas.  4),  it 
was  Fabius  himself  Uiat  nominated  the  magister  eqnitum.  There  can  be  no 
doabt  that  the  statement  of  Polybius  and  Livy  is  correct. 

■  Surely  a  most  remarkable  number,  and  one  showing  the  sacredness  of  the 
number  three  among  the  Bomans.    It  reminds  us  of  the  oldest  political 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  213 

sacrifice,  and  the  whole  popolatioiiy   men,  women,  and     CHAP, 
children,  put  up  their  prayers  and  ofiFerings  to  the  gods.  s. 


FlBST 


For  three  continuous  days  the  six  principal  pairs  of  deities  ^^^ 
were  publicly  exhibited  on  couches  and  feasted.^  A  218-216 
solemn  vow  was  made  by  the  community,  if  the  Eoman 
commonwealth  of  the  Quirites  should  remain  unimpaired 
for  five  years,  to  sacrifice  to  Jupiter  all  the  young  of 
swine,  sheep,  goats,  and  cattle  that  should  be  bom  in  this 
year.*  It  was  not  necessary  to  devote  also  the  children 
of  men ;  they  fell  in  fall  hecatombs  as  victims  to  the  god 
of  war  on  the  field  of  battle. 

Having  scrupulously  fulfilled  the  duties  to  the  gods.  Military 
Fabius  addressed  himself  to  military  measures.  The  first  ^^f^^. 
task  was  to  fill  up  the  gap  which  the  fatal  battle  of  Lake 
Thrasymenus  had  made  in  the  armed  force.  Two'  new 
legions  were  raised.  The  consul  Servilius  was  ordered 
to  come  to  Borne  with  his  two  legions.  He  met  the 
dictator  at  Ocriculum  on  the  Tiber,  not  far  from  Namia.^ 
Here  the  Boman  soldiers  who  had  never  been  commanded 
by  a  dictator  saw  for  the  first  time  that  his  power  in  the 
state  was  supreme.  When  the  consul  was  drawing  near 
the  dictator,  the  latter  commanded  him  to  dismiss  his 
lictors,  and  to  appear  alone  before  his  superior,  who  was 
preceded  by  twenty-four  lictors. 

Meanwhile  more  evil  news  had  arrived.      A  fieet  of  Greatness 

of  the 

institntioDB  of  Home,  in  which  the  number  three  and  its  mnltipleb  frequently         ^^    ^* 
occur — the  three  tribes,  the  thirty  curies,  the  three  hundred  knights,  and  the 
original  legion  of  three  thousand  men ;   the  three  hundred  senators,  three 
hundred  colonists,  and,  in  religion,  the  Capitoline  trinity  of  Jupiter,  Venus,  and      ^ 
Minerra.  — 

>  Livy,  zxii.  10:  'Sex  pulvinaria  in  oonspectu  fuerunt;  IotI  ac  lunoni 
unum,  alternm  Neptuno  ac  Minervs,  tertium  Marti  et  Veneri,  qnartum 
ApoUini  ac  Diane,  quintum  Vulcano  ac  Vestae,  sextum  Mercurio  et  Cereri/ 

'  Livy,  xxii.  9, 10.  Polybius  passes  over  the  detail  of  all  the  superstitious 
rites,  which  he  detests,  and  says  only  (iii.  88,  §  7),  *dfiios  .  .  •  6^0*01  rois 
Otoit  .  .  .  i^(&pijaiff9, 

'  LiTy,  xxii.  11.  According  to  Polybius  (iii.  88,  §  7),  four  legions.  Liv/s 
statement  is  more  precise  and  credible,  especially  as  it  is  confirmed  xxii.  27. 

*  This  statement  of  Livy  (xxii.  11)  appears  to  be  trustworthy,  and  b 
preferable  to  that  of  Polybius  (iii.  88,  |  8),  according  to  which  Fabius  and 
Servilius  effected  their  junction  in  northern  Apulia. 


214 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Plans  of 
Hannibal. 


transports,  destined  for  the  legions  in  Spain,  had  been  sur- 
prised and  taken  bj  the  Carthaginians  near  Cosa  on  the 
coast  of  Etmria.  Upon  this  news  Servilins  was  sent  to 
Ostia,  to  arm  and  eqnip  the  Boman  ships  in  that  port. 
Out  of  the  lower  class  of  people  he  enrolled  seamen  for 
the  fleet  and  a  body  of  soldiers  to  serve  as  a  garrison  for  the 
citj.  Already  the  pressure  of  war  was  felt,  and  was  producing 
alarming  symptoms.  In  spite  of  the  apparently  inexhaus- 
tible population  of  Italy,  in  spite  of  the  vast  superiority  of 
Bome  over  Carthage  in  men  trained  to  war — the  point  in 
which  the  preponderance  of  Borne  chiefly  lay — the  Bomans 
were  obliged,  in  the  second  year  of  the  war,  to  take  soldiers 
from  a  class  of  citizens  which  in  the  good  old  time  was 
looked  upon  as  unworthy  of  the  honourable  service  of  war. 
From  among  the  freedmen,  the  descendants  of  manumitted 
slaves,  those  were  enrolled  who  were  fathers  of  families, 
and  seemed  to  have  given  pledges  to  the  state  for  their 
fidelity  in  its  service.  The  time  was  not  yet  come,  but  it 
was  approaching,  when  the  proud  city  would  be  compelled 
to  arm  the  hands  of  slaves  in  her  defence. 

The  apprehension  that  Hannibal,  after  his  victory  over 
Flaminius,  would  march  straight  upon  Bome,  proved  un- 
founded. Hannibal  knew  perfectly  well  that,  with  his 
reduced  army,  his  few  remaining  Spanish  and  African 
veterans,  and  with  the  unsteady  Gauls,  he  could  not  lay 
siege  to  such  a  town  as  Bome.  His  plan  had  been  from 
the  very  beginning  to  induce  the  Boman  allies  to  revolt, 
and  in  union  with  them  to  strike  at  the  head  of  his  foe. 
He  calculated  above  all  on  the  Sabellian  nations  in  the 
heart  of  Italy.  They  had  offered  the  longest  and  stoutest 
resistance  to  the  Boman  supremacy.  If  he  succeeded  in 
gaining  their  co-operation,  his  great  plan  was  realised, 
Carthage  was  avenged,  and  Bome  annihilated  or  perma- 
nently weakened.  Hannibal  therefore  did  not  remain  long 
in  Etruria,  which  was  entirely  in  his  power,  and  where  he 
would  have  found  ample  resources  and  l>ooty  for  his  army. 
It  seems  that  he  did  not  expect  much  help  from  the 
Etruscans,  who  were  too  fond  of  peace  and  quiet,  and  looked 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  216 

upon  his  allies,  the  Gauls,  their  old  national  enemies  and  CHAP, 
despoilers,  with  unmitigated  distrust.  After  an  unsuccess-  ^_  ^  '_^ 
ful  attempt  to  surprise  Spoletium,  he  marched  westwards,  jZ?" 
through  Umbria  and  Ficenum,  to  the  coast  of  the  Adria-  218-216 
tic.  These  rich  and  well-cultivated  districts  now  felt  the  ^'^' 
scourge  of  war.  The  Eoman  settlers,  who,  since  the  agra- 
rian law  of  Flaminius,  were  very  numerous  in  Picenum, 
suffered  most.  No  doubt  Hannibal  followed  the  same 
rule  which  since  his  first  victory  he  had  observed  with 
regard  to  the  Boman  citizens  and  Eoman  allies  that  feU 
into  his  hands.  The  former  he  had  treated,  if  not  cruelly, 
yet  with  harshness  and  severity,  by  keeping  them  as  pri- 
soners and  loading  them  with  chains.  The  latter  he  had 
endeavoured  to  gain  over  by  his  generosity,  and  had  dis- 
missed them  without  ransom.  There  is  something,  there- 
fore, perplexing  in  the  statement  of  Poly  bins,'  that  Hanni- 
bal now  put  to  death  all  the  men  capable  of  bearing  arms 
that  fell  into  his  hands.  We  have  no  hesitation  in  declaring 
this  to  be  a  pure  fiction  or  a  gross  exaggeration.  By  such 
an  act  of  cruelty,  Hannibal,  even  if  he  had  been  capable  of 
it,  would  have  interfered  with  the  success  of  his  own  plan. 
But  we  can  hardly  hold  him  capable  of  causing  the  murder 
of  inoffensive  people,  when  the  utmost  severity  he  showed 
to  soldiers  taken  in  battle  was  imprisonment.  The  Soman 
reports  were  therefore  either  inspired  by  national  hatred, 
or  caused  by  isolated  acts  of  barbarity,  such  as  occur  even 
in  the  best  disciplined  armies,  not  with  the  sanction, 
but  agaiust  the  explicit  order  of  the  commander-in-chief. 

Yet,  though  in  all  probability  the  lives  of  the  people  of  The  Car- 
Picenum  were  spared,  their  property  was  forfeited  to  the  jJ^^J*^*"* 
wants  and  the  rapacity  of  the  invading  host.     Hannibal's  num. 

*  The  language  of  Polybius  (iii.  86,  §  11)  is  not  quite  precise.  Having 
said  that  Hannibal  killed  iro\b  irKriOos  Mp^»y  on  his  march,  he  adds, 
vapdyy^KfAd  ri  Z^ofUvop  ^y,  <f^ovt{t€iy  rovs  iiroiriirroyrai  rt$p  iv  reus  riKiKlais, 
Whether  this  order  was  ezecuti^,  and  whether  those  that  were  actually  killed 
were  killed  in  compliance  with  it,  or  for  other  reasons,  he  does  not  say,  but  he 
learee  us  to  infer  it.  It  is  to  be  remarked,  however,  that  Livy,  who  seldom 
omits  an  opportunity  for  stigmatising  what  he  calls  Hannibars  '  inhumana 
CTudelitas,'  is  silent  on  this  alleged  act  of  barbarity,  which  he  might  have 
brought  in  with  effect  (zzii.  9). 


'ice- 


216 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Adoption 
of  the 
Roman 
arms. 


Exultation 
at  Car- 
thage. 


soldiers  had  not  yet  recovered  from  the  hardships  of  the 
preceding  winter  and  spring,  and  from  their  wounds  re- 
ceived in  battle.  A  malignant  skin  disease  was  spread 
among  them.*  The  horses  were  overworked  and  in 
wretched  condition.  Now,  in  the  beantiftd  mild  spring 
weather,  Hannibal  gave  his  army  time  to  repose  and  to 
recover.  The  country  on  the  Adriatic  produced  wine,  oil, 
com,  fruit  in  abundance.  There  was  more  than  could  be 
consumed  or  carried  away.*  Now,  at  length,  the  army 
was  in  the  possession  and  enjoyment  of  the  rich  land 
which  on  the  snow-covered  heights  of  the  Alps  had  been 
promised  to  them  as  the  reward  for  their  fidelity,  courage, 
and  endurance. 

But  the  time  had  not  yet  arrived  for  mere  enjoyment 
and  repose,  as  if  the  hardships  of  war  were  all  over. 
Hannibal  made  use  of  the  short  interval  of  rest,  the  fruit 
of  his  victory,  to  arm  a  portion  of  his  army  in  the  Roman 
style.  The  quantities  of  arms  taken  in  battle  suflSced  to 
equip  the  African  infantry  with  the  short  swords  and  the 
large  shields  of  the  Boman  legionary  soldiers.  We  can- 
not imagine  a  more  striking  proof  of  the  superiority  of 
the  Roman  equipment,  and  consequently  of  the  instinctive 
aptitude  of  the  Boman  people  for  war,  than  the  fact  that 
the  greatest  general  of  antiquity,  in  the  heart  of  the  hostile 
country,  exchanged  the  accustomed  native  armament  of 
his  soldiers  for  that  of  the  Romans. 

A  march  of  ten  days  had  brought  Hannibal  from  the 
lake  Thrasymenus  across  the  Apennines  to  the  shore  of 
the  Adriatic.  Having  reached  the  sea  coast,  he  renewed 
the  communication  with  Carthage  which  had  long  been 
interrupted,  and  sent  home  the  first  direct  and  official 
report  of  his  victorious  career.  Of  course  the  Carthagi- 
nians were  not  ignorant  of  his  proceedings.  The  sudden 
withdrawal  of  the  Roman  legions,  which  had  been  sent  to 
Sicily  for  Jan  expedition  into  Africa,  was  in  itself  a  sufficient 


>  Polybius  (iii.  87,  §  2)  calls  it  Xifi^pos. 

'  Polybius  (iii.  88,  §  1)  tells  us  that  Hannibal's  soldiers  had  washed  their 
horses  with  old  wine. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  217 

intimation    that  tlie    Romans   were    attacked  in  Italy.     CHAP. 
Carthaginian  cmisers  hovered  about  the  Italian  coasts. 


At  Cosa,  on  the  coast  of  Etruria,  a  fleet  of  Roman  transports     ^^^^ 
had  been  taken.     The  state  of  affairs  in  Italy  was  there-     218-216 
fore,  on  the  whole,  perfectly  well   known  in  Carthage.        ^'^' 
Nevertheless,  the  first  direct  message  from  Hannibal,  and 
the  authentic  narrative  of  his  immense  success,  produced 
raptures    of  joy  and    enthusiasm,  which    showed   that 
Hannibal  was  supported  by  the  consentient  voice  of  his 
countrymen.      The  Carthaginians   resolved  to  continue 
with  all  their  strength  the  war  in  Italy  and  Spain,  and  to 
reinforce  in  every  possible  manner,  not  only  Hannibal,  but 
his  brother  Hasdrubal  in  Spain.' 

Having  completely  restored  and  re-organised  his  army.  The  fidelity 
Hannibal  left  the  sea-board,  and  marched  again  into  the  Roman 
midland  parts  of  Italy,  where  the  genuine  Italians  lived,  allies. 
who  vied  with  the  Romans  and  Latins  for  the  prize  of 
courage.    He  passed  through  the  country  of  the  Marsians, 
Marrucinians,  and  Pelignians  into  the  northern  part  of 
Apulia,  called  Daunia."    Everywhere  he  offered  his  friend- 
ship and  alliance  for  a  war  with  Rome,  but  everywhere  he 
met  with  refusals.     Not  a  single  town  opened  her  gates 
to  him.   All  were  as  yet  unshaken  in  their  fidelity  to  Rome. 
No  doubt  this  fidelity  was  due  in  part  to  the  character  of 
the  Roman  government,  which  was  not  unjust  or  oppressive, 
and  allowed  to  the  subjects  a  full  measure  of  self-govern- 

'  Polybins,  iii.  87,  J  6 :  *E^'  oh  kHoivavrts  fityaXtUos  ^x^^om  ol  Kapxn- 
Z6viot'  iral  ToW^y  iirolowTo  tnrovH^y  koX  wp6yoi(t»  6ir^p  rod  «caT&  rdirra  rp6wo¥ 
ivtKovptty  ffol  Tois  iv  'IroA/f  «cal  rols  iv  *Wrip^9  irpdyficuri.  Compared  with  this 
evidence  of  Polybias,  we  cannot  attribute  the  slightest  weight  to  the  statements 
of  Appian  (vii.  16)  and  Zonaras  (viii.  26 )»  who  say  that,  upon  Hannibal's 
report  of  his  Yictories,  the  Carthaginians  laughed  at  his  demanding  reinforce- 
ments and  assistance,  saying  that,  if  he  were  victorious,  he  ought  to  be  able  to 
send  money  home,  and  not  to  ask  for  aid.  Such  silly  language  refutes  itself. 
The  wonder  is  that  any  man  pretending  to  the  name  of  an  historian  could 
attribute  it  to  the  government  of  a  state  like  Carthage. 

'  This  is  the  line  of  march  given  by  Livy  (zii.  9).  Polybius  (iii.  88,  3) 
does  not  take  Hannibal  so  far  away  from  the  coast,  but  straight  from  Picenum, 
tbrongh  the  country  of  the  Marrucinians  and  Frentanians,  into  Daunia. 
Perhaps  the  main  body  of  the  army  marched  on  the  more  direct  road,  and  the 
more  inland  districts  were  only  visited  by  detached  flying  corps. 


218 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Romnn 
finnndss. 


ment  ;*  and  partly  it  was  prodiiced  by  fear  of  the  revenge 
which  Borne  would  take  if  in  the  end  she  proved  victorious. 
But  it  is  apparent  that  another  motive  operated  at  the 
same  time.  A  feeling  of  Italian  nationality  had  grown  up. 
The  Italians  had  been  bound  together  with  the  Bomans  by 
the  fear  which  they  both  entertained  of  the  Grauls,  the 
worst  enemies  of  their  fertile  country.  As  the  numerous 
tribes  of  Greeks  learnt  to  feel  and  act  as  one  nation  in 
their  common  war  with  the  Persians,  thus  the  Italians 
first  became  conscious  of  being  a  kindred  race  in  con- 
sequence of  the  repeated  invasions  of  the  Grauls,  and 
they  learnt  to  look  for  safety  in  a  close  union  under  the 
leadership  of  Rome.  These  Gauls,  the  hereditary  enemies 
of  all  Italy,  were  now  the  most  numerous  combatants  in 
Hannibal's  army.  It  was  chiefly  their  co-operation  that 
made  the  present  war  so  terrible,  and  threatened  universal 
devastation,  ruin,  and  extermination.  These  feelings  of 
the  Italians  were  the  disturbing  force  which  crossed  Han- 
nibal's expectations.  Nevertheless,  he  did  not  yet  despair 
of  the  idtimate  success  of  his  plan.  Perhaps  his  sword 
could  yet  break  the  charm  which  bound  up  the  Italians 
with  Bome.  If  they  were  acted  upon  mainly  by  fear,  he 
had  only  to  show  that  he  was  more  to  be  feared  than  the 
Bomans,  and  that  they  risked  more  in  remaining  faithful 
to  their  masters  than  in  joining  the  invader. 

The  fidelity  of  the  allies  was  justified  by  the  firmness 
which  the  Bomans  displayed.  Stunned  for  a  moment  by 
the  terrible  blow  of  the  late  battle,  the  senate  had  speedily 
recovered  its  composure,  its  confidence,  and  its  genuine 
Boman  determination.  There  were  no  thoughts  of  yield- 
ing, of  compromise,  or  peace ;  but  the  spirit  of  un- 
wavering resistance  animated  the  senate  and  every 
individual  Boman.  Not  a  single  soldier  was  withdrawn 
from  Spain,  Sardinia,  or  Sicily.  The  spirit  with  which 
Bome  was  determined  to  carry  on  the  war  was  most 
clearly  expressed  in  the  order  issued  to  the  different 


>  How  the  country  flourished  is  seen  from  Folybius,  iii.  90,  §  7. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  219 

Italian  districts  threatened  by  the  Punic  army.     It  en-     CHAP, 
joined  the  people  to  take  reftige  in  the  nearest  fortresses, 


to  set  fire  to  the  farm-honses  and  villages,  to  lay  waste     jZ™^ 
their  fields,  and  to  drive  away  the  cattle.*     Italy  was  to    21S-216 
become  a  desert,  rather  than  support  the  foreign  invaders.        ^'^' 

It  was  in  truth  not  advisable  for  a  Boman  army  now  to  Koman 
venture  on  an  encounter  in  the  open  field  with  the  irre-  ^®^®®* 
sistible  conqueror.  The  losses  of  the  Trebia  and  the 
Thrasymenus  could  indeed  be  quickly  replaced  by  new 
levies,  and  Fabius  ordered  foiu:  new  legions  to  be  raised. 
But  the  impression  produced  by  the  repeated  defeats 
could  not  be  so  easily  effaced.  The  self-confidence  of  the 
Boman  soldiers  was  gone.  Before  they  again  crossed  swords 
with  the  dreaded  enemy,  they  had  to  learn  to  look  him  in 
the  face.  Among  the  new  levies  there  was,  no  doubt,  a  pro- 
portion of  old  soldiers  who  had  served  in  former  campaigns, 
but  the  majority  were  young  recruits ;  for  the  large  levies, 
recently  made,  could  not  have  been  effected  unless  the 
younger  men  had  been  enlisted  in  considerable  numbers. 
The  most  difficult  task,  however,  must  have  been  that  of 
replacing  the  centurions  and  higher  officers  who  had  fallen 
in  battle;  and  the  want  of  a  sufficient  number  of  ex- 
perienced officers  must  have  made  the  newly-raised 
legions  still  more  unfit  to  encounter  Hannibal's  formidable 
veterans. 

These  circumstances  necessarily  imposed  on  Fabius  the  Tactics  of 
utmost  caution,  even  though  he  had  not  been  by  nature  Apulia/" 
inclined  to  it.  Before  he  could  venture  on  a  battle,  he 
was  obliged  to  accustom  his  lirmy  to  war,  and  to  revive 
the  courage  and  self-confidence  which  generally  charac- 
terised the  Eoman  soldier.  He  did  this  skilfully  and  per- 
sistently, and  thus  he  rendered  the  most  essential  service 
that  any  general  could  at  that  time  render  to  the  state. 
He  marched  (probably  with  four  legions')  through 
Samiiium  into  northern  Apulia,  and  encamped  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Hannibal  near  ^cso.     In  vain  the  latter 

'  Livy,  zxii.  11.  *  Compare  above^  p.  213,  note  3. 


220 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Evpnts  in 
Campania. 


tried  to  draw  him  out  of  his  camp,  and  to  force  on  an 
engagement.  Neither  the  haughty  challenges  of  the 
Punians,  nor  the  sight  of  the  devastations  which  they 
committed  round  about,  nor  the  impatience  of  Marcus 
Minucius,  his  master  of  the  horse,  could  induce  the  wary 
old  Fabius  to  change  his  cautious  strategy.  At  length, 
Hannibal  marched  past  him  into  the  mountains  of 
Samnium,  and  thus  forced  him  to  follow.  But  Fabius 
followed  more  cautiously  than  Flaminius.  He  was  naturally 
the  *  cunctator,*  and  moreover  he  had  before  his  eyes  the 
disaster  that  had  befallen  Flaminius.  Hannibal  had  no 
chance  of  coming  upon  him  unawares.  He  passed  through 
the  country  of  the  Hirpinians  and  Caudinians  without 
impediment  or  resistance.  For  the  third  time  in  this  one 
year  he  crossed  the  Apennines,  and  suddenly  appeared  in 
the  Campanian  plain.  It  was  to  be  made  clear  to  all  the 
Italians  that  the  Punians  were  masters  of  Italy,  and  that 
no  Soman  ventured  to  oppose  them. 

The  plain  of  Campania  was  the  garden  of  Italy.  Its 
fertility  is  proved  by  the  many  flourishing  towns  which, 
in  a  wide  circle,  surrounded  Capua,  the  largest  and  richest 
of  them  all.  Hannibal  had  already  found  partisans  in 
Capua,  and  he  was  in  hopes  that  this  city,  which  of  old 
was  a  rival  of  Bome,  would  join  his  cause.  Among  the 
captives  whom  he  had  discharged  after  the  battle  on  the 
Thrasymene,  there  were  three  Capuan  knights.  These  had 
promised  their  services,  and  it  was  no  doubt  in  order  to 
support  and  back  their  plans  by  the  presence  of  his  army 
that  he  appeared  now  before  the  town.  But  the  fruit  was 
not  yet  ripe.  Capua  remained  faithful  to  Bome.  Han- 
nibal, therefore,  did  not  remain  longer  in  Campania  than 
was  sufficient  to  plunder  and  lay  waste  the  fertile  Faler- 
nian  plain  north  of  the  Volturnus.  The  dictator  Fabius 
had  followed  in  the  track  of  the  enemy  across  the 
Apennines,  and  was  encamped  on  the  summit  of  the 
mountain  ridge  of  Massicus,  which,  from  Casilinum,  the 
modem  Capua,  on  the  Volturnus,  extends  in  a  north- 
westerly direction  as  far   as  the  sea,  and    borders  the 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


221 


First 
Period, 
218-216 

B.C. 


Falemian  plain  on  the  north.  From  this  high  and  safe  CHAP, 
position,  the  Romans  could  see.  how  the  villages  of  the  n. 
plain  were  consumed  by  the  flames,  and  how  the  culti- 
vated fields  were  changed  into  wastes.  But  nothing  could 
induce  Fabius  to  leave  the  heights  and  to  offer  battle  in 
the  plain.  Under  these  circumstances  it  appeared  that 
chance  was  offering  him  an  opportunity  of  dealing  the 
enemy  a  decisive  blow. 

Hannibal  had  never  had  the  intention  of  wintering  in 
Campania  before  a  strong  and  large  town  was  in  his  posses- 
sion. He  set  himself  therefore  in  motion  to  march  back  into 
Apulia,  with  immense  spoils  and  with  long  trains  of  captured 
cattle.  It  seemed  feasible  to  intercept  an  army  thus  encum- 
bered somewhere  in  the  mountainous  region  which  lay  be- 
tween the  plains  of  Campania  and  Apulia — a  region  with 
which  the  Romans  had  become  thoroughly  familiar  in  the 
Samnite  wars,  and  which  was  inhabited  by  faithful  allies. 
The  attempt  was  actually  made.  In  a  spot  where  the  pass 
over  the  mountains  was  contracted  on  one  side  by  the 
river  Voltumus,  and  on  the  other  by  steep  declivities,  a 
detachment  of  4,000  Romans  was  posted  to  block  up  the 
road,  whilst  Fabius,  with  the  rest  of  his  army,  had  taken 
a  strong  position  on  the  crest  of  a  hill  not  far  off.  But 
it  was  not  so  easy  to  catch  Hannibal  in  a  trap,  nor  was 
the  slow  and  pedantic  Fabius  the  man  to  do  it.  No  doubt 
Hannibal,  if  he  had  found  it  necessary  or  desirable,  might 
have  turned  back  and  taken  another  road ;  *  but  he  pre- 
ferred marching  straight  on.  In  order  to  clear  the  pass 
in  front  of  him,  he  caused,  in  the  night,  a  number  of  oxen, 
with  bundles  of  lighted  wood  fastened  to  their  horns,  to 
be  driven  against  the  crest  of  the  range  of  hills.  The 
4,000  men  in  the  pass,  deceived  by  this  sight,  and  think- 
ing that  the  Carthaginian  army  intended  to  cross  the 
hills  in  that  direction,  left  their  post  in  the  defile  and 


'  Zonaras  (viii.  26)  and  Appian  (vii.  14)  relate  that  Hannibal  put  to 
death  5,000  prisoDurs  of  war,  to  rid  himself  of  this  encumbrance.  As  neither 
Poljbius  nor  Liyy  confirms  this  startling  statement,  we  are  justified  in  setting 
it  aside  as  false. 


222 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 

—  — T-— 


Dissatis- 

f^tion 

of  the 

Romans 

■with 

Fabins. 


hastened  to  the  spot  on  the  heights  which  they  believed  to 
be  threatened.  But  they  encountered  here  only  a  few  light- 
armed  troops,  whilst  the  bulk  of  the  Punic  army,  with  all 
their  plunder,  marched  unmolested  through  the  pass, 
which  had  been  left  without  defence.  During  the  dis- 
order and  the  tumult  of  the  night,  Pabius  had  not  ven- 
tured out  of  his  camp ;  and  when  day  broke,  he  could  just 
see  his  soldiers  being  driven  from  the  heights  with  great 
loss,  and  the  hostile  army  winding  through  the  defile  and 
beyond  his  reach.* 

Again  Hannibal  marched  through  Samnium  and  crossed 
the  Apennines  for  the  fourth  time  in  the  same  year  (217 
B.C.),  to  take  up  his  winter-quarters  in  the  sunny  plain 
of  Apulia.  He  occupied  the  town  of  Geronium  between 
the  rivers  Tifemus  and  Prento,  and  established  his  maga- 
zines in  it.  Por  his  army  he  constructed  a  fortified  camp 
outside  the  town.  Two-thirds  of  his  troops  he  dispatched 
in  every  direction  to  collect  supplies,  while  with  the  remain- 
ing third  he  kept  Pabius  in  check,  who  had  again  followed 
him,  without  however  venturing  so  near  as  to  risk  a  battle. 
But  during  a  temporary  absence  of  the  dictator,  who  had 
been  obliged  to  go  to  Rome  for  the  performance  of  some 
religious  ceremonies,  Minucius,  the  master  of  the  horse, 
being  left  in  command  of  the  Boman  forces,  made  an 
attempt  to  check  the  predatory  excursions  of  the  Cartha- 


'  The  locality  of  this  celebrated  stratagem  of  Hannibal  cannot  be  ascertained 
'with  accuracy  from  the  reports  either  of  Polybius  (iii.  92)  or  of  Livy  (zxii.  16), 
who  differ  considerably  from  one  another.  We  may  here  remark  again,  what 
we  have  observed  several  times,  that  the  ancient  authors  are  most  defective  in 
their  descriptions  of  places.  Near  Casilinum,  where,  according  to  lavy, 
Hannibal  found  himself  almost  surrounded  ('  inclusus  inde  videri  Hannibal  via 
ad  Casilinum  obsessa '),  the  mountains  and  the  river  form  nothing  like  a  defile. 
Polybius  mentions  a  range  of  hills  called  Eribanus,  but  we  are  unable  to 
identify  it.  On  the  whole,  it  is  utterly  impossible  for  us  to  ascertain  accurately 
the  movements  of  Hannibal  from  Apulia  to  Campania  and  back  again,  owing 
partly  to  the  obscurity  or  the  contradictions  of  the  several  historians,  partly 
to  our  ignorance  of  the  ancient  geography  of  Italy.  Livy  (xxii.  13)  relates 
that  Hannibal  intended  to  march  from  Apulia  to  Casinum  in  Latium,  but,  by  a 
mistake  of  his  guides,  was  taken  to  Casilinum.  This  story  is  no  doubt 
without  the  least  foundation.  It  looks  like  a  camp  anecdote,  and  is  in  every 
respect  improbable. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  228 

ginians,  and,  as  he  boasted  in  a  report  to  the  senate,  he     CHAP, 
actually  succeeded  in  gaining  some  advantages.     Upon  ^  ^^^'  - 
this  news  becoming  known  to  the  people,  a  storm  of  indig-     ^^^ 
nation  broke  loose  against  Fabius.     Had  Bome  fallen  so     218-216 
low,  the  people  asked,  that  they  must  give  up  Italy  as  a       ^^' 
helpless  prey  to  the  haughty  invader,  that  they  must  suffer 
him  to  march  unopposed  wherever  he  listed  through  the 
length  and  breadth  of  the  peninsula,  and  to  pillage  and 
waste  it  with  his  African,  Spanish,  and  Gaulish  hordes  ? 
Surely  it  was  not  the  duty  of  a  Roman  army  to  follow  the 
enemy,  to  keep  cautiously  in  a  safe  camp,  and  quietly  to  look 
on  whilst  the  whole  country  was  being  devastated.     How 
could  it  be  expected  that  the  allies  would  remain  faith- 
ful in  their  allegiance  if  they  were  left  exposed  to  all 
the  horrors  of  war?  Were  not  the  Roman  soldiers  men  of 
the  same  race  that  had  repeatedly  struck  down  the  Gauls, 
and  in  a  war  of  twenty  years  had  wrested  Sicily  from  these 
Carthaginians  ?    But  there  was  no  doubt  of  the  warlike 
spirit  of  the  soldiers ;  the  general  only  lacked  resolution 
and  courage.     Minucius  had  just  shown  that  Hannibal 
was  not  unconquerable,  and  if  only  the  brave  master  of  the 
horse  had  freedom  of  action,  perhaps  the  disastrous  war 
might  now  be  ended  with  one  blow.* 

Such  views  found  favour  in  Rome,  especially  with  the  The 
multitude,  which  felt  most  keenly  the  pressure  of  war,  and  '"^^^^'^ 
was   already  impatient  for  peace.     In  the   assembly  of  shared 
the  tribes,  accordingly,  the  foolish  proposal  was  made  to  t^tween 
equalise   Minucius   and  Fabius  in  the  command  of  the  *hedic-, 

tator  and 


army ;  that  is  to  say,  to  destroy  that  unity  of  direction  and  the  master 
authority  which  gave  its  chief  value  to  the  dictatorship  in  ?^  ^^^ 
comparison  with  the  divided  command  of  the  consuls.  In 
the  old  time,  when  the  office  of  the  dictator  was  better  un- 
derstood as  an  embodiment  of  the  majesty  and  authority  of 
the  whole  state,  it  would  have  been  impossible  thus  to  curtail 
the  dictatorial  power.  Now,  however,  the  terrible  disasters 
of  the  war  had  produced  the  effect  which  may  be  observed 
in  the  case  of  sick  persons  who  have  tried  several  remedies 

*  LiTj,  zxii.  25. 


224 


KOMAN  HISTOKY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Defeftt  of 
Minudus. 


Eflectsof 
tbepolicy 
of  Fabiiis. 


in  vain,  and  are  almost  given  up  for  lost.  The  ttBual  and 
regular  treatment  is  abandoned,  and  the  chance  remedy  of 
some  impudent  quack  is  adopted  in  sheer  despair.  The 
Boman  people,  generally  so  sober,  composed,  and  self-col- 
lected, so  conservative  and  so  full  of  confidence  in  their 
ancient  institutions,  suddenly  became  reckless  innovators 
and  undid  their  own  work. 

On  his  return  into  ApuUa.  Fabins  made  aa  arrangement 
with  Minucius  to  the  effect  that  the  legions  should  be 
divided  between  them,  and  that  each  should  act  indepen- 
dently of  the  other.  Fabius  continued  in  his  old  practice, 
and,  fortunately  for  Rome,  kept  near  Minucius.  The  latter 
was  burning  with  impatience  to  show  what  he  could  do 
now  that  he  was  no  longer  hampered  by  the  old  pedant's 
timidity.  Hannibal  was  delighted  at  the  prospect  of  a 
battle  which  he  had  been  anxious  to  bring  about  with  the 
whole  Boman  army,  and  which  was  now  offered  by  one-half 
of  it.  He  again  chose  the  battle-field  with  his  accustomed 
skill,  and  concealed  a  body  of  5,000  men  in  ambush. 
The  battle  was  quickly  decided,  and  would  have  ended  in 
a  rout  of  the  Romans  as  complete  as  that  of  the  Trebia, 
if  Fabius  had  not  come  up  just  in  time  to  cover  the  retreat 
of  his  rival.  ^  Minucius  felt  so  shamed  and  humbled  that 
he  laid  down  his  independent  command,  and  voluntarily 
resumed  his  position  as  master  of  the  horse  imder  the 
dictator,  until,  after  the  expiration  of  the  six  months  of  ex- 
traordinary command,  both  abdicated  and  handed  over  the 
legions  to  the  consul  of  the  year,  Cn.  Servilius,  and  his  col- 
league, M.  Attilins  Regulus,  who  had  in  the  meantime  been 
elected  in  the  place  of  I'laminius.  The  situation  of  affairs 
in  Apulia  remained  unaltered.  Hannibal,  in  his  camp 
before  Geronium,  awaited  the  winter  with  well-filled  maga- 
zines. The  Romans  contented  themselves  with  watching 
his  movements,  and  both  parties  made  their  preparations 
for  the  campaign  of  the  ensuing  year  (216  B.C.). 

The  skill,  caution,  and  firmness  of  Fabius  had  given 
Rome  time  to  recover  from  the  stunning  blow  of  the 

'  Liv7»  zzii.  28. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


225 


battle  on  tlie  Thrasymenus,  and  to  regain  self-possession 
and  confidence.  Much  was  profited  by  the  mere  fact  that 
the  war  came  to  a  sort  of  standstill ;  and  the  reputation 
which  the  *cunctator*  Fabius  acquired,  even  among  his 
contemporaries,  of  having  saved  Rome  from  ruin  *  is  not 
quite  undeserved,  though  it  is  clear  that  his  mode  of  war- 
fare was  imperatively  commanded  by  the  circumstances  in 
which  he  found  himself.  After  the  annihilation  of  the  army 
of  Flaminius,  Bome  was  not  in  a  position  to  meet  the 
conqueror  again  in  the  field,  even  if  all  the  troops  had 
been  recalled  from  Spain,  Sicily,  and  Sardinia.  It  was 
necessary  to  create  a  new  army,  to  accustom  it  to  war,  and 
to  inspire  it  with  courage.  Only  two  new  legions  were 
raised.  These,  added  to  the  two  legions  of  Servilius, 
formed  an  army  which  in  numbers  may  have  equalled 
that  of  Hannibal,  but  could  not  be  compared  with  it  in 
experience,  self-reliance,  and  general  efficiency.  It  would 
have  been  madness,  with  such  an  army  as  this,  to  risk  a 
battle,  only  a  few  months  after  the  terrible  disaster  which 
had  befallen  Flaminius.  If,  nevertheless,  the  Soman  people 
began  to  grow  impatient  and  to  clamour  for  a  battle  and 
a  victory,  we  must  remember  they  were  no  wiser  than 
the  populace  generally  is,  and  that  they  were  already 
suflfering  grievously  from  the  calamities  and  burdens  of 
war. 

But  the  Eoman  senate  was  far  indeed  from  losing  its 
firmness  and  its  wonted  spirit  of  haughty  defiance.  Indeed, 
the  greatest  danger  that  could  threaten  the  safety  of  the 


CHAP. 
Vlll. 

First 
Period, 
218-216 

B.C. 


Spirit 
of  the 
Eoman 
senate. 


'  The  verse  of  Ennius  (Cicero,  Offio.  i.  24)  is  well  known :  '  Unus  homo 
nobis  cunctando  restituit  rem.'  It  was  probably  in  this  year  of  his  pro- 
dictatorship  that  the  senate  voted  him  a  crown  of  grass  (corona  graminea), 
the  highest  military  distinction  which  was  awarded  to  a  general  who  had 
saved  a  besieged  town.  Gellius  says  {N.  A.  v.  6)  :  '  Hanc  coronam  gramineani 
senatus  populusque  Romanns  Q.  Fabio  Maximo  dedit  bello  Poenonim  secundo 
quod  urbem  Komanam  obsidione  hostium  liberasset.'  According  to  Pliny 
{Hist,  Nat.  xxii.  6),  the  grass  crown  was  decreed  *  Hannibale  ex  Italia  pulw.' 
But  this  seems  hardly  possible,  if  it  be  true,  as  Plutarch  relates  {Fab.  Max.  27), 
that  Fabius  fell  sick  and  died  irtfA  hy  xpoyoy  *Ayylfias  &in)pcy  i^  *lra\las. 
Livy  also  gives  the  year  (203)  of  Hannibal's  departure  from  Italy  as  that  of 
the  death  of  Fabius. 

VOL.  II.  Q 


226  KOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     commonwealth  had  not  yet  shown  itself.    The  Itoman 
allies  and  subjects  as  yet  exhibited  no  symptom  of  re- 


bellion, and  as  long  as  these  remained  faithfal,  the  victories 
of  Hannibal  produced  only  military  advantages  which 
might  at  any  time  be  counterbalanced  by  the  fortune  of 
war.  It  was  therefore  of  the  first  importance  to  keep 
alive  among  the  allies  the  old  faith  in  the  power  of  Bome, 
and  not  to  yield  one  inch  of  that  proud  position  which 
accepted  faith  and  obedience  as  a  natural  duty,  and  not  as 
a  benefit.  In  this  spirit  the  senate  met  an  ofier  of  some 
Greek  cities,*  which  sent  golden  vessels  from  their  temples 
to  Rome  as  a  voluntary  contribution  towards  the  expenses 
of  the  war.  The  senate  accepted  the  smallest  of  the 
presents,  in  order  to  honour  the  intention  of  the  allies,  and 
returned  the  remainder  with  thanks  and  with  the  assurance 
that  the  Roman  commonwealth  did  not  require  any  aid. 
The  aged  King  Hiero  of  Syracuse,  zealous  as  ever  in  his 
■  political  attachment  to  Rome,  sent  a  golden  image  of  the 
Goddess  of  Victory,  300,000  bushels  {modii)  of  wheat, 
200,000  of  barley,  and  1 ,000  archers  and  slingers.  This 
gift  was  not  refused.  The  golden  Victory  was  placed  for 
a  good  omen  in  the  temple  of  the  Capitoline  Jupiter. 
The  supplies  of  grain  and  the  auxiliary  troops  were 
accepted  as  a  tribute  due  to  the  protecting  state.*  In.  the 
course  of  the  year  ambassadors  were  sent  to  the  king  of 
Macedonia,  to  demand  the  surrender  of  Demetrius  of 
Pharos,  who  had  taken  refuge  with  him.  The  king  of 
the  lUyrians  was  reminded  to  pay  the  tribute  due  to  Rome, 
and  the  Ligurians  were  warned  to  abstain  from  hostilities 
again^it  the  Roman  republic.  At  the  same  time  the 
Operations  maritime  war  and  the  war  in  Spain  were  carried  on  with 
Scip'M)  vigour.  In  the  latter  country  the  campaign  of  217  B.C. 
in  Spain,  j^ad  been  opened  successfully.  Cn.  Scipio  sailed  from 
Tarraco  southwards  with  a  fleet  of  thirty-five  vessels,  in 
which  number  there  were  a  few  fast-sailing  galleys  of 

>  Of  Nea polls  and  Papstum  CLivy,  xxii.  32,  36). 

*  Livy,  xxii.  37.    Valerius  Maximus,  iv.  8,  ext.  1.    Zonaras,  viii.  26. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAK. 


227 


CHAP. 
VIII. 

First 
Period. 
218-216 

B.C. 


MassUia,'  tind  defeated  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ebro  a 
superior  Carthaginian  fleet  of  forty  ships  of  war,  causing 
them  a  loss  of  twenty-five  ships.^  Afber  this,  when  a 
Carthaginian  fleet  of  seventy  sail  cruised  off  Pisa,  in  the 
expectation  of  falling  in  with  Hannibal,'  one  hundred  and 
twenty  Boman  ships  were  sent  from  Ostia  against  them 
imder  the  command  of  the  consul  Servilius.  But  the 
Boman  consul,  not  being  able  to  find  the  Carthaginian 
fleet  in  the  Tyrrhenian  Sea,  sailed  to  LilybsBum,  and 
thence  to  the  coast  of  Africa.  In  the  smaller  Syrtis  he 
landed  on  the  island  of  Meninx,  which  he  plundered,  and 
from  the  island  of  Cercina  he  exacted  a  contribution  of 
war  amounting  to  10,000  silver  talents.  He  even  ventured 
to  land  on  the  coast  of  Africa,  but  was  repulsed  with  great 
loss.*  Having,  on  his  return  voyage,  taken  possession  of 
the  small  island  of  Cossyra,  he  landed  at  Lilybseum,  and 
proceeded  by  the  land  route  through  Sicily  and  southern 
Italy  to  Rome,  in  order,  after  the  expiration  of  the  dictator- 
ship of  Fabius,  to  assume  the  command  of  the  army  in 
Apulia  with  his  colleague  Atilius  Begulus. 

Meanwhile  Publius  Scipio,  the  consul  of  the  year  218,  Dispatch 
had  been  sent  to  Spain  with  a  reinforcement  of   thirty  fo^^gro^ntg 
vessels  and  8,000  men.*    The  senate  considered  the  war  in  for  Spain. 
Spain  to  be  so  important  that,  even  after  the  annihilation 
of  the  Flaminian  army,  when   Hannibal  seemed  to  be 
threatening  Home   and  was  laying  waste   central  Italy 
without    opposition,  this   considerable    force    was    with- 
drawn from  the  protection  of  Italy  and  sent  to  that  distant 
country.     The  Romans  thought  that  Hannibal  would  be 
isolated  and  powerless  in  Italy,  if  they  could  but  prevent 
reinforcements  being  sent  to  him  from  Spain.      The  two 


*  The  co-operation  of  Greek  ressels  is  mentioned  so  rarely  that  it  might 
almost  appear  as  an  exception.     But  we  refer  to  toI.  i.  pp.  275,  276,  note  1. 

*  Polybius,  iii.  95  ff.     Livy,  xxii.  19  ff. 

*  It  was  probably  this  fleet  that  capttired  the  Boman  transports  destined  for 
Spain.    See  above,  p.  213» 

*  Liyy,  xxii.  31. 

*  Livy,  xxii.  22.    Folybins  does  not  mention  the  SjOOO  men,  and  gives  the 
Bunber  of  ships  as  twenty. 

q2 


228 


ROMAN  mSTOBY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Ciril  dis- 
sennions 
at  Rome. 


brothers  Scipio  carried  on  the  war  in  that  country  not  less 
by  the  arts  of  persuasion  than  by  the  force  of  arms.  They 
endeavoured  to  gain  the  friendship  of  the  numerous  inde- 
pendent tribes,  and  they  skilfully  availed  themselves  of 
the  discontent  which  the  recently  imposed  dominion  of 
Carthage  had  called  forth.  "Sot  did  they  disdain  to  make 
use  of  treason.  It  is  related  that  a  Spanish  chief,  called 
Abelux,  in  order  to  gain  the  favour  of  the  Bomans,  delivered 
into  their  hands  a  number  of  Spanish  hostages,  which 
were  then  detained  by  the  Carthaginians  in  Saguntum. 
These  hostages  the  Scipios  sent  back  to  their  friends,  and 
thus  gained  for  themselves  the  reputation  of  generosity 
without  any  cost  or  sacrifice.  Their  military  enterprises 
were  confined  to  a  few  expeditions  into  the  country  south 
of  the  Ebro,  which,  however,  did  not  result  in  any  serious 
collision  with  the  Carthaginians. 

K  ever  there  was  a  time  when  unity  was  necessary 
among  the  citizens  of  Borne,  to  avert  the  threatened  down- 
fall of  the  republic,  it  was  in  the  first  few  years  of  the 
Hannibalian  war.  Even  the  unconditional  abandonment 
of  party  spirit  and  the  most  hearty  and  devoted  patriotism 
seemed  hardly  able  to  save  the  commonwealth.  Nevertheless 
it  was  precisely  at  this  time  that  dissension  showed  itself 
again,  and  that  civil  discord  threatened  to  break  out. 
Flaminius  had  been  raised  to  the  consulship  chiefly  as 
leader  of  the  democratic  party.  If  he  had  been  able  to 
defeat  Hannibal,  the  popular  cause  would  at  the  same 
time  have  triumphed  over  the  privileged  class.  But  the 
liberal  politician  happened  to  be  an  unsuccessfol  general. 
Through  his  defeat  and  death  the  nobility  gained  the 
upper  hand,  and  Pabius  was  chosen  to  restore  its  full 
supremacy  and  prestige.  This  called  forth  in  Bome  a 
violent  opposition.  His  apparent  timidity,  his  slowness 
and  indifference  to  the  sufierings  of  the  ravaged  country, 
supplied  his  opponents  with  grounds  for  laying  to  the 
charge  of  the  nobility  the  intentional  prolongation  of 
the  war,  and  enabled  them  at  last  to  limit  his  dictatorial 
power  by  the  decree  which  raised  Minucius  to  an  inde- 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAK. 


229 


CHAP. 
VIII. 


FlKST 

Period, 
218-216 

B.C. 


pendent  command.  This  last  imprudent  measure  Lad 
been  carried  chiefly  through  the  influence  of  C.  Terentius 
Varro,  a  man  who,  in  spite  of  his  low  birth,  had  been 
raised  successively  to  several  of  the  high  of&ces  of  the 
republic,  from  the  qusestorship  upwards,  and  was  now 
actually  a  candidate  for  the  consulship.*  He  evidently 
enjoyed  the  fall  confidence  of  the  people,  and  he  was 
consequently  elected  for  the  year  216,  in  spite  of  the 
opposition  of  the  nobility,  whilst  of  three  patrician  can- 
didates none  obtained  a  sufficient  number  of  votes.  Thus 
Varro,  being  alone  elected,  held  the  comitia  for  the  elec- 
tion of  a  colleague,  and  used  his  influence  in  favour  of 
Lucius  ^milius  Paullus,  a  man  of  well-known  military 
capacity.  Paullus  had,  three  years  before,  commanded  in 
lUyria,'  and  had  in  a  very  short  time  brought  that  war  to  a 
successful  issue ;  he  had  afterwards  been  suspected  of  dis- 
honesty in  the  division  of  the  spoil,  but  had  escaped  con- 
demnation, and  now  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the  nobility 
in  fuller  measure,  as,  in  opposition  to  the  plebeian  Varro, 
he  represented  the  principles  of  the  old  families.  The 
annalists  have  accordingly  shown  him  especial  favour,  and 
have  done  their  best  to  throw  the  blame  for  the  great 
misfortune  that  was  about  to  befall  Eome  on  the  shoulders 
of  his  colleague  Varro,  the  butcher's  son.^ 

It  had  become  evident  that  Hannibal  could  not  be  Enrolment 
conquered  by  a  Roman  army  of  equal  strength.     Pour  J;foman^ 
legions  opposed  to  him  could  do  no  more  than  watch  and  army. 

'  He  was  quaestor,  plebeian  and  curule  sedile,  and  pisetor.  Whether  he  ever 
was  tribune  of  the  people  is  doubtful. 

'  A  law  had  been  passed  in  342  b.c.,  forbidding  the  re-election  of  a  person 
to  the  same  magistracy  within  ten  years  (Livy,  vii.  42,  x.  13 ;  see  vol.  i.  p.  345) ; 
but  in  times  of  danger  this  law  was  set  aside,  and  a  law  moved  by  the  consid 
On.  Servilius  had  suspended  it  for  the  period  of  the  Hannibalian  war.     See  « 

Livy,  xxvii.  6  :  '  On.  Servilio  consule,  ex  auctoritate  patrum  ad  plebem  latum 
plebemque  scivisse,  ut  quoad  helium  in  Italia  eBset,  ex  iis  qui  consules  fuissent, 
quos  et  quotiens  vellet  reficiendi  consules  populo  ius  esset.' 

'  It  is  not  at  all  probable  that,  as  Mommsen  says  (Bom,  Gesch.  i.  610  ; 
English  translation,  ii.  128), '  Varro  was  recommended  by  nothing  but  his  low 
birth  and  his  coarse  impudence.'  Compare  the  just  remarks  of  Arnold,  Hist,  of 
Rome,  iii.  129;  Dion  Cassius,  fr.  49;  Livy.  xxiii.  25,  32;  xxiv.  10,  11,  41  ; 
XXV.  3,  6 ;  xxvii.  24,  35;  xxx.  26;  xxxi.  11,  49. 


230  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     embarrass  his  movements,  and  limit  his  freedom  of  foraging 

> ^ —    and  of  plundering  the  country,  even  though  they  might, 

under  favourable  circumstances,  venture  to  attack  detached 

portions  of  the  enemy.     This  had  been  the  practice  of 

Fabius ;  it  had  answered  its  purpose  for  the  time,  but  it 

was  not  calculated  to  bring  the  war  to  an  end,  and,  by 

exposing  the   Italians  for  an   indefinite   period  to  the 

calamities  of  war,  it  tried  their  fidelity  too  long.     The 

Bomans  now  resolved  to  end  this  state  of  things  before  it 

was  too  late,  and  before  either  the  allies  should  revolt  or 

reinforcements  reach  Hannibal  from  Africa  or  Spain.    The 

senate  resolved  to  add  four  new  legions  to  those  of  the 

preceding  year,  and  to  raise  the  strength  of  each  legion 

from  4,200  foot  and  200  horse  to  5,000  foot  and  300  horse. 

Thus  the  army  opposed  to  Hannibal  numbered,  with  the 

allies,  not  less  than  80,000  foot  and  6,000  horse.  It  was  a 

force  larger  than  any  that  Bome  had  ever  sent  against  an 

enemy.     On  the  Trebia  and  the  Thrasymenus  the  Roman 

armies  had  reached  only  half  that  strength,  and  in  the 

earlier  wars  a  single  consular  army  of  two  legions  had 

generally  been   suf&cient.      But  now  the  object  was  to 

crush  Hannibal  by  an  overwhelming  force,  and  the  new 

consuls  received  positive  orders  from  the  senate  to  offer  a 

battle.* 

aaestion         This  was,  indeed,  not  only  advisable  but  absolutely  neces- 

o  8upp  OS.  gg^jy^     j^  voiTLj  o^  ucarly  90,000  men  could  only  with 

the  greatest  difficulty  be  fed  in  a  country  which,  almost 
for  a  whole  year,  had  been  made  to  support  both  the 
Boman  and  the  Carthaginian  armies,  and  which  was  no 
doubt  thoroughly  exhausted.  Moreover,  Hannibal  had, 
before  the  arrival  of  the  new  consuls,  left  his  position 
near  Greronium,  and  had  seized  the  citadel  of  Cannse, 
not  fiir  from  the  sea,  on  the  south  of  the  river  Aufidus, 
where  the  Bomans  had  established  a  magazine  for  the 
supply  of  their  army.'    The  eight  legions  were  therefore 

>  Polybius,  iii.  107,  §  7;  108,  §  2. 

'  Polybius,  iii.  107,  §  2.    The  annalists, /who  approved  of  the  alleged  plan  of 
^milius  Faullus  to  avoid  a  battle,  gave  an  entirely  different  coloaxing  to 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  231 

obliged  to  retire  to  another  part  of  the  country,  or  to     CHAP, 
risk  a  battle.  wl^ 

According  to  the  account  of  the  Boman  annalists,  which      ^^sr 
Polybius  adopted,*  the  two  consuls  could  not  agree  on  the    218-216 
plan  of  battle  to  be  adopted.     Varro,  carried  away,  it  was       ^'^' 
said,  with  blind  self-confidence,*  hurried  on  a  decision,  as  ^^^'"^^ 
soon  as  the  hostile  armies  were  in  front  of  each  other,  Eoman 
whilst  the  more  cautious  iBmilius,  following  in  the  foot-  *'™^' 
steps  of  Fabius,  urged  that  they  should  avoid  a  battle  in 
the  plains  of  JLpulia,  where  Hannibal's  superior  cavalry  had 
free  scope  to  act.    But  the  successfulness  of  a  skirmish 
among  the  outposts  had  the  effect,  perhaps  intended  by 
Hannibal,'  of  raising  the  courage  of  the  Bomans  and  in- 
ducing them  to  move  forward.  They  now  established  their 
camp  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Aufidus,  not  far  from  the 
camp  of  Hannibal. 

The  two  consuls  had  the  chief  command  of  the  army  in  Defects 
turn  on  alternate  days.    This  arrangement,  which  seemed  military 
purposely  devised  to  exclude  uniformity  and  systematic  ^^»^^ 
order  from  the  strategic  movements,  may  have  been  good 
enough  in  a  war  with  barbarians ;  but  in  a  contest  with 
Hannibal  it  went  far  towards  neutralising  all  the  advan- 
tages which  the  innate  courage  of  the  Bomans  and  their 
great  superiority  in  numbers  gave  them.     It  is  no  doubt 
an  exaggeration  that  Yarro  alone  was  responsible  for  the 


these  events,  which  altogether  perrerted  the  tnith.  AccoidiDg  to  them,  the 
Eomans  had  abundance  of  provisions,  whilst  Hannibal  was  short  of  them. 
Livy  (xxii.  43)  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  great  discontent  prevailed  in 
Hannibal's  army,  and  a  disposition  to  mutiny  and  treason,  and  that  Hannibal, 
in  despair,  had  formed  the  plan  of  returning  with  the  cavaliy  to  Gaul.  It 
was  the  intention  of  the  writers  who  reported  these  idle  tales  to  cofndemn  the 
strategy  of  Varro,  and  to  make  him  answerable  for  the  great  disaster. 

>  Polybius,  iii.  116. 

'  Mommsen  (Rom,  Gesch,  i.  611 ;  English  translation,  ii«  129)  improTee 
upon  the  vituperative  tone  of  the  Roman  annalists :  '  It  was  necessaiy/  he 
says,  '  to  allow  the  hero  of  the  pavement  to  have  his  way/ 

'  Livy,  xxii.  41 :  '  Hannibal  id  damnum  baud  eegerrime  pati ;  quin  potius 
credere  velut  inescatam  temeritatem  ferocioris  consulis  ac  novomm  maxime 
militum  esse.'  Zonaras,  ix.  1 :  ^kvyifias  kKiov  6ir«x(^/>^^(''»  ^^^^  Ititivai  yofua$«U 
iwunrdureuro  ftaXAoF  wbrohs  f  is  fopdra^iy^ 


232 


EOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Move- 
ments of 
The  coDsal 
iGmilius. 


advancing  movement  of  the  Boman  army  into  the  imme- 
diate proximity  of  the  enemy,  and  for  the  necessity  of 
accepting  the  battle  which  was  the  inevitable  result.  It 
appears,  on  the  contrary,  that  both  Paullus  and  Varro,  in 
conformity  with  the  orders  of  the  senate  and  by  the  force 
of  circumstances,  made  no  attempt  to  avoid  a  battle ;  but 
if  the  views  of  the  two  consuls  did  not  agree  in  every 
respect,  if  one  of  them  hurried  on  the  decision  whilst  the 
other  preferred  to  wait  for  ever  so  short  a  time,  it  is 
possible  that  one  of  them  could  compel  his  colleague  to 
accept  the  very  conditions  of  battle  which  he  had  from 
the  first  disapproved. 

The  two  armies  were  now  so  near  each  other  that  a 
ba.ttle  was  inevitable;  and  this  was  clear  to  ^milius 
Paullus  himself.  On  the  day,  therefore,  on  which  he  had 
the  supreme  command  he  divided  fhe  legions,  and  passed 
with  about  one-third  of  his  forces  from  the  camp  which 
was  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Aufidus,  to  the  left  bank, 
where,  a  short  distance  lower  down  and  nearer  to  the 
enemy,  he  erected  a  second  and  smaller  camp.^     This 

*  PolybiuB,  iii.  110,  §  8.  Unfortunately  the  expreBsions  of  Polybius  are 
again  vague  (see  above,  p.  172),  and  leave  it  doubtful  on  which  side  of  the 
river  the  larger  and  Bmaller  camps  were  respectively  placed.  He  a&ya :  Eir 
9h  r^v  healpiov  6  At^Kios  o&re  fiix*^^  Kpivav^  olrre  /iV  kTciyeiv  aff^aXSn  t^y 
arparikif  frt  ^vydftfuos  rots  fi^v  9va\  fi4p€<ri  KarcoTparoircScvo'c  v^aph  rhv  AC^iioy 
myrafxSv  .  .  .  .  r^  di  rpirtp  wtpav^  birh  rrts  ^tafidirtws  irp6s  r&r  kyaroKdtt 
ifidKfTO  ;i^({f)aica,  r^s  fi^y  Ulas  Topc/i/SoA^s  irepl  diKa  (TtqSIous  iaroaxi&Vi  t^$  ^^ 
T&y  httevayriiav  fuxp^  ir\(7oy.  Further  on  he  says  of  Hannibal  (ch.  Ill,  §  11)  : 
iroio^ftCKOs  r^K  x^P<^^  ^<^P^  '''^^  fi^^'r^y  x\€vp6.y  rov  xorafiov  rp  fi€l(oyi 
arparowtHtlq,  r&y  tfrtyayriwy.  It  looks  almost  as  if  Polybius  had  inten- 
tionally avoided  the  decisive  words  right  and  left  His  words  leave  the 
position  of  the  two  camps,  and  consequently  the  locality  of  the  battle,  quite 
undetermined.  We  must  therefore  try  to  fix  it  from  other  data.  As  we  see 
from  Livy  (xzii.  43),  Hannibal  was  encamped  near  Canne,  i.e.  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Aufidus.  Nothing  is  said  of  his  moving  to  the  other  side  of  the 
river,  until  he  crossed  on  the  day  of  battle  (Livy,  xxii.  46  ;  Polybius,  iii. 
113,  §  6).  This  alone  proves  conclusively  that  the  field  of  battle  was  on  the 
left  bank.  Moreover  Polybius  states  that  the  Romans  had  their  right  wing 
on  the  river,  and  the  Carthaginians  the  left.  If,  with  this  position,  the  two 
armies  had  been  drawn  up  on  the  right  bank,  it  would  follow  that  the  Romans 
had  actually  marched  past  the  Carthaginian  army  and  were  now  standing 
between  it  and  the  sea.  Nothing  is  reported  of  such  an  extraordinary  and 
dangerous  manoea^TO.      Nevertheless  Arnold   (Hist  of'Bomej  iii.  p.   185) 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  233 

movement  towards  the  Carthaginian  army  was  evidently     CHAP. 

a  challenge,  and  shows  very  clearly  with  what  degree  - ,  ' 

of  security  and  self-confidence  the   Boman  armies  could     p^?^ 
manoeuvre  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  the  enemy.*     218-216 
Hannibal  was  highly  delighted  at  the  resolution  of  the       **^ 
Komans.     A  whole  year  had  passed  since  the  battle  on 
the  lake  Thrasymenus,  a  year  in  which  all  his  attempts 
to  bring  on  a  battle  had  been  vain.     Now,  at  length, 
his  wish  was  gratified,  and,  confident  of  success,  he  looked 
forward  to  the   great  passage   of   arms   which  was  to 
arbitrate  between  his  own  country  and  her  deadly  foe. 

In  Bome  the  collision  between  the  two  armies  was  State  of 
looked  for  day  after  day,  and  the  town  was  in  the  most  R^mef  ^^ 
anxious  suspense.  After  the  repeated  disasters  of  the  last 
two  years,  the  confident  expectation  of  victory  was  gone. 
Like  a  desperate  gambler,  Bome  had  now  doubled  her 
stake;  and  if  fortune  went  against  her  once  more,  it 
seemed  that  all  must  be  irrecoverably  lost.  At  such 
times  man  feels  keenly  his  dependence  on  higher  powers. 
The  Bomans  especially  were  liable  to  convulsions  of 
superstitious  fear ;  they  were,  as  Polybius  says,  *  powerful 
in  prayers ;  when  great  dangers  threatened,  they  implored 
gods  and  men  for  help,  and  thought  no  practices  unbe- 
coming or  unworthy  of  them  that  are  usual  under  such 
circumstances.*  Accordingly  the  population  was  feverish 
with  religious  excitement ;  the  temples  were  crowded,  the 

assumes  it  as  certaio,  as  ho  is  obliged  to  do,  because  he  places  the  battle  on 
the  right  bank.  Now  there  appears  to  be  no  inducement  for  the  selection  of 
this  bank  as  the  field  of  battle  beyond  the  statement  of  Polybius  and  livy 
that  the  Roman  army,  leaning  with  their  right  wing  on  the  river,  had  their 
faces  turned  to  the  south.  But,  though  the  general  course  of  the  Aufidus  is 
from  S.W.  to  N.E,  there  is  near  Cannae  a  decided  bend  in  tlie  river  to  the 
S.  or  S.E.,  so  that,  even  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  the  Komans  could  front 
towards  the  south,  and  yet  rest  on  the  river  with  their  right  wing. 

'  Compare  above,  p.  204. 

'  Polybius,  iii.  112,  §  9:  itiyol  yiip  iy  to7s  v€ptordafffi 'P»fi€uot  ica)  0coiw 
i^i\dffK€(rBeu  Koi^  kyBp^ovs  ical  fitfi^y  &irp«ir^s  /11178*  iytkifh  iv  rots  roiovrois 
Kutpolt  ffytTaOai  r&v  inpi  ravra  ffvrr€\ovfi4iftifv,  Virgil  (^n.  iii.  260)  makes 
^neas  say  of  his  companions: 

'  Cecidere  animi  nee  iam  amplius  armis 
Sed  Totis  precibusque  iubent  exposcere  pacem.' 


234  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

^?v  ^     gods  besieged  with  prayers  and  sacrifices ;  warnings  and 

^ r-^ — '  prophecies  of  old  seers  were  in  everybody's  mouth,  and 

every  honse  and  every  heart  was  divided  between  hope 
and  fear.V 
ThebatUe-       The  Aufidus   (now  called  Ofanto)   is    the  most  con- 
Cannae,       siderable  of  the  numerous  coast-rivers  which  flow  east- 
ward from  the  Apennines  into  the  Adriatic  Sea ;  but  its 
broad  bed  is  filled  only  in  winter  and  spring.     It  was  now 
the  early  part  of  summer,  about  the  middle  of  June ;  and 
the  river  was  so  narrow  and  shallow  that  it  could  be 
crossed  everywhere  without  any  serious  difficulty.     In  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  smaller  Boman  camp  the  Aufidus 
made  a  sudden  sharp  bend  towards  the  south  or  south- 
east,  and  after  a  short  distance  turned  again  to  the  north- 
east, which  is  the  general  direction  of  its  course.     Here, 
on  the  left  or  northern  bank,  was  the  battle-field  selected 
by  Varro.     In  the  larger  camp  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
river,  and  a  little  way  higher  up,  he  left  only  a  garrison  of 
10,000  men,  with  orders  to  attack,  during  the  battle,  the 
Carthaginian  camp,  which  was  on  the  same  side  of  the 
river,  and  thus  to  divide  the  attention  and  the  forces  of 
the  enemy.   With  the  remainder  of  his  infantry  and  6,000 
horse  he  crossed  the  Aufidus,  and  drew  up  his  army  in 
the  usual  manner,  having  the  legions  in  the  middle  and 
the  cavalry  on  the  wings,  with  his  front  looking  south- 
ward and  the  river  on  his  right.     As  the  infantry  con- 
sisted of  eight  legions,  the  fix)nt  ought  to  have  had  twice 
the  length  of  two  usual  consular  armies.     But  instead  of 
doubling  the  breadth  of  front  Varro  doubled  the  depth, 
probably  for  the  purpose  of  asing  the  new  levies,  not  for 
the  attack,  but  for  increasing  the  pressure  of  the  attacking 
column.     Thus  it  happened  that,  in  spite  of  the  great 
numerical  superiority  of  the  Bomans,  they  did  not  present 
a  broader  front  than  the  Carthaginians.     On  the  right 
flank  of  the  infantry,  leaning  on  the   river,  stood  the 
Boman  horse,  which  contained  the  sons  of  the  noblest 

'  Compare  Livy,  zxii.  36,  57* 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  235 

families,  and  formed  the  flower  of  the  army.     The  much     CHAV. 
more  numerous  cavaby  of  the  allies  was  stationed  on  the  •_^ 

left  wing.    Before  the  front  there  were,  as  usual,  the  light    p^^^, 
troops,  which  always  began  the  engagement,  and  retired    218-216 
through  the  intervals  of  the  heavy  infantry  behind  the       ^'^' 
line   after  they  had    discharged  their    weapons.      The 
Boman  cavalry  on  the  right  was  commanded  by  Paullus, 
and  the  cavalry  of  the  allies  on  the  left  wing  by  Varro, 
while  Cn.  Servilius,  the  consul  of  the  preceding  year,  and 
Minucius,  the  master  of  the  horse  under  Fabius,  led  the 
legions  in  the  centre. 

As  soon  as  Hannibal  saw  that  the  Romans  offered  battle,  Bisposi- 
he  also  led  his  troops,  40,000  foot  and  10,000  horse,  carthL^^* 
across  the  river,  which  he  had  now  in  his  rear.  In  taking  ginian 
this  position  he  risked  no  more  than  his  situation  at  the 
time  warranted,  for  he  knew  that  a  defeat  would,  under 
any  circumstances,  end  in  the  total  destruction  of  his  army. 
He  drew  up  his  infantry  opposite  the  Roman  legions ;  but, 
instead  of  forming  them  in  a  straight  line,  he  advanced  the 
Spaniards  and  Gauls  in  a  semicircle  in  the  centre,  placing 
the  Africans  on  their  right  and  left,  but  at  some  distance 
behind  them.  On  his  left  wing,  by  the  bank  of  the  Aufid.us, 
and  opposed  to  the  Roman  cavalry,  were  the  heavy  Spanish 
and  Gaulish  horse,  under  Hasdrubal ;  on  the  right,  under 
Hanno,  the  light  Numidians.'  Hannibal,  with  his  brave 
brother  Mago,  took  his  position  in  the  centre  of  his  infan- 
try, to  be  able  to  survey  and  to  guide  the  battle  in  every 
direction.  Hir  African  infantry  was  armed  in  the  Roman 
fashion  with  the  spoils  of  his  previous  victories;  the 
Spaniards  wore  white  linen  coats  with  red  borders,  and 
carried  short  straight  swords,  fit  for  cut  and  thrust ;  the 
Gauls,  naked  down  to  the  waist,  brandished  their  long 
sabres,  suitable  only  for  cutting.  The  aspect  of  these 
huge  barbarians,  who  had  after  the  recent  battles  regained 
the  prestige  of  bravery  and  invincibility,  could  not  fail  to 
make  a  deep  impression  upon  the  Roman  soldiers,  and  to 

*  Polybius,  iii.  114,  §  7.  Appian,  yii.  20.    Accoidmg  to  Livy  (xxii.  46), 
Maharbal  commanded  the  Numidianf . 


236  BOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     fill  them  with  anxiety  and  misgivings  for  the  result  of  the 

w    /. -  impending  conflict. 

Defeat  of  The  sun  had  been  two  hours  risen  when  the  battle  began, 
cavalry.  When  the  light  skirmishers  had  been  scattered,  the  heavy 
horsemen  of  the  Carthaginians  dashed,  in  close  ranks  and 
with  an  irresistible  shock,  upon  the  Eoman  cavalry.  For 
one  moment  these  stood  their  ground,  man  against  man, 
and  horse  against  horse,  as  if  they  were  welded  into  one 
compact  mass.  Then  this  mass  began  to  waver  and  to  be 
broken  up.  The  Gauls  and  Spaniards  forced  their  way 
amongthe  disorganised  squadrons  of  their  antagonists,  and 
cut  them  down  almost  to  a  man.  Pushing  forward,  they 
soon  found  themselves  in  the  rear  of  the  Eoman  infantry, 
and  fell  upon  the  allied  cavalry  on  the  left  wing  of  the 
Eomans,  which  was  at  the  same  time  attacked  in  front  by 
the  Kumidians.  Their  appearance  in  this  quarter  soon 
decided  the  contest  here  ;  the  allied  horsemen  were  driven 
off  the  field.  Hsisdrubal  intrusted  their  pursuit  to  the 
Numidians,  and  fell  with  all  his  forces  upon  the  rear  of  the 
Eoman  infantry,  where  the  young  inexperienced  troops 
were  placed,  of  whom  many  had  never  yet  met  an  enemy 
in  the  field. 
Destruc-  Meanwhile  the    Boman   infantry  had    driven  in  the 

tion  of  the  Spaniards  and  Gauls  who  formed  the  advanced  centre  of 
infantry,  the  Carthaginian  line.  Pressing  against  them  from  the 
right  and  the  left,  the  Eomans  contracted  their  front  more 
and  more,  and  advanced  like  a  wedge  against  the  retiring 
centre  of  the  Carthaginian  army.  When  they  were  on 
the  point  of  breaking  through  it,  the  African  infantry  on 
the  right  and  left  fell  upon  the  Koman  flanks.  At  the 
same  time  the  heavy  Spanish  and  Gaulish  cavalry  broke 
upon  them  from  behind,  and  the  retiring  hostile  infantry 
in  front  returned  to  the  charge.  Thus  the  huge  unwieldy 
masses  of  the  Koman  infantry  were  crowded  upon  one 
another  in  helpless  confusion  and  surrounded  on  all  sides. 
Whilst  the  outer  ranks  were  falling  fast,  thousands  stood 
idle  in  the  centre,  pressed  close  against  each  other,  unable 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  237 

to  strike  a  blow,  penned  in  like  sheep,  and  doomed  to  wait     CHAP, 
patiently  until  it  should  be  their  turn  to  be  slaughtered. 


Never  before  had  Mars,  the  god  of  battle,  gorged  himself  p,'^ 
so  greedily  with  the  blood  of  his  children.  It  seems  218-216 
beyond  comprehension  that  in  a  close  combat,  man  to  man, 
the  conquerors  could  strike  down  with  cold  steel  more  than 
their  own  number.  The  physical  exertion  alone  must  have 
been  almost  superhuman.  The  carnage  lasted  nearly  the 
whole  day.  Two  hours  before  the  sun  went  down,  the 
Boman  army  was  annihilated,  and  more  than  one-half  of 
it  lay  dead  on  the  field  of  battle.  The  consul  ^milius 
Faullus  had  been  wounded  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
conflict,  when  his  horsemen  were  routed  by  the  Cartha- 
ginian horse.  Then  he  had  endeavoured,  in  spite  of  his 
wound,  to  rally  the  infantry  and  to  lead  them  to  the 
charge ;  but  he  could  not  keep  his  seat  in  the  saddle,  and 
fell,  unknown,  in  the  general  slaughter.  The  same  fate 
overtook  the  proconsul  Cn.  Servilius,  the  late  master  of 
the  horse  Minucius,  two  qusestors,  twenty-one  military 
tribunes,  and  not  less  than  eighty  senators — an  almost 
incredible  number,  which  shows  that  the  Roman  senate 
consisted  not  only  of  talking  but  also  of  fighting  men, 
and  was  well  qualified  to  be  the  head  of  a  warlike  people. 
The  consul  Terentius  Varro,  who  had  commanded  the 
cavalry  of  the  allies  on  the  left  wing,  escaped  with  about 
seventy  horsemen  to  Venusia. 

It  was  not  Hannibal's  custom  to  leave  his  work  half-  9*P^  ^^ 
done.  Immediately  after  the  battle  he  took  the  larger  camps. 
Boman  camp.  The  attack  which  its  garrison  of  1 0,000 
men  had  made  on  the  Carthaginian  camp  during  the 
battle  had  failed;  and  the  Bomans,  driven  back  behind 
their  ramparts,  and  despairing  of  being  able  to  resist  the 
victorious  army,  were  compelled  to  surrender.  The  same 
fate  befell  the  garrison  and  the  fugitives  who  had  sought 
shelter  in  the  smaller  camp.  Nevertheless,  the  number 
of  prisoners  was  very  small  in  comparison  with  that  of  the 
slain ;  it  amounted  to  about  10,000  men.     In  Canusium, 


238 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Effecte  of 
the  battle 
of  Cannae. 


Venusia,  and  other  neighbouring  towns,  about  3,000 
fugitives  were  rallied.  Many  more  were  dispersed  in  all 
directions.  This  unparalleled  victory,  which  surpassed  his 
boldest  expectations,  had  cost  Hannibal  not  quite  6,000 
men,  and  among  them  only  two  hundred  of  the  brave 
horsemen  to  whom  it  was  principally  due.* 

Great  as  was  the  material  loss  of  the  Bomans  in  this 
most  disastrous  battle,  it  was  less  serious  than  the  effect 
produced  by  it  upon  the  morale  of  the  Boman  people. 
Throughout  the  whole  course  of  the  war  they  never 
quite  recovered  from  the  shock  which  their  courage  and 
self-confidence  had  sustained.  From  this  time  forward 
Hannibal  was  invested  in  their  eyes  with  supernatural 
powers.  They  could  no  longer  venture  to  face*  him 
like  a  common  mortal  enemy  of  flesh  and  blood.  Their 
knees  trembled  at  the  very  mention  of  his  name,  and 
the  bravest  man  felt  unnerved  at  the  thought  of  his 
presence.  This  dread  stood  Hannibal  in  the  place  of 
a  whole  armv,  and  did  battle  for  him  when  the  war 
had  carried  'off  his  African  and  Spanish  Teterans,  and 
when  Italian  recruits  made  up  the  bulk  of  his  forces. 
How  stupified  and  bewildered  the  Romans  felt  by  the 
stunning  blow  at  Cannae  may  be  seen  from  one  striking 


'  Then?  are,  as  may  be  expected,  consideraWo  variations  among  our  in- 
formants as  to  the  losses  of  the  two  armies  in  the  battle.  According  to 
Polybius  (iii.  117),  72,000  Komans  were  killed,  20,000  taken,  and  no  more 
tlian  4,000  escaped,  Livy  (xxii.  49)  makes  the  loss  of  the  Komans  to  consist 
of  45,000  infantry  and  2,700  cavalry  killed,  3,000  infantry  and  1,500  cavalry 
taken  in  the  battle.  2,000  men  taken  in  Cannae,  and  16,400  in  the  two  camps  ; 
the  total  loss,  therefore,  48,200  killed  and  22,900  prisoners,  or  71,100  men. 
According  to  him  (xxii.  52,  54),  about  14,000  escaped.  This  agrees  with  the 
statement  (xxii.  36)  that  the  strength  of  the  army  was  87,200,  for  this  leaves 
only  2,100  men  as  *  missing.'  The  statement  of  Livy  has  the  appearance  of 
greater  accuracy,  and  agrees  better  than  that  of  Polybius,  at  least  as  far  as 
the  fugitives  are  concerned,  with  what  we  are  told  in  the  course  of  the  war  of 
the  Megiones  Cannenses,'  which,  as  a  punishment  for  their  behaviour  at 
Cannae,  were  condemned  to  serve  in  Sicily  without  pay  to  the  end  of  the  war. 
The  stat4%ment8  of  the  loss  of  the  Carthaginians  vary  only  between  6,000 
and  8,000. 

'  The  Greeks  called  this  with  an  expressive  term  hrro^tBaXfitiy.  Still 
stronger  is  the  Shakesperian  term  *  outstare.'  See  Merchant  qf  Venice,  ii.  1 : 
'  I  would  outstare  the  sternest  eyes  that  look.' 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  239 

instance.*     Several  Eoman  knights,  young  men  of  the     chap. 

first  families,  had  so  completely  lost  all  hope  of  saving  >,    ,  ' 

their   country  from   utter   ruin,   that   in    their    despair    p^^^ 
they  conceived  the  wild  plan  of  escaping  to  the  sea-    218-216 
coast,  and  seeking  shelter  in  some  foreign  country.    From       "*^' 
this  dishonourable  plan  they  were  diverted  only  by  the 
energetic  intervention  of  the  youthful  P.  Cornelius  Scipio, 
who,   forcing   his    way  among-  them,   is    said    to   have 
drawn  his   sword,  and  threatened  to  run  through  any 
one  that  refused  to  take  an  oath  never  to  abandon  his 
country. 

The  patriotic  annalists  did  all  that  they  could  to  assign  Causes 
as  the  cause  of  the  Eoman  defeat  the  perfidious  cunning  of  ^^^^^^p 
the  Punians.  This  intention  becomes  especially  evident  writers  for 
in  Appian's  description  of  the  battle,  and  in  his  concluding  defeat.™*" 
remarks.^  It  was  related'  that  Hannibal  placed  a  body 
of  men  in  an  ambush,  and  that  during  the  battle  these 
men  attacked  the  Romans  in  the  rear ;  moreover,  that  five 
hundred  Numidians*  or  Celtiberians*  approached  the 
Roman  lines  under  the  pretext  of  desertion,  and  being 
received  without  suspicion,  and  left  unguarded  in  the 
heat  of  the  battle,  attacked  the  Romans  and  threw  them 
into  confusion.  Nature  itself  was  made  to  favour  the 
Carthaginians  and  to  help  them  to  gain  the  victory,  like 
the  cold  weather  on  the  Trebia  and  the  mist  at  the  lake 
Thrasymenus.  A  violent  south  wind  carried  clouds  of  dust 
into  the  faces  of  the  Romans,  without  in  the  least  in- 
commoding the  Carthaginians,  whose  front  looked  north- 
ward.^ According  to  Zonaras,^  Hannibal  had  actually 
calculated  upon  this  fidendly  wind,  and  to  increase  its 
efficacy  he  had  on  the  previous  day  caused  the  land  which 
lay  to  the  south  of  the  battle-field  to  be  ploughed  up.     In 

'  Liry,  xxii.  63.  •  Appian,  vii.  26. 

'  Zonaras,  ix.  i.    Poljbins  knows  nothing  of  thid. 

*  Liry,  xxii.  48.  ■  Appian,  vii.  20. 

*  Plutarch,  Fah,  16.  It  appears  that  Enniua,  in  his  epic  poem,  bad  dwelt 
upon  this  circumstance,  as  may  be  gathered  from  the  fragment  (viii.  9, 
edit.  Vahlen).    '  lamque  fere  pulyis  ad  coelum  vasta  videtur.* 

'  Zonaras,  iz.  1. 


240 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


The 

Roman 

allies. 


Dispoei- 

tion  of 

Hannibal 

towards 

the 

Romans. 


such  silly  stories  some  writers  sought  consolation  for 
'  their  wounded  feelings;  but  on  the  whole  it  must  be 
confessed  that  the  Boman  people,  though  writhing  and 
suffering  under  the  blows  of  Hannibal,  and  deeply  wounded 
in  their  national  pride,  admitted  their  defeat  frankly,  and 
instead  of  falsifying  it,  or  obliterating  it  from  their 
memory,  were  spurred  on  by  it  to  new  courage  and  to 
a  perseverance  which  could  not  fail  to  lead  in  the  end 
to  victory. 

The  overthrow  at  Cannse  was  so  complete  that  every 
other  nation  but  the  Bomans  would  at  once  have  given  up 
the  idea  of  further  resistance.*  It  seemed  that  the  pride 
of  Bome  must  now  at  last  be  humbled,  and  that  she  was 
as  helplessly  at  the  mercy  of  the  invader  as  after  the  fatal 
battle  on  the  Allia.  What  chance  was  there  now  of 
resisting  this  foe,  whose  victories  became  only  the  more 
crushing  as  the  ranks  of  the  legions  became  more  dense  ? 
Since  he  had  appeared  on  the  south  side  of  the  Alps,  no 
Boman  had  been  able  to  resist  him,  and  every  successive 
blow  which  he  had  dealt  had  been  harder.  It  seemed 
impossible  that  Italy  could  any  longer  bear  within  her 
own  limits  such  an  enemy  as  the  Punic  army.  If  Bome 
was  unable  to  protect  her  allies,  they  had  no  alternative 
but  to  perish  or  to  join  the  foreign  invader. 

This  was  from  the  beginning  Hannibal's  calculation ; 
and  now  it  appeared  that  his  boldest  hopes  were  about  to 
be  realised,  and  that  the  moment  of  revenge  for  the  wrongs 
of  Carthage  was  approaching.  Nevertheless  this  truly 
great  man  was  not  swayed  by  the  feeling  that  he  might 
now  indulge  in  the  pleasure  of  retaliation.  More  than  this 
pleasure  he  valued  the  safety  and  the  welfare  of  his  country, 
and  he  was  ready  to  sacrifice  his  personal  feelings  to 
higher  considerations.  In  spite  of  his  victories,  he  had 
learnt  to  appreciate  the  superior  strength  of  Borne  ;  and 
instead  of  still  further  trying  the  fortune  of  war,  he  resolved 
now,  in  the  full  career  of  victory,  to  seize  the  first  oppor- 

'  Livj  (zxii.  51)  does  not  exaggerate  in  sajing:  *  Nulla  profecto  alia  gens 
tanta  mole  cladis  non  obruta  esset.' 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  241 

tunity  for  concluding  peace.     His  envoy,  Carthalo,  who     CHAP, 
went  to  Eome  to  negotiate  about  the  ransom  of  the  Boman  s^    ,  '^ 
prisoners,  was  commissioned  by  him  to  show  his  readiness     Y^i^n 
for  entertaining  any  proposals  of  peace  which  the  Eomans     218-216 
might  be  willing  to  make.     But  Hannibal  did  not  know 
the  spirit  of  the  Boman  people,  if  he  thought  that  it  was 
broken  now ;  and  he,  like  Pyrrhus,  was  to  discover  that  he 
had  undertaken  to  fight  with  the  Hydra. 

The  feverish  excitement  which  prevailed  in  Home  during  Danger 
the  time  of  the  expected  conflict  did  not  last  very  long.  ^^^^ 
Messengers  of  evil  ride  fast.    Though  no  official  report  was  «»ty. 
sent  *  by  the  surviving  consul,  the   news  of  the  defeat 
reached  Eome,  nobody  knew  how,  and  the  first  rumour 
went  even  beyond  the  extent  of  the  actual  calamity.     It 
was  said  that  the  whole  army  was  annihilated,  and  both 
consuls  dead.     On  this  dreadful  day  Eome  was  saved  only 
by  the  circumstance  that  the  whole  breadth  of  Italy  lay 
between  it  and  the  conqueror.     If,  as  in  the  first  Gallic 
war,  the  battle  had  been  fought  within  sight  of  the  Capitol, 
nothing  could  have  saved  the  town  from  a  second  destruc- 
tion, and  Hannibal  would  not  have  been  bought  off,  like 
Brennus,  with  a  thousand  pounds  of  gold. 

The  Eoman  people  gave  themselves  up  to  despair.  They  Pre- 
thought  the  last  hour  of  the  republic  was  come,  and  ^f Bju^te^ 
many  who  had  lost  their  nearest  friends  or  relatives  in 
the  slaughter  of  battle  may  have  been  almost  indifferent 
as  to  any  further  calamities  which  might  be  in  store 
for  them.  The  city  was  almost  in  a  state  of  actual  anar- 
chy. The  consuls,  and  most  of  the  other  magistrates,  were 
absent  or  dead.  A  small  remnant  only  of  the  senate  was 
left  in  Eome.  In  one  battle  eighty  senators  had  shed 
their  blood,  and  many,  no  doubt,  were  absent  with  the 
armies  in  Gaul,  Spain,  Sicily,  or  elsewhere  on  public 
service.  In  this  urgency  the  senators  who  happened  to 
be  on  the  spot  took  the  reins  of  government  into  their 
hands,  and  strove  by  ttieir  calm  and  dignified  firmness  to 
counteract    the    effects    of    the    general   consternation, 

*  Dion  Cassius,  fr.  49.    Livy.  xxii.  54-56. 
VOL.  11.  B 


242 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK     Q.  Fabins  Maximus  was  the  soul  of  ilieir  deliberations. 

^ r^ '   On  his  proposition  the  measures  were  determined  upon 

which  the  urgency  of  the  danger  required.  Guards 
were  placed  at  the  gates  to  prevent  a  general  rush  from 
the  city ;  for  it  seemed  that,  as  after  the  rout  of  the  Allia, 
174  years  before,  the  terrified  citizens  thought  of  seeking 
shelter  elsewhere,  and  were  giving  up  Some  for  lost. 
Horsemen  were  dispatched  on  the  Appian  and  Latin  roads 
to  gather  whatever  tidings  they  could  from  messengers  or 
fugitives.  All  men  who  could  give  information  were 
brought  before  the  authorities.  Strict  orders  were  given 
to  prevent  vague  alarm,  and  the  women  who  filled  the 
streets  with  their  lamentations  were  made  to  retire  into 
the  interior  of  the  houses.  All  assemblies  and  gatherings 
of  the  people  were  broken  up,  and  silence  restored  in  the 
city.  At  length  a  messenger  arrived  with  a  letter  from 
Varro,  which  revealed  the  extent  of  the  calamity.  Though 
it  confirmed,  on  the  whole,  the  evil  tidings  which  had  anti- 
cipated it,  yet  it  contained  some  consolation.  One  consul 
at  least,  and  a  portion  of  the  army,  had  escaped ;  and  (what 
was  the  most  welcome  news  for  the  present)  Hannibal  was 
not  on  his  march  to  Rome,  but  still  far  away  in  Apulia, 
busy  with  his  captives  and  his  booty. 
Military  Thus  at  least  a  respite  was  gained.     The  old  courage 

forcam-  returned  by  degrees.  The  time  for  mourning  the  dead 
ingonthe  ^as  limited  to  thirty  days.  Measures  were  taken  for 
raising  a  new  force.  A  fleet  was  lying  ready  at  Ostia,  to 
sail  under  the  command  of  M.  Claudius  Marcellus  to  Sicily, 
whence  disquieting  news  had  arrived  that  the  Cartha- 
ginians had  attacked  the  Syracusan  territory  and  were 
threatening  LilybsBum.^  Under  the  present  circumstances 
the  anxiety  for  the  safety  of  Sicily  had  to  give  place  to  the 
care  for  the  defence  of  the  capital.  A  body  of  1,500  troops 
was  transferred  from  the  fleet  at  Ostia  to  garrison  Rome, 
and  a  whole  legion  *  from  the  same  naval  force  was  ordered 

*  Livy,  xxii.  66. 

'  We  meet  here  (Livy,  xxii.  67)  with  a  novelty,  a  *  legio  classics,*  called 
the  'third,    which  was  no  doubt  intended  to  serve  on  the  fleet  in  naval 


war. 


B.C. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  243 

to  march  through  Campania  to  Apulia  for  the  purpose  of    CHAP, 
collecting  the   scattered  remains  of  the  defeated  army.  ~_    ,  '  ^ 
With  this  legion  Marcellus  proceeded  to  Canusium,  only     -^^^ 
three  miles  from  the  fatal  field  of  Cannae,  and,  relieving    218-216 
Varro  from  the  command  in  Apulia,  requested  him  to  return 
to  !Rome.  The  Boman  historians  relate,  with  national  pride, 
that  all  civil  discord  was  at  once  buried  in  the  present 
danger  of  the  commonwealth,  that  the  senators  went  out 
to  meet  the  defeated  consul,  and  expressed  their  thanks  to 
him  for  not  despairing  of  the  republic.     Such  sentiments 
were  honourable  and  worthy  of  the  best  days  of  Rome  ; 
but  if  it  were  true  that  Varro  had  caused  the  disaster  of 
Cannse  by  his  folly  and  incapacity — if  indeed  he  had  forced 
on  the  battle  against  the  instructions  of  the  senate  and 
the  advice  of  his  colleague — in  that  case  the  acknowledg- 
ment of  his  merits,  and  the  generous  and  conciliatory  spirit 
exhibited  by  the  senate,  would  have  been  a  virtue  all  the 
more  questionable  inasmuch  as  it  could  not  fail  to  have  the 
effect  of  re-instating  Varro  in  the  confidence  of  the  people 
aud  of  again  intrusting  him  with  high  office.     But  we 
have  already  been  constrained  to  doubt  the  report  of  Varro's 
incapacity,*  and  the  conduct  of  the  senate  after  the  battle 
of  CannsB  justifies  this  doubt.     In  the  course  of  the  war 
Varro  rendered  his  country  many  important  services,  and 
he  was  always  esteemed  a  good  soldier.*    On  the  present 
occasion  it  is  reported '  that  the  dictatorship  was  offered 
to  him,  but  that  he  refused  it  because  he  considered  his 
defeat  at   Cannse  as   a  bad  omen.      Having   nominated 
M.  Junius  Pera  dictator,  he  returned  at  once  to  the  theatre 
of  war,  leaving  to  the  dictator  the  management  of  the 
government,  the  levying  of  new  troops,  and  the  duty  of  pre- 
siding over  the  election  of  the  consuls  for  the  ensuing  year. 

expeditions,  such  as  those  of  Sempronius  in  the  first  jear  of  the  war.  (See 
above,  pp.  167,  183  ff.;  cf.  Livy,  xxiy.  11,  §  3:  *Legionem  Valerio  ad  classem 
zelinqni ').  In  the  beginning  of  the  year,  two  legions  had  been  raised  from 
the  population  of  the  town  of  Home  alone,  as  we  are  informed  by  Livy  (xxiii. 
14).  How  these  two  legions  were  employed  wo  do  not  know.  Perhaps  the 
third  '  legio  classica '  was  one  of  them. 

>  See  above,  pp.  229,  231.  *  See  above,  p.  229,  note  3. 

'  YaleriiiB  Mazimus,  iii.  4,  4 ;  iv.  5,  2.    Frontinus,  iv.  6,  6. 

B  2 


244  KOMAN  HISTORY. 


Second  Period  of  the  Hannibalian  War, 

FROM   THE   BATTLE   OP   CANN-ffl   TO   THE   REVOLUTION   IN 

BTKAOUSE,  216-216  B.C. 

BOOK         Unvarying  success  had  accompanied  Hannibal  from  the 
•  ^   first  moment  of  his  setting  foot  in  Italy,  and  had  risen 


Position  of  l^igtcr  and  higher  until  it  culminated  in  the  crowning  vic- 
Hannibal  tory  at  Cannse.  From  this  time  the  vigour  of  Hannibal's 
attack  relaxes  ;  its  force  seems  spent.  The  war  continues, 
but  it  is  changed  in  character ;  it  is  spread  over  a  greater 
space ;  its  unity  and  dramatic  interest  are  gone.  For  Han- 
nibal those  difficulties  begin  which  are  inseparable  from  a 
campaign  in  a  foreign  country  at  a  great  distance  from 
the  native  resources.  His  subsequent  career  in  Italy  is  not 
marked  by  triumphs  on  the  colossal  scale  of  the  victories 
at  the  Trebia,  the  Thrasymenus,  and  CannsB.  He  remains 
indeed  the  terror  of  the  Eomans,  and  scatters  or  crushes 
on  every  occasion  the  legions  that  venture  to  oppose  him 
in  the  field,  but,  in  spite  of  the  insurrection  of  many  of  the 
Boman  allies  and  of  the  undaunted  spirit  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian government,  it  becomes  now  more  and  more  appa- 
rent that  the  resources  of  Rome  are  superior  to  those  of 
her  enemies.  Gradually  she  rises  from  her  fall.  Slowly  she 
recovers  strength  and  confidence.  Yielding  on  no  point, 
she  keeps  up  vigorously  the  defensive  against  Hannibal, 
whilst  she  passes  to  the  oflfensive  in  the  other  theatres  of 
war,  in  Spain,  Sicily,  and  finally  in  Africa ;  and,  having 
thoroughly  reduced  and  weakened  the  strength  of  her 
adversary,  she  deals  a  last  and  decisive  blow  against 
Hannibal  himself. 
Tiie  Unfortunately  we  lose  after  the  battle  of  Cannse  the 

histories  of  most  Valuable  witness,  on  whom  we  have  chiefly  relied 

I'd  villus* 

for  the  earlier  events  of  the  war.  Of  the  great  historical 
work  of  Polybius  only  the  first  five  books  are  preserved 
entire,  while  of  the  remaining  thirty- five  we  have  only 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAK.  .      245 

detached  fragments,  valuable  indeed,  but  calculated  more     CHAP. 

TTTTT 

to  make  us  feel  the  greatness  of  the  loss  than  to  satisfy  ^ 


B.C. 


our  curiosity.     Polybius  has  almost  the  authority  of  a  con-     ^^^ 
temporary  writer,  though  the  Hannibalian  war  was  ended     216-216 
when  he  was  still  a  child.     He  wrote  when  the  memory  of 
these  events  was  fresh,  and  information  could  easily  be 
obtained — when  exaggerations  and  lies,  such  as  are  found 
in  later  writers,  had  not  yet  ventm:^d  into  publicity  or 
found  credence.     He  was  conscientious  in  sifting  evidence, 
in  consulting  documents,  and  visiting  the  scenes  of  the 
events  which  he  narrates.     As  a  Greek  writing  on  Koman 
affairs,  he  was  free  from  that  national  vanity  which  in 
Koman   annalists  is  often  very  offensive.     Though  he 
admires  Bome  and  Koman  institutions,  he  brings  to  bear 
upon  his  judgment  the  enlightenment  of  a  man  trained 
in  all  the  knowledge  of  Greece,  and  of  a  statesman  and  a 
soldier  experienced  in  the  management  of  public  affairs. 
He  is  indeed  not  free  from  errors  and  faults.     His  intimate 
friendship  with  some  of  the  houses  of  the  Roman  nobility 
biassed  his  judgment  in  favour  of  the  aristocratic  govern- 
ment, and  his  connexion  with  Scipio -ffirailianus  made  him, 
willingly  or  imconsciously,  the  panegyrist  of  the  members 
of  that  family.      He  is   guilty  of  occasional  oversights, 
omissions,  or  errors,  some  of  which  we  have  noticed ;  but, 
taking  him  for  all  in  all,  he  is  one  of  our  truest  guides  in  the 
history  of  the  ancient  world,  and  we  cannot  sufficiently  re- 
gret the  loss  of  the  greater  part  of  his  work.     Fortunately 
the  third  decade  of  Livy,  which  gives  a  connected  account  of 
the  Hannibalian  war,  is  preserved,  and  we  find  in  the  frag- 
ments of  Dion  Cassius,  Diodorus,  and  Appian,  and  in  the 
abridgment  of  Zonaras,  as  well  as  in  some  other  later  ex- 
tracts, occasional  opportunities  for  completing  our  know- 
ledge. But  it  cannot  be  denied  that,  with  some  exceptions, 
the  history  of  the  war  flags  after  the  battle  of  Cannse.    The 
figure  of  Hannibal,  the  most  interesting  of  all  the  actors 
in  that  great  drama,  retires  more  into  the  background. 
We  know  for  certain  that  he  was  as  great  in  the  years  of 
comparative,  or  apparent,  inactivity  as  in  the  time  which 


246 


EOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Religious 
ceremonies 
at  Rome. 


ended  with  the  triumph  at  Cannae;  but  we  cannot  follow 
him  into  the  recesses  of  southern  Italy,  nor  watch  his 
ceaseless  labours  in  organising  the  means  and  laying 
the  plans  for  carrying  on  the  war  in  Italy,  Sicily,  Spain, 
Greece,  Gaul,  and  in  all  the  seas.  We  know  that  he  was 
ever  at  work,  ready  at  all  times  to  pounce  upon  any  Eoman 
army  that  ventured  too  near  him,  terrible  as  ever  to  his 
enemies,  full  of  resources,  unyielding  in  the  face  of  multi- 
plied difficulties,  and  unconquered  in  battle,  until  the  com- 
mand of  his  country  summoned  him  from  Italy  to  Africa. 
But  of  the  details  of  these  exploits  we  have  a  very  inade- 
quate knowledge,  partly  because  no  history  of  the  war 
written  on  the  Carthaginian  side  has  been  preserved,*  and 
partly  because  the  full  narrative  of  Polybius  is  lost. 

The  disaster  of  Cannae,  it  appears,  had  long  been  fore- 
told, but  the  warnings  of  the  friendly  deity  had  been  cast 
to  the  winds.  More  than  that,  the  Eoman  people  had  been 
guilty  of  a  great  offence.  The  altar  of  Vesta  had  been 
desecrated.  Two  of  her  virgins  had  broken  the  vow  of 
chastity.  It  is  true  they  had  grievously  atoned  for  their 
sin  :  one  had  died  a  voluntary  death,  the  other  had  suffered 
the  severe  punishment  which  the  sacred  law  imposed. 
She  was  entombed  in  her  grave  alive,  and  left  there  to 
perish ;  the  wretch  who  had  seduced  her  was  scourged  to 
death  in  the  public  market  by  the  chief  pontiff.^  But  the 
conscience  of  the  people  was  not  at  ease.  A  complete 
purification  and  an  act  of  atonement  seemed  required  to 
relieve  the  feeling  of  guilt  and  to  regain  the  favour  of  the 
outraged  deity.  Accordingly  an  embassy  was  sent  to 
Greece  to  consult  the  oracle  of  Apollo  at  Delphi.  The 
chief  of  this  embassy  was  Fabius  Pictor,  the  first  writer 
who  composed  a  continuous  history  of  Rome  from  the 
foundation  of  the  city  to  his  own  time.  But  even  before 
the  reply  of  the  Greek  god  could  be  received,  something 


*  Sosilos*  work,  r&  ircpl  'Avyf/Sor,  is  lost.    Comp.  Polybius,  iii.  20. 

'  Livy  xxii.  57:  'L.  Cantilius,  scriba  pontificis,  qui  cum  Floronia  stuprum 
fecerat,  a  pontifice  maximo  eo  usque  rirgis  in  comitio  csesus  erat,  ut  inter  verben 
expiraret.' 


THE  .SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  247 

had  to  be  done  to  calm  the  apprehensions  of  the  public,     CHAP, 
and  to  set  at  rest  their  religious  terrors.     The  Bomans 


had  national  prophecies,  preserved  like  the  Sibylline  books,  |^^^ 
with  which  they  were  often  confounded.^  These  books  of  216-216 
fate  were  now  consulted,  and  they  revealed  the  pleasure  ^'^' 
of  a  barbarous  deity,  which  again  claimed,  as  during  the 
last  Gallic  war  nine  years  before,  to  be  appeased  by  human 
sacrifices,  A  Greek  man  and  a  Greek  woman,  a  Gaul 
and  a  Gaulish  woman  were  again  buried  alive.  By  such 
cruel  practices  the  leading  men  atBome  showed  that  they 
were  not  prevented  by  the  influence  of  Greek  civilisation 
and  enlightenment  from  working  on  the  abject  superstition 
of  the  multitude,  and  from  adding  to  their  material 
strength  and  patriotic  devotion  by  religious  fanaticism. 

The  superiority  of  Eome  over  Carthage  lay  chiefly  in  ^^ain  of 
the  vast  mOitary  population  of  Italy,  which  in  one  way  or  the  popu- 
another  was  subject  to  the  republic  and  available  for  the  ^?^j^ 
purposes  of  war.  At  the  time  of  the  last  enumeration,  which 
took  place  in  225  B.C.  on  the  occasion  of  the  threatened 
Gaulish  attack,  the  number  of  men  capable  of  bearing  arms 
is  said  to  have  amounted  to  nearly  800,000,  and  in  all  pro- 
bability that  statement  fell  short  of  the  actual  number.^ 
Here  was  a  source  of  power  that  seemed  inexhaustible. 
Nevertheless  the  war  had  hardly  lasted  two  years  before  a 
difficulty  was  felt  to  fill  up  the  gaps  which  bloody  battles  had 
made  in  the  Boman  ranks.  Since  the  engagement  on  the 
Ticinus  the  Bomans  must  have  lost  in  Italy  alone  120,000 
men,  actually  slain  or  taken  prisoners,  without  reckoning 
those  who  succumbed  to  disease  and  the  fatigues  and  priva- 
tions of  the  prolonged  campaigns.  This  loss  was  felt  most 
severely  by  the  Boman  citizens ;  for  these  were  kept  by 
Hannibal  in  captivity  whilst  the  prisoners  of  the  allies  were 
discharged.    Whether  the  latter  were  enrolled  again,  we 

'  The  Sibylline  books  were  of  Greek  origin,  but  similar  in  character  to  the 
native  '  libri  fatales/  on  which  they  were,  in  a  manner,  engrafted,  and  with 
which  they  formed  one  body  of  prophetic  writings,  in  the  keeping  of  the 
decemviri  (afterwards  quindecimviri)  sacris  faciundis.     See  vol.  i.  p.  80. 

'  See  the  Appendix  on  the  population  of  Italy,  at  the  end  of  this  Tolume. 


248  BOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  are  not  informed.  At  any  rate  a  corresponding  number 
of  men  was  spared  for  the  necessary  domestic  labour,  for 
agriculture  and  the  various  trades ;  and  consequently  the 
allies  who  remained  faithful  to  Borne  could  more  easily 
replace  the  dead,  although  they  also  had  already  reached 
that  point  of  exhaustion  where  war  begins  to  undermine, 
not  only  the  public  welfare,  but  society  itself  in  the  first 
conditions  of  its  existence.  Men  capable  of  bearing  arms 
are,  in  other  words,  men  capable  of  working;  and  it  is  upon 
work  that  civil  society  and  every  political  community  is 
finally  based.  If,  therefore,  only  one-tenth  of  the  labour 
strength  of  Italy  was  consumed  in  two  years,  and  if  an- 
other tenth  was  needed  for  carrying  on  the  war,  we  may 
form  an  idea  of  the  fearful  disorganisation  which  was 
rapidly  spreading  over  Italy,  of  the  check  to  every  sort  of 
productive  industry  at  a  time  when  the  state,  deprived  of 
so  many  of  its  most  valuable  citizens,  was  obliged  to  raise 
its  demands  in  proportion,  and  to  exact  more  and  more 
sacrifices  from  the  survivors.  The  prevalence  of  slavery 
alone  explains  how  it  was  possible  to  take  away  every 
fifth  man  from  peaceful  occupations  and  employ  him  in 
military  service.  The  institution  of  slavery,  though  in- 
compatible by  its  very  nature  with  the  moral  or  even  the 
material  progress  of  man,  and  though  always  a  social  and 
political  evil  of  the  worst  kind,  has  at  certain  times  been 
of  great  temporary  advantage ;  for,  by  relieving  the  free 
citizens  to  a  great  extent  from  the  labour  necessary  for 
existence,  it  has  set  them  free  to  devote  themselves  either 
to  intellectual  pursuits,  to  the  cultivation  of  science  and 
of  art,  or  to  war.  We  have  no  direct  testimony  of  the 
extent  to  which  slave-labour  was  employed  in  Italy  at  the 
time  of  the  second  Punic  war ;  but  we  have  certain  indi- 
cations to  show  that,  if  not  everywhere  in  Italy,  at  least 
among  the  Romans,  and  in  all  the  larger  towns,  the 
number  of  slaves  was  very  considerable.' 

'  The  noble  Eomans  were,  even  in  the  field,  accompanied  by  slaves,  who 
served  as  grooms,  or  carriers  of  baggage  (calones). — Livy,  xxii.  58.  Paullus 
Diaconus,  s.  v.  calones,  p.  62.     Servius  ad  Virg.  ^n,  vi.  1. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIO  WAE.  249 

These  remarks  are  suggested  by  the  statements  of  the     CHAP, 
measures  which  the  dictator  M.  Junius  took  after  the  >  .^^L . 
battle   of  Cannee  for  the  defence   of  the   country.     In     ^^^^ 

^  Period, 

order  to  raise  four  new  legions  and  one  thousand  horse,     216-215 
he  was  compelled  to  enrol  young  men  who  had  only  just       ^'^' 
entered  on  the  military  age ;  nay,  he  went  even  further,  ^^JJ^^®^^®* 
and  took,  probably  as  volunteers,  boj^s  below  the  age  of  dictator 
seventeen  who  had  not  yet  exchanged  their  purple-bor-  p^.^^*^' 
dered  toga  (the  toga  prsetexta)  the  sign  of  childhood,  for 
the  white  toga  of  manhood  (the  toga  virilis).     Thus  the 
legions  were   completed.^      For  the   present  Eome   had 
reached  the  end  of  her  resources.     But  the  man-devouring 
war  claimed  more  victims,  and  the  pride  of  the  Romans 
stooped  to  the  arming  of  slaves.*    Eight  thousand  of  the 
most  vigorous  slaves,  who  professed  their  readiness  to 
serve,  were  selected.     They  were  bought  by  the  state  from 
their  owners,  were  armed  and  formed  into  a  separate  body 
destined  to  serve  by  the  side  of  the  legions  of  Eoman 
citizens  and  allies.     As  a  reward  for  brave  conduct  in  the 
field,  they  received  the  promise  of  freedom.'    With  these 
slaves,  six  thousand  criminals  and  debtors  were  set  free, 
and  enrolled  for  military  service.^ 

The  full  significance  of  this  measure  can  be  appreciated  Refnsal  of 
only   if  we  bear  in  mind  how  the   Boman  government  Roroansto 
treated  those  unhappy  citizens  whom  the  fortune  of  war  ransom  the 
had  delivered  into  captivity.     In  the  first  Punic  war  it  uk^Tar 
had  been  the  practice  of  the  belligerents  to  exchange  or  Canna. 
ransom  the  prisoners.     It  seemed  a  matter  of  course  that 
the  same  practice  should  be  observed  now,  provided  that 

*  Livy,  xxii.  57. 

*  Livy,  xxii.  67 :  *Et  aliam  formam  novi  delectus  inopialiberorum  capitum  ac 
necespitas  dedit.* 

■  Livy,  xxiv.  14.  According  to  Appian,  vii.  27,  the  slaveB  were  set  free  at 
once. 

*  Livy,  xxiii.  14 :  *  Ad  ultimum  prope  desperatas  rei  public®  auxilium,  cum 
honesta  utilibus  cedunt,  descendit.'  This  mentioning  of  prisoners  for  debt  is 
strange,  as,  according  to  Livy  (viii.  28),  imprisonment  for  debt  was  abolished. 
Probably  this  abolition  referred  only  to  Koman  citizens ;  and  the  debtors 
referred  to  by  Livy  as  liberated  from  prison  and  enrolled  were  perhaps  Italian 
allies. 


250  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  Hannibal  was  ready  to  waive  the  strict  right  of  war  which 
—  , '  ,^  gave  him  permission  to  employ  the  prisoners  or  to  sell 
them  as  slaves.  From  his  point  of  view  the  last  was 
evidently  the  most  profitable,  for  it  was  his  object  to 
weaken  Bome  as  much  as  possible,  and  Eome  possessed 
nothing  more  precious  than  her  citizens.  But,  as  we  have 
already  noticed,  he  was  led  by  higher  considerations  and 
by  a  wise  policy  to  seek  a  favourable  peace  with  a  nation 
which,  even  after  CannsB,  he  despaired  of  crushing.*  He 
selected,  therefore,  from  among  the  prisoners  ten  of  the 
foremost  men,  and  sent  them  to  Kome,  accompanied  by  an 
officer  named  Carthalo,  with  instructions  not  only  to  treat 
with  the  senate  for  the  ransom  of  the  prisoners,  but  to 
open  at  the  same  time  negotiations  for  peace.  But  in 
Bome  the  genuine  Boman  spirit  of  stubborn  defiance  had 
so  completely  displaced  the  former  fears  that  no  man 
thought  of  even  mentioning  the  possibility  of  peace ;  and 
Hannibal's  messenger  was  warned  not  to  approach  the 
city.  Thereupon  the  question  was  discussed  in  the  senate, 
whether  the  prisoners  of  war  should  be  ransomed.  The 
mere  possibility  of  treating  this  as  an  open  question  causes 
astonishment.  The  men  whose  liberty  and  lives  were  at 
the  mercy  of  Hannibal  were  not  purchased  mercenaries 
nor  strangers.  They  were  ihe  sons  and  brothers  of  those 
who  had  sent  them  forth  to  battle ;  they  had  obeyed  the 
call  of  their  country  and  of  their  duty,  they  had  staked 
their  lives  in  the  field,  had  fought  valiantly,  and  were 
guUty  of  no  crime  except  this,  that  with  arms  in  their 
hands  they  had  allowed  themselves  to  be  overpowered  by 
the  enemy,  as  Boman  soldiers  had  often  done  before.  But 
in  this  war  Bome  wanted  men  who  rated  their  lives  as 
nothing,  and  were  determined  rather  to  die  than  to  flee  or 
surrender.  In  order  to  impress  this  necessity  upon  all 
Boman  soldiers,  the  unfortunate  prisoners  of  CannaB  were 
sacrificed.   The  senate  refused  to  ransom  them,  and  aban- 

*  OompAre  Hannibars  speech  to  the  prisoners  (Liry,  xxii.  68) :  *  RomanoB 
jMtifl  miti  sermone  alloqnitur ;  non  interneciTum  sibi  esse  cum  Romania  bellom ; 
da  dignit&te  atque  imperio  certare/  &c 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  251 

doned  them  to  the   mercy  of  the   conqueror.'     At  the     CHAP, 
very  time  when  Bome  armed  slaves  in  her  defence,  she  -_    .   '  - 
handed  over  thousands  of  freebom  citizens  to  be  sold  in  the     Skcoxd 

Pebiod, 

slave-markets  of  Utica  and  Carthage,  and  to  be  kept  to  216-215 
field  labour  under  the  burning  sun  of  Africa.  We  may  ^^' 
admire  the  grandeur  of  the  Koman  spirit,  and  from  ^  some 
points  of  view  it  is  worthy  of  admiration ;  but  we  are 
bound  to  express  our  horror  and  detestation  of  the  idol  of 
national  greatness  to  which  the  !Bomans  sacrificed  their 
own  children  in  cold  blood. 

As  if  they  could  excuse  or  palliate  the  inhuman  severity  Roman 
of  the  Eoman  senate  by  painting  in  a  still  more  odious  g^^ng" 
light  the  character  of  the  Punic  general,  some  among  the  Hannibal. 
Boman  annalists  related  that  Hannibal,  from  spite,  vexa- 
tion, and  inveterate  hatred  of  the  Boman  people,  now 
began  to  vent  his  rage  on  his  unfortunate  prisoners,  and 
to  torment  them  with  the  most  exquisite  cruelty-     Many 
of  them,  they  said,  he  killed,  and  from  the  heaped  up 

>  Polybius  (ri.  58)  and  Iavj  (zxii.  68)  gire  an  interesting  account  of  the 
sending  of  the  ten  deputies  of  the  prisoners  to  Rome.  According  to  them  they 
had  sworn  to  return  to  Hannibal  if  the  negotiations  failed ;  but  one  of  their 
number,  after  leaving  the  camp,  returned  immediately,  under  the  pretext  of 
having  forgotten  something,  thinking  thus  to  comply  with  his  promise,  and  he 
remained  in  Home  when  the  other  nine  returned  into  captivity,  after  the  refusal 
of  the  senate  to  ransom  the  prisoners.  But  the  Bomans  would  not  allow  this  sub- 
terfuge, and  sent  him  back  to  Hannibal  in  chains.  There  was,  however,  another 
version  of  this  story,  which  can  be  traced  (see  Cicero,  De  Offie.  iii.  32,  §  lid)  to 
C.  Acilius,  one  of  the  oldest  Boman  annalists,  a  contemporary  of  the  elder  Cato. 
According  to  this  version,  all  the  ten  deputies  played  the  trick  imputed  in  the 
first  version  to  one  only,  and,  what  is  of  more  importance,  all  of  them  remained 
at  Rome  after  the  breaking  off  of  the  negotiations,  in  consequence  of  a  decree 
of  the  senate  which  sanctioned  this  perfidious  sophistry.  They  were,  indeed, 
afterwards  degraded  by  the  censors,  and  lived  covered  with  infamy,  so  that 
some  of  them  destroyed  themselves,  and  others  retired  altogether  from  public 
life,  but  they  were  not  compelled  to  return  into  captivity,  as  they  had  sworn 
to  do.  It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that,  of  the  two  versions,  this  is  the  one 
more  entitled  to  credence ;  for  we  cannot  see  how  it  would  ever  have  obtained 
circulation  if  it  had  not  been  founded  on  truth,  whereas  the  other  version 
seems  invented  from  patriotic  motives.  Livy  gives  some  details  which 
corroborate  it:  he  mentions  the  names  of  three  messengers  dispatched  by 
Hannibal  on  account  of  the  delay  caused  by  the  conduct  of  the  first  ten.  He 
alse  assumes  its  truth  in  a  later  account  (xxiv.  18).  So  does  Valerius  Maximus 
(ii.  9,  8),  whilst  the  story  of  Gellius  {N,  A.  vii.  18)  is  an  attempt  to  combine 
both^ersiong. 


252  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  corpses  lie  made  dams  for  crossing  rivers ;  some,  who  broke 
>- — r^ — '  down  imder  the  weight  of  the  baggage  which  they  had  to 
cany  on  the  marches,  he  caused  to  be  maimed  by  having 
their  tendons  cut ;  the  noblest  of  them  he  compelled  to 
fight  with  one  another  like  gladiators,  for  the  amusement 
of  his  soldiers,  selecting,  with  genuine  Punic  inhumanity, 
the  nearest  relations — fathers,  sons,  and  brothers — to  shed 
each  other's  blood.'  But,  as  Diodorus  relates,  neither 
blows,  nor  goads,  nor  fire  could  compel  the  noble  Bomans 
to  violate  the  laws  of  nature,  and  impiously  to  imbrue 
their  hands  with  the  blood  of  those  who  were  nearest  and 
dearest  to  them.  According  to  Pliny,*  the  only  survivor 
in  these  horrid  combats  was  made  to  fight  with  an 
elephant,  and  when  he  had  killed  the  brute,  he  received 
indeed  his  freedom,  which  was  the  price  that  Hannibal 
had  promised  for  his  victory,  but  shortly  afber  he  had  left 
the  Carthaginian  camp,  he  was  overtaken  by  Numidian 
horsemen  and  cut  down.  K  such  detestable  cruelties  were 
really  within  the  range  of  possibility,  we  should  have  to 
accuse,  not  only  those  who  inflicted  them,  but  those  also 
who,  by  refusing  to  ransom  the  prisoners,  exposed  them  to 
such  a  fate.  But  the  sOence  of  Polybius,*  and  stiU  more 
the  silence  of  Livy,  who  would  have  found  in  the  suflFerings 
of  the  Eoman  prisoners  a  most  welcome  opportunity  for 
rhetorical  declamations  on  Punic  barbarity,  are  sufficient 
to  prove  that  the  alleged  acts  of  cruelty  are  altogether 
without  foundation,  and  that  they  were  invented  for  the 
purpose  of  representing  Hannibal  in  an  odious  light,  and 
of  raising  the  character  of  the  I£omans  at  the  expense 
of  that  of  the  Carthaginians.^ 

'  Appian,  vii.  38;  viii.  63.  Diodoras,  excerpt.  i>e  Vtrtut.  668,  p.  101, 
Tauchnitz.  ZoDaras,  ix.  2.  Valerius  Maximu8»  ix.  2,  ext.  2 :  '  Hannibal  cuius 
maiore  ex  parte  virtns  seevitia  constabat  in  flumine  Vei^ello  corporibus 
Romania  ponte  facto  exercitum  traduxit.  Idem  captives  nostros  oneribiis  et 
itinere  fessos  infima  pf^ium  part-e  snccisa  relinquebat.  Quos  rero  in  castra  per* 
duxerat,  paria  fere  fratrum  et  propinquorum  iungens  ferro  deceraere  cogebat' 

»  Pliny,  Hist.  Nat.  viii.  7. 

'  Polybius  had  twice  occasion  to  speak  of  the  alleged  cruelties  of  Hannibal : 
tL  68  and  ix.  24. 

*  This  contrast  of  the  tifa4fiHa  of  the  Romans,  with  the  d^/i^s  of  the  Car- 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  258 

When,  on  the  evening  of  the  bloody  day  of  Cann®,     CHAP. 
Hannibal  rode  over  the  battle-field,   he   is   reported  by  >^ 


Appian  to  have  burst  into  tears,  and  to  have  exclaimed,     Second 
like  Pyrrhus,  that  he  did  not  hope  for  another  victory    216-215 
like  this.     It  is  possible   that   credulous  Bomans   may       ^•^" 
have  found  in  this  childish  story  some  consolation  for  the  ^0"^^°  o^ 

•^  ^  ^  ^        Hannibal 

soreness  of  their  national  feelings.  But  an  impartial  after  the 
observer  cannot  but  feel  convinced  that  Hannibal's  heart  caniue** 
must  have  swelled  with  pride  and  hope  when  he  surveyed 
the  whole  extent  of  his  unparalleled  victory,  and  that  he 
considered  it  cheaply  purchased  by  the  loss  of  only  6,000 
of  his  brave  warriors.  But  he  did  not  allow  himself  to 
be  carried  away  by  the  natural  enthusiasm  which  caused 
the  impetuous  Maharbal,  the  commander  of  his  light 
Numidian  cavalry,  to  urge  an  immediate  advance  upon 
Eome,  and  so  to  put  an  end  to  the  war  in  one  run.  *  If,' 
said  Maharbal,  *  you  will  let  me  lead  the  horse  forthwith, 
and  follow  quickly,  you  shall  dine  on  the  Capitol  in  five 
days.'  We  may  be  sure  that  Hannibal,  without  waiting 
for  Maharbal's  advice,  had  maturely  considered  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  hostile  capital,  the  final  goal  of  his 
expedition,  were  within  his  reach  at  this  moment.  He 
decided  that  it  was  not,  and  we«  can  scarcely  presume  to 
accuse  the  first  general  of  antiquity  of  an  error  of  judg- 
ment, and  to  maintain  that  he  missed  the  favourable 
moment  for  crowning  all  his   preceding  victories.      All 

thaginians  is  especially  insisted  upon  by  Diodorua  {Joe.  cit.).  It  was  even 
reported  that  Hannibal  had  trained  his  soldiers  to  feed  on  human  flesh. 
Polybius  (ix.  24)  explains  how  this  idle  story  arose.  One  of  HannibaVs  sub- 
ordinate generals,  called  Hannibal  Monomachos,  is  said  to  have  advised  his 
chief  to  accustom  the  soldiers  to  human  flesh,  so  that  they  might,  in  case  of 
necessity,  have  this  food  to  fall  back  upon,  when  all  other  supplies  failed.  But 
Hannibal,  it  is  said,  rejected  the  odious  idea.  Upon  such  evidence  as  this 
Hannibal  was  accused  of  cruelty !  Arnold  (Hist,  of  Bome^  iii.  154),  though 
he  says  in  a  note  that  'the  remarks  of  Polybius  should  make  us  slow  to 
believe  stories  of  Hannibal's  cruelties,  which  so  soon  became  a  theme  for  the 
invention  of  poets  and  rhetoricians,'  nevertheless  repeats  in  his  text  the 
chaises  brought  against  him.  He  says,  *  When  Hannibal  found  that  his 
officer  had  not  been  allowed  to  enter  the  city,  and  that  the  Romans  had 
refused  to  ransom  their  prisoners,  his  disappointment  betrayed  him  into  acts 
of  the  most  inhuman  cruelty.'  If  Ai'nold's  note  was  an  afterthought,  it  is  a 
pity  that  ho  left  his  text  unaltered. 


254 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Reasons 
for  Hanoi- 
bars  hesi- 
tation to 
march 
upon 
IU>ine. 


Policy  of 
Hannibal. 


that  we  can  do  is  to  endeavour  to  discover  the  motives 
which  may  have  kept  him  from  an  immediate  advance 
upon  Borne. 

After  the  battle  of  Cannse,  Hannibal's  army  numbered 
still  about  44,000  men.  It  was  surely  possible  with  such 
a  force  as  this  to  penetrate  straight  through  the  mountains 
of  Samnium,  and  through  Campania  into  Latium,  without 
encountering  any  formidable  resistance.  But  this  march 
could  not  be  accomplished  in  less  than  ten  or  eleven  days, 
even  if  the  army  were  not  delayed  by  any  obstacles,  and 
marched  ever  so  fast.  The  interval  of  time  which  must 
thus  elapse  between  the  arrival  of  news  from  the  battle- 
field and  the  approach  of  the  hostile  army,  would  enable 
the  Homans  to  make  preparations  for  defence,  and  ex- 
cluded, accordingly,  the  possibility  of  a  surprise-  Bome 
was  not  an  open  city,  but  strongly  fortified  by  its  situation 
and  by  art.  Every  Boman  citizen  up  to  the  age  of  sixty 
was  able  to  defend  the  walls,  and  thus,  even  if  no  reserve 
was  at  hand  (which  Hannibal  could  not  take  for  granted), 
Bome  was  not  helplessly  at  the  mercy  of  an  advancing 
army. 

Failing  to  take  Bome  by  a  surprise,  Hannibal  would 
have  been  compelled  to*  besiege  it  in  form.  This  was 
an  undertaking  for  which  his  strength  was  insufficient. 
His  army  was  not  even  numerous  enough  to  blockade  the 
city  and  to  cut  off  supplies  and  reinforcements  from 
without.  What  could,  therefore,  be  the  result  of  a  mere 
demonstration  against  Bome,  even  if  it  was  practicable 
and  involved  no  risk  ?  *  It  was  of  far  greater  importance 
to  gather  the  certain  fruits  of  victory — ^to  obtain,  by  the 
conquest  of  some  fortified  towns,  a  new  basis  of  operations 
in  the  south  of  Italy,  such  as  he  had  not  had  since  his 
advance  from  Cisalpine  Gaul.  Now,  at  last,  the  moment 
had  come  when  Hannibal  might  expect  to  be  joined  by 

*  Vincke  {JDer  eweite  punische  Krieg,  p.  851)  considers  the  omission  of  a 
march  upon  Borne  an  unpardonable  error.  He  thinks  that  Hannibal  ought  to 
hare  marched  so  rapidly  as  to  precede  the  news  of  the  Koman  defeat  at 
Gannse ;  and  insists  that,  even  if  the  enterprise  had  failed,  it  would  not  have 
entailed  dangers  or  losses. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAB.  255 

the  Boman  allies.     The  battle  of  Cannse  had  shaken  their     CHAP. 

VIII 

confidence  in  the  power  of  Rome  to  protect  them  if  faith-  * ^-^ 

fill,  or  to  punish  their  revolt;   and  thus   were   severed     ^^^ 
the   strongest  bonds  which  had  hitherto  secured  their    216-216 
obedience.     If  Hannibal  now  succeeded  in  gaining  them     ' 
over  to  his  side,  his  deep-laid  plan  would  be  brilliantly 
realised,  and  Borne  would  be  more  completely  and  securely 
overpowered  than  if  he  had  stormed  the  Capitol. 

Keeping  this  end   steadily  in  view,  Hannibal  again  Overtures 
acted  precisely  as  he  had  done  after  his  previous  victories,  bal  to°the 
He  set  the  captured  allies  of  the  Bomans  fi-ee  without  Roman 
ransom,  and  dismissed  them  to  their  respective  homes, 
with  the  assurance  that  he  had  come  to  Italy  to  wage 
war,  not  with  them,  but  with  the  Bomans,  the  common 
enemies  of  Carthage  and  Italy.     He  promised  them,  if 
they  would  join  him,  his  assistance  for  the  recovery  of 
their  independence  and  their  lost  possessions,  threatening 
them  at  the  same  time  with  severe  punishment  if  they 
should  still  continue  to  show  themselves  hostile. 

It  causes  just  astonishment,  and  it  is  a  convincing  proof  Fidelity  of 
of  the  political  wisdom  and  the  fitness  of  the  Boman  to  Rome, 
people  to  rule  the  world,  that  even  now  the  great  majority 
of  their  Italian  subjects  remained  faithful  in  their  alle- 
giance. Not  only  the  citizens  of  the  thirty-five  tribes, 
of  whom  many  had  received  the  Boman  franchise  not  as 
a  boon,  but  as  a  punishment — not  only  all  the  colonies, 
Boman  as  well  as  Latin — but  also  the  whole  of  Etruria, 
XJmbria,  Picenum,  the  genuine  SabeUian  races  of  the 
Sabines,  Marsians,  Pelignians,  Yestinians,  Frentanians, 
and  Marrucinians,  the  Pentrian  Samnites,  and  the  Cam- 
panians,  as  well  as  all  the  Greek  cities,^  remained  faithful 
to  Bome.  Only  in  Apulia,  in  southern  Samnium,  where 
the  Caudinians  and  Hirpinians  lived,  in  Lucania  and 
Bnittium,  and  especially  in  the  city  of  Capua,  more  or  less 
readiness  was  shown  to  revolt  from  Bome ;  but  even  in 

those  places,  where  the  greatest  hostility  against  Bome 

< » 

'  The  latter,  no  doubt,  partly  out  of  fear  of  the  Bruttians. — Livy.  xxir.  1. 


256  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     prevailed,  there  was  not  a  trace  of  attachment  to  Car- 
- _    /  _'  thage,  and  everywhere  there  was  found  a  zealous  Boman 


party  which  opposed  the  Carthaginian  alliance.  This 
was,  as  we  have  hinted  above,  partly  the  consequence  of 
the  national  antipathy  of  Italians  and  Punians,  between 
natives  and  foreigners;  partly  it  was  the  alliance  of 
Hannibal  with  the  Gauls,  which  made  the  Italians  averse 
to  join  the  invader ;  partly  that  dread  of  Roman  revenge, 
of  which,  even  after  Cannse,  they  could  not  rid  themselves. 
But  it  was  mainly  the  political  unity  under  the  supremacy 
of  Rome,  which,  in  spite  of  isolated  defections,  bound  the 
various  races  of  Italy  into  indissoluble  union,  and  in  the 
end  prevailed  even  over  the  genius  of  Hannibal. 
B^Tti^  ^^  When  the  Apulian  towns  of  Arpi,'  Salapia,^  and  Her- 
and  donea,'  and  the  insignificant  and  all  but  unknown  Uzentum 

Hinpania.  j^  ^j^^  extreme  south  of  Calabria,  had  embraced  the  Car- 
thaginian cause,  Hannibal  marched  along  the  Aufidus 
into  Samnium,  where  the  town  of  Compsa  opened  her 
gates  to  him.  A  portion  of  his  army  he  sent  under  Hanno 
to  Lucania  for  the  purpose  of  organising  a  general  in- 
surrection among  the  restless  population  of  that  district ; 
another  portion,  under  the  command  of  his  brother  Mago, 
he  dispatched  to  Bruttium  with  the  same  commission,* 
whilst  he  himself  marched  with  the  bulk  of  his  army  into 
Campania.  The  Lucanians*  and  Bruttians  were  ready  to 
rise  against  Rome.  Doubtless  they  chafed  impatiently 
under  a  government  which  obliged  them  to  keep  the 
peace ;  they  regretted  their  former  licence  of  ravaging 
and  plundering  the  land  of  their  Greek  neighbours,  and 
they  hoped,  with  Hannibal's  sanction,  to  be  able  to  resume 

>  Polybius,  iii.  118,  §  2. 

'  Liry,  xxiv.  47.    Appian,  Tii.  45. 

■  Liry,  xxvii.  1.  Both  Polybius  and  Livy  are  inaccurate  in  their  state- 
ments which  refer  to  the  revolt  of  the  allies.  They  omit  to  mention  at  the 
proper  place  the  defection  of  some,  as  of  Salapia  and  Herdonea,  referring  but 
casually  to  it  on  some  other  occasion ;  and  again  they  enumemte  others  as 
having  joined  Hannibal  after  the  battle  of  Cannse,  who  remained  in  their 
allegiance  for  some  time  longer,  as,  for  instance,  Tarentum. 

*  Livy,  xxiii.  11. 

»  But  with  some  exceptions.    See  Livy,  xxiv.  20;  xxv.  16. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  257 

on  a  large  scale  those  practices  of  brigandage  to  which     CHAP, 
they  had  been  so  long  addicted.^     Only  two  insignificant 


towns,  Consentia  and  Petelia,  remained  faithful  to  Eome,     Second 
and  were  taken  by  force,  after  an  obstinate  resistance.  216-216 

Prom  a  port  on  the  Bmttian  coast  Mago  no\t  sailed  to 
Carthage,  and  conveyed  to  the  government  Hannibal's  p^*"g** 
report  of  his  last  and  most  glorious  victory,  as  also  his  character 
views  and  wishes  with  regard  to  the  manner  of  conducting  ^  ^  ^  ^"' 
the  war  for  the  future.  After  the  battle  of  Cannee  the 
character  of  the  war  in  Italy  was  changed.  Up  to  that 
time  the  Eomans  had  defended  themselves  so  vigorously 
that  they  might  almost  be  said  to  have  acted  on  the 
oflfensive.  They  had  striven  to  beat  Hannibal  in  the  field, 
opposing  to  him  first  an  equal,  then  a  double  force.  They 
resolved  now  to  confine  themselves  entirely  to  the  defensive, 
and  indeed  from  this  time  to  the  end  of  the  war  they  never 
ventured  on  a  decisive  battle  with  Hannibal.  The  Car- 
thaginians had  military  possession  of  a  large  portion  of 
southern  Italy.  Hannibal  had  no  difficulty  in  maintaining 
this  possession,  and  needed  for  this  purpose  no  great 
reinforcements  from  home,  especially  since  he  reckoned  on 
the  services  of  the  Italians.  But  he  was  not  able  to  aim 
a  decisive  blow  at  Bome.  To  do  this  he  needed  assistance 
on  a  large  scale — nothing  less,  in  fact,  than  another 
Carthaginian  army,  which,  considering  the  naval  superiority 
of  the  Eomans,  could  reach  Italy  only  by  land.  A  consider- 
able portion  of  this  army  moreover  must  necessarily  consist 
of  Spaniards,  for  Africa  alone  could  not  supply  sufficient 
materials.  Spain,  therefore,  was,  under  present  circum- 
stances, of  the  greatest  importance  to  Carthage.  In  that 
country  Hasdrubal,  the  brother  of  Hannibal,  carried  on  the 
war  against  the  two  Scipios.  If  in  the  year  216  he  could 
beat  the  Bomans,  penetrate  over  the  Pyrenees  and  the 
Bhone,  and  then  in  the  following  spring  cross  the  Alps,  the 
two  brothers  could  march  upon  Bome  from  north  and 
south,  and  end  the  war  by  the  conquest  of  the  capital. 

To  carry  out  this  plan,  which  Mago  as  Hannibal's  con-  Reeolution. 

'  Livy,  xxiy.  2. 
VOL.  n.  S 


258  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     fidential  envoy  laid  before  the  Carthaginian  government, 

_  V    '  it  was  resolved  to  send  4,000  Numidian  horse  and  forty 

of  the  Car-  elephants  to  Italy,  and  to  raise  in  Spain  20,000  foot  and 

thjiginians   4^000  horse.     We  hear  much*  of  the  opposition  which 

Hannibal,    these  measures  encountered  in  the  Carthaginian  senate. 

Hanno,  the  leader  of  the  party  hostile  to  the  house  of 

Barcas,  it  is  said,  resisted  Hannibal's  propositions  and  the 

prosecution  of  the  war.     But  as  the  Barcide  party  had  an 

overwhelming  majority,  the  opposition  was  powerless  and 

unable  to  thwart  Hannibal's  plans.     We  can  therefore 

easily  believe  that  the  Carthaginian  senate  voted  all  but 

unanimously  the  supplies  of  men  and  materials  of  war 

which  Hannibal  required. 

The  war  As  matters  stood  now,  everything  depended  on  the  issue 

in  Spam,     ^f  ^j^^  ^g^  jj^  Spain.     While  the  rapid  course  of  events  in 

Italy  was  followed  by  a  comparative  rest,  while  the  war  was 

there  resolving  itself  into  a  number  of  smaller  conflicts,  and 

turned  chiefly  on  the  taking  and  maintaining  of  fortified 

places,  the  Bomans  succeeded  in  dealing  a  decisive  blow  in 

Spain,  which  delayed  the  Carthaginian  plan  of  reinforcing 

Hannibal  from  that  quarter  to  a  time  when  the  Romans 

had  completely  recovered  from  the  effects  of  their  first 

three  defeats  on  the  Trebia,  the  Thrasymenus,  and  the 

Aufidus. 

Further  But  this  event,  which  was  in  reality  the  turning-point 

revolts        jj^  ^Y^Q  career  of  Carthaginian  triumphs,  did  not  take  place 

3?oii.an       till  later  in  the  course  of  the  year  216  B.o.   Meanwhile  the 

*  '®**         prospects  of  Eome  in  Italy  had  become  still  more  clouded. 

The  battle  of  Cannae  began  to  produce  its  effects.     One 

after  another  of  the  allies  in  southern  Italy  joined  the 

enemy,  and  Eome  in  her  trouble  and  distress  was  obliged 

to  leave  to  their  fate  those  who,  remaining  faithful,  only 

asked  for  protection  and  help  to  enable  them  to  hold  their 

ground. 

Condition        The  richest  and  most  powerful  city  in  Italy  next  to 

ofCupua.    ;^mQ  ^a^  Capua.     She  was  able  to  send  into  the  field 

30,000  foot  and  an  excellent  cavalry  of  4,000  men,  unsui^ 

>  Livj,  xxiii.  13. 


THE  SECOND  KJNIC  WAR.  259 

passed  by  any  Italian  state.     No  city  not  included  in  the     CHAP. 
Boman  tribes   appeared   so    intimately  connected    with 


Eome   as   Capua.      The   Eomans  and  the  Capnans  had     |«»n^ 
become  one  people  more  completely  than  the  Eomans  and    2 16-21 5 
the  Latins.     The  Capuan  knights  possessed  the  fuU  Roman       ^'^' 
franchise,  and  the  rest  of  the  people  of  Capua  enjoyed  the 
civil  rights  of  Romans  exclusive  only  of  the  political  rights. 
The  Capuans  fought  in  the  Roman  legions  side  by  side 
with  the  inhabitants  of  the  thiriiy-five  tribes.     A  great 
number  of  Romans  had  settled  in  Capua,  and  the  pro- 
minent families  of  this  town  were  connected  by  marriage 
with  the  highest  nobility  of  Rome.     These  Capuan  nobles 
had  a  double  motive  for  remaining  faithful  to   Rome.    . 
Through  the  decision  of  the  Roman  senate  they  had  in  the 
great  Latin  war  (338  B.C.')  obtained  political  power  in 
Capua  and  the  enjoyment  of  an  annual  revenue  which  the 
people  of  Capua  were  made  to  pay  to  them.     A  Roman 
prefect  resided  in  Capua  to  decide  civil  disputes  in  which 
Roman  citizens  were  concerned ;  but  in  every  other  respect 
the  Capuans  were  free  from  interference  with  their  local 
self-government.     They  had  their  own  senate  and  their 
national  chief  magistrate,   called  Meddix.      Under  the 
dominion  of  Rome  the  town  had  probably  lost  little  of  her 
former  importance  and  prosperity,  and  she  was  considered 
now,  as  she  had  been  a  century  before,  a  worthy  rival  of 
Rome. 

But  it  was  precisely  this  greatness  and  prosperity  which  T>isposi- 
fostered  in  the  people  of  Capua  the  feeling  of  jealousy  and  ^\Qbeian8* 
impatience  of   Roman  superiority.      A    position  which  of  Capua 
smaller  towns  might  accept  without  feeling  humbled  could  Hanuibal. 
not  fail  to  offend  the  pride  of  a  people  which  looked  upon 
itself  as  not  inferior  even  to  the  people  of  Rome.     The 
plebeians  of  Capua,  in  other  words  the  vast  majority  of  the 
population,  had  been  grievously  wronged  and  exasperated 
by  the  measure  of  the  Roman  senate  which  had  deprived 
Capua  of  her  domain  or  public  land,  and  had  in  consequence 
imposed  a  tax  for  the  support  of  the  Capuan  nobility.    The 

*  See  Tol.  i.  p.  373. 
s  2 


260  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     natural  opposition  between  the  two  classes  of  citizens, 

s^ — ^ .   which  we  find  in  every  Italian  community,  had  through  this 

measure  been  embittered  by  a  peculiar  feeling  of  injustice 
on  the  popular  side,  and  by  the  slavish  attachment  of  the 
nobles  to  their  foreign  friends  and  supporters.     It  was  not 
Hannibal's  appearance  in  Italy  that  first  produced   this 
division  in  Capua.     But  the  discontent  which  had  been 
growing  for  years,  had  hitherto  been  kept  down  by  the 
irresistible  power  of  Rome.     Now,  as  it  seemed,  the  hour 
of  deliverance  was  at  hand.     Soon  after  the  battle  of  the 
lake  Thrasy menus  iu  the  preceding  year,  when  Hannibal 
for  the  first  time  appeared  in  Campania,  he  had  tried  to 
detach  Capua  from  the  Roman  alliance.     Some  Capuan 
prisoners  of  war  whom  he  had  set  free,  had  promised  to 
bring  about  an  insurrection  in  their  native  city ;  but  the 
plan  had  failed.*   Another  decisive  victory  over  the  Romans 
was  wanted  to  inspire  the  national  and  popular  party  in 
Capua  with  sufficient  courage  for  so  bold  a  step  as  the 
throwing  off  of  their  allegiance.     Such  a  victory  had  been 
gained  at  Cannse ;  and  the  revolution  in  Capua  was  one  of 
its  first  and  most  valuable  fruits.* 
Revolt  of         The  Capuan  nobility  was  neither  strong  enough  to  sup- 
At^u*'        press  the  popular  movement  in  favour  of  Hannibal,  nor 
and   *        honest  and  firm  enough  to  retire  from  the  government  and 
to  leave  the  town  after  the  Carthaginian  party  had  gained 
the  ascendency.      Only  a  few  men  remained  faithful  to 
Rome,  foremost  among  whom  was  Decius  Magius.     The 
majority  of  the  senate  of  Capua  allowed  themselves  to  be 
intimidated  by  Pacuvius  Calavius,'  one  of  their  number, 
and  hoped  by  joining  the  Carthaginians  to  save  their  pre- 
rogatives and  their  position.      Soon  after  the  battle  of 
Cannse  they  despatched  an  embassy  to  Hannibal  and  con- 
cluded a  treaty  of  friendship  and  alliance  with  Carthage, 
which  guaranteed  their  entire  independence,  and  especially 
an  immunity  from  the  obligation  of  military  service  and 
other  burthens.^     As  the  prize  of  their  joint  victory  over 

»  See  above,  p.  220.  •  Livy,  audii.  2-10.     Zonaras,  ix.  2. 

■  Livy,  zxiii.  2. 

*  Liyy,  zxiii.  7 :  '  Legati  ad  Hannibalem  yenerant  pacemque  cum  eo  con 


Galatia. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE. 


261 


Borne  they  hoped  that  the  dominion  over  Italy  would  fall 
to  their  share.  In  order  to  cut  off  every  chance  of  a 
reconciliation  with  Eome,  and  to  convince  their  new  ally 
of  their  unconditional  attachment,  the  Capuan  populace 
seized  the  Boman  citizens  who  happened  to  be  residing 
among  them^  shut  them  up  in  one  of  the  public  baths,  and 
killed  them  with  hot  vapour.  Three  hundred  Boman  pri- 
soners were  delivered  into  the  keeping  of  the  Capuan s  by 
Hannibal  as  a  security  for  the  safety  of  an  equal  number 
of  Capuan  horsemen  who  were  serving  with  the  Boman 
army  in  Sicily.  The  example  of  Capua  was  followed 
voluntarily  or  on  compulsion  by  Atella  and  Calatia,  two 
neighbouring  Italian  cities.  All  the  other  numerous  towns 
of  Campania,  especially  the  Greek  community  of  Neapolis 
and  the  old  city  of  Cumae  (once,  like  Neapolis,  a  Greek 
settlement,  but  now  entirely  Italian),  remained  faithfiilto 
Bome.  This  was  due  to  the  influence  of  the  nobility, 
while  the  popular  party  evinced  everywhere  a  strong  desire 
to  join  the  Carthaginian  cause. 

Among  the  great  events  which  convulsed  Italy  at  this 
time  our  attention  is  arrested  by  the  fate  of  a  comparatively 
humble  individual,  because  it  permits  us  to  catch  a  glimpse 
of  the  civil  struggles  and  vicissitudes  which  the  great 
war  called  forth  in  every  Italian  city,  and  because  it  throws 
an  interesting  and  a  favourable  light  on  the  character  of 
Hannibal.*  Decius  Magius  was  the  leader  of  the  minority 
in  the  Capuan  senate,  which,  remaining  faithful  to  Borne, 
rejected  all  the  offers  of  Hannibal,  and  even  after  the  occu- 
pation of  their  town  by  a  Punic  garrison  entertained  the 
hope  of  recalling  their  countrymen  to  their  allegiance,  of 
overpowering  and  murdering  the  foreign  troops,  and  re- 
storing Capua  to  the  Bomans.  He  made  no  secret  of  his 
sentiments  and  his  plans.  When  Hannibal  sent  for  him 
into  his  camp,  he  refused  to  go,  because,  as  a  free  citizen  of 


CHAP. 

VIII. 

Skci^nd 
Pkruu), 
2I6-2I0 

B.C. 


The 

resistance 
of  Decius 
Magius  to 
Hannibal. 


dicionibus  his  fecerunt,  ne  quia  imperator  magistratiuiTe  Fcenonim  ius  tilhim 
in  civem  CampAnum  haberet,  neve  civis  Campanus  in^itus  militaret  munusre 
£iceret;  ut  sn^e  leges,  sui  magibtratus  Capus  essent.' 
*  Livy,  xxiii.  8-10. 


262 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Story  of 

PaciiTius 

CalaTiuB. 


Capua,  he  was  not  boond  to  obey  the  behests  of  a  stranger. 
Hannibal  might  have  employed  force ;  but  his  object  was 
to  gain  oyer  as  a  friend,  not  to  punish,  so  influential  a  man 
as  Decius.  When  he  made  his  public  entry  into  Capua,  the 
whole  population  poured  out  to  meet  him,  eager  to  see  face 
to  face  the  man  who  had  taken  the  Roman  yoke  from  their 
shoulders.     But  Decius  Magius  kept  aloof  from  the  gaping 
crowd*    He  walked  up  and  down  on  the  market-place  with 
his  son  and  a  few  clients  as  if  he  had  no  concern  in  the 
general  excitement.     On  the  following  day,  when  he  was 
brought  before  Hannibal,  he  exhibited  the  same  spirit  of 
defiance^  and  tried  even  to  rouse  the  people  against  the  in- 
vaders.    What  would  have  been  the  fate  of  such  a  man,  if 
he  had  thus  defied  a  Eoman  general?    Hannibal  was 
satisfied  with  removing  him  from  the  place  where  his  pre- 
sence was  likely  to  cause  difficcdties.  He  ordered  him  to  be 
sent  to  Carthage  to  be  kept  there  as  a  prisoner  of  war.  But 
Decius  Magius  was  spared  the  humiliation  of  living  at  the 
mercy  of  his  hated  enemies.  The  ship  that  was  to  take  him 
to  Carthage  was  driven  by  adverse  winds  to  Cyrene.  Hence 
he  was  brought  to  Egypt;  and  KingPtolemy  Philopator,  who 
was  on  friendly  terms  with  Some,  allowed  him  to  return  to 
Italy.     But  where  was  he  to  go  ?     His  native  town  was  in 
the  hands  of  a  hostile  faction  and  of  the  national  enemies, 
while  Bome  was  carrying  on  a  war  of  extermination  against 
her.     He  remained  an  exile  in  a  foreign  land,  and  thus  was 
spared  the  misery  of  witnessing  the  barbarous  punishment 
which  a  few  years  later  the  ruthless  hand  of  Bome  inflicted 
on  Capua.     No  man  would  have  been  more  justified  in 
deprecating  this  punishment,  and  more  likely  to  mitigate 
it,  if  Boman  justice  could  ever  be  tempered  with  mercy, 
than  the  man  who  had  dared  in  the  cause  of  Bome  to  defy 
the  victorious  Hannibal.^ 

The  two  hostile  parties  which  opposed  each  other  in  the 
Campanian  towns  had  caused  even  members  of  the  same 
families  to  be  divided  against  each  other.'    Pacuvius  CaJa- 


>  Livy,  zxiii.  10. 


'  livj,  zziii.  8. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE. 


263 


CHAP. 

vni. 


Srcokd 
Pbbioo, 
216-216 

B.C. 


vius,  the  chief  instigator  of  the  revolt  of  Capua,  had  mar- 
ried a  daughter  of  a  noble  Roman,  Appius  Claudius,  and 
his  son  was  a  zealous  adherent  of  the  Roman  cause.  The 
father  tried  in  vain  to  convince  the  youth  that  the  star  of 
Some  had  set,  and  that  his  na.tive  town  of  Capua  could  re- 
gain her  ancient  position  and  splendour  only  by  a  league 
with  Carthage.  Not  even  the  countenance  and  the  kind 
words  of  Hannibal  himself,  who  at  the  father's  request 
pardoned  the  errors  of  the  son,  could  conciliate  the 
sturdy  young  man.  Invited  with  his  father  to  dine  in 
company  with  Hannibal,  he  remained  sullen  through  the 
merriment  of  the  banquet,  and  refused  even  to  pledge 
Hannibal  in  a  cup  of  wine,  under  the  pretext  of  not  feel- 
ing well.  Towards  evening,  when  Pacuvius  left  the  dining 
room  for  a  time,  his  son  followed  him,  and  drawing  him 
aside  into  a  garden  at  the  back  of  the  house,  declared  his 
intention  of  presently  killing  Hannibal  and  thus  obtaining 
for  his  countrymen  pardon  for  their  great  oflFence.  In  the 
utmost  dismay,  Pacuvius  besought  his  son  to  give  up  this 
heinous  scheme,  and  vowed  to  shield  with  his  own  body  the 
man  to  whom  he  had  sworn  to  be  faithful,  who  had  in- 
trusted himself  to  the  hospitality  of  Capua,  and  whose 
guests  they  were  at  this  moment.  In  the  struggle  of  con- 
flicting duties  filial  piety  prevailed.  The  youth  cast  away 
the  dagger  with  which  he  had  armed  himself,  and  returned 
to  the  banquet  to  avert  suspicion. 

In  Nola  as  in  Capua  the  people  were  divided  between  Occupation 
a  Roman  and  a  Carthaginian  party.'     The  plebs  was  in  the^°rotor 
favour  of  joining  Hannibal,  and  it  was  with  difiiculty  that  Maicellus. 
the  nobles  delayed  the  decision,  and  thus  gained  time  to 
inform  the  prsator  Marcellus,  who  was  then  stationed  at 
Casilinum,  of  the  danger  of  a  revolt.     Marcellus  immedi- 
ately hastened  to  Nola,  occupied  the  town  with  a  strong 
garrison,  and  repulsed  the  Carthaginians,  who,  counting 
on  the  friendly  disposition  of  the  people  of  Nola,  had 
come  to  take  possession  of  the  town.    This  lucky  hit  of 


>  loYj,  zxiii.  14. 


264  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     Marcellus  was  magrnified  by  the  Roman  annalists  into  a 
>- — r^ — '  complete  victory  over  Hannibal.     Livy  *  found  in  some  of 
the    writers    whom    he    consulted    the    statement    that 
2,800  Carthaginians  were  slain;  but  he  is  sensible  and 
honest  enough  to  suspect  that  this  is  a  great  exaggeration. 
The  extent  of  the  success  of  Marcellus  was  no  doubt  this, 
that  Hannibal's  attempt  to  occupy  Nola  with  the  assistance 
of  the   Carthaginian  party  failed;   and  considering  the 
importance  of  the  place,  this  was  indeed  a  great  point 
gained.     But  it  was  an  empty  boast  if  Roman  writers 
asserted  in  consequence  that  Marcellus  had  taught  the 
Romans  to  conquer  Hannibal.^     Livy  hits  the  truth  by 
saying  that  not  to  be  conquered  by  Hannibal  was  more 
difficult  at  that  time  than  it  was  afterwards  to  conquer 
him.     It  was  the  merit  of  Marcellus  that  he  saved  Nola 
from  being  taken.     This  was  effected  not  only  by  antici- 
pating the  arrival  of  the  Carthaginians,  and  by  securing 
the  town  with  a  garrison,  but  by  severely  punishinj^  the 
leaders  of  the  popular  party  in  Nola,  who  were  guilty  or 
suspected  of  an   understanding  with  Hannibal.     When 
seventy  of  them  had  been  put  to  death,  the  fidelity  of  Nola 
seemed  sufficiently  secured.' 
Occupation       The  pretended  victory  of  Marcellus  at  Nola  appears  the 
and  ^^^'"*   more  doubtful  as  Hannibal  about  the  same  time  was  able 
Acerrflpby    to  take  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood  the  towns  of 
Nuceria  and  Acerrse,*  and  made  several  attempts  to  gain 

'  Livy,  xxiii.  16. 

*  Compare  Cicero,  Brut.  iii.  12 :  *  Post  Cannensem  illam  calamitatfim  primnm 
Marcelli  ad  Nolam  proelio  populus  se  Eomanus  erezit/  Valerius  Maximus, 
i.  6,  9. 

*  Livy,  xxiii.  17. 

*  On  this  occasion  the  stories  of  Hannibal's  treachery  and  cruelty  are 
repeated.  According  to  Zonaras  (ix  2:  compare  Dion  Cassius,  ff.  50,  54; 
Appian,  viii.  63),  Hannibal  caused  the  senators  of  Nuceria  to  be  kiUed ;  and 
though  he  promised  the  other  inhabitants  to  let  them  leave  the  town  in  safety, 
he  caused  them  to  be  cut  dovn  on  the  road  by  his  horsemen.  This  story  is 
indirectly  contradicted  by  Livy  (xxiii.  16),  who  relates  that  the  people  of 
ISuceria  rejected  the  offer  of  Hannibal,  who  wished  them  to  take  sen'ice  with 
him,  and  took  refuge  all  over  Campania,  but  especially  in  Nola  and 
Neapolis;  that  thirty  senators  of  Nuceria,  on  being  refused  admittance  into 
Capua,  went  to  Cums.    Livy  either  could  not  have  found  anything  of  the 


THE  SECOND  PTJNIC  WAE.  265 

possession  of  Neapolis.     Neapolis  would  have  been  a  most     CHAP, 
valuable  acquisition,  as  a  secure  landing-place  and  a  sta-  ,   yiu. 
tion  for  the  Carthaginian  fleet.     But  the  Neapolitans  were     Sboond 
on  their  guard.     All  attempts  to  take  the  town  by  sur-    216-216 
prise  failed,  and  Hannibal  had  not  the  means  of  laying       ^'^' 
siege  to  it  in  a  regular  manner.     His  attempts  to  take 
Cumse  were  equally  futile,  and  even  the  petty  town  of 
Casilinum,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Capua,  on  the  river 
Volturnus,  offered  a  stout  resistance.     But  Casilinum  was 
too  important  on  account  of  its  position  to  be  left  in  the 
hands   of  the  Romans.     Hannibal  therefore  resolved  to 
lay  regular  siege  to  it. 

The  siege  of  Casilinum  claims  our  special  attention,  as  Sie^e  of 
it  shows  the  spirit  and  the  quality  of  the  troops  of  whom  the  ^***""^^™* 
Bomans  disposed  in  their  struggle  with  Carthage.  When 
the  Roman  legions  in  the  spring  of  the  year  216  b.o. 
assembled  in  Apulia,  the  allied  town  of  Prseneste  was  some- 
what in  arrear  in  preparing  its  contingent.  This  con- 
tingent, consisting  of  five  hundred  and  seventy  men,  was 
therefore  still  on  its  march,  and  had  just  reached  Campania, 
when  the  news  of  the  disaster  of  Cannse  arrived.  Instead  of 
marching  further  south,  the  troops  took  up  their  position 
in  the  little  town  of  Casilinum,  and  were  there  joined  by 
some  Latins  and  Bomans,  as  well  as  by  a  cohort  of  four 
hundred  and  sixty  men  from  the  Etruscan  town  of  Perusia, 
which,  like  the  Prsenestine  cohort,  had  been  delayed  in 
taking  the  field.  Shortly  after  this  Capua  revolted,  and 
everywhere  in  Campania  the  popular  party  showed  a  dis- 
position to  follow  the  example  of  Capua.  To  prevent  the 
people  of  Casilinum  from  betraying  their  Roman  garrison 
to  the  Carthaginians,  the  soldiers  anticipated  treason  by 
a  treacherous  and  barbarous  act.  They  fell  upon  the 
inhabitants,  put  to  death  all  fchat  were  suspected,'  destroyed 

alleged  atrocities  of  Hannibal  in  the  annals  he  consnlted,  or  he  discredited  the 
Btatementi).  Mommsen  {Som.  Hiat.  i.  p.  623 ;  £ng.  translation,  ii.  142)  accepts 
them  as  true. 

1  From  lAyy  zxiii.  17  it  wonld  appear  that  all  the  inhabitants  were  killed, 
but  this  is  contradicted  by  Liry  himself  in  another  place  (xxiii.  19).  This 
heinous  act  of  the  Roman  garrison  closely  resembles  the  doings  of  the  garrison 


266  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     that  portion  of  the  town  which  lay  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
'_    /    -  river,  and  pnt  the  other  half  in  a  state  of  defence.     The 
Carthaginians  summoned  the  town  in  vain,  and  then  tried 
to  take  it  by  storm  ;  but  several  assaults  were  repulsed  by 
the  garrison  with  the  greatest  courage,  and  with  perfect 
success.     Hannibal  with  his  victorious  army  was  unable  to 
take  by  force  this  insignificant  place,  with  its  garrison  of 
scarcely  one  thousand  men — so  utterly  was  he  destitute 
of  the  means  and  apparatus  necessary  for  a  regular  siege  ; 
and  perhaps  he  shrunk  from  sacrificing  his  valuable  troops 
in  this  kind  of  warfare.     Yet  he  did  not  give  up  Casilinum. 
He  kept  up  a  blockade,  and  in  the  course  of  the  winter 
hunger  soon  began  its  ravages  among  the  defenders.     A 
Soman  force  under  Gracchus,  the  master  of  the  horse  of 
the  dictator  Junius  Pera,  was  stationed  at  a  short  distance, 
but  made  no  attempt  to  throw  supplies  into  the  town,  or 
to  raise  the  siege.     Gradually  all  the  horrors  of  a  pro- 
tracted siege  broke  out  in  the  town ;  the  leather  of  the 
shields  was  cooked  for  food,  mice  and  roots  were  devoured, 
many  of  the  garrison  threw  themselves  from  the  walls  or 
exposed  themselves  to  the  missiles  of  the  enemies  to  end 
the  pangs  of  hunger  by  a  voluntary  death.     The  Roman 
troops  under  Gracchus  tried  in  vain  to  relieve  the  distress 
of  the  besieged  by  floating  down  the  river  during  the  night 
casks  partly  filled  with  grain.     The  Carthaginians  soon  dis- 
covered the  trick,  and  fished  the  casks  out  of  the  river 
before  they  reached  the  town.     When  all  hope  of  relief 
was  thus  gone,  and  half  of  the  defenders  of  Casilinum  had 
perished  by  hunger,  the  heroic  Prsenestines  and  Perusians 
at  last  consented  to  surrender  the  town  on  condition  of 
being  allowed  to  ransom  themselves  for  a  stipulated  sum.^ 

of  Bona  in  Sicily,  and  those  of  the  Campanian  legion  in  Bhegium. — See 
Tol.  i.  p.  518. 

'  Again  some  annalifits  accused  Hannibal  of  an  act  of  cruel  perfidy.  They 
said  (Liry,  zxiii.  19)  that  horsemen  were  sent  after  the  men  and  killed  them. 
Liyy  had  no  difficulty  in  rejecting  this  impudent  lie.  which  is  exposed  by  the 
subsequent  narrative  of  the  honours  publicly  awarded  to  the  Prssnestine 
soldiers  after  their  return.  He  says :  '  Donee  omne  aurum  persolutum  est,  in 
viflculifl  habit! ;  turn  remiss!  aumnia  cum  fide' 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAK,  267 

They  were  justly  proud  of  their  performance.     Marcus     CHAP. 
Anicius,  the  commander  of  the  PrsBnestine  cohort,  who,  as 


Livy  remarks,  had  formerly  been  a  public  clerk,  caused  a  p^^^^ 
statue  of  himself  to  be  erected  on  the  market-place  of  216-215 
Prseneste,  with  an  inscription  to  commemorate  the  defence 
of  Casilinum.  The  Boman  senate  granted  the  survivors 
double  pay  and  exemption  from  military  service  for  five 
years.  It  is  added  that  the  Boman  franchise  was  also 
offered  to  them,  but  declined.  Probably  the  men  of  Perusia 
were  honoured  like  the  Praenestines,  but  we  have  no 
information  on  the  subject. 

The  obstinate  defence  of  Casilinum  is  instructive,  as  Prospects 
showing  the  spirit  by  which  the  allies  of  Bome  were  ani-  ^^  ^^^  ^*'* 
mated.  K  after  the  battle  of  Cannse  the  citizens  of  two  towns 
which  did  not  even  possess  the  Boman  franchise  fought 
for  Bome  with  such  firmness  and  heroism,  the  republic  could 
look  with  perfect  composure  and  confidencse  upon  all  the 
vicissitudes  of  the  war ;  nor  could  Hannibal  with  a  handful 
of  foreign  mercenaries  have  much  hope  of  subduing  a 
country  defended  by  several  hundred  thousand  men  as 
brave  and  obstinate  as  the  garrison  of  Casilinum. 

The  blockade  of  Casilinum  had  lasted  the  whole  winter,  Hannibal's 
and  the  surrender  of  the  town  did  not  take  place  before  aiiieg.'* 
the  following  spring.  Meanwhile  Hannibal  had  sent  a 
portion  of  his  army  *  to  take  up  their  winter-quarters  in 
Capua.  The  results  of  the  battle  of  Cannse  were  in  truth 
considerable,  but  we  can  hardly  think  that  they  answered 
his  expectations.  The  acquisition  of  Capua  was  the  only 
advantage  worth  mentioning;  and  the  value  of  this 
acquisition  was  considerably  reduced  by  the  continued 
resistance  which  he  had  to  encounter  in  all  the  other 
important  towns  of  Campania,  especially  in  those  on  the 
sea  coast.  Thus  Capua  was  in  constant  danger,  and 
instead  of  vigorously  supporting  the  movements  of  Hannibal 
it  compelled  him  to  take  measures  for  its  protection.  It 
could  not  be  left  without  a  Carthaginian  garrison,  for  the 

>  Two  detachments  of  his  army  were  in  Lucania  and  Brattiom ;  a  third  waa 
blockading  Casilinum. 


268 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Defeat  of 
Hasdnibal 
at  Ibera 
in  Spain. 


Boman  party  in  the  town  would,  as  tlie  example  of  Nola 
showed,  have  seized  the  first  opportunity  for  betraying  it 
into  the  hands  of  the  Bomans.  The  conditions  on  which 
Capua  had  joined  the  Carthaginian  alliance,  viz.  exemption 
from  military  service  and  war  taxes,  show  clearly  that 
Hannibal  could  not  dispose  freely  of  the  resources  of  his 
Italian  allies.  He  could  rely  only  on  their  voluntary  aid ; 
and  it  was  his  policy  to  show  that  their  alliance  with 
Carthage  was  more  profitable  for  them  than  their  sub- 
jection to  Borne.  It  was  evident,  therefore,  that  he  could 
not  raise  a  very  considerable  army  in  Italy ;  and  that  if  he 
could  have  found  the  men,  he  would  have  had  the  greatest 
difficulty  in  providing  for  their  food  and  pay,  and  for  the 
materials  of  war. 

Still,  whatever  difficulties  Hannibal  might  encounter 
by  continuing  the  war  in  Italy,  he  might,  after  the 
stupendous  success  that  had  hitherto  accompanied  him, 
expect  to  overcome,  provided  he  obtained  from  home 
the  reinforcements  on  which  he  had  all  along  calculated. 
His  first  expectations  were  directed  to  Spain.  In  this 
country  the  Bomans  had  with  a  just  appreciation  of  its 
importance  made  great  efforts  during  the  first  two  years 
of  the  war  to  occupy  the  land  between  the  Ebro  and  the 
Pyrenees,  and  they  had  thus  blocked  up  the  nearest  road 
by  which  a  Punic  army  could  march  from  Spain  to  Italy. 
The  two  Scipios  had  even  advanced  beyond  the  Ebro  to 
attack  the  Carthaginian  dominions  in  the  southern  part 
of  the  peninsula,  and,  following  the  example  of  Hannibal 
in  Italy,  they  had  adopted  the  policy  of  endeavouring  to 
gain  over  to  their  side  the  subjects  and  allies  of  Carthage. 
In  the  third  year  of  the  war  Hasdrubal  had  to  turn  his 
arms  against  the  Tartessii,'  a  powerful  tribe  in  the  valley 

'  There  is  aome  doubt  whether  the  revolted  tribe  was  that  of  the  Tartessii 
or  the  Carpesii.  (See  Drakenbirch's  note  to  Livy,  xxiii.  26.)  Our  ignorance  of 
the  ancient  geography  of  Spain,  and  still  more  the  ignorance  of  it  which  the 
ancient  historians  betray,  and  which  makes  their  narratires  so  vagne,  is  the 
chief  canse  of  the  obscurity  in  which  the  events  in  Spain  are  hidden,  and  has 
given  ample  scope  to  the  inrentions  and  exaggerations  with  which  the 
narrative  of  the  war  in  Spain  is  disfigured. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  269 

of  the  Baetis,  which  had  revolted,  and  was  reduced  only    [CHAP, 
after  an  obstinate  resistance.    Then,  after  he  had  received  ^_    ,   '_^ 
reinforcements  for  the  defence  of  the  Carthaginian  posses-     Second 

^  ^  Period, 

sions  in  Spain,  he  advanced  towards  the  Ebro  to  carry  out  216-215 
the  plan  which  was  so  essential  for  Hannibal's  success  in  ^'^' 
Italy.  In  the  neighbourhood  of  this  river,  near  the  town 
of  Ibera,*  the  two  Scipios  awaited  his  arrival.  A  great 
battle  was  fought;  the  Carthaginians  were  completely 
beaten ;  their  army  was  partly  destroyed,  partly  dispersed. 
This  great  victory  of  the  Bomans  ranks  in  importance  with 
that  on  the  Metaurus  and  that  of  Zama.  It  foiled  the 
plan  of  the  Carthaginians  of  sending  a  second  army  into 
Italy  from  Spain,*  and  left  Hannibal  without  the  necessary 
reinforcements  at  a  time  when  he  was  in  the  full  career 
of  victory,  and  seemed  to  need  only  the  co-operation  of 
another  army  to  compel  Rome  to  yield  and  to  sue  for 
peace.  The  Romans  now  had  leisure  to  recover  from 
their  great  material  and  moral  overthrow,  and  after 
surviving  such  a  crisis  as  this  they  became  invincible. 

While  the  Roman  arms  in  Spain  not  only  opposed  a  State  of 
barrier  to  the  advance  of  the  Carthaginians,  but  laid  the  saidiSa 
foundation  for  a  permanent  acquisition  of  new  territory,  and  Sicily, 
the  two  provinces  of  Sicily  and  Sardinia,  lately  wrested 
from  Carthage,  showed  alarming   symptoms  of  dissatis- 
faction.    The  dominion  of  Rome  in  these  two  islands  had 
not  been  felt  to  be  a  blessing.     Under  its  weight  the 
government  of  Carthage  was  looked  upon  by  a  considerable 
portion  of  the  natives  as  a  period  of  lost  happiness,  the 
evils  of  the  present  being  naturally  felt  more  keenly  than 
those  of  the  past.   The  battle  of  Cannee  produced  its  effect 
even  in  these  distant  parts  of  the  Roman  empire,  and 
revived  the  hopes  of  those  who  still  felt  attachment  to 
their  former  rulers,  or  thought  to  avail  themselves  of  their 
aid  to  cast  off  their  present  bondage.     Carthaginian  fleets 

'  This  town  of  Ibora,  which  Liyy  (zxiii.  28)  calls  '  urbem  opulentissimam 
ea  tempestate  regionis  eius/  is  never  mentioned  again  by  any  other  writer,  and 
its  locality  is  entirely  unknown  to  us. 

'  Liyy,  xziii.  29 :  '  £a  pugna  Hasdrubali  non  modo  in  Italiam  tradncendi 
ezercitus  sed  ne  manendi  qiiidem  satis  tuto  in  Hisponia  spem  reliqueraC 


IV. 


270  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  cruised  off  the  coasts  of  Sicily  and  kept  the  island  in  a 
.  continued  state  of  excitement.  The  Eoman  officers  who 
commanded  in  Sicily  sent  home  reports  calculated  to 
cause  disquiet  and  alarm.  The  proprsetor  T.  Otalicius 
complained  that  his  troops  were  left  without  sufficient 
supplies  and  pay.  From  Sardinia  the  propr»tor  A, 
Cornelius  Mammula  sent  equally  urgent  demands.^  The 
home  goverument  had  no  resources  at  its  disposal,  and 
the  senate  replied  by  bidding  the  two  propreetors  do  the 
best  they  could  for  their  fleets  and  troops.  In  Sardinia 
consequently  the  Roman  commander  raised  a  forced  loan 
— a  measure  ill  calculated  to  improve  the  loyalty  of  the 
subject^.*  In  Sicily  it  was  again  the  faithful  Hiero  who 
volunteered  his  aid,  and  this  was  the  last  time  that  he 
exerted  himself  in  the  cause  of  his  allies.  Although  his 
own  kingdom  of  Syracuse  was  at  this  very  time  exposed  to 
the  devastations  of  the  Carthaginian  fleet,  he  nevertheless 
provided  the  Roman  troops  in  Sicily  with  pay  and  pro- 
visions for  six  months.  The  old  man  would  have  been 
happy  if  before  his  death  he  could  have  seen  the  war 
ended,  or  at  least  warded  off  from  the  coasts  of  Sicily. 
He  foresaw  the  danger  to  which  its  continuance  exposed 
his  country  and  his  house,  and  he  conjured  the  Romans  to 
attack  the  Carthaginians  in  Africa  as  soon  as  possible. 
But  the  year  after  the  battle  of  Cannse  was  not  the  time 
for  such  an  enterprise,  and  before  it  came  to  be  carried 
out  a  great  calamity  had  overwhelmed  Sicily,  had  over- 
thrown the  dynasty  and  exterminated  the  whole  family  of 
Hiero,  and  had  reduced  Syracuse  to  a  state  of  desolation 
from  which  it  never  rose  again* 

'  LiTy,  xxiii.  21. 

*  Livy  says  (xxiii.  21):  '  Cornelio  in  Sardinia  civitates  80ci»  benigne  con- 
tulerunt.'  This  expression  is  apt  to  mislead.  What  the  effect  of  the  measora 
of  Cornelius  was,  we  learn  from  Livy,  xxiii.  32,  where  the  people  of  Sardinia 
are  spoken  of  as  complaining  that  they  had  had  to  submit  to  harsh  and 
extortionate  demands,  and  that  they  were  oppressed  by  being  made  to  pay 
heavy  contributions  and  to  furnish  supplies.  The  loans  of  the  Sardinians 
appear  from  this  to  hare  been  not  unlike  those  which  English  kings  used  to 
raise  in  the  city  of  London,  and  which  were  euphemistically  called  '  bene- 
volences.' 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  271 

Altbong^li  since  the  battle  of  the  Trebia  the  seat  of  war     CHAP. 

VIII 

had  been  shifbed  from  Cisalpine  Gaul  to  central  and 


southern  Italy,  and  although  Borne  itself  was  now  more    ^^^ 
directly  exposed  to  the  victorious  arms  of  Hannibal,  yet  the    216-216 
Bomans  had  neither  given  up  Cremona  and  Placentia, 
their  fortresses  on  the  Po,  nor  relaxed  their  efforts  for 
continuing  the  war  with  the  Ghiuls  in  their  own  country. 
They  hoped  thereby  to  draw  off  the  Gkillic  auxiliaries  from 
Hannibal's  army,'  and  moreover  to  prevent  any  Punic 
army  which  might  succeed  in  crossing  the  Pyrenees  and 
Alps  from  advancing  further  into  Italy.  For  this  reason  in 
the  spring  of  216  two  legions  and  a  strong  contingent  of 
auxiliaries,  amounting  altogether  to  25,000  men,  were  sent 
northward,  under  the  command  of  the  prsetor  L.  Postumius 
Albinus,  at  the  time  when  Terentius  Yarro  and  iEhnilius 
Paul!  us  set  out  on  their  ill-fated  expedition  to  Apulia. 
The  disaster  of  Cannee  naturally  rendered  the  task  of 
Postumius  very  difficult  by  increasing  the  courage  of  the 
tribes  hostile  to  Rome,  and  by  damping  that  of  their 
friends.     Nevertheless  the  prsetor  kept  his  ground  in  the 
country  about  the  Po  during  the  whole  of  the  year  216, 
and  so  far  gained  the  confidence  of  his  fellow-citizens  that 
he  was  elected  for  the  consulship  of  the  ensuing  year. 
But  before  he  could  enter  on  his  new  office  he  was  over- 
taken by  an  overwhelming  catastrophe,^  second  only  to  the  Defeat  of 
great  disaster  of  Cannse.     He  fell  into  an  ambush,  and  AibinS^n 
was  cut  to  pieces  with  his  whole  army.     It  is  related*  Cisalpine 
that  the  Gauls  cut  off  his  head,  set  the  skull  in  gold,  and 
used  it  on  solemn  occasions  as  a  goblet,  according  to  a 
barbarous  custom  which  continued  long  among  the  later 
Gauls  and  Germans. 

Borne  was  in  a  stat€  of  frantic  excitement.     The  worst  Further 
calamities  of  the  disastrous  year  that  had  just  passed  away  ^Ji^an*^ 
seemed  about  to  be  repeated  at  the  very  time  when  the  «iiiio8  in 

Bruttium. 

»  Polybiiw.  iii.  106,  §  6. 

'  This  WHS  early  in  the  year  215  B.C.,  more  than  seren  months  after  the 
battle  of  Cannae.  Polybias  (iii.  118,  §  0)  is  careless  in  stating  that  it 
happened  '  a  few  days  after.* 

'  Livy,  xziii.  24.    Zonaras,  ix.  3. 


272  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     brave  garrison  of  Casilinum  had  been  forced  to  capitulate, 
, ^_1— '   and  when  by  this  conquest  Hannibal  had  opened  for  him- 
self the  road  to  Latium.     A  short  time  before  the  faith- 
ful towns  of  Petelia  and  Consentia  in  Bruttium  had  been 
taken  by  storm.     The  others  were  in  the  greatest  danger 
of  suflFering  the  same  fate.    Locri  soon  after  joined  the  Car- 
thaginians under  favourable  conditions  :  ^  and  thus  a  mari- 
time town  of  great  importance  was  gained  by  the  enemy. 
In  Croton  the  nobility  tried  in  vain  to  keep  the  town  for 
the    Romans,   and   to   shut   out   the   Bruttian   allies   of 
Hannibal.     The  people  admitted  them  within  the  walls, 
and  the  aristocratic  party  had  no  choice  but  to  yield  to  the 
storm  and  to  purchase  for  themselves  permission  to  leave 
the  town  by  giving  up  possession  of  the  citadel.^     Thus 
the  whole  of  Bruttium  was  lost  to  the  Romans,  with  the 
single  exception  of  Rhegium.     The  legions  were  stationed 
in  Campania,  and  did  not  venture  beyond  their  fortified 
camps.     Everywhere  the  sky  was  overhung  with  black 
clouds.     In  Spain  alone  the  victory  of  the  Scipios  at  Ibera 
opened  a  brighter  prospect.     By  it  the  danger  of  another 
invasion  of  Italy  by  Hannibal's  brother  was  for  the  pre- 
sent averted.     Had  the  battle  near  the  Ebro  ended  like 
the  battles  hitherto  fought  on  Italian  soil,  it  would  seem 
that  even  the  hearts  of  the  bravest  Romans  must  have 
despaired  of  the  republic. 
Sojourn  of       Hannibal  passed  the  winter  of  216-215  B.C.  in  Capua. 
Hannibal     These  winter-quarters  became  among  the  Roman  writers 
a  favourite  topic  of  declamation.     Capua,  they  said,  be- 
came Hannibal's  Cannse.'    In  the  luxurious  life   of  this 
opulent  city,  to  which  Hannibal's  victorious  soldiers  gave 
themselves  up  for  the*  first  time  after  long  hardships  and 
privations,  their  military  qualities  perished,  and  from  this 
time  victory  deserted  their  standards.     This  statement,  if 
not  altogether  false,  is  at  any  rate  a  vast  exaggeration. 

*  The  date  of  the  loss  of  Locri  and  Croton  cannot  be  ascertained  with 
perfect  accuracy.    Livy  reports  it  twice:  xxiii.  30,  and  zziv.  1. 

*  Livy,  xxiv.  2,  3. 

*  Florus,  ii.  6 :  '  Capnam  Hannibali  Cannas  fuisse.'  Liyy,  xxiii.  18.  Valerias 
Maximus,  ix.  1,  ext.  1. 


THE.  SECOND  PUNIC  WAB. 


278 


As  we  have  seen,  only  a  portion  of  Hannibal's,  army  passed 
the  winter  in  Capua,  whilst  the  rest  was  in  Bruttium, 
Lucania,  and  before  Casilinum.  But  apart  from  this,  it  is 
manifest  that  the  people  of  Capua  could  not  at  that  time 
have  been  sunk  in  luxury  and  sensual  pleasures.  If  their 
wealth  had  been  little  affected  by  the  calamities  of  the 
war,  surely  the  necessity  of  feeding  some  thousand  soldiers 
would  soon  have  sobered  them  down  and  taught  them 
the  need  of  economy.  Hannibal  knew  how  to  husband 
his  resources,  and  he  would  not  have  allowed  his  men  to 
drain  his  most  valuable  allies.  We  c^  scarcely  suppose 
that  voluntary  extravagance  and  excessive  hospitality 
marked  the  conduct  of  a  people  which  had,  at  the  very 
outset,  stipulated  for  immunity  from  contributions.  Lastly, 
it  is  not  true  that  the  Punic  army  had  in  Capua  the  first 
opportunity  of  recovering  from  the  hardships  of  the  war, 
and  of  enjoying  ease  and  comfort.  The  soldiers  had  had 
pleasant  quarters  in  Apulia  after  the  battle  on  the  lake 
Thrasymenus,*  and  had  already  passed  one  winter  comfort- 
ably. But  whatever  may  have  been  the  pleasures  and 
indulgences  of  Hannibal's  troops  in  Capua,  their  military 
qualities  cannot  have  suffered  by  them,  as  the  subsequent 
kistory  of  the  war  Sufficiently  demonstrates. 

That  Hannibal's  offensive  tactics  were  relaxed  after  the 
battle  of  Cannae  is  particularly  evident  from  the  events 
of  215  B.C.  The  year  passed  without  any  serious  en- 
counters between  the  two  belligerents.  The  Bomans  had 
resolved  to  avoid  a  battle,  and  applied  their  whole  strength 
to  prevent  the  spread  of  revolt  among  their  allies,  and  to 
punish  or  re-conquer  the  towns  that  had  revolted.  The 
war  was  confined  almost  entirely  to  Campania.  In  this 
country  Hannibal  did  not  succeed,  after  the  surrender  of 
Casilinum,  in  making  any  further  conquests.  An  attempt 
to  surprise  Cumse  failed,  and  on  this  occasion  the  Capuans 
suffered  a  serious  reverse.*    IN'eapolis  remained  steadfast 

>  Seealx)ve,  p.  216. 

•  Livy's  account  (xxiii.  35),  divested  of  the  specific  colouring  which  a  patriotic 
Boman  would  naturally  give  it,  comes   to  this,  that  the  Eoman   consul^ 

VOL.  11.  T 


CHAP. 
VIII. 

Second 
Pbbiod, 
216-215 

B.C. 


Operations 
in  Cam- 
pania, 
215  B.C 


274  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     and  faithfal  to  Borne;  Nola  was  guarded  by  a  Boman 


IV. 


garrison,  and  the  Boman  partisans  among  the  citizens ; 
and  a  renewed  attempt  of  Hannibal  to  take  this  town  is 
said  to  have  been  thwarted,  like  the  first  attack,  the  year 
before,  by  a  sally  of  the  Bomans  under  Marcellus,  and  to 
have  resulted  in  a  defeat  of  the  Carthaginian  army.'  On 
the  other  hand  the  Bomans  took  several  towns  in  Cam- 
pania* and  Samnium,'  punished  their  revolted  subjects  with 
merciless  severity,  and  so  devastated  the  country  of  the 
Hirpinians  and  Caudinians  that  they  piteously  implored 
the  help  of  Hannibal.  But  Hannibal  had  not  sufficient 
forces  to  protect  the  Italians  who  had  joined  his  cause 
and  who  now  felt  the  fatal  consequences  of  their  step. 
Hanno,  one  of  Hannibal's  subordinate  officers,  being 
beaten  at  Grumentum  in  Lucania  by  Tiberius  Sempronius 
Longus,  an  officer  of  the  prsetor  M.  Valerius  LsBvinus, 
who  commanded  in  Apulia,  was  obliged  to  retreat  into 
Bruttium.  A  reinforcement  of  12,000  foot,  1,500  horse, 
20   elephants,  and  1,000  talents  of  silver,  which  Mago 

Sempronius  Gracchus,  in  conjunction  with  the  people  of  CiimsB,  laid  a  trap  for 
the  Cupuans.  The  various  towns  of  Campania,  it  appears,  celebmted  a  common 
festival  at  Hanue  (as  the  Latins  celebrated  theirs  on  the  Mons  Albanua). 
During  onA  of  these  festivals,  the  Roman  consul  Sempronius  Gracchus  and  the 
Cumanians  surprised  and  killed  the  unarmed  and  unresisting  Capuaus.  They 
afterwards  justified  this  act  of  treachery  by  saying  that  the  Capuans  hod 
intended  to  surprise  them,  and  were  caught  in  their  own  snare.  But,  as 
Arnold  remarks  (Hist,  of  Borne,  iii.  184),  this  could  only  be  a  suspicion, 
whilst  the  overt  act  of  violence  was  their  own. 

*  According  to  all  appearance,  this  alleged  victoiy  is  but  another  version  of 
that  of  the  preceding  year.  In  all  essential  parts  the  same  circumstances  are 
related,  only  on  a  larger  scale.  Instead  of  2,800  Carthaginians,  6,000  are  slain 
in  the  second  fight,  together  with  four  elephants.  Plutarch  (MarcelL  11)  relates 
only  one  victory  of  Marcellus ;  but  we  cannot  appeal  to  his  authority,  as  his 
account  seems  to  be  the  result  of  a  confusion.  Livy  relates  (xxiv.  17) 
actually  a  third  victory  of  Marcellus  over  Hannibal  at  Nola,  in  which  2,000 
Carthaginians  are  killed.  It  is  precisely  the  same  story  over  again.  The 
plebeians  at  Nola  send  for  Hannibal,  the  nobility  for  Marcellus ;  the  march  of 
Marcellus  is  identical  with  that  related  xxiii.  17.  The  panegyrists  of  the 
house  of  Marcellus,  it  seems,  had  great  faith  in  the  credulity  of  the  public ; 
nor  did  they  see  any  improbability  in  a  story  which  makes  the  people  of  Nola 
call  in  the  aid  of  Hannibal  a  second  time,  shortly  after  a  first  attempt  had 
been  punished  by  the  execution  of  seventy  of  the  conspirators. 

^  Compulteria,  Trebula,  and  Saticula. — Livy,  xxiii.  39. 

•  Livy,  xxiii.  37. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIO  WAR.  275 

was  to  hare  brought  to  his  brother  in  Italy,  had  been     CHAP, 
directed  to   Spain  after  the  victory  of  the   Scipios  at  ._    .    _- 
Ibera ;  and  Hannibal  had  accordingly,  in  the  year  215  b.o.,     Second 
not  only  calculated  in  vain  on  being  joined  by  his  brother    216-215 
Hasdrubal  and  the  Spanish  army,  but  he  was  also  de-       ^'°' 
prived  of  the  reinforcements  which  ought  to  have  been 
sent  to  him  straight  from  Africa.    As  at  the  same  time 
the  revolt  of  the  Boman  allies  did  not  spread  further,  and 
as  the  Bomans  gradually  recovered  from  the  effects  of  the 
defeat  at  Cannse,  the  fact  that  Hannibal  was  not  able 
to  accomplish  much  is  easily  explained. 

As  in  Italy,  so  in  the  other  theatres  of  war,  the  Cartha-  Defeat  of 

the  Cap- 

ginian  arms  were  not  very  successful  during  this  year,  216  thaginiann 
B.C.     In  Spain,  the  victory  of  the  Scipios  at  Ibera  was  fol-  at  illiturgi 
lowed  by  a  decided  preponderance  of  Boman  influence*  intibili 
The  native  tribes  became  more  and  more  disinclined  to  ^°  ^P*^"» 

216  B.C. 

submit  to  Carthaginian  dominion,  thinking  that  the 
Bomans  would  help  them  to  regain  their  independence. 
It  seems  that  the  battle  of  Ibera  was  lost  chiefly  by 
the  defection  of  the  Spanish  troops.  Hasdrubal  had 
thereupon  tried  to  reduce  some  of  the  revolted  tribes,  but 
was  prevented  by  the  Scipios,  and  driven  back  with 
great  loss.  According  to  the  reports  which  the  Scipios 
sent  home,  they  had  gained  victories  which  almost  counter- 
balanced the  disaster  of  CannsB.  With  only  16,000  men 
they  had  totally  routed  at  Illiturgi  a  Carthaginian  army  of 
60,000  men,  had  killed  more  of  the  enemy  than  they  them- 
selves numbered  combatants,  had  taken  3,000  prisoners, 
nearly  1,000  horses,  and  seven  elephants,  had  captured 
fifby-nine  standards,  and  stormed  three  hostile  camps. 
Soon  after,  when  the  Carthaginians  were  besieging  In- 
tibili, they  were  again  defeated  and  suffered  almost  as 
heavily.'    Most  of  the  Spanish  tribes  now  joined  Bome. 

'  Liry,  xziii.  49.  It  is  a  great  pitj  that  we  have  no  more  detailed  report  of 
these  two  splendid  yictories  than  the  dry  narrative  which  Livy  gives  in  half  a 
chapter.  But  the  meagreness  of  the  report  might  he  excused  if  its  truth 
were  heyond  suspicion.  We  shall  find  in  the  sequel  that  all  the  statements 
that  have  reference  to  the  affairs  of  Spain,  and  especially  to  the  exploits  of 
the  Scipios  in  that  *  country,  are  tainted  with  laudato  y  exaggeration  on  aa 

T  2 


276  .         ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     These  victories  threw  into  the   shade   all  the  military 
events  which  took  place  in  Italy  this  year. 


Success  of        Equal  success  attended  the  Boman  arms  in  Sardinia. 
^^  In  the  preceding  year  the  propraetor  Aulus  Cornelius 

Sardinia.     Mammula  had  been  left  in  that  island  without  supplies 
for  his  troops,  and  had  exacted  the  necessary  sums  and 
contributions  by  a  species  of  forced  loans  from  the  natives.^ 
The  discontent  engendered  by  this  measure,  in  connexion 
with  the  news  of  the  battle  of  Cannse,  had  the  effect  of 
inflaming  the  national  spirit  of  the  Sardinians,  who,  from 
the  time  of  their  subjection  to  Bome,  had  hardly  allowed 
a  year  to  pass  without  an  attempt  to  shake  off  the  galling 
yoke.     The  Carthaginians   had   contributed  to   fan  this 
flame,'  and  now  dispatched  a  force  to  Sardinia  to  support 
the  insurgents.     Unfortunately  the  fleet  which  had  the 
troops  on  board  was  overtaken  by  a  storm  arid  compelled 
to  take  refuge  in  the  Balearic  Islands,  where  the  ships 
had  to  be  laid  up  for  repair^'     Meanwhile,  the  son  of  the 
Sardinian   chief   Hampsicoras,   impatient   of  delay,  had 
attacked  the  Romans  in  the  absence  of  his  father,  and 
had  been  defeated  with  great  loss.     When  the  Cartha- 
ginians appeared  in  the   island,  the  force  of  the  insur- 
rection was    already   spent.      The    praetor    Titus   Man- 
lius    Torquatus   had    arrived   from   Rome  with   a   new 
legion,  which  raised  the  Soman   army  in  the  island  to 
22,000  foot  and  1,200  horse.      He  defeated  the  united 
forces  of  the  Carthaginians  and  revolted  Sardinians  in  a 
decisive  battle,  whereupon  Hampsicoras  put  an  end  to  his 
life,  and  the  insurrection  in  the  island  was  eventually 
suppressed. 
Alliance  of      While  thus  the  sky  was  clearing  in  the  west,  a  new 

nnusoally  lai^e  scale.  Arnold  {History  of  SoTMf  iii.  260)  says :  '  The  Roman 
annalists,  whom  lAvj  has  copied  here,  seem  to  have  outdone  their  nsnal 
exaggerations  in  describing  the  exploits  of  the  two  Scipios,  and  what  amount 
of  truth  may  be  oonceoled  beneath  this  mass  of  fiction  we  are  wholly  unable 
to  discover.*  '  See  above,  p.  270. 

'  Livy,  xziii.  41 :  *  Hanno,  auctor  rebellionis  Sardis,  bellique  eius  haud 
dubie  concibor.' 

»  Livy,  xxiii.  84* 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  277 

storm  seemed  to  be  ffatherine:  in  the  east.     Since  the     CHAP. 

.  .  VIII 

Komans  had  obtained  a  footing  in  lUyria,  they  had  ceased  ..-. ^_L^ 

to  be  uninterested  spectators  of  the  disputes  which  agitated  p^^^^ 
the  eastern  peninsula,'  and  they  had  assumed  the  character  216-210 
of  patrons  of  Greek  liberty  and  independence.  By  this 
policy,  and  by  their  conquests  in  Illyria,  they  had  become  ^eefio^nia 
the  natural  opponents  of  Macedonia,  whose  kings  had  withHan- 
steadily  aimed  at  the  sovereignty  over  the  whole  of  Greece. 
The  jealousy  between  Macedonia  and  Rome  favoured  the 
ambitious  plans  of  Demetrius  of  Pharos,  the  Ulyrian 
adventurer  whom  the  Romans  had  at  first  favoured  and 
then  expelled,  219  b.c*  Demetrius  took  refuge  at  the 
court  of  King  Philip  of  Macedonia,  and  did  all  in  his  power 
to  urge  him  to  a  war  with  Rome.  Hannibal  also  had 
hoped  for  the  co-operation  of  the  Macedonian  king.  But 
the  so-called  Social  War  which  Philip  and  the  Achaian 
league  carried  on  since  220  B.C.  against  the  piratical 
-Sltolians  occupied  him  so  much  that  he  had  no  leisure  for 
another  enterprise.  Then  the  news  reached  him  of  the 
invasion  of  Italy  by  Hannibal.  The  gigantic  struggle 
between  the  two  most  powerful  nations  of  their  time 
attracted  specially  the  attention  of  the  Greeks.  In  the 
year  217  B.C.  Philip  was  in  the  Peloponnesus.  It  hap- 
pened to  be  the  time  of  the  Nemean  games,  with  which, 
as  with  the  other  great  festivals  of  the  Greek  nation,  not 
even  war  was  allowed  to  interfere.  The  king,  surrounded 
by  his  courtiers  and  favourites,  was  looking  on  at  the  games, 
when  a  messenger  arrived  straight  from  Macedonia  and 
brought  the  first  news  of  Hannibal's  great  victory  at  the 
lake  Thrasymenus.  Demetrius  of  Pharos,  the  king's  con- 
fidential friend,  was  by  his  side.  Philip  immediately 
imparted  the  news  to  him  and  asked  his  advice.  Demetrius 
eagerly  seized  the  opportunity  to  urge  the  king  to  a  war 
with  Rome,  in  which  he  hoped  to  regain  his  lost  possessions 

'  This  vas  the  real  beginning  of  that  revolution  which  Polybius  (v.  1 05)  places 
in  the  year  217  B.C.,  and  traces  to  the  peace  of  Kuupactos.  See  p.  278, 
note  1. 

«  See  above,  p.  138  ff. 


278 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Mistaken 
policy  of 
PliUip. 


in  Ulyria.  At  Ids  snggestion  Philip  resolved  to  end  the 
war  in  Greece  as  soon  as  possible,  and  to  prepare  for  a 
war  with  Borne.  He  hastened  to  conclude  peace  at 
Nanpactos '  with  the  ^tolians,  and  forthwith  began 
hostilities  bj  land  and  sea  against  the  allies  and  depen- 
dents of  Borne  in  Ulyria.  But  he  displayed  neither 
promptness,  energy,  nor  courage.  He  took  a  few  insignifi- 
cant places  from  fche  Ulyrian  prince  Skerdilaidas,  an  ally 
of  the  Bomans ;  but  when  he  had  reached  the  Ionian  Sea 
with  his  fleet  of  one  hundred  small  undecked  galleys  of 
Ulyrian  construction  {lembi)y  in  the  hope  of  being  able  to 
take  ApoUonia  by  surprise,  he  was  so  frightened  by  a  false 
report  of  the  approach  of  a  Boman  fleet,  that  he  made  a 
precipitate  and  ignominious  retreat.  Perhaps  he  was 
already  disheartened,  and  beginning  to  repent  the  step 
which  he  had  taken,  when  in  21 6  B.C.  the  news  of  the 
battle  of  CannfB  and  of  the  revolt  of  Capua  and  other 
Boman  allies  inspired  him  with  new  hope,  and  induced 
him  to  conclude  with  Hannibal  a  formal  alliance,  by  which 
he  promised  his  active  co-operation  in  the  war  in  Italy,  on 
condition  that  Hannibal,  afber  the  overthrow  of  the  Boman 
power,  should  assist  him  to  establish  the  Macedonian 
supremacy  in  the  eastern  peninsula  and  islands.'  Thus 
the  calculations  and  expectations  with  which  Hannibal  had 
began  the  war  seemed  on  the  point  of  being  realised,  and 
the  fruits  of  his  great  victories  to  be  gradually  maturing. 

The  Bomans  had  watched  the  movements  of  Philip  with 
increasing  anxiety.  As  long  as  he  was  implicated  in  the 
Greek  Social  War,  he  was  unable  to  do  any  mischief. 
But  when  he  brought  this  war  to  a  hasty  conclusion  to 
have  his  hands  free  against  Ulyria  and  Bome,  the  senate 
made  an  attempt  to  frighten  him  by  demanding  the  ex- 
tradition of  Demetrius  of  Pharos.'    When  Philip  refused 

'  PolybiuB  {v,  105)  dates  from  this  peace  the  complication  of  the  politics  of 
the  eastern  and  western  states  of  the  Mediterranean,  which  had  formerly  been 
independent  of  each  other,  but  were  henceforward  determined  by  Rome.    Tclt 

roiro  rh  StafioiXiop  ffwhrXt^t  Tp&roVj  k.t.X, 
'  Folybius,  vii.  9.    JAvj,  xziii.  33.    2ionaras,  iz.  4.        *  See  above,  p.  22d* 


B.C. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  279 

this  demand  and  followed  up  his  refusal  by  an  attack  upon  CHAP. 
Ulyricum,  Borne  was  de  facto  at  war  with  Macedonia;  but  ^^ — ,— L^ 
the  condition  of  the  republic  was  such  that  the  senate  -^^^ 
was  compelled  to  ignore  the  hostility  of  the  Macedonian  216-216 
king  as  long  as  he  made  no  direct  attack  upon  Italy.  But 
when,  in  the  year  215  B.C.,  an  embassy  which  Philip  had 
sent  to  Hannibal  fell  into  their  hands,  they  learnt  with 
terror  that,  in  addition  to  the  war  which  they  had  to  carry 
on  in  Italy,  Spain,  and  Sardinia,  they  would  have  to 
undertake  another  in  the  east  of  the  Adriatic.  They  did 
not,  however,  shrink  from  the  new  danger,  and,  in  fact,  they 
had  no  choice.  They  strengthened  their  fleet  at  Tarentum 
and  the  army  which  the  prsetor  M.  Valerius  Leevinus  com- 
manded in  Apulia,  and  made  all  the  necessary  preparations 
for  anticipating  an  attack  of  Philip  in  Italy  by  an  invasion 
of  his  own  dominions.'  But  it  seems  that  Philip  never 
earnestly  contemplated  the  idea  of  carrying  the  war  into 
Italy.  He  was  bent  only  on  profiting  by  the  embarrass- 
ment of  the  Komans  to  pursue  his  plans  of  aggrandisement 
in  Greece.  It  was,  therefore,  easy  for  the  Romans  to  keep 
him  occupied  at  home  by  promising  their  support  to  all 
who  were  threatened  by  Philip's  ambitious  projects;  and 
the  military  resources  of  Macedonia,  which,  if  they  had 
been  employed  in  Italy  in  conjunction  with  and  under  the 
direction  of  Hannibal,  might  have  turned  the  scale  against 
Bome,  were  wasted  in  Greece  in  a  succession  of  unprofitable 
petty  encounters. 

*  On  this  occasion  they  sect  to  Valerius  a  sttm  of  money,  which  was 
originally  destined  to  repay  Hiero  of  Syracuse  for  his  loan  of  the  preceding 
year.  At  the  same  time  Hiero  again  supplied  200,000  modii  of  wheat  (Livy, 
xxiii.  38).  This  proves  sufficiently  that  Hiero  did  not  die  before  2\b  B.C.,  as 
has  been  supposed. — See  Mommsen,  Bom,  Gesch,  i.  615;  English  translation, 

ii.  133. 


280 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


Third  Period  of  the  Hanntbalian  War. 


BOOK 
IV. 

Death  of 
Hiero, 
k\n^  of 
SjracQBe. 


THE   WAR  IN   SICILY,   216-212   B.C. 

Sicily,  the  principal  theatre  of  the  first  war  between 
Borne  and  Carthage,  had  hitherto  been  almost  exempt 
from  the  ravages  of  the  second.  While  Italy,  Spain,  and 
Sardinia  were  visited  and  suffering  by  it,  Sicily  had  only 
been  threatened  now  and  then  by  the  Carthaginian  fleets, 
but  had  never  been  seriously  attacked.  But  now,  in  the 
fourth  year  of  the  war,  an  event  took  place  destined  to 
bring  over  the  island  all  the  worst  calamities  of  an  inter- 
necine struggle,  and  to  give  the  final  blow  to  the  declining 
prosperity  of  the  Greek  cities.  In  the  year  215  B.C.  King 
Hiero  of  Syracuse  died,  at  the  advanced  age  of  mofe  than 
ninety  years,  and  aflber  a  prosperous  reign  of  fifty-four. 
He  was  among  the  last  of  that  class  of  men  produced 
by  the  Greek  world  with  wonderful  exuberance,  who 
were  called  ^  tyrants '  in  more  ancient  times,  and  who 
afterwards,  when  that  name  lost  its  original  and  inoffen- 
sive signification,  preferred  to  call  themselves  *  kings.' 
The  best,  and  also  the  worst,  of  these  rulers  had  sprung  up 
in  Syracuse,  a  city  which  had  tried  in  rapid  succession  all 
forms  of  government,  and  had  never  long  been  able  to 
abide  by  any.  Syracuse  had  seen  the  arbitrary,  but  in 
their  way  honourable,  tyrants  G«lon  and  the  elder  Hiero ; 
then  the  blood-stained  first  Dionysius,  and  his  son,  the 
consummate  ideal  of  a  man  of  terror ;  afterwards  Agatho- 
kles,  great  and  brave  as  a  soldier,  but  detestable  as  a  man; 
and,  lastly,  the  wise  and  moderate  Hiero  11.,  under  whose 
mild  sceptre  she  once  more  revived,  after  a  period  of  anar- 
chy and  depression,  and  enjoyed  a  long  peace,  security, 
and  well-being  in  the  midst  of  the  most  devastating  wars. 
Polybius*  bestows  on  Hiero  ftill  and  well-deserved  praise, 

*  Folybiua,  xii.  8, 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  281 


and  his  honourable  testimony  deserves  to  be  recorded.     CHAP. 

VIII 

*  Hiero,'  he  says,  *  obtained  the  government  of  Syracuse  by  %- — ,^-L- 
his  own  personal  merit;  fortune  had  given  him  neither  j^^^ 
wealth,  nor  glory,  nor  anything  else.  And  what  is  of  all  216-212 
things  the  most  wonderful,  he  made  himself  the  king  of 
Syracuse  without  kiUing,  driving  into  exile,  or  harming  a 
single  citizen,  and  he  exercised  his  power  in  the  same 
manner  in  which  he  had  acquired  it.  For  fifty-four 
years  he  preserved  peace  in  his  native  city,  and  the  govern- 
ment for  himself,  without  danger  of  conspiracy,  escaping 
that  jealousy  which  generally  fastens  itself  on  greatness. 
Often  he  proposed  to  lay  down  his  power,  but  was  pre- 
vented by  the  universal  wish  of  his  fellow-citizens.  He 
became  the  benefactor  of  the  Greeks,  and  strove  to  win 
their  approval.  Thus  he  gained  great  glory  for  himself, 
and  won  from  all  people  great  good-will  for  the  men 
of  Syracuse.  Though  he  lived  surrounded  by  magnifi- 
cence and  luxury,  he  reached  the  great  age  of  more  than 
ninety  years,  retaining  possession  of  all  his  senses  with 
unimpaired  health  of  body,  which  seems  to  me  to  be  a 
most  convincing  proof  of  a  rational  life.' 

Such  a  ruler  was  the  best  constitution  for  Syracuse,  Character 
where  republican  freedom  never  failed  to  produce  civil  reign?"** 
war,  anarchy,  and  all  imaginable  horrors.  Hiero  re- 
newed the  laws  which,  about  a  century  and  a  ha.lf  before 
his  time,  had  been  enacted  in  Syracuse  by  Diokles,  and, 
what  was  of  far  more  importance,  he  took  care  that  they 
should  be  inforced.  He  seems  to  have  bestowed  his 
especial  care  on  the  improvement  of  agriculture,  industrial 
pursuits,  and  commerce,  and  on  healing  the  wounds  which 
the  long  wars  had  inflicted  on*his  country.  Thus  it  is 
explained  how  he  was  always  able  to  supply  money,  com, 
and  other  necessaries  of  war  when  his  allies  needed  his 
aid.  But  he  was  at  the  same  time  a  patron  of  art,  and 
animated  by  the  desire  of  gaining  the  approbation  of  the 
whole  Hellenic  race — a  desire  which  had  been  strong  in 
his  predecessors  Gelon  and  Hiero,  and  even  in  the  blood- 
stained tyrant  Dionysius.     He  embellished  the  city  of 


282 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK     Syracuse  with  splendid  and  useful  buildings,  contested  in 

> ^ — .  the  great  national  games  of  the  Greeks  the  prizes  which 

were  the  highest  peaceful  honours   that  a  Greek   could 
aspire  to ;  he  erected  statues  at  Olympia,*  and  patronised 
poets   like   Theokritos,    and  practical  philosophers  like 
Archimedes.      Of  his   Greek  national  spirit,  and  at  the 
same  time  of  his  humane  sentiments  and  of  his  wealth,  he 
gave  a  striking  proof  when,  in  227  B.C.,  the  city  of  Rhodes 
was  visited  by  a  terrible  earthquake,  which  destroyed  the 
walls,  dockyards,  a  great  part  of  the  town,  and  also  the 
far-famed  colossus.     It  was  not  the  universal  custom  in 
antiquity,  as  it  is  at  present  in  the  civilised  world,  to 
relieve   extraordinary  calamities  like  this  by  charitable 
contributions  from  all  parts.     But  Hiero's  proper  feelings 
supplied  the  force  of  custom.     He  readily  and  liberally 
succoured  the  distressed  Ehodians,    giving  them  more 
than  one  hundred  talents  of  silver  and  fifby  catapults,  and 
exempting  their  ships  from  tolls  and  dues  in  the  port  of 
Syracuse.     For  this  liberality,   which  was   entirely  his 
own   doing,   he  gracefully  and  modestly  disclaimed  any 
personal  merit,  by  putting  up  in  Rhodes  a  group  of  statues 
representing  the  city  of  Syracuse  in  the  act  of  crowning 
her  sister  city.^ 
Relations        How  Hiero  assisted  Rome  with  never-failing  zeal  and 
wiS^Rome  ^^l^^l  ^®  have  noticed  on  several  occasions.     It  was  by 
this  steadfast   and  honest  policy  that  he  succeeded  in 
keeping  unscathed  the  independence  of  Syracuse  during  the 
contest  of  his  two  powerful  neighbours.     When  peace  was 
concluded  after  the  first  Punic  war,  this  independence  was 
formally  recognised,  and  Hiero  had  now  good  reason  to 
persevere  in  his  attachment  to  Rome,  which  had  proved 
her  superiority  over  Carthage,  and  was  now  mistress  of  the 
greater  part  of  SicUy,  exercising  that  influence  over  him 
which  a  patron  has  over  his  client.     Nevertheless  he  did 
not  hesitate  to  render,  in  the  Mercenary  War,  that  essen- 
tial service  to  Carthage  which  seemed  to  him  called  for. 


and  Car- 
thage. 


'  FauBanias,  Ti.  15,  3. 


Polybiufl,  V.  88. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  288 

He  wished  to  preserve  a  balance  of  power,  and  the  Bomans     CHAP, 
had  no   just   eanse  or  pretext   to  interfere  with   him,  >^    ,   ' __- 
though,  from  their  ungenerous  policy  with  regard  to  Car-     ^^ 
thage  at  this  time,  they  must  have  been  annoyed  at  any    216-212 
support  being  given  to  their  rivals.     In  the  year  237  B.C.       *'^" 
Hiero  paid  a  visit  to  Borne,  was  present  at  the  public 
games,  and  distributed  200,000  modii  of  com  among  the 
people.     Perhaps  the  journey  was  not  undertaken  merely 
for  pleasure.    It  was  not  customary  at  that  time  for 
princes  to  travel  for  their  amusement.     Hiero  went  to 
Bome  soon  after  the  disgraceful  stroke  of  policy  by  which 
the  Bomans  had  acquired  possession  of  Sardinia ; '  and  it 
is  not  at  all  unlikely  that,  even  at  that  early  period,  four 
years   after  the  termination  of  the  first  Punic  war,  a 
desire  was  manifested  in  Bome  to  annex  the  Syracusan 
dominions  to  the  Boman  province  of  Sicily,  and  thus  to 
prevent  the  possibility  of  Carthage  finding  in  some  future 
war  friends  or  allies  in  Syracuse.  If,  indeed,  such  dangers 
were  then  threatening  his  independence,  Hiero  succeeded 
in  removing  them,   and,  by  renewed  proofs  of  sincere 
attachment,  was  able  to  maintain  himself  in  the  favour  of 
his  too  powerful  friends.     The  Gallic  war  (225  B.C.)  gave 
him  again  an  opportunity  for  it ;  *  and  soon  after  the  break- 
ing out  of  the  second  Punic  war,  he  showed  his  unaltered 
zeal  and  att8<;hment  by  sending  auxiliaries  and  supplies, 
in  217  and  216  B.C.'    It  seemed  that,  of  all  parts  of  the 
Boman  dominions,  Sicily  was  most  exposed  to  the  attacks 
of  the  Carthaginians,  and  the  most  serious  danger  arose 
from  the  existence  of  a  strong  Carthaginian  party  within 
the  island.     Sicily  had  been  so  long  under  Carthaginian 
dominion  or  influence  that  here,  as  well  as  in  Sardinia, 
such  a  party  could  not  fail  to  exist.     It  was  of  course 
made  up  chiefly  of  the  large  number  of  men  who  had 
sufiFered  by  the  change  of  masters,  and  were  hoping  for 
better  things  from  a  return  of  the  Carthaginians.    The 
whole  of  Sicily,  as  the  succeeding  events  prove,  was  in  a 

^  >  See  aboTe,  p.  120.  *  See  above,  p.  132,  n.  2.  'See  aboye,  pp.  200,  226. 


284 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Effects  (rf 
Roman 
supremacy 
in  Sicily. 


state  of  fermentation,  and  it  required  but  a  slight  impulse 
to  rouse  a  great  part  of  the  population  to  take  up  arms 
against  Borne.  This  impulse  was  given  in  215  B.C.  by 
the  death  of  Hiero,  which  produced  an  eflfect  so  much  the 
more  fatal  as  his  son  Gelon,  who  seems  to  have  shared 
his  sentiments  and  policy,  had  died  shortly  before  him, 
leaving  only  a  son,  called  Hieronymus,  a  boy  of  fifteen 
years.i 

Of  the  condition  of  Sicily  since  its  acquisition  *  by  Rome 
in  241  B.C.,  we  can  form  only  an  imperfect  notion.  We 
may  suppose  that,  upon  the  whole,  the  material  prosperity 
of  the  island  was  gradually  increasing,  after  the  ending  of 
the  destructive  internal  wars  ;  but  we  should  not  wonder 
if  the  compulsory  peace  which  the  different  communities 
of  Sicily  were  now  enjoying  had  been  felt  by  many  to  be 
a  mark  of  their  subjection.  The  towns  which  during  the 
war  with  Carthage  had  joined  the  Roman  side — such  as 
Segesta,  Panormus,  Centuripa,  Alsesa,  Halicyse — occupied 
a  privileged  position  and  were  free  from  all  taxes  and  ser- 
vices. The  Mamertines  of  Messana  were  regarded  as 
allies  of  Rome,  and  supplied  their  contingent  of  ships  like 
the  Greek  towns  in  Italy.  All  the  other  towns  were 
tributary,  and  paid  the  tenth  part  of  the  produce  of  their 
land.  This  liability  implied  no  oppression,  for  most  of  the 
Sicilians  had  in  former  times  paid  the  same  tax  to  the 
Carthaginians,  or  to  the  government  of  Syracuse.  But 
the  Romans  placed  on  the  free  intercourse  between  the 
different  communities  restrictions  which  must  have  been 
felt  as  highly  injurious  and  annoying.  No  Sicilian  was 
allowed  to  acquire  landed  property  beyond  the  limits  of 
his  native  community,  and  the  right  of  intermarriage  and 


*  According  to  Livy  (xxiii.  30),  the  disposition  of  Gelon  was  hostile  to 
Home,  and  his  sudden  death  caused  the  suspicion  tliat  Hiero  was  the  cause  of 
it.  But  this  statement  is  refuted  by  Polybius,  from  whose  account-s  (t.  88, 
Tii.  8,  §  9)  it  appears  that  Gelon,  down  to  the  very  last  years  of  his  father's  life, 
was  associated  with  him  in  the  government,  and  conformed  in  all  respects  to 
his  father's  wishes. 

'  It  is  of  course  understood  that  we  speak  only  of  the  Boman  portion  of 
Sicily,  i.e,  of  Sicily  apart  from  tlie  kingdom  of  Syracuse. 


THE.  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE. 


285. 


ihlieritance  was  probably  confined  within  the  same  narrow 
bounds,  Boman  citizens  and  the  people  of  the  few  favoured 
towns  being  alone  exempt  from  this  restriction.  Thus 
every  town  in  Sicily  was,  to  a  great  extent,  isolated,  and 
the  limited  competition  placed  the  privileged  few  at  a  great 
advantage  both  in  the  acquisition  of  land  and  in  every  kind 
of  trade  and  commerce.  Under  such  circumstances  the 
freedom  from  military  service  was  probably  not  felt  to  be 
a  great  boon,  especially  as  at  that  time  the  prospect  of 
booty  and  military  pay  was  no  doubt  attractive  to  many  of 
the  impoverished  population.  Since  227  b.o.  Sicily  was 
placed  under  a  prsetor,  who  conducted  the  whole  civil  and 
military  administration,  including  that  of  justice.  This 
was  the  beginning  of  those  annual  viceroyalties  with  un- 
limited power  which,  in  course  of  time,  became  the  terrible 
scourge  of  the  Boman  provinces,  and  almost  neutralized 
the  advantages  which,  by  the  inforcement  of  internal  peace, 
Bome  was  able  to  bestow  on  the  countries  round  the 
Mediterranean.  The  Eoman  nobles  could  not  resist  the 
temptation  of  abusing,  for  their  own  profit,  the  public 
authority  which  was  intrusted  to  them  for  the  govern- 
ment of  the  provinces ;  and  as  long  as  the  Boman  republic 
lasted,  it  never  succeeded,  in  spite  of  many  attempts,  in 
putting  down  this  great  evil. 

The  consequences  of  the  discontent  in  Sicily,  and  of  the 
revolution  which  followed  the  death  of  Hiero,  did  not 
assume  a  threatening  aspect  till  the  following  year.  In 
the  meantime  the  attention  of  the  Boman  senate  was 
absorbed  by  other  things  nearer  home.  Since  the  censor- 
ship of  C.  Flaminius  and  L.  ^milius  in  the  year  220,  the 
senate  had  not  been  formally  reconstituted.  The  public 
magistrates,  from  the  quaestors  upwards,  enjoyed,  it  is  true, 
the  right,  after  the  termination  of  their  office,  of  joining 
in  the  deliberations  of  the  senate,  and  of  voting ;  but  their 
number  was  not  sufficient,  even  under  ordinary  circum- 
stances, to  keep  the  senate  at  its  normal  strength  of  three 
hundred  members,  and  the  censors  were  therefore  obliged, 
every  five  years,  on  the  revision  of  the. list  of  senators,  to 


CHAP. 

vni. 

— — . — ^ 

Third 
Pkbiod, 
216-212 

B.C. 


Re-consti- 
tution of 
the  Roman 
senate. 


286  EOMAN  mSTORY. 

BOOK  admit  into  the  senate  a  number  of  men  from  the  general 
^  •  -  body  of  the  citizens,  who  had  not  yet  discharged  any 
public  office.  But  now  the  circumstances  were  most  extra- 
ordinary. Many  senators  had  fallen  in  battle;  eighty 
were  said  to  have  perished  at  Cannes  alone.  Many  were 
absent  on  the  public  service  in  various  parts  of  Italy,  in 
Spain,  Sardinia,  and  Sicily.  The  senate  therefore  was  re- 
duced in  numbers  as  it  never  had  been  since  the  establish- 
ment of  the  republic.  Accordingly,  when,  in  216  B.C.,  the 
government  had  first  taken  measures  for  raising  new 
armies,  for  providing  the  means  of  defence,  and  for  prose- 
cuting the  war  vigorously  in  every  direction,  it  occupied 
itself  with  the  task  of  filling  up  the  numerous  vacancies 
in  the  senate.^  It  was  found  necessary  to  make  a  whole- 
sale addition  of  new  senators,  such  as  had  been  made, 
according  to  tradition,  by  Brutus  after  the  expulsion  of 
the  kings.  For  this  extraordinary  measure  the  official 
authority  of  a  regular  censor  seemed  to  be  insufficient. 
Becourse  was  had  therefore  to  the  dictatorship,  an  office 
which  in  times  of  special  difficulties  had  always  rendered 
excellent  service  to  the  state.  The  disastrous  year  of  the 
battle  of  Cannse,  216  e.g.,  had  not  yet  come  to  an  end,  and 
the  dictator  M.  Junius  Pera '  was  still  in  office,  occupied 
with  organizing  the  means  of  defence.  As  it  seemed  un- 
advisable  to  divert  his  attention  from  his  more  immediate 
duties,  a  proposal  was  made  and  adopted  to  elect  a  second 
dictator  for  the  special  purpose  of  raising  the  senate  to  its 
normal  number— an  innovation  which  shows  that,  under 
extraordinary  circumstances,  the  Romans  were  not  entirely 
the  slaves  of  custom,  but  could  adapt  their  institutions  to 
the  requirements  of  the  time.  C.  Terentius  Varro  was 
called  upon  to  nominate  to  the  dictatorship  the  oldest  of 
those  who  had  discharged  the  office  of  censors  before. 
This  was  M.  Fabius  Buteo,  who  had  been  consul  in  245  3.0.^ 
five  years  before  the  close  of  the  first  Punic  war,  and 
censor  in  241  at  the  time  when  that  war  was  concluded. 

>  Liry,  xxiii.  22.  *  See  above,  p.  243. 


fi.C. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAB.  287 

In  the  debate  which  now  took  place  in  the  senate  with     CHAP. 

VIII 

respect  to  the  nomination  of  new  members,  Spurius  -_  ,  _- 
Carvilius  proposed  to  admit  two  men  from  every  Latin  ^^^^ 
town.  Never  was  a  wiser  proposal  made  than  this,  and  216-212 
no  season  was  more  suitable  than  the  present '  for  rein- 
vigorating  the  Roman  people  with  new  blood,  and  for 
spreading  the  feeling  and  the  right  of  citizenship  over 
Italy.  The  Latins  were  in  every  respect  worthy  to  be 
admitted  to  a  share  in  the  Boman  franchise,  and  without 
their  fidelity  and  courage  Rome  would  undoubtedly  have 
lost  her  preponderance  in  Italy  and  perhaps  her  independ- 
ence. If  now  the  best  men  from  the  several  Latin  towns 
had  been  received  as  representatives  of  those  towns  into  the 
Boman  senate,  a  step  would  have  been  taken  leading  to  a 
sort  of  representative  constitution,  and  tending  to  diminish 
the  monopoly  of  legislative  power  enjoyed  by  the  urban 
population  of  Rome,  a  monopoly  which  became  more  and 
more  injurious  and  unnatural  with  the  territorial  exten- 
sion  of  the  republic.  As  yet  no  Latin  town  had  exhibited 
the  least  system  of  discontent  or  disloyalty,  and  a  generous 
and  conciliatory  policy  on  the  part  of  Rome  could  not 
have  been  looked  upon  as  a  result  of  fear  or  of  intimida- 
tion. But  the  Roman  pride  revolted  now,  as  it  had  done 
more  than  a  century  before,  and  as  it  did  again  more  than 
a  century  later,'  at  the  idea  of  admitting  strangers  to  an 
equality  with  Romans ;  and  Spurius  CarvUius  was  silenced 
almost  as  if  he  had  been  a  traitor  to  the  majesty  of  Rome. 
His  proposal  was  treated  as  if  it  had  not  been  made,  and 
the  senators  were  bound  not  to  divulge  it,^  lest  the  Latins 
should  venture  to  hope  that  hereafter  they  might  possibly 
gain  admission  into  the  sanctuary  of  the  Roman  senate. 

*  The  Boman  sentiment  is  expressed  in  the  words  which  Livy  puts  into  the 
mouth  of  Q.  Fabius  (xxiii.  22) :  '  Kunquam  rei  iillius  alieniore  tempore  men- 
tionem  factam  in  senatUi  quam  inter  tarn  snspensos  sociohim  animos  incer- 
tamqne  fidem  id  tactnm,  qnod  insuper  soUicitaret  eoe/ 

'  In  340  and  90  b.c. 

'  Livy,  xxiii.  22 :  'Si  qnid  unquam  aicani  sanctire  ad  silendnm  in  cnria 
f^ierit,  id  omnium  maxime  tegendum  occulendum  obliviscendom,  pro  non  dicto 
habendum  esse.    Ita  eius  rei  oppressa  mentio  est.' 


Financial 
difficulties. 


288  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     A  list  of  one  hundred  and  seventy-seven  new  senators  was 
IV  .    . 
^ — -   drawn  np,  consisting  of  men  who  had  discharged  public 

oflSces,  or  proved  themselves  to  be  valiant  soldiers.  As  soon 
as  Fabius  had  performed  this  formal  duty,  he  abdicated 
the  dictatorship. 

The  most  difficult  task  which  the  reorganised  senate  had 
to  perform  was  to  restore  order  in  the  finances,  or  rather 
to  provide   means   for  continuing  the  war.     The  public 
treasury  was  empty,  the  demands  made  upon  the  state  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  fleets  and  armies  became  greater 
from  year  to  year,  and  in  the  same  proportion  the  resources 
of  the  state  were  diminished.*     The  revenues  of  Sicily  and 
Sardinia  were  not  even  sufficient  for  the  support  of  the 
forces  necessary  for  the  defence  of  these  islands,  and  could 
not  therefore  be  applied  to  other  purposes.  A  large  portion 
of  Italy  was  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  and  all  its  produce 
was  lost  to  Bome.     The  tithes   and  rents  of  the   state 
domains,  the  pastures,  woods,  mines,  and    saltworks  in 
Campania,  Samnium,  Apulia,  Lucania,  and  Bruttium  were 
no  longer  paid,  or  not  paid  with  regularity.     Even  where 
the  enemy  was  not  in  actual  possession,   the  war  had 
reduced  the  public  income.     Many  thousand  citizens  and 
tax-payers  had  fallen  in  battle  or  were  in  captivity ;  the 
scarcity  of  hands  began  to  tell  on  the  cultivation  of  the 
land ;  the  families  whose  heads  or  supporters  were  serving 
in  the  army  fell  into  poverty  and  debt,  and  the  republic 
had  already  contracted  loans  in  Sicily  and  Sardinia  which 
it  was  unable  to  repay .^     The  senate  now  adopted  the 
plan  of  doubling  the  taxes,^  a  most  unsafe  expedient^  by 
which  the  extreme  limit  of  the  tax-paying  power  of  the 
community  could  not  fail  soon  to  be  reached  or  passed, 
and  which  accordingly  paralysed  this  power  for  the  future. 
But  even  this  measure  was  not  sufficient.     Large  sums  of 
ready  money  .were  wanted  to  purchase  supplies  of  pro- 
visions, clothing,  and  materials  of  war  for  the  armies.     The 
senate  appealed  to  the  patriotism  of  the  rich,  and  the  con- 

'  Livj,  xxiii.  48.  *  See  above,  p.  279,  note  2. 

.    •  Livy,  xxiii.  31. 


THK  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR,  289 

sequence  was  the  formation  of  three  companies  of  army     CHAP, 
purveyors,  who  undertook  to  supply  all  that  was  needed  w    ,  '^^ 
and  to  give  the  public  credit  till  the  end  of  the  war.  They     ^^^^^^ 
only  stipulated  for  freedom  from  military  service  for  them-     216-212 
selves,  and  required  that  the  state  should  undertake  the 
sea  and  war  risks  ^  of  the   cargoes  afloat.      This  offer 
seemed  noble  and  generous;  but  experience  showed  that  the 
most  sordid  motives  had  more  share  in  it  than  patriotism 
or  public  spirit. 

To  obtain  a  supply  of  rowers  for  the  fleet,  the  wealthier  Financial 
class  of  citizens  were  called  upon  to  furnish,  in  proportion  °i^^^^®- 
to  their  property,  from  one  to  eight  men,  and  food  for  a 
period  of  from  six  to  twelve  months.*  In  proposing  this 
measure,  the  senate  gave  a  proof  of  its  devotion  to  the 
common  cause  ;  for  the  senators,  as  belonging  to  the  richest 
class  in  the  state,  had  to  contribute  most.  But  the  middle 
class  would  not  be  surpassed  by  the  senatorial  order. 
Horsemen  and  officers  refused  to  take  pay,*  and  the 
owners  of  the  slaves  who  had  been  drafted  for  military 
service  waived  their  right  to  compensation  for  their  loss. 
The  undertakers  of  public  works  and  of  repairs  of  temples 
and  public  buildings  promised  to  wait  till  the  conclusion 
of  peace  before  claiming  payment;  trust  moneys  were 
applied  to  the  use  of  the  state  :*  a  universal  enthusiasm  had 
seized  the  whole  nation.  Every  individual  citizen  looked  for 
his  own  safety  only  in  the  safety  of  the  commonwealth,  and 
to  save  the  commonwealth  no  sacrifice  was  held  too  dear.* 

One  of  the  financial  measures  of  this  time,  dating  from  Commis- 
the  year  216  B.C.,  was  the  appointment  of  a  commission,^  y°i"  ° 
similar,  as  we  may  suppose,  to  that  which  in  the  year  '-^i^  bc 
S52  B.o.^  relieved  the  debts  of  a  great  mass  of  the  people 
by  loans  on  sufficient  security.  But  no  satisfactory  account 

'  Livy,  xziii.  48.  •  Iii^Ji  xxiv.  11. 

■  Livy,  i^iv.  18.  *  Livy,  xxiv.  18. 

*  This  conviction  is  beautifully  e^xpressed  in  the  words  which  Livy  (xxvi.  36) 
puts  into  the  mouth  of  the  consul  Lsevinus :  'Bee  publica  incolumis  et  privataa 
res  facile  salvas  pitestat ;  publica  prodendo  tua  nequicquam  serves.' 

•  *  Triumviri  mensarii.' — liyy^  xriii.  20i. 
»  See  vol.  i.  p.  343. 

VOL.  !!•  V 


290  EOMAN  HISTOKY. 

BOOK     is  given  of  tlie  proceedings  of  this  commission,  and  we  may 
A — '  reasonably  doubt  whether  it  effected  much.    It  is  one  of 


the  most  difficult,  and  as  yet  unsolved,  problems  of  finan- 
cial skill  to  procure  money  where  there  is  none.  Paper 
has  been  a  great  temporary  resource  to  modem  financiers. 
But  the  Romans  were  innocent  of  this  contrivance,  and  it 
is  not  likely,  therefore,  that  they  effected  more  than  the 
alchemists  of  the  middle  ages,  who  vainly  sought  the  secret 
of  changing  base  metal  into  gold.^ 

Sumptiiaiy  In  times  of  extreme  danger,  when  the  commonwealth 
is  suffering  from  an  insufficiency  of  means,  it  seems  un-> 
natural  and  unjustifiable  that  private  citizens  should 
indulge  in  an  unnecessary  display  of  riches.  On  the  con- 
trary it  seems  just  that  private  wealth  should  be  made  to 
minister  to  the  necessities  of  the  state.  This,  at  any  rate, 
was  the  feeling  of  the  Bomans  when  they  strained  every 
nerve  \jo  make  head  against  Carthage.  They  hit  upon 
the  idea  of  limiting  private  extravagance.  On  the  motion 
of  the  tribune  C.  Oppius,  a  law  was  passed  forbidding  the 
women  to  apply  more  than  half  an  ounce  of  gold  for  their 
personal  ornaments,  to  dress  in  coloured  (i.e.  purple)  robes, 
and  to  drive  within  the  town  in  carriages.*  This  law  was 
enforced ;  but  the  Boman  ladies  found  it  a  great  hardship, 
and  submitted  to  it  with  a  heavy  heart  as  long  as  the  war 
lasted,  but  not  longer,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  sequel. 

Amonnt  of      The  extraordinary  measures  adopted  for  replenishing: 

the  Koman    „  ,  ,.     ,  ,  „  ^      .^  . 

levies.  the  public  treasury  were  not  superfluous.  For  the  commg 
year  Rome  maintained  not  less  than  twenty-one  legions 
and  a  fleet  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  vessels.'  The  war 
assumed  larger  proportions  from  year  to  year,  and  baffied 
all  the  calculations  which  had  been  made  at  its  commence- 

'  If,  as  was  afterwards  related,  one  thousand  ponnds  of  gold,  being  the 
ransom  of  Rome  which  Camillus  took  from  the  Gauls,  had  been  kept  at  that 
time  in  the  temple  of  the  Capitoline  Jupiter,  it  seems  that  even  the  priests 
would  have  consented  to  take  this  sum  at  present  for  the  service  of  the  state, 
at  least  on  loan.    See  vol.  i.  p.  273. 

•  Livy,  xxiv.  1. 

•  Livy  (xxiv.  11),  it  is  true,  mentions  only  eighteen  legions,  but  he  neglects 
to  speak  cf  the  threo  which  were  in  Snain. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAB.  291 

ment,  when  one  consular  army  in  Spain  and  one  in  Africa     CHAP, 
were  supposed  to  be  sufficient  to  resist  the  power  of  Car-   .,    .  '_^ 
thage.  Eight  legions  alone  were  required  to  keep  Hannibal     ^™^ 
in  check;    three   were  employed  in  the  north  of   Italy    216-212 
against  the  Gauls ;  one  was  kept  ready  near  Brundusium       ^'^' 
to  meet  the  expected  attack  of  the  king  of  Macedonia ; 
two  formed  the  garrison  of  Rome ;  two  held  Sicily,  and 
two  Sardinia.     Including  the  army  engaged  in  Spain,  the 
Eoman  land  and  sea  forces  cannot  have  amounted  to  less 
than  200,000  men,  that  is,  one-fourth  of  the  population  of 
Italy  capable  of  bearing  arms. 

The  i-esults  accomplished  were  not  what  might  have  Reeoveiy 
been  expected  from  this  prodigious  display  of  strength,  '^^I'^^l 
although  Fabius  and  Marcellus,  the  two  ablest  generals  repulse  of 
that  Rome  possessed,  were  elected  consuls  for  the  year  at  Nola. 
214.     The  events  of  this  year  are  of  trifling  importance, 
and  can  be  summed  up  in  a  few  words.     Hannibal  was 
prevented  from  gaining  more  ground  in  Italy;  his  attempts 
to  get  possession  of  Neapolis,  Tarentum,  and  Puteoli  were 
thwarted ;  his  lieutenant  Hanno,  with  an  army  consisting 
chiefly  of  Bruttians  and  Lucanians,  was  defeated  near 
Beneventum  by  Gracchus,  who  commanded  the  corps  of 
6,000  slaves  raised  after  the  battle  of  Cannae,  and  now 
rewarded  their  courage  by  giving  them  their  freedom.* 
Hannibal,  it  is  alleged,'  was  repulsed  a  third  time  by 
Marcellus  at  Nola,  and  (what  was  for  him  the  greatest  loss) 
Casilinum  was  retaken  by  the  Romans,  owing  to  the  treason 
and  cowardice  of  2,000  Campanian  soldiers  of  the  garrison, 
who,  by  betraying  the  town  and  seven  hundred  men  of 
Hannibal's  troops,  sought  to  purchase  their  own  safety.* 

*  Is  it  mere  chance  that  it  was  a  Gracchus  who  erected  a  temple  of  *  Liberty  * 
(Lxvy,  zxiv.  16),  and  again  a  Gracchus  who  was  the  first  to  enfhinchise  a  great 
number  of  slaves  ? 

•  LiTy,  xxiv.  17. 

■  Livjr's  narrative  (xxiy.  19")  is  somewhat  obscure.  It  appears  that  the 
2,000  Campanians  surrendered  to  the  consul  Fabius  on  condition  of  being 
allowed  to  leave  the  town  unmolested  and  to  retire  to  Capua.  But  when  they 
were  in  the  act  of  evacuating  Casilinum,  the  consul  Marcellus  broke  the 
capitulation,  penetrated  into  the  town,  and  ordered  an  attack  upon  the  retiring 
garrison.    Only  500  Campanians,  who  had  already  gained  the  open  oountry^ 

17  2 


293  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     Meanwhile  tlie  king  of  Macedonia  did  not  make  tlid  ex- 


IV. 


.  pected  attack  on  Italy.  The  Gauls,  after  their  great 
ictory  over  Postumius  early  in  the  year  215/  remained 
quiet;  several  Samnite  communities  that  had  revolted 
were  again  subdued  by  the  Romans  and  severely  punished. 
It  seemed  that  Hannibal  must  soon  be  crushed  by  the 
overwhelming  power  of  his  enemies,  whilst  the  reinforce- 
ments for  which  he  looked  were  delayed,  and  his  friends 
and  allies  became  either  lukewarm  or  weak.  Yet  the 
terror  of  his  name  was  undiminished.  He  was  a  power  in 
himself,  independent  of  aU  co-operation  from  without,  and 
no  Roman  general  ventured  as  yet  to  attack  him,  even 
with  the  greatest  superiority  of  numbers. 
Revolution  Meanwhile  a  revolution  had  taken  place  in  Sicily  which 
in  an  unexpected  manner  revived  the  hopes  of  Carthage. 
Hiero's  grandson  and  successor,  Hieronymus,  a  boy  of 
fifteen,  was  entirely  guided  by  a  few  ambitious  men  and 
women,  who  deluded  themselves  with  the  hope  of  being 
able  to  make  use  of  the  war  between  Rome  and  Carthage 
for  the  aggrandisement  of  the  power  of  Syracuse  and  of 
the  royal  house.*  Andranodoros  and  Zoippos,  the  sons-in- 
law  of  Hiero,  and  Themistos,  the  husband  of  a  daughter  of 
Gelon,  having  put  aside,  soon  after  Hiero's  death,  the 
council  of  regency  of  fifteen  members  which  had  been 

were  safely  conducted  to  Capua  by  order  of  Fabius.  The  rest  of  the  Gam- 
panians,  and  the  700  men  of  Hannibal's  army,  were  either  cut  down  or  sent  as 
prisoners  to  Rome,  The  pretext  for  this  action  of  Marcellus,  which  looks 
very  much  like  treachery,  was,  according  to  Livy,  that  *  Casilinum  was  taken  by 
a  sudden  assault,  whilst  the  garrison  was  negotiating  for  a  capitulation  and 
hesitating/  "We  feel  here  the  want  of  an  independent  historian.  No  doubt  a 
Carthaginian  would  represent  as  an  act  of  outrageous  perfidy  what,  even  under 
the  skilful  colouring  of  a  Koman  patriot,  appears  as  a  very  doubtful  transaction. 
The  inhabitants  of  Casilinum  were  sent  to  the  neighbouring  towns  to  be  kept 
as  prisoners.  Here  the  question  arises  who  these  inhabitants  were.  Of  the 
original  inhabitants  of  Casilinum,  those  whose  loyalty  to  Rome  was  suspected 
had  been  put  to  death  by  the  Roman  garrison  during  the  first  siege  (see  above, 
p.  265).  The  remainder,  we  may  suppose,  were  faithful  to  Rome,  unless 
after  the  takiil^  of  Casilinum  by  Hannibal  these  were  expelled,  and  new 
settlers  introduced  of  the  Carthaginian  party  in  and  about  Capua. 

*  See  above,  p.  271. 

»  Folybius,  vii.  6,  §  4, 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  293 

established  by  Hiero  for  the  guidance  of  his  youthful  sue-     CHAP, 
cesser,  persuaded  the  boy  that  he  was  old  enough  to  be  ^_    ^  ^  ^ 
independent  of  guardians  and  counciUors,  and  thus  they     ^» 
practically  seized  the  government  themselves.     In  vain    216-212 
the  dying  Hiero  had  conjured  his  family  to  continue  his        ^'^' 
policy  of  a  close  alliance  with  Eome,  which  had  so  far 
proved  eminently  successful.   They  were  not  satisfied  with 
simply  preserving  the  government  of  Syracuse  and  the 
small  part  of  Sicily  which  the  Bomans  had  allowed  Hiero 
to  retain.     Seeing  no  chance  of  enlarging  the  Syracusan 
dominion  by  free  concessions  on  the  part  of  the  Romans, 
they  directed  their  hopes  towards  Cai*thage,  which  after 
the  battle  of  Cannae  seemed  to  them  to  have  gained  a 
decided  superiority. 

Hiero  had  scarcely  closed  his  eyes  when  Hieronymus  Negotia- 
opened  communications  with  Carthage.     Hannibal,  who  between 
in  the  midst  of  his  military  operations  watched  and  guided  Hannibal 
the  policy  of  the  Carthaginian  government,  sent  to  Syra-  Hierony- 
cuse  two  men  who  were  eminently  fitted  by  their  descent  ^^' 
and  abilities  to  act  as  negotiators  between  the  two  states. 
These    were  two    brothers,  Hippokrates    and  Epikydes, 
Carthaginians  by  birth  and  Syracusan  s  by  descent,  their 
grandfather  having  been  expelled  from  his  native  country 
by  the  tyrant  Agathokles,  and  having  settled  in  Carthage 
ODd  married  a  Carthaginian  wife.^  They  had  long  served  in 
Hannibal's  army,  and  were  equally  distinguished  as  soldiers 
and  as  politicians.     As  soon  as  they  arrived  in  Syracuse, 
they  exercised  unboimded  influence  as  the  advisers  of 
Hieronymus.    They  promised  him  at  first  the  possession  of 
half  the  island,  and  when  they  found  that  his  wishes  went 
further,  they  at  once  agreed  that  he  should  be  king  of  all 
Sicily  after  the  expulsion  of  the  Romans.     It  was  not 
worth  while,  the  Carthaginians  thought,  to  haggle  about 
the  price  to  be  paid  to  so  valuable  an  ally,  especially  as 
the  payment  was  to  be  made  at  the  expense  of  the  common 
enemy.      These  transactions  between  Hieronymus   and 

V  PolybkiSi  vii.  2. 


294  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     Carthage  could  not  be  carried  on  in  secret.    They  became 

^■■■,' known  to  Appius  Claudius,  who,  commanding  as  prsetor 

in  Sicily  in  215,  repeatedly  sent  messengers  to  Syracuse, 
warning  the  king  of  any  steps  which  might  endanger  his 
friendly  relations  with  Eome.^  In  truth  Bome  ought  to 
have  at  once  declared  war;  but  she  was  little  inclined, 
and  not  at  all  prepared,  in  the  year  after  Canme  to  meet 
a  new  enemy,  and  Claudius  probably  entertained  hopes  of 
gaining  his  end  without  a  rupture,  either  by  intimidation 
or  by  an  internal  revolution  in  Syracuse. 
Kepub-  Such  hopes  were  not  unfounded ;  for,  immediately  after 

reaction  in  the  death  of  Hiero,  a  republican  party  had  been  formed  at 
Syracuse,  gyracuse,  headed  by  the  wealthiest  and  most  influential  citi- 
zens. The  turbulent  Syracusans  had  now  quietly  submitted 
for  an  unusually  long  time  to  a  stable  and  orderly  govern- 
ment. As  during  Hiero's  lifetime  all  opposition  would 
have  been  nipped  in  the  bud  by  the  king's  popularity,  not 
less  than  by  his  prudence  and  caution,  the  republicans  had 
not  stirred;  but  Hieronymus  inspired  contempt  by  his 
folly  and  arrogance,  and  he  provoked  the  enemies  of 
despotism  by  showing  that  he  possessed  the  qualities,  not 
of  his  grandfather,  but  of  the  worst  tyrants  that  had  pre- 
ceded him.  Whilst  Hiero,  in  his  dress  and  mode  of 
living,  had  made  no  distinction  between  himself  and  the 
simple  citizens,  Syracuse  now,  as  in  the  days  of  the  tyrant 
Dionysius,  saw  her  ruler  surrounded  by  royal  pomp,  wear- 
ing a  diadem  and  purple  robes,  and  followed  by  armed 
body-guards.  His  authority  was  no  longer  based  on  the 
willing  submission  of  the  people,  but  on  foreign  mer- 
cenaries and  on  the  lowest  popidace,  who  had  always 
hailed  the  advent  of  tyrants,  and  hoped  from  them  a  share 
in  the  spoils  of  the  rich.  The  better  class  of  citizens 
desired  the  overthrow  of  despotic  government  and  an 
alliance  with  the  Bomans,  the  natural  friends  and  patrons 
of  the  aristocratic  party. 
Death  of         The  fermentation  continued  during  the  remainder  of  the 

Hierony- 
mu8. 

>  Polybiufl,  Yii.  3.    Liyy,  xxiv.  6. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  295 

year  215.  One  of  the  conspirators  was  discovered  and  CHAP. 
crueUy  tortured,  but  died  without  naming  his  accomplices.  sJ^HL. 
Many  innocent  persons  were  put  to  death,  and  Hieronymus,  ^^^ 
thinking  himself  safe,  was  prosecuting  his  schemes  for  the  210-212 
enlargement  of  his  kingdom  in  214,  when  he  was  betrayed 
by  one  of  his  own  body-guard  into  the  hands  of  the  con- 
spirators, who  killed  him  as  he  was  passing  through  a 
narrow  lane  in  the  city  of  Leontini.  This  deed  was  the 
signal  for  one  of  those  sanguinary  civil  wars  which  so 
often  convulsed  the  unhappy  city  of  Syracuse.  Whilst  the 
body  of  Hieronymus  lay  neglected  in  the  street  at  Leontini, 
the  conspirators  rushed  back  to  Syracuse,  to  call  the 
people  to  arms  and  to  liberty.  A  rumour  of  what  had 
happened  had  preceded  them,  and  when  they  arrived  in 
the  evening,  bearing  the  blood-stained  cloak  and  the 
diadem  of  the  tyrant,  the  whole  town  was  in  a  fever  of 
excitement.  When  the  death  of  Hieronymus  became 
known  for  certain,  the  people  rushed  into  the  temples  and 
tore  from  the  walls  the  Gallic  arms  which  Hiero  had 
received  from  the  Eomans  as  his  share  of  the  booty  after 
the  victory  at  Telamon.  Sentinels  were  placed  in  different 
parts  of  the  town,  and  all  important  posts  were  secured. 
In  the  course  of  the  night  the  whole  of  Syracuse  was  in 
the  power  of  the  insurgents,  with  the  exception  of  the 
island  Ortygia. 

This  small  island  was  the  place  where  the  first  Greek  Sarrmder 
colonists  had  settled.   As  the  town  increased  in  population,  ^y  Andm* 
the  inhabitants  removed  to  the  adjoining  mainland,  and  nodoros. 
the  island  Ortygia  became  the  fortress   of  Syracuse.    A 
narrow  strip  of  land  connected  it  with  the  mainland,  but 
the  access  was  defended  by  strong  lines  of  wall.     Behind 
these  walls  the  masters  of  Syracuse  had  frequently  defied 
their  insurgent  subjects,  and  from  this  stronghold  they  had 
issued  to  regain  their  authority.     For  a  moment  this  was 
now  attempted  by  Andranodoros,  who  after  the  death  of 
Hieronymus  was  the  head  of  the  royal  family,  and  was 
stimulated  by  his  ambitious  wife  Damarate,  the  daughter 
of  Hiero,  to  resist  the  insurgents  and  to  uphold  the  cause 


296 


EOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Massacre 
of  the 
frtmily  of 
Hiero. 


of  monarcliy.  But  he  found  that  a  part  of  the  garrison  of 
Ortygia  was  inclined  to  side  with  the  conspirators,  and 
there  was,  consequently,  nothing  left  to  him  but  to  declare 
his  adhesion  to  the  popular  cause  and  to  deliver  up  to  the 
republicans  the  keys  of  the  fortress.  He  even  affected  zeal 
in  joining  the  revolutionary  party,  and  was  elected  as  one 
of  the  magistrates  to  govern  the  new  republic.  The  cause 
of  liberty  triumphed,  and  with  it  the  policy  of  those  sensible 
and  moderate  men  who  wished  to  remain  faithful  to  the 
Roman  alliance.  Hippokrates  and  Epikydes,  the  agents 
of  Hannibal,  found  that  their  mission  had  failed,  and  that 
they  could  no  longer  safely  remain  in  Syracuse.  They 
requested  a  safe-conduct  to  return  to  Italy  into  HannibaFs 
camp. 

But  Andranodoros  had  not  given  up  the  hope  of  preserv- 
ing the  dominion  over  Syracuse  for  himself  and  the  family 
of  Hiero.  He  was  suspected,  justly  or  unjustly,  of  a  plan 
for  overthrowing  the  republican  government  and  for  assas- 
sinating its  chiefs.  Impartial  inquiry  and  fair  trial  were 
never  thought  of  in  the  civil  broils  of  Syracuse.  The  party 
that  brought  forward  an  accusation  acted  at  the  same 
time  as  judge  and  executioner,  and  resorted  to  violence  and 
treachery  without  the  least  scruple.  Accordingly,  when 
Andranodoros  one  day  entered  the  senate  with  his  kinsman 
Themistos,  the  husband  of  Gelon's  daughter,  they  were 
both  seized  and  put  to  death.  Nor  did  their  death  seem  a 
sufficient  guarantee  for  the  safety  of  the  republic  against 
a  restoration  of  the  monarchy.  It  was  resolved  to  root 
out  the  whole  family  of  Hiero.  Murderers  were  dispatched 
to  the  palace,  which  now  became  a  scene  of  the  most 
atrocious  carnage.  Damarate,  the  daughter,  and  Harmonia, 
the  grand-daughter,  of  Hiero,  were  murdered  first.  Hera- 
kleia,  another  daughter  of  Hiero,  and  wife  of  Zoippos,  who 
was  at  that  time  absent  in  Egypt,  fled  with  her  two  youth- 
ful daughters  into  a  domestic  sanctuary,  and  in  vain 
implored  mercy  for  herself  and  her  innocent  children. 
She  was  dragged  away  from  the  altar  and  butchered. 
Her  daughters,  besprinkled  with  their  mother's  blood,  only 


THE.  SECOND  PUNIC  WAU.  297 

prolonged  their  sufferings  by  trying  to  escape,  and  fell  at     CHAP, 
last  Tinder  the    blows    of  their  pursuers^      Thns    was  JEj^ 
destroyed  the  house  of  a  prince  who   had  ruled  over     p^^J^D 
Syracuse  for  half  a  century,  and  had  been  universally    216-212 
admired  and  envied  as  one  of  the  wisest,  happiest,  and 
best  of  men. 

This  deed  of  horror  bore  evil  finits  to  the  authors.  It  Cduntor 
could  not  fail  to  bring  about  a  reaction  in  public  opinion,  jn  sypa- 
and  consequently  when,  soon  affcer,  two  new  magistrates  ^^^* 
were  elected  in  the  place  of  Andranodoros  and  Themistos, 
the  choice  of  the  people  fell  on  Hippokrates  and  Epikydes, 
who,  in  the  hope  of  some  such  chance,  had  prolonged  their 
stay  in  Syracuse,  and  had,  no  doubt,  in  doing  so  risked  their 
lives.  Their  election  was  evidently  to  be  attributed  to 
the  populace  and  the  army,  which  began  to  exercise  more 
and  more  influence  in  the  civil  affairs  of  Syracuse,  and  a 
considerable  part  of  which  consisted  of  Eoman  deserters, 
who  wished  at  all  hazards  to  bring  about  a  rupture  with 
Home.*  From  this  moment  began  the  counter-revolution, 
which  was  soon  followed  by  the  most  deplorable  anarchy* 
When  the  magistrates  showed  their  desire  to  renew  the 
Roman  alliance,  and  for  this  purpose  sent  messengers  to 
^he  prsetor  and  received  Eoman  messengers  in  return,  the 
people  and  the  army  began  to  be  agitated.  The  agitation 
increased  when  a  Carthaginian  fleet  showed  itself  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Pachynus,  inspiring  the  enemies  of 
Eome  with  confidence  and  courage.  When,  therefore, 
Appius  Claudius,  to  coimteract  this  movement,  appeared 
with  a  Boman  fleet  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbour,  the 
Carthaginian  party  thought  themselves  betrayed,  and  the 
crowd  rushed  tumultuously  into  the  port  to  resist  a  landing 
of  the  Eomans,  if  they  should  attempt  it.' 

>  Livy,  mv.  26.  •  Liry,  xxiv.  23,  10. 

•  Livy,  xxiv.  27.  We  are  here  involuntarily  reminded  of  the  events  which 
in  282  led  to  the  war  with  Tarentnm.  In  both  cases,  the  Roman  fleet  came  to 
the  support  of  a  Koman  party.  But  in  Tarentum  it  appears  that  the  govern- 
ment was  in  the  hands  of  the  democrats  hostile  to  Borne,  while  in  Syracuse* 
with  the  exception  of  Hippokrates  and  Epikydes,  the  magistrates  belonged  to 
the  Koman  party.    The  Bomans  might  therefore  claim  a  formal  right  to  entei^ 


298  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK         Thus  the  unhappy  town  was  torn  by  two  hostile  parties; 


IV. 


.  nor  was  the  form  of  government  the  only  object  of  conten- 
Triumph     *^^^'  The  independence  and  the  very  existence  of  Syracuse 
of  the         were  involved  in  the  struggle.     For  a  time  it  seemed  that 
ginian        the  government,  and  with  it  the  friends  of  Eome,  would 
party  at      prevail.     The  greatest  obstacles  in  the  way  of  an  arrange- 
ment  with  Eome  were  the  two  Carthaginian  brothers,  who, 
from  being  the  agents  and  messengers  of  Hannibal,  had 
been  elected  among  the  Syracusan  magistrates.    K  these 
two  men  coidd  be  got  rid  of,  the  government,  it  was  thought, 
was  strong  enough  to  carry  out  its  policy  of  reconciliation 
with  Rome.     Force  could  not  be  employed  against  men 
who  enjoyed  the  favour  of  a  great  mass  of  the  people  and 
were  the  idols  of  the  soldiers.     But  a  decent  pretext  was 
not  wanting.     The  town  of  Leontini  asked  for  military 
protection.     Hippokrates  was  sent  thither  with  a  body  of 
4,000  men.      But  no  sooner  did  he  find  himself  in  pos- 
session of  an  independent  command  than  he  began  to  act 
in  direct  opposition  to  the  government.      He  incited  the 
people  of  Leontini  to  assert  their  independence  of  Syracuse, 
and,  to  precipitate  matters,  he  surprised  and  cut  to  pieces 
a  military  post  of  the  Bomans  on  the  frontier,  and  thus  de 
facto  commenced  the  war  with  Borne.    As  yet,  however, 
the  government  of  Syracuse  was  not  compromised  by  this 
act  of  hostility.     They  disavowed  all  participation  in  this 
violation  of  the  still  existing  alliance,  and  offered  to  put 
down  the  rebellion  of  Hippokrates  and  the  Leontinians  in 
conjunction  with  a  Boman  force.      The  Boman  prsetor 
Marcellus,  however,  did  not  wait  for  the  co-operation  of 
the   Syracusan  force,  which,  8,000  strong,  left   Syracuse 
under   the   command  of  their  *strategoi.*      Before  they 
arrived  Marcellus  had  taken  Leontini  by  force,  and  had 
inflicted  severe  punishment  on  the  rebels  and  mutineers. 
Two  thousand  Boman  deserters  who  had  been  taken  in 
the  town  were  scourged  and  beheaded.      Hippokrates  and 
his  brother  escaped  with  difSculty  to  the  neighbouring 

the  harbour  of  Syracuse,  as  the  allies  of  the  goTemment ;  but  even  this  plea 
was  wanting  in  the  case  of  Tarentum. — See  toL  i.  p.  489  ft. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  299 

fort  of  Herbessos.  Again  the  Carthaginian  party  seemed  chap. 
annihilated,  but  again  the  cruelty  shown  by  their  oppo-  -_  ;  \  - 
nents  brought  about  a  reaction.  When  the  Sj^racusan  ^^^^ 
troops,  on  their  march  to  Leontini,  heard  of  the  storming  216-212 
of  the  town  by  the  Eomans,  and  of  the  terrible  punishment  ^'^ 
inflicted  on  the  citizens,  and  especially  on  the  captive 
soldiers,  they  feared  that  their  government  would  deliver 
up  all  the  deserters  among  them  to  the  vengeance  of  the 
Bomans.  They  not  only  refused,  therefore,  to  attack 
Hippokrates  and  Epikydes  in  Herbessos,  but,  fraternising 
with  them,^  drove  away  their  officers  and  marched  back  to 
Syracuse  under  the  command  of  the  very  men  whom  they 
had  been  sent  to  capture.  In  Syracuse  an  exaggerated 
report  had  been  spread  of  the  brutality  of  the  Eomans  in 
Leontini,  and  had  revived  the  ill-feeling  of  the  populace 
towards  the  Komans.  In  spite  of  the  resistance  of  the 
strategoi  the  soldiers  were  admitted  into  the  town,  and 
this  was  the  signal  for  all  the  worst  horrors  of  anarchy. 
The  slaves  were  set  free,  the  prisons  broken  open  and  the 
inmates  let  loose,  the  strategoi  murdered  or  expelled,  their 
houses  ransacked.  Syracuse  was  now  at  the  mercy  of  the 
populace,  the  soldiers,  deserters,  slaves,  and  condemned 
ofibnders  ;  the  only  men  enjoying  anything  like  authority 
and  obedience  were  Hippokrates  and  Epikydes.  The  Car- 
thaginian party  was  completely  triumphant,  and  the 
Bomans,  in  addition  to  their  numerous  difficulties,  had 
now  a  new  and  most  arduous  task  imposed  on  them — ^the 
reduction  by  force  of  the  principal  town  of  Sicily,  v^hich 
in  the  hands  of  the  Carthaginians  made  the  whole  island 
an  unsafe  possession,  and  cut  off  all  prospect  of  ending  the 
war  by  a  descent  on  the  African  coast. 

Sosls,  one  of  the  expelled  strategoi,  and  a  leader  of  the  Mmh  of 
republican  movement  from  the  very  beginning,  brought  to  Marcellw 

'  On  this  occasion,  a  corps  of  600  Cretans  is  mentionedi  whom  Hiero  had  sent 
as  an  aoxiliaiy  force  to  the  Eomans  in  217.  These  men  had  been  taken 
prisoners  in  the  battle  of  the  lake  Thrasymenus,  dismissed  by  Hannibal,  and 
sent  back  to  Syracuse.  They  were  the  first  to  fraternise  with  Hippokrates  and 
Epikydes,  having  served  under  them,  and  feeling  themselves  to  be  under  an 
obligation  to  Hannibal. — Livy,  zziv.  30. 


800 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


book: 

IV. 

to  Syra- 
cuse. 


Military 
resourced 
of  Syra- 
cuse. 


Marcellus  the  news  of  what  had  happened.  The  Roman 
general  at  once  marched  upon  Syracuse,  and  took  up  a 
position  on  the  south  side  of  the  town,  near  the  temple  of 
the  Olympian  Zeus  and  not  far  from  the  great  harbour, 
while  Appius  Claudius  anchored  with  the  fleet  in  front  of 
the  town.  The  oldest  part  of  Syracuse  was  in  the  small 
island  Ortygia,  which  separates  the  large  harbour  in  the 
south  from  a  much  smaller  one  on  the  north.  On  this 
island  was  the  famous  fountain  of  Arethousa,  which  seemed 
to  gush  forth,  even  from  the  sea,  at  a  place  where,  according 
to  a  myth,  the  nymph — who,  as  she  fled  from  the  river-god 
Alpheios,  had  thrown  herself  into  the  sea  from  the  shores 
of  Elis — ^had  re-appeared  above  the  waters.  Such  islands, 
near  to  the  mainland,  easy  of  defence  and  containing  good 
anchoring-ground,  were  on  all  the  coasts  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean the  favourite  spots  where  the  Phoenicians  used  to 
settle  in  the  primeval  period  long  before  the  wanderings 
of  the  Greeks. 

On  this  island  accordingly,  as  in  many  similar  places,  a 
Phoenician  settlement  had  preceded  the  Greeks  ;  but  when 
here,  as  on  the  whole  eastern  half  of  Sicily,  the  Semitic 
traders  retired  before  the  warlike  Greeks,  the  latter  soon 
became  too  numerous  for  the  islet  of  Ortygia.  They 
extended  their  settlement  to  the  mainland  of  Sicily,  and 
buUt  anew  town,  called  Achradina,  along  the  sea-coast,  on 
the  north  side  of  the  original  town  on  the  islet.  Achradina 
became  now  the  principal  part  of  Syracuse,  whilst  Ortygia, 
more  and  more  cleared  of  private  dwellings,  became  a 
fortress,  containing  the  palaces  of  the  successive  tyrants, 
the  magazines,  the  treasure-houses,  and  the  barracks  for 
the  mercenaries.  It  was  strongly  fortified  all  round,  but 
especially  on  the  northern  side,  where  a  narrow  artificial 
neck  of  land  connected  it  with  the  nearer  portions  of 
Syracuse.  It  thus  formed  a  formidable  stronghold,  and 
its  possession  was  indispensable  for  those  who  wished  to 
control  the  town.  During  the  memorable  siege  of  Syra- 
cuse in  the  Peloponnesian  war  by  the  Athenian  armament, 

• 

the  town  consisted  only  of  the  two  parts — the  inland  of 


THE.  SECOND  PUNIC  WAB.  801 

Ortygia  and  Achradina ;  but  at  a  subsequent  period  there  CHAP. 
^iTOse  on  the  western  side  of  the  latter  two  suburbs,  called  ^,  ,  ',# 
Tyche  and  Neapolis,  each  of  which  was,  like  Achradina  and  -^^^^ 
Oitygia,  surrounded  with  walls  and  separately  fortified.  216-212 
Dionysius  the  elder  considerably  enlarged  the  circum-  ^'^' 
ference  of  the  town  by  fortifying  the  northern  and  south- 
western side  of  the  whole  slope  called  Epipolse,  which,  in 
the  form  of  a  triangle,  rose  with  a  gradual  incline  to  a  point 
called  Euryalus,  in  the  west  of  Achradina,  Tyche,  and 
Neapolis.  Thus  a  large  space  was  included  in  the  fortifi- 
cations of  Syracuse ;  but  this  space  was  never  quite  covered 
with  buildings,  and  the  population  was  not  large  enough, 
even  in  the  most  flourishing  period,  to  man  efiFectually  the 
whole  extent  of  wall,  amounting  to  eighteen  miles ;  but  the 
natural  strength  of  the  town  made  the  defence  more  easy. 
The  walls,  which  from  the  northern  and  southern  extre- 
inities  of  the  older  town  ran  westward  and  converged  at  the 
fort  Euryalus,  stood  on  precipitous  rocks,  and  were  there- 
fore easily  defended,  even  by  a  comparatively  small  number 
of  troops.  Moreover  Hiero  had  in  his  long  reign  accu- 
mulated in  abundance  all  possible  means  of  defence.^  The 
ingenious  Archimedes,  liberally  supported  by  his  royal 
friend,  was  in  possession  of  all  material  and  scientific 
resources  for  the  construction  of  the  most  perfect  engines 
of  war  that  the  world  had  hitherto  seen.  If  we  recollect 
Jiow  often  Hiero  in  the  first  Punic  war  supplied  the 
Bomans  with  munitions  of  war,  and  that  he  gave  fifty 
ballistce  to  the  Bhodians  after  the  earthquake,  we  may 
form  an  idea  of  the  extensive  scale  on  which  machinery 
of  this  kind  must  have  been  manufactured  in  Syracuse, 
and  how  large  a  stock  must  have  been  there  ready  for  use. 

The  attempts  of  Marcellus  to  take  Syracuse  by  storm  Failure  of 
failed,  accordingly,  in  the  most  signal  manner.     On  the  atumptaof 

^  Livy,  zxiy.  84, 13 :  '  Sed  ea  quoque  pan  eodem  omni  apparatu  tormentorum 
instnicta  erat,  Hieronis  impensis  curaque  per  multos  annos,  Archimedis  tmica 
arte.  Natura  etiam  adiuyabat  loci,  quod  saxnm  cui  imposita  muri  fimdamenta 
8unt  ma^a  parte  ita  proclive  est,  ut  non  solum  missa  tormento,  sed  etiam  qusD 
pondere  suo  provoluta  essent,  graviter  in  hostem  inciderent ;  eadem  causa  ad 
subeundum  arduum  aditum  instabilemque  ingressum  prsebebaC 


302 


ROMAN  mSTOBY. 


BOOK 

IV. 

* , ' 

Marcellus 
to  storm 
Syracuse. 


Cartha- 
ginian OpO' 
rations  m 
Sicily. 


land  side  the  wall-crested  rocks  defied  all  tlie  usual  modes 
of  attack  with  ladders,  movable  towers,  or  battering-rams. 
On  the  sea-front  of  Achradina  sixty  Boman  vessels, 
venturing  to  approach  the  walls,  lashed  two-and-two  to- 
gether, and  carrying  wooden  towers  and  battering-rams, 
were  driven  back  by  an  overwhelming  shower  of  great  and 
small  missiles  from  the  bastions  and  from  behind  the  loop- 
holed  walls;  some  ships,  caught  by  iron  hooks,  were 
raised  partly  out  of  the  water,  and  then  dashed  back, 
to  the  dismay  of  the  crews,  so  that  at  length  they  appre- 
hended danger  when  they  only  saw  a  beam  or  a  rope  on 
the  wall,  which  might  turn  out  to  be  a  new  instrument  of 
destruction  invented  by  the  dreaded  Archimedes.'  Mar- 
cellus  saw  that  it  was  of  no  use  to  persist  in  his  attacks. 
Syracuse,  which  had  repeatedly  resisted  the  power  of  Car^ 
thage  and  the  Athenian  armada,  was  indeed  not  likely  to 
be  taken  by  force.'  He  therefore  gave  up  the  siege,  but 
remained  in  the  neighbourhood  in  a  strong  position  for 
the  purpose  of  watching  the  town  and  cutting  oflF  sup- 
plies and  reinforcements.  It  was  impossible  to  blockade 
Syracuse  by  a  regular  circumvallation,  on  account  of  the 
vast  extent  of  her  walls ;  and  this  would  have  been  useless, 
even  if  it  had  been  possible,  so  long  as  the  harbour  was 
open  to  the  Carthaginian  fleet. 

From  the  moment  when  Syracuse  passed  over  from  the 
Boman  to  the  Carthaginian  alliance,  the  chief  momentum 
of  the  war  seemed  shifted  from  Italy  to  Sicily.  The 
attention  of  both  the  belligerent  nations  was  again  turned 
to  the  scene  of  their  first  great  struggle,  and  thither  both 
now  sent  new  fleets  and  armies.  It  was  Hannibal  himself 
who  advised  the  Carthaginian  government  to  send  rein- 
forcements to  Sicily  instead  of  Italy.*  The  Bomans  had 
already  a  considerable  force  on  the  island,  and  now  sent  a 
new  legion,  which,  as   Hannibal  blocked  the  land  road 

*  Polybius  and  Livy  say  nothing  of  the  wonderful  reflecting  mirrors  with 
which  Archimedes  is  said  to  have  fired  the  Koman  vessels  at  a  distance.  The 
oldest  historian  to  whom  this  story  can  be  traced  is  Dion  Cassius  (Zonaras, 
ix.  4).    It  may  therefore  be  considered  a  fable. 

•  Livy,  xxiv.  34;  xxv.  23.  •  Livy,  xxiv.  36. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  808 

throngh  Lucania  ami  Bruttium,  was  conveyed  by  sea  from     CHAP. 
Ostia  to  Panormus.     Of  the  exact  strength  of  the  Roman  .^   ,  '  .^ 
armies  in  Sicily  we  are  not  informed.     The  garrisons  of     ^^^ 
the  numerous  towns  must  have  absorbed  a  great  number    216-212 
of  troops,  apart  from  the  force  engaged  before  Syracuse. 
A  considerable  portion  of  Sicily  was  inclined  to  rebellion, 
and  in  several  places  rebellion  had  already  broken  out. 
The  towns  of  Helorus,  Herbessus,  and  Megara,  which  had 
revolted,  were  retaken  by  Marcellus  and  destroyed,  as  a 
warning  to  all  those  that  were  wavering  in  their  fidelity. 
Nevertheless,  as  at  this  very  time  Himilco  had  landed  with 
15,000  Carthaginians  and  twelve  elephants  at  Heraclea  in 
the  west  of  the  island,  the  insurrection  against    Rome 
spread,  under  the  protection  and  encouragement  of  the 
Carthaginian  arms.     Agrigentum,  though  destroyed  in  the 
first  Punic  war,  was  still  of  great  importance,  from  the 
strength  of  its  position.     Marcellus  marched  upon  it  in  all 
haste  from  Syracuse,  to  prevent  its  being  occupied  by  the 
Carthaginians;   but  he    came  too    late.      Himilco    had 
already  seized  Agrigentum,  and  made  it  the  base  of  his 
operations.     At  the  same  time  a  fleet  of  fifty-five  Car- 
thaginian vessels  entered  the  harbour  of  Syracuse,  and 
thereupon  Himilco,  advancing  with  his  army,  established 
his  camp  under  the  southern  walls  of  Syracuse,  near  the 
river  Anapus. 

The  situation  of  the  Romans,  close  before  the  hostile  Masgacre 
town,  and  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  a  hostile  army,  was  LbitoSs 
by  no  means  satisfactory.     But  it  became  still  worse  when  o^Ennaby 
the  town  of  Murgantia  (probably  in  the  vicinity  of  Syracuse)  riiw. 
where  they  had  large  magazines,  was  betrayed   to  the 
Punians  by  the  inhabitants.*     The  Romans  now  felt  that 
they  were  nowhere  safe ;  but,  although  their  suspicions 
justified  not  only  precaution  but  even  severity,  we  cannot, 
even  at  this  distance  of  time,  read  without  indignation  and 
disgust  the  report  of  the  way  in  which  the  Roman  garri- 
son of  Enna  treated  a  defenceless  population  on  a  mere 
suspicion  of  treason.  The  town  of  Enna  (Castro  Giovanni), 

*  Livy,  xxiv.  36. 


804 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Besults 
of  the 
massacre. 


situated  in  the  central  part  of  the  island  on  an  isolated 
rock  difficult  of  access,  was  of  great  importance  on  account 
of  the  natural  strength  of  its  position.  Ancient  myths 
called  it  the  place  where  Persephonfi  (Proserpina)  the 
daughter  of  Demeter,  was  seized  by  Hades,  the  god  of  the 
regions  beneath  the  earth.  A  temple  of  the  goddess  was 
a  national  sanctuary  for  all  the  inhabitants  of  Sicily,  and 
conferred  on  Enna  the  character  of  a  sacred  city.  In  the 
j&rst  Punic  war  it  had  suffered  much  and  had  been  re- 
peatedly taken  by  one  or  the  other  belligerent.  It  had  now 
a  strong  Boman  garrison,  commanded  by  L.  Pinarius.  The 
inhabitants,  it  appears,  felt  little  attachment  to  Eome,  and 
probably  L.  Pinarius  had  good  reason  to  be  on  his  guard 
day  and  night.  But  fear  urged  him  to  commit  an  act  of 
atrocity  which  rendered  his  own  name  infamous  and 
sullied  the  honour  of  his  country.  He  called  upon  the 
inhabitants  of  Enna  to  lay  their  requests  before  him  in  a 
general  assembly  of  the  people.  Meanwhile  he  gave  secret 
instructions  to  his  men,  posted  sentinels  all  round  the 
public  theatre  where  the  popular  assembly  was  held,  and 
upon  a  given  signal  the  Roman  soldiers  rushed  upon  the 
defenceless  people,  killed  them  indiscriminately,  and  then 
sacked  the  town,  as  if  it  had  been  taken  by  storm,*  The 
consul  Marcellus  not  only  approved  of  this  iniquitous  deed 
but  rewarded  the  perpetrators,  and  allowed  them  to  keep 
the  plunder  of  the  unhappy  town,*  hoping,  no  doubt,  thus 
to  terrify  the  vacillating  Sicilians  into  obedience  to  Bome. 
The  carnage  of  Enna  reminds  us  of  similar  acts  of  atro- 
city committed  by  Italian  warriors  in  Messana,  Hhegium, 
and  more  recently  in  Casilinum.  But  the  crime  had 
never  been  so  openly  approved  and  rewarded  by  the  first 

'  Iav/b  description  (xxiv.  39)  of  this  carnage  is  a  masterpiece :  '  Milites 
intonti  dudum  ac  parati,  alii  supeme  in  aversam  concionem  clamore  sublato 
decnrrunt,  alii  ad  exitus  theatri  conferti  obsistunt.  Cseduntur  Ennenses  cavea 
inclusi  coacervanturque  non  csede  solum  sed  etiam  fiiga,  cum  alii  super  aliorum 
capita  ruerent,  atque  integri  sauciis,  vivi  mortuis  incidentes,  cumularentur. 
Inde  passim  discurritur,  et  urbis  captse  modo  fugaque  et  csedes  omnia  tenet, 
nihilo  remissiore  militum  ira,  quod  turbam  inermem  csedebant,  quam  si  periculum 
par  et  ardor  certaminis  eos  irritaret.' 

>  Of  course  the  plunder  included  the  women  and  children. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


305 


representative  of  the  Boman  community.  The  defenders 
of  Casilinum  had  acted  not  only  as  murderers,  but  also  as 
brave  soldiers;  but  L.  Pinarius  and  his  men  were  rewarded 
with  the  spoils  of  their  victims  without  showing  that  they 
were  as  brave  as  they  were  treacherous,  bloodthirsty,  and 
greedy.  It  seemed  that  the  war  rendered  more  ferocious 
the  minds  of  the  men  who  were  destined  to  receive  and  to 
spread  the  civilisation  of  antiquity  and  to  defend  it  from 
the  barbarians  of  the  north  and  of  the  south. 

The  cruel  punishment  of  Enna  failed  to  produce  the  eflfect 
which  the  Romans  had  expected.  Hatred  and  aversion 
acted  even  more  powerfully  than  fear.  The  towns  which  had 
as  yet  been  only  wavering  in  their  allegiance  joined  the  Car- 
thaginian side  all  over  Sicily.  Himilco  left  his  position 
before  Syracuse,  and  made  expeditions  in  every  direction 
to  organise  and  support  the  insurrection  against  Borne. 
Thus  passed  the  year  213  B.C.  Towards  its  close,  Marcellus, 
with  a  part  of  his  army,  took  up  his  vrinter-quarters  in  a 
fortified  camp  five  miles  to  the  west  of  Syracuse,  without 
abandoning,  however,  the  camp  previously  established 
near  the  temple  of  the  Olympian  Zeus  in  the  south  of  the 
town.*  Lacking  the  means  of  blockading  the  town,  he 
remained  in  the  neighbourhood  only  in  the  hope  of  obtain- 
ing possession  of  it  by  some  stratagem,  or  by  treason. 

The  result  showed  that  his  calculations  were  just.  The 
republican  party  in  Syracuse  was  indeed  vanquished  and 
broken  up  by  the  soldiers  and  the  populace;  and  its  chiefs, 

•  The  chronological  order  of  the  events  in  Sicily  cannot  be  fixed  satis- 
factorily. It  is  probable  that  Msircellus  reached  Sicily  late  in  the  year  214,  as 
in  the  earlier  part  of  that  year  ho  was  occupied  in  Campania  (Liry,  xxir.  13  ff.), 
and  afterwards  was  ill  (ibid.  20).  As  he  did  not  advance  immediately  upon 
Syracuse,  the  siege  possibly  began  either  quite  at  the  end  of  214,  or,  us  seems 
more  likely,  in  213.  At  any  rate,  the  events  which  followed  the  fruitless 
attempts  at  storming  the  town  belong  to  the  latter  year.  From  Livy's  account 
it  would  appear  that  all  this  took  place  in  214.  This,  howevpr,  must  be  an 
error.  See  Weissenbom's  note  to  Livy  xxiv.  39.  According  to  Polybius 
(viii.  9,  §  6),  the  siege  of  Syracuse  lasted  eight  months  longer  after  the  plan 
of  taking  it  by  storm  was  given  up.  But  the  town  was  not  taken  before,  the 
autumn  of  212  (Livy,  xxv.  26),  in  the  third  year  after  the  commencement  of 
the  siege  (Livy,  xxv.  31).  The  account  of  Polybius  does  not  agree  with  this 
•tatument ;  probably  the  numbers  in  his  text  are  corrupt 

VOL.  II.  X 


CHAP. 
VIII. 

Third 
Period, 
216-212 

B.C. 


Siege  of 
Syracuse 
by  Mar- 
cellus. 


806  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     the  murderers  of  Hieronymns  and  of  the  family  of  Hiero, 

^     / ,  were  in  exile,  mostly  in  the  Eoman  camp.    All  power  was 

in  the  hands  x)f  the  foreign  mercenaries  and  deserters, 
and  Syracuse  was  de  facto  a  Carthaginian  fortress  under 
the  command  of  Hippokrates  and  Epikydes.  Nevertheless 
the  republican  party  found  the  means  of  keeping  up  with 
the  Bomans  a  regular  correspondence,  the  object  of  which 
was  to  deliver  up  the  town  into  their  hands.  In  fishing 
boats,  hidden  under  nets,  messengers  were  secretly  de- 
spatched from  the  harbour  of  Syracuse  into  the  Roman 
camp,  and  found  their  way  back  in  the  same  manner. 
Thus  were  discussed  and  settled  the  conditions  under 
which  the  town  was  to  be  betrayed.  Marcellus  promised 
that  the  Syracusans  should  be  restored  to  the  same  position 
which  they  had  occupied  as  Eoman  allies  imder  King 
Hiero;  they  were  to  retain  their  liberty  and  their  own 
laws.  All  the  preparations  were  already  made  for  carrying 
out  the  proposed  plan,  when  it  became  known  to  Epikydes, 
and  eighty  of  the  conspirators  were  put  to  death.  Thus 
baffled,  Marcellus  nevertheless  persevered  in  his  scheme. 
By  his  partisans  he  was  informed  of  everything  that  took 
place  within  the  town.  He  knew  that  a  great  festival  was 
about  to  be  celebrated  to  Artemis,  which  was  to  last  for 
three  days.  He  justly  expected  that  on  this  occasion 
great  laxity  would  be  shown  in  guarding  the  walls.  Mar- 
cellus had  observed  that  in  one  part  of  the  fortifications, 
on  the  northern  side,  the  wall  was  so  low  that  it  could  be 
easily  scaled  with  ladders.  To  this  place  he  sent,  on  one 
of  the  festive  nights,  a  party  of  soldiers,  who  succeeded  in 
reaching  the  top  of  the  wall,  and,  under  the  guidance  of  the 
Syracusan  Sosis,  one  of  the  conspirators,  proceeded  to  the 
gate  called  Hexapylon.  Here  the  drunken  guardsmen 
were  found  sleeping  and  quickly  dispatched,  the  gate  was 
opened,  and  the  signal  given  to  a  body  of  Boman  troops 
outside  to  advance  and  enter  the  town.  When  the  morn- 
ing dawned,  Epipolse,  the  upper  part  of  the  town,  was  in 
the  hands  of  the  Eomans.  The  suburbs  Tyche  and 
Neapolis,  which  in  former  times  had  been  protected  by 


Third 
Pebiod, 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  807 

"walls  on  the  side  of  Epipolse,  were  now  probably  open  on     CHAP, 
the  west,  since  Dionysius  had  constructed  the  wall  which 
inclosed  the  whole  space  of  Epipoto.     They  could  not, 
therefore,  be  held  for  any  longtime  after  theBomans  were    2i5-2ri 
inside  the  common  wall.     But  on  the  extreme  west  point       ^^' 
of  Epipoke,  the  strong  detached  fort  Euryalus  defied  all 
attacks.     Marcellus  was  therefore  still  very  far  from  being 
master  of  Syracuse.     Not  only  Euryalus  and  the  island  of 
Ortygia,  but  Achradina,  the  largest  and  most  important 
part  of  Syracuse,  had  still  to  be  taken;  and  these  had  lost 
nothing  of  their  strength  by  the  fact  that  the  suburbs 
were  now  in  the  power  of  the  Bomans.     In  truth  the 
siege  of  Syracuse  lasted  for  some  months  longer,  and  the 
difBculties  of  the  Bomans  were  now  doubled  rather  than 
diminished.      It  is,  therefore,  a   silly    anecdote   which 
relates  that  when,  on  the  morning  after  the  taking  of 
Epipolse,  Marcellus  saw  the  rich  town  spread  out  before 
his  feet  and  now  within  his  grasp,  he  shed  tears  of  joy  and 
emotion.'     He  summoned  the  garrisons  of  Euryalus  and 
Achradina.     The  deserters  who  kept  guard  on  the  walls 
of  Achradina  woidd  not  even  allow  the  Soman  heralds  to 
approach  or  to  speak.     On  the  other  hand  the  commander 
of  Euryalus,  a  Greek  mercenary  from  Argos  called  Philo- 
demos,  showed  himself  ready  after  a  while  to  listen  to  the 
proposals  of  the  Syracusau  Sosis,  and  evacuated  the  place. 
Marcellus  was  now  safe  in  his  rear  and  had  no  longer  to 
apprehend  a  simultaneous  attack  from  the  garrison  of  the 
town  in  front  and  from  an  army  approaching  by  land  in 
his  rear.*    He  encamped  on  the  ground  between  the  two 
suburbs  Tyche  and  Neapolis,  and  gave   these  up  to  be 
plundered  by  his  soldiers  as  a  foretaste  of  the  booty  of 
Syracuse.    Soon  after,  a  Carthaginian  army,  under  Hippo- 
krates  and  Himilco,  marched  upon  Syracuse,  and  attacked 
the  Roman  camp  near  the  temple  of  Zeus  Olympios,  whilst, 
simultaneously,  Epikydes  made  a  sally  from  Achradina 
upon  the  other  Boman  camp  between  the  suburbs.     These 

•  IdTy,  XXV.  U,  «  Liv>*,  xxr.  26. 

z  2 


308  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     attacks  failed.      On  every  point  the  Bomans  kept  their 
. ,1^   ground ;  and  thus  the  hostile  forces  within  and  before  Syra- 
cuse remained  for  some  time  in  \he  same  relative  position, 
without  being  able  to  make  an  impression  either  one  way 
or  the  other.     Meanwhile  summer  advanced,  and  a  malig- 
nant disease  broke  out  in  the  Carthaginian  camp,  which 
was  pitched  on  the  low  ground  by  the  river  Anapus.      In 
times  past  the  deadly  climate  of  Syracuse  had  more  than 
once  delivered  the  town  from  her  enemies.    Under  the  very 
walls  of  the  town  a  Carthaginian  army  had  perished  in 
the  reign  of  the  elder  Dionysius.     Now  the  climate  proved 
as  disastrous   to  the  defenders  as  it  had  formerly  done 
to  the  besiegers  of  Syracuse.     The  Carthaginians  were 
struck  down  by  the  disease  in  masses.     When  a  great 
part  of  the  men  and  of  the  officers,  and  among  them 
JBippokrates  and  Himilco  themselves,  had  been  carried  oflF, 
the  remainder  of  the  troops,  consisting  for  the  most  part 
of  Sicilians,  dispersed  in  different  directions.    The  Bomans 
also  suffered  from  the  disease ;  but  the  higher  parts  of 
Syracuse,  where  they  were  stationed,  were  more  cool  and 
airy  than  the  low  ground  on  the  banks  of  the  Anapus ;  and 
moreover  the  houses  of  the  suburbs  Tyche  and  Neapolis 
afforded  shelter  from  the  deadly  rays  of  the  sun,  so  that 
the  Roman  loss  was  comparatively  small.     Nevertheless 
Marcellus  had,  as  yet,  no  prospect  of  taking  by  storm  a 
town  so  vigorously  defended,  nor  could  he  reduce  it  by 
famine,  as  the  port  was  open  to  the  Carthaginian  vessels. 
At  this  very  time  Carthage  made  renewed  efforts  to  supply 
Syracuse  with  provisions.    Seven  hundred  transports,  laden 
with  supplies,  were  dispatched  to  Sicily  under  the  convoy 
of  one  hundred  and  thirty  ships  of  war.     This  fleet  had 
already  reached  Agrigentum  when  it  was   detained  by 
contrary  winds.     Epikydes,  impatient  of  delay,  left  Syra- 
cuse and  proceeded  to  Agrigentum,   for  the  purpose  of 
urging  Bomilcar,  the  Carthaginian  admiral,  to  make  an 
attack  upon  the  B-oman  fleet  which  lay  at  anchor  near  the 
promontory  of  Pachynus.     Bomilcar  advanced   with  his 
ships  of  war ;  but,  when  the  Bomans  sailed  to  meet  him, 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  809 

he  avoided  them,  and  steered  to  Tarentnm,  after  having     CHAP, 
dispatched  an  order  to  the  transports  to  return  to  Africa.  '_- 

The  cause  of  this  extraordinary  proceeding  does  not  appear      Third 
in  the  account  handed  down  to  us.     If  it  be  true,  as  Livy     215-212 
reports,^  that  Bomilcar's  fleet  was  stronger  than  that  of      •  ^'^' 
the  Bomans,  it  cannot  have  been  fear  which  prevented  him 
from  accepting  battle.     Perhaps  he  thought  that  his  pre- 
sence at  Tarentum  was  more  necessary  than  at  Syracuse ; 
perhaps  he  quarrelled  with  Epikydes.    At  any  rate  he  left 
to  its  own  resources  the  town  which  he  was  sent  to  relieve, 
and  thus  spread  discouragement  among  its  defenders  and 
hastened  its  fall. 

From  this  moment  the  fate  of  Syracuse  was  sealed.  Anarchy  in 
Epikydes  himself  probably  lost  all  hope,  as  he  did  not  Syracuse. 
return,  but  remained  in  Agrigentum.  Again  the  repub- 
lican party  took  courage.  The  leaders  of  this  party  re- 
newed negotiations  with  the  Bomans,  and  again  Marcellus 
guaranteed  the  liberty  and  independence  of  Syracuse  as 
the  price  for  surrendering  the  town.  But  the  friends  of 
Bome  were  not  able  to  fulfil  the  promises  they  had  made. 
The  unhappy  town  was  torn  by  a  desperate  straggle  be- 
tween the  citizens  and  the  soldiers.  At  first  the  citizens 
had  the  advantage.  They  succeeded  in  killing  the  chief 
officers  appointed  by  Epikydes,  and  in  electing  republican 
magistrates  in  their  place,  who  were  ready  to  hand  the 
town  over  to  the  Bomans.  The  lawless  soldiery  seemed 
overpowered  for  a  moment.  But,  after  a  short  time,  that 
faction  among  the  troops  got  the  upper  hand  again  who 
had  a  just  apprehension  that  their  lives  were  in  jeopardy 
if  they  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Bomans.  The  foreign 
mercenaries  were  persuaded  to  resist  to  the  last.  Another 
revolution  followed.  The  republican  magistrates  were 
murdered,  and  a  general  massacre  and  pillage  si$;nalised 
the  final  triumph  of  the  enemies  of  Bome  and  of  Syracuse. 
The  unhappy  town  resembled  a  helpless  wreck,  drifting 
fast  towards  a  reef  whilst  the  crew,  instead  of  battling  with 

>  Idvy,  xxT.  27. 


310 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Treachery 
of  Mtri- 
cus. 


Fall  and 
Back  of 
Syracuse. 


the  elements,  spends  its  last  strength  in  bloody  internecine 
strife. 

Even  now  MareeUus  did  not  make  a  direct  attempt  to 
take  Syracuse  by  force  until  he  had  secured  the  co-opera- 
tion of  a  party  in  the  town.     The  troops  had  chosen  six 
captains,  each  of  whom  was  to  defend  a  certain  part  of 
the  walls.     Among  these  captains  was  a  Spanish  officer  of 
the  name  of  Mericus,  who  commanded  on  the  southern 
side  of  Ortygia.     Seeing  that  the  town  could  not  possibly 
be  held  much  longer,  and  that  therefore  it  was  high  time 
to  make  his  peace  if  he  wished  to  obtain  favourable  terms, 
at  least  for  those  soldiers  who  were  not  deserters,  he 
entered  secretly  into  negotiations  with  Marcellus.      An 
agreement  was  soon  made.     A  barge  approached  at  night 
the   southern  extremity  of  Ortygia,  and  landed  a  party 
of  Roman  soldiers,  who  were  admitted  through  a  postern- 
gate  into  the  fortification.      On  the  following  day  Mar- 
cellus ordered  a  general  attack  upon  the  walls  of  Achradina, 
and  whilst  the  garrison  rushed  from  all  parts,  and  also 
from  Ortygia  to  the  threatened  spot,  Roman  soldiers  landed 
in  several  ships  unopposed  on  Ortygia  and  occupied  the 
place  with  a  sufficient  force.     Having  made  sure  of  the 
fact  that  Ortygia  was  in  his  power,  Marcellus  at  once  de- 
sisted from  any  farther  attack  on  Achradina,  well  knowing 
that,  after  the  fall  of  Ortygia,  the  defence  of  Achradina 
would  not  be  continued.     His  calculation  proved  correct. 
During  the  following  night  the  deserters  found  means  of 
escaping,  and  in  the  morning  the  gates  were  opened  to 
admit  the  victorious  army. 

Thus,  at  length,  after  a  siege  that  had  lasted  more  than 
two  years,  the  Romans  reaped  the  fruit  of  their  dogged 
perseverance.  If  any  town  that  had  ever  succumbed  to 
the  Roman  arms  was  justified  in  expecting  a  lenient,  or 
even  a  generous  treatment,  this  town  assuredly  was  Syra- 
cuse.^ The  invaluable  services  which  Hiero  had  rendered 
in  the  course  of  more  than  half  a  century,  could  not  in 

>  Compare  the  just  remarks  of  Livy,  xxvi.  82. 


B.C. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  811 

justice  be  considered  as  balanced  by  the  follies  of  a  child,  CHAP, 
and  by  the  hostility  of  a  political  party  with  which  the  — ..-1 
better  class  of  Syracusan  citizens  had  never  sympathized,  p^^^ 
From  the  very  beginning  of  the  sad  complications  and  215-212 
revolutions  at  Syracuse,  the  true  republican  party,  which 
was  attached  to  order  and  freedom,  inclined  to  Rome  and 
wished  to  continue  the  foreign  policy  of  Hiero.  It  was 
they  who  conspired  to  put  down  the  tyrant  Hieronymus 
and  his  anti-Roman  relations  and  councillors.  They  had 
attempted  to  rid  themselves  of  the  emissaries  of  Hannibal 
and  of  their  adherents  in  the  army ;  they  were  overpowered 
without  renouncing  their  plans ;  they  had  made  every 
effort,  in  conjunction  with  their  exiled  friends  who  had 
taken  refuge  in  the  camp  of  Marcellus,  to  deliver  Syracuse 
into  the  hands  of  the  Romans;  they  had  resisted  the 
reign  of  terror  exercised  by  the  foreign  mercenaries  and 
the  Roman  deserters,  and  many  of  them  lost  their  lives  in 
the  attempt  to  deliver  their  native  town  from  the  tyranny 
of  an  armed  mob  of  mutineers  and  traitors,  and  to  renew 
the  old  alliance  with  Rome.  Syracuse  had  not  rebelled 
against  Rome,  but  had  implored  assistance  from  Rome 
against  its  worst  oppressors.  Not  only  clemency  and 
magnanimity,  but  even  justice,  should  have  prompted  the 
conquerors  to  look  upon  the  sufferings  of  Syracuse  in  this 
light ;  and  it  would  have  been  the  undying  glory  of  Mar- 
ceUus— brighter  than  the  most  splendid  triumph— if,  on 
obtaining  possession,  he  had  shielded  the  wretched  town 
from  further  miseries.  He  would  indeed  have  acted 
right  in  punishing  with  Roman  severity  the  soldiers  who 
had  violated  the  military  oath  and  deserted  their  colours, 
and  who  were  the  chief  cause  of  the  pertinacity  of  the 
struggle.  But  he  ought  to  have  spared  the  citizens  of  the 
town,  the  deplorable  victims  of  hostile  factions.  He  did 
the  very  opposite.  He  allowed  the  deserters  to  escape, 
perhaps  with  the  object  of  being  able  to  plunder  so  much 
the  more  leisurely,  and  he  treated  the  town  as  if  it  had 
been  taken  by  storm,  handing  it  over  to  the  rapaciiy  of  sol- 
diers maddened  to  fury  by  the  long  resistance  and  by  the 


IV. 


312  .  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     prospect  of  plunder  and  revenge.     The  noble  Syracuse, 
which  had  ranked  in  the  foremost  line  of  the  fairest  cities 
that  bore  the  Hellenic  name,  fell  never  to  rise  again  from 
that  time  to  the  present.     Marcellus  had  indeed  promised 
that  the  lives  of  the  people  should  be  spared ;  ^  but  how 
such  a  promise  was  kept  we  may  infer  from  the  savage 
murder  of  the  best  man  in  Syracuse,  whose  grey  hair 
and  venerable,  thought-furrowed  forehead  ought  to  have 
shielded  him  from  the  steel  even  of  a  barbarian.     Where 
Archimedes  was  slain,  because,  absorbed  in  his  studies,  he 
did  not  readily  understand  the   demand  of  a  plundering 
soldier,  there,  we  may  be  sure,  ignoble  blood  was  shed 
without  stint.*     Marcellus  was  intent  only  on  obtaining 
possession  of  the  royal  treasures,  which  he  hoped  to  find  in 
the  island  of  Ortygia ;  but  it  is  hardly  likely  that  much  of 
them  had  been  left  by  the  successive  masters  of  Syracuse 
during  the  time  of  anarchy.     On  the  other  hand,  the  works 
of  art  which  had  been  accumulated  in  Syracuse  during  the 
periods  of  prosperity  were  still  extant.    These  were  all, 
without  exception,  taken,  to  be  sent  to  Rome.'  Syracuse  waa 
not  the  first  town  where  the  Bomans  learnt  and  practised 
this  kind  of  public  spoliation.*      Tarentum  and  Volsinii 
had   already  experienced  the  rapacity  rather  than  the 
taste  of  the  Romans  for   works  of  art.      But*  the   art 


'  Probably  an  order  was  issued  to  the  Koman  soldiers  forbidding  that 
indiscriminate  butchery  of  all  the  inhabitants  which  usually  followed  the 
storming  of  a  hostile  town,  according  to  the  detailed  and  graphic  account  of 
Polybius,  X.  39. 

«  Livy,  XXV.  31 :  *  Cum  multa  irse,  miilta  avaritise  foeda  exempla  ederentur/ 
etc.  Zonaras,  ix.  5:  *EyKpar€is  8i  rovrtty  ol  'Pwfiaioi  y9v6/A9woi  6.KKovs  re 
iroWohs  Kot  rhv  *Apx^'h^y  i,w4Kreivaw. 

■  Polybius,  ix.  10 :  "EKplOri  fiky  oly  8i3l  rovro  ro7s  *P»/Aa(ois  ri  r&v  ^vpcucowr&w 
froKvTfKiarara  KaraaKfvAirfiaTa  irdpra  fierh  r^v  SXvffiv  fiCTcuco/xf^cxy  €is  r^v 
iavr&v  irarplSa  Ka\  firi^ku  iiroXircIy.  Cicero  indeed  says  {Verr.  ii.  2,  2) 
that  Marcellus  'spared  the  conquered  enemies,'  and  not  only  preserved 
Syracuse  uninjured,  but  left  it  so  adorned  that  it  wiu  a  monument  of  his 
victory  and,  at  the  same  time,  of  his  clemency.  This  is  not  historical  evidence, 
but  a  rhetorical  artifice  by  which  the  orator  pressed  history  into  his  service 
and  shaped  it  according  to  his  wants.  Cicero  used  Marcellus  only  as  a  foil 
for  Verres.    His  assertion  is  of  no  force  to  contradict  Polybius. 

*  See  voL  I  p.  563. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  318 

treasures  of  Syracuse  were  so  numerous  and  so  splendid  CHAP, 

that  they  threw  into  the  shade  everything  of  the  sort  that  ^      ,   '  ,^ 

had  been  transported  to  Rome  before.     It  came  therefore  S^f™ 

to  be  a  received  tradition  that  Marcellus  was  the  first  who  212-211 
set  the  example  of  enriching  Bome,  at  the  expense  of  her 
conquered  enemies,  with  the  triumphs  of  Greek  art  J 


Fourth  Period  of  the  Hannihalian  War. 

FBOM  THE  TAKING  OP  STEACUSE  TO  THE  CAPTURE  OP 

CAPUA,  212-211  B.C. 

By  the  taking  of  Syracuse  the  war  in  Sicily  was  decided  Sarrender 
in  favour  of  the  Eomans,  but  not  by  any  means  finished.  LntSiiby 
Agrigentum  was  still  held  by  the  Carthaginians,  and  a  Mutines, 
great  number  of  Sicilian  towns  were  on  their  side.     A  piete  sub- 
Libyan  cavalry  general,  named  Mutines,  sent  to  Sicily  by  j^S**^^"  ^^ 
Hannibal,  and  operating  in  conjunction  with  Hanno  and 
Epikydes,  gave  the  Eomans  a  great  deal  of  trouble.     But 
when  Mutines  had  quarrelled  with  the  other  Carthaginian 
generals,  and  had  gone  over  to  the  Romans  in  conse- 
quence, the  fortune  of  war  inclined  more  and  more  to  the 
side  of  the  latter.     At  length,  two  years  after  the  fall  of 
Syracuse,  Mutines  betrayed  Agrigentum  to  the  Bomans. 
The  consul,  M.  Valerius  Lsevinus,  who  then  commanded 
in  Sicily,  ordered  the  leading  inhabitants  of  Agrigentum 
to  be  scourged  and  beheaded,  the  rest  to  be  sold  as  slaves, 
and  the  town  to  be  sacked.     This  severe  punishment  had 
the  eflPect  of  terrifying  the  other  towns.     Forty  of  them 
submitted  voluntarily,  twenty  were  betrayed,  and  only  six 
had  to  be  taken  by  force.'    All  resistance  to  the  Roman 
arms  in  Sicily  was  now  broken,  and  the  island  returned  to 
the  peace  and  slavery  of  a  Roman  province.     Its  principal 
task  was  henceforth  to  grow  corn  for  feeding  the  sovereign 

'  Liyy,  xxr.  40 :  '  Ceterum  inde  primum  initium  mirandi  Gnecarum  artium 
opera,  licentiteque  huic  sacra  profanaque  omnia  Tulgo  spoliandi  fitctum  est.'— 
Compare  Plntarch  (Marcell,  21). 

■  LiTy,  xxvi.  40. 


314 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Events  in 
Spain  and 
Africa. 


populace  of  the  capital,  and  to  allow  itself  to  be  plundered 
systematically  by  farmers  of  the  revenue,  traders,  usurers, 
and,  above  all,  by  the  annual  governors. 

It  was  most  fortunate  for   Borne   that,  by  the  fall  of 
Syracuse  in  212,  the  Sicilian  war  had  taken  a  favourable 
turn.     For  the  same  year  was  so  disastrous  to  them  in 
other  parts,  that  the  prospect  for  the  future  became  more 
and  more  gloomy.     In  Spain  the  two  brothers  Scipio  had, 
after  the  successful  campaign  of  215,'  continued  the  war 
in   the   following    year  with   the   same    happy    results. 
Several  battles  are  reported  for  this  year,  in  which  they 
are  said   invariably  to  have   beaten  the  Carthaginians.^ 
We  may  safely  pass  over  the  detailed  accounts  of  these 
events,  which  are  of  no  historical  value,  from  their  evident 
air  of  exaggeration,  and  on  account  of  our  ignorance  of 
the  ancient  geography  of  Spain.     Yet,  through  all  mis- 
representations, it  appeaxs  certain  that  the  war  was  con- 
tinued in  Spain,  and  that  the  Carthaginians  were  not  able 
to  carry  out  Hannibal's  plan  of  sending  an  army  across 
the  Pyrenees  and  Alps  to  co-operate  with  the  army  already 
in  Italy.     How  much  of  this  result  is  due  to  the  genius  of 
the  Boman  generals  and  to  the  bravery  of  the  Boman 
legions  it  is   impossible   to   ascertain   from   the   partial 
accounts  of  the  annalists,  who  probably  derived  their  in- 
formation chiefly  from  the  traditions  of   the  Scipionic 


»  See  p.  268. 

*  We  cannot  read  Livy*8  report  withont  the  conviction  that  a  great  portion 
of  it  rests  on  fiction  or  exaggeration.  (See  p.  275,  note  1 ;  and  Arnold,  IRat, 
of  Bome,  vi.  260-263).  The  first  alleged  victory  at  Illitnrgi  (Livy,  xxiv.  49) 
is  evidently  a  repetition  of  the  victory  related  before  (Livy,  xxiii.  18),  and 
placed  in  the  preceding  year :  the  circumstances  are  precisely  the  same ;  the 
difference  lies  only  in  the  number  of  the  slain,  of  prisoners  and  military 
finsigns  taken.  In  the  battle  of  Munda  which  now  follows,  Cn.  Scipio  is 
wounded,  and  thus  the  Carthaginians  are  saved  from  a  defeat,  but  lose,  never- 
theless, 12,000  dead,  3,000  prisoners,  and  57  military  ensigns.  In  a  third 
battle,  at  Auringis,  they  lose  about  half  as  many,  '  because,'  as  Livy  (ibid.  42) 
adds  in  explanation,  'there  were  fewer  left  to  fight'  Thereupon  they  are 
beaten  a  fourth  time,  with  a  loss  of  8,000  dead,  1,000  prisoners,  58  ensigns,  and 
XI  elephants.  If  we  add  up  tlia  numbers  given  by  Livy,  the  OarthaginiAns 
lost  in  the  two  years  215  and  214,  in  Spain,  not  less  than  80,000  men.  The 
magnificence  of  such  boasting  is  apt  to  inspire  admiration. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


815 


family.  One  cause  of  tlie  failure  of  the  Carthaginians 
lay  no  doubt  in  the  frequent  rebellions  among  the  Spanish 
tribes,  which  the  Romans  instigated  and  turned  to  their 
own  advantage.  But  the  principal  cause  was  a  war  in  Africa 
with  Syphax,  a  Numidian  chief  or  king,  which  seems  to 
have  been  very  serious,  and  which  compelled  them  to  with- 
draw Hasdrubal  and  a  part  of  their  army  from  Spain  for 
the  defence  of  their  home  territory.*  This  circumstance 
operated  most  powerfully  in  favour  of  the  Roman  arms  in 
Spain,  leaving  the  Scipios  almost  unopposed,  and  enabKng 
them  to  overrun  the  Cai'thaginian  possessions,  and  to 
obtain  a  footing  south  of  the  river  Ebro.^  In  the  year 
214,  the  Romans  took  Saguntum,  and  restored  it  as  au 
independent  allied  town  five  years  after  its  capture  by 
Hannibal.'  They  also  entered  into  relations  with  Kin«j 
Syphax.  Every  enemy  of  Carthage  was  of  course  an  ally 
of  Rome,  and  valuable  in  proportion  as  he  was  troublesome 
or  dangerous  to  Carthage.  Roman  officers  were  dispatched, 
into  Africa  to  train  the  undisciplined  soldiers  of  the 
Numidian  prince,  and  especially  to  form  an  infantry,  after 
the  Roman  model,  which  might  be  capable  of  resisting 
the  Carthaginians  in  the  field.  Such  a  task  as  this,  how- 
ever, would  have  required  more  time  than  the  Roman 
officers  coidd  devote  to  it.  It  seems  that  Syphax  derived 
no  benefit  from  the  attempt  to  turn  his  irregular  horsemen 
into  legionary  soldiers.  He  was  soon  after  in  gr^at  diffi- 
culties. The  Carthaginians  secured  the  alliance  of  another 
Numidian  chief,  called  Gula,  whose  son  Masinissa,  a  youth 
seventeen  years  old,  gave  now  the   first  evidence  of  a 

*  Appian,  vi,  15:  Kai  imh  rouSt  (the  year  217)  ol  Zio  JiKiitiwifts  rhp  iy 
*lBiilpi<f.  'k6K9iio¥  9t4<f>tpoy,  *A(r9pov$ou  tr^laiv  hfrurrparrfyovvros  fn^XP^  KapxiiZ^yiot 
li\v  bTch  ^Z6i^QKos  rov  r&v  Nofui8»y  Zwdtrrov  woXtftoifiepot  rhy  *AirZpo^^ay  Kal 
IJL4pos  rris  ovtov  ffrpartas  fiertviixi^airro.  r&y  8i  &wof>jol-ruy  ol  SfCivfcwef  ^hi^ap&s 
iKpdrow,  (Livj,  zxiv.  48).  Appi&n  altogether  passes  orer  the  battle  of 
Ibera.    See  p.  268. 

*  LiTy,  xxiv.  48. 

*  Livy  (xxiv.  42)  states  erroneously  that  Sagnntum  was  seven  years  in  the 
hands  of  the  Carthaginians.  The  capture  and  the  restoration  of  the  town  to 
the  old  inhabitants  indirectly  shows  that  it  could  not  have  been  totally 
destroyed  by  Hannibal  in  219,  as  LiTy*8  description  would  lead  us  to  believe. 


CHAP. 
VIII. 

1    — " 

TOUBTH 

Period, 
212-211 

B.O. 


316 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
JV. 


"Employ- 
ment of 
mercena- 
ries in 
Spain. 


Defeat  and 
death  of 
the  SeipioB. 


militarj  ability  and  an  ambition  destined  in  the  sequel 
to  become  most  fataFto  the  Carthaginians.  Syphax  was 
completely  defpated  and  expelled  from  his  dominions.  He 
came  to  the  Bomans  as  a  fugitive  about  the  same  time 
that  Hasdmbal,  after  the  victorious  termination  of  the 
African  war,  returned  to  Spain  with  considerable  reinforce- 
ments. 

The  fortune  of  war  now  changed  rapidly  and  deci- 
dedly. The  Scipios,  having  long  been  left  without  a  supply 
of  new  troops  from  home,  had  been  obliged  to  enrol  a 
great  number  of  Spanish  mercenaries.  Bome  now  learnt  to 
know  the  diflFerence  between  mercenaries  and  an  army  of 
citizens.^  It  was  not  indeed  the  first  time  that  such 
troops  had  been  employed.  In  the  first  Punic  war  a  body 
of  Gallic  deserters  had  been  taken  into  Roman  pay.'  The 
Cenomanians  and  other  tribes  of  Cisalpine  Gaul,  mentioned 
as  serving  on  the  Roman  side  in  the  beginning  of  the 
Hannibalian  war,  were  no  doubt  regularly  paid,  and  were, 
in  fact,  mercenaries.  So  were  of  course  the  Cretans  and 
other  Greek  troops  whom  Hiero  had  sent  as  auxiliary 
contingents  on  several  occasions.'  But  it  appears  that 
the  first  employment  of  mercenaries  on  a  large  scale,  after 
the  model  of  the  Carthaginians,  took  place  in  Spain  on 
the  present  occasion.  Where  the  Scipios  obtained  the 
means  for  paying  these  troops  we  cannot  tell.  Perhaps 
they  were  not  able  to  pay  them  punctually,  and  this 
fact  would  alone  sufiice  to  explain  their  faitUessness  and 
desertion. 

It  was  in  21 2  B.C.  that  Hasdrubal,  the  son  of  Barcas, 
after  the  defeat  of  Syphax,  returned  to  Spain.  He  found 
that  the  Roman  generals  had  divided  their  forces,  and 
were  operating  separately  in  diflFerent  parts  of  the  country. 
Their  Celtiberian  mercenaries    had  deserted  and    gone 

>  The  defeat  of  On.  Scipio  BUggeeta  to  Livy  (xxr.  33)  the  following  remark : 
'  Id  quidem  cavendnm  semper  Romanis  ducibas  erit,  exemplaque  hsec  rer^  pro 
docamentie  habenda,  ne  ita  extemis  credant  auxiliie,  nt  non  pins  sui  loboris 
tfuarumque  proprie  ririum  in  castris  habeant.' 

*  See  aboTe,  p.  102.  '  See  above,  pp.  200, 226. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


817 


home,  tempted,  it  is  said,  by  their  countrymen  who  served 
in  the  Carthaginian  army.  Thus,  weakened  by  desertion 
and  by  the  division  of  their  strength,  the  two  Scipios  were 
one  after  another  attacked  by  Hasdrubal,  and  so  thoroughly 
routed  that  hardly  a  remnant  of  their  army  escaped.* 
Publius  Cornelius  Scipio  and  his  brother  Cneius  both  fell 
at  the  head  of  their  troops.  A  poor  remnant  was  saved, 
and  made  good  its  retreat  under  the  command  of  a  brave 
officer  of  equestrian  rank,  called  L.  Marcius.^     But  almost 


CHAP. 
VIII. 

FOUBTH 

Pkbiud, 
212-211 

B.C. 


*  It  1*8  difficult  to  decide  whether  the  defeat  of  the  Scipios  took  place  in  212 
or  iu  211,  as  Livy  contradicts  himself.  The  argumeots  in  favour  of  the  year 
211  are  stAied  by  U.  Becker,  Vorarbeiten  zur  Geschichte  des  zweiten  punischen 
Krieffes,  p.  1  ?  3. 

'  Livy,  XXV.  82-40.  The  exploits  of  this  Marcius  were  the  subject  of  the 
most  impudent  and  barefaced  exaggerations.  It  was,  as  we  know  from 
numerous  examples,  a  practice  of  the  Koman  annalists  to  make  it  appear  that 
every  Roman  defeat  was  compensated  in  a  signal  manner  by  some  glorious 
victory.  This  disingenuous  vanity  is  nowhere  more  apparent  than  in  the 
boastful  report  of  the  doings  of  L.  Marcius.  Whilst  Appian  (vi.  17)  says 
that  Marcius  (whom  he  erroneously  calls  Marcellus)  accomplished  so  little 
tbit  the  Romans  were  expelled  from  almost  the  whole  of  Spain  and  shut  up 
in  a  small  district  among  the  Pyrenees,  the  annalist  Piso — according  to  Livy 
(xxv.  39) — reported  that  Marcius  turned  round  upon  the  pursuing  army  under 
Mugo,  and  killed  5,000  of  the  enemy.  Valerius  Antias  was  not  satisfied  with 
this  result.  According  to  him,  Marcius  attacked  and  took  Mago's  camp,  killed 
7,000  Carthaginians,  then  fought  a  battle  with  Hasdrubal,  killed  10,000,  and 
took  4,730  prisoners.  But  the  lies  of  Valerius  Antias  are  modest  iu  com- 
parison with  those  of  another  annalist,  called  Acilius,  whose  report  contained 
the  raw  materials  for  Livy's  elaborate  description.  The  number  of  slain 
Carthaginians,  which  was  at  first  5,000,  then  7,000  and  10,000,  is  swelled 
here  to  37,000  (in  the  account  of  Valerius  Maximus  (i.  6,  2)  even  to  38,000, 
but  what  is  a  trifie  of  1,000  men  more  or  less  ?)  and  two  Carthaginian  camps 
are  stormed  in  succession.  Such  victories,  gained  by  the  flying  remnants  of  a 
routed  army,  belong  seemingly  to  the  regions  of  the  miraculous;  but  we 
actually  meet  also  with  a  genuine  miracle,  for,  according  to  Valerius  Antias — 
quoted  by  Pliny  (Hut.  Nat.  ii.  Ill)  and  Livy  (xxv.  39) — the  head  of  Marcius, 
when  he  addressed  his  soldiers,  was  surrounded  by  a  halo.  Reading  such 
reports  as  these,  we  can  fancy  that  we  are  still  in  the  time  of  the  Samnite 
wars.  But  distance  of  locality  lends  almost  as  much  freedom  to  the  story- 
teller as  distance  of  time.  Spain,  as  we  have  already  noticed  (p.  314,  note  2), 
was  a  fruitful  soil  for  fiction.  After  this,  we  bcH^ome  very  sceptical  about  the 
genuineness  of  a  silver  shield  of  137  pounds  weight,  containing  a  portrait  of 
Hasdrubal,  which  is  said  to  have  been  preserved  in  the  Capitol  till  the  great 
cojiflagration,  84  b.c.  (Livy,  loc.  cit.  Pliny,  Hist.  Nat.  xxxv.  4).  If  such  a 
shield  existed,  could  it  have  come  from  Spain  on  the  occasion  of  the  imaginaiy 
victories  of  Marcius  ? 


318  R03IAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  the  whole  of  Spain  was  lost  to  the  Romans  at  one  blow. 

IV 

^ — *  The  war  which  they  had    vigorously  and  saccessfully 


carried  on  for  so  many  yearcf,  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 
venting a  second  invasion  of  Italy  from  Spain,  had  ended 
now  with  the  annihilation  of  almost  all  their  forces,  and 
nothing  seemed  henceforth  able  to  check  the  Carthaginian 
general,  if  he  intended  to  carry  out  the  plan  of  his 
brother. 
Opprations  The  disastrous  issue  of  the  war  in  Spain  was  the  more 
bai  in  '  alarming  as  in  the  year  212  Hannibal  again  displayed  in 
southeni  Italy  an  energy  which  vras  calculated  to  remind  the 
Romans  of  his  first  three  campaigns  after  he  had  crossed 
the  Alps  in  218.  The  year  213  had  passed  almost  as 
quietly  as  if  a  truce  had  been  concluded.  Hannibal  had 
spent  the  summer  in  the  country  of  the  Sallentinians,  not 
far  from  Tarentum,  in  the  hope  of  taking  by  surprise  or 
by  treason  that  city,  which  was  of  the  greatest  importance 
to  him  from  the  facilities  which  it  aflForded  for  direct 
communication  with  Macedonia.  He  obtained  possession 
of  several  small  towns  in  the  neighbotu*hood ;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  he  lost  again  Consentia  and  Taurianum  in 
Bruttium,  while  a  few  insignificant  places  in  Lucania  were 
taken  by  the  consul  Tiberius  Sempronius  Gracchus.*  On 
this  occasion  we  learn  incidentally  that  Borne  allowed  at 
that  time,  or  rather  encouraged,  a  kind  of  guerilla  warfare 
of  volunteers,  not  unlike  privateering  in  naval  wars,  which 
must  have  contributed  largely  to  brutalize  the  population. 
A  certain  Roman  knight  and  contractor,  called  T.  Pom- 
ponius  Veientanus,  commanded  a  body  of  irregulars  in 
Bruttium,  pillaging  and  devastating  those  communities 
which  had  joined  the  Carthaginian  side.  He  was  joined 
by  a  lai^e  number  of  runaway  slaves,  herdsmen,  and 
peasants,  and  he  had  formed  something  like  an  army, 
which,  without  costing  the  republic  anything,  did  good 
service  in  damaging  and  harassing  her  enemies.  But  this 
mob  was  not  fit  to  encounter  a  Carthaginian  army,  and  it 

'  Livy,  xxy.  1. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  819 

was  accordingly  an  easy  task  for  Hanno,  who  commanded     CHAP, 
in  these  parts,  to  capture  or  cut  to  pieces  the  whole  band.   -_    ,  '.- 
Pomponius    was    taken    prisoner,   and    it  was    perhaps     |«^^™ 
fortunate  for  him  that  he  thus  escaped  the  vengeance  of    212-211 
his  countrymen,  whose  curses  he  had  richly  deserved,  not       **^' 
only  by  his  incompetence  as  an  officer,  but  much  more 
by  the  rascality  with  which  he,  in  conjunction  with  other 
contractors,  had  robbed  the  public  and  jeopardized  the 
safety  of  the  state. 

It  now  became  evident  that  the  apparently  self-denying  Dishonesty 
patriotism  of  which,  two  years  before,  several  large  capital-  coiSw-*° 
ists  had  made  an  ostentatious  display,  was  nothing  but  a  ton. 
cover  for  the  meanest  rapacity,  selfishness,  and  dishonesty. 
The  ungovernable  craving  for  wealth  which  at  all  times 
possessed  the  great  men  of  Rome,  joined  with  their  utter 
contempt  of  right — the  two  great  evils  which  the  Gracchi 
in  vain  endeavoured  to  check — show  themselves  for  the 
first  time  with  great  distinctness  in  the  trial  of  the  con- 
tractor M.  Postumius  Pyrgensis  and  his  fellow-conspirators 
in  the  beginning  of  the  year  212  b.o. 

This  Postumius,  like  the  just-mentioned  Pomponius,  Trial  of  M. 
was  a  member  of  a  joint-stock  company,  which  in  215  had  pm^^^ 
oflFered  to  furnish,  on  credit,  the  materials  of  war  necessary 
for  the  army  in  Spain,  on  condition  that  the  government 
should  insure  them  against  sea  risks.'      Since  then  the 
pretended  patriots  had  been  discovered  to  be  common 
rogues  and  villains.      They  had  laden  old  vessels  with 
worthless  articles,  had  scuttled  and  abandoned  them  at 
sea,  and  then  claimed  compensation  for  the  alleged  full 
value.     This  act  was  not  merely  an  ordinary  fraud  on  the 
public  purse,  but  a  crime  of  the  gravest  nature,  inasmuch 
as  it  endangered  the  safeiy  of  the  army  in  Spain.     In- 
formation of  it  had  been  given  as  early  as  the  year  213; 
but,  as  Livy*  assures  us,  the  senate  did  not  venture  at 
once  to  proceed  against  the  men  whose  wealth  gave  them 

>  See  p.  288. 

•  Livy,  XXV,  8 :  *  quia  patres  oidinem  publicanorum  in  tali  tempore  offensum 
nolebant/ 


320 


BOMAN  HISTOEY. 


BOOK      an   overpowering    influence    in  the    state.      Pomponius 

*- r^ — '   accordingly  remained  not  only  unpunished,  but  was  even 

appointed  to  a  sort  of  military  command,  and  allowed  to 
carry  on  a  predatory  war  on  his  own  account  and  for  his 
own  profit.     We  can  easily  understand  that  men  of  such, 
reckless  audacity  and  so  unprincipled  as  Pomponius,  who 
commanded  bands  of  armed  ruffians,  could  not  easily  be 
punished  like  common  oflFenders.     Yet  after  Pomponius 
had  fallen  into  captivity,  and  his  band  was  annihilated, 
the  government  plucked  up  courage  to  call  his  accomplices 
to  account  for  their  misdeeds.     Two  tribunes  of  the  people, 
Spurius  Carvilius  and  Lucius  Carvilius,  impeached  Pos- 
tumius  before  the  assembly  of  tribes.     The  people  were 
highly  incensed.     Nobody  ventured  to  plead  in  favour  of 
the  accused ;  even  the  tribune  C.  Servilius  Casca,  a  relative 
of  Postumius,  was  kept  by  fear  and  shame  from  interceding. 
The   accused  now  ventured   upon   an   act   which   seems 
almost  incredible,  and  which  shows  to  what  an  extent,  even 
at  the  best  time  of  the  republic,  the  internal  order  and 
the  public  peace  were  at  the  mercy  of  any  band  of  de- 
sperate villains  who  ventured  to  set  the  law  at  defiance. 
The  Capitol,  where  the  tribes  were  just  about  to  give  their 
votes,  was  invaded  by  a  mob,  which  created  such  an  uproar 
that  acts  of  violence  would  have  been  committed  if  the 
tribunes,  yielding  to  the  storm,  had  not  broken  up  the 
assembly. 
Condem-         This  triumph  of  lawlessness  over  the  established  order 
Postumius    ^f  *^®  state  was  a  temporary  success  which  carried  the 
and  his       anarchical  party  beyond  their  real  strength.     Bome  was 
plices.         not  yet  so  degenerate  that  a  permanent  terrorism  could 
be  established  by  the  audacity  of  some  rich  and  influential 
malefactors.     It  was  rather  an  outbreak  of  madness  than 
a  deliberate  act  which  prompted  Postumius  and  his  ac- 
complices to  resist  the  authority  of  the  Roman  people  and 
its  lawful  magistrates.     They  were  far  from  forming   a 
political  party,  or  from  finding  men  in  the  senate  or  in 
the  popular  assembly  who  would  venture  to  defend  or  even 
to  excuse  them.      Their  vile  frauds   were  now  a  small 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  321 

offence  compared    with  their  attempt    to  outrage    the     chap. 
majesty  of  the  Eoman  people.    The  tribunes  dropped  the   -     ^'  .- 
minor  charge,  and,  instead  of  asking  the  people  to  inflict  a    ^o^^™ 
fine,  insisted  upon  a  capital  punishment.     Fostumius  for*     212-211 
feited  his  baU,  and  escaped  from  Itome.     The  punishment       "'^* 
of  exile  was  formally  pronounced  against  him,  and  all 
his  property  was   confiscated.     All  participators   in  the 
outrage  were  punished  with  the  same  severity,  and  thus 
the  offended  majesty  of  the  Boman  people  was  fiilly  and 
promptly  vindicated.^ 

The  villany  of  the  Soman  publicani,  who  abused  the  Roman 
necessities  of  the  state  to  enrich  themselves,  and  whose  ®*^'°v^ 

^  moralitj. 

criminal  rapacity  endangered  the  safety  of  the  troops  in 
Spain,  is  not  without  parallels  in  history,  and  has  been 
equalled  or  surpassed  in  modem  Europe,  as  well  as  in 
America  during  the  late  civil  war.  We  must  not,  there- 
fore, be  too  harsh  in  our  judgment,  or  too  sweeping  in  our 
condemnation  of  the  Soman  people  among  whom  such 
swindlers  could  prosper.  But  we  shall  do  well  to  remem- 
ber infamous  acts  like  these,  when  we  hear  the  fulsome 
praise  often  lavished  on  the  civic  virtue,  the  self-denial, 
and  the  devotion  of  the  Itoman  people  in  the  service  of 
the  state.  The  moral  and  religious  elements  of  the  com- 
munity must  have  been  deeply  tainted  if,  in  the  very  midst 
of  the  HannibaUan  war,  in  the  agonizing  struggle  for  exis- 
tence, a  great  number  of  men  could  be  found  among  the 
influential  classes  so  utterly  void  of  patriotic  feeling  and 
conscientiousness,  so  hardened  against  public  indignation, 
so  careless  of  just  retribution. 

Not  only  public  morality,  but  also  the  religion  of  the  Growth  of 
Romans,  felt  the  injurious  effect  of  the  protracted  war.  superaii- 
It  seemed  that  men  gradually  lost  confldence  in  their  Rome, 
native  gods.   All  the  prayers,  vows,  processions,  sacrifices, 
and  offerings,  all  the  festivals  and  sacred  games  which 
had  been  celebrated  on  the  direct  injunction  of  the  priests, 
had  proved  to  be  of  no  avail.     Either  the  ancestral  gods 

*  liyy,  XXV.  4. 
VOL.  II.  T 


322  '  KOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     had  forsaken  the  town,  or  they  were  powerless  against 
^ — r^ — '  the  decrees  of  fate.    In  their  despair  the  people  turned 


towards  strange  gods.  The  number  of  the  superstitious 
was  swelled  by  a  mass  of  impoverished  peasants,  who  had 
left  their  wasted  fields  and  burnt  homesteads  to  find 
support  and  protection  in  the  capital.^  The  streets 
swarmed  with  foreign  priests,  soothsayers,  and  religious 
impostors,  who  no  longer  secretly,  but  openly,  carried  on 
their  trade,  and  profited  by  the  fear  and  ignorance  of  the 
multitude.  Such  a  neglect  of  the  national  religion  was, 
in  the  eyes  of  every  community  in  the  ancient  world,  a 
kind  of  treason,  which,  if  tolerated,  would  have  brought 
about  the  most  fatal  consequences.  No  nation  of  antiquity 
rose  to  the  conception  of  a  God  common  to  the  human 
race.  Every  people,  every  political  society,  had  its  own 
special  protecting  deity,  distinct  from  the  deity  of  the 
next  neighbour  and  hostile  to  the  gods  of  the  national 
enemy.  It  was  of  the  utmost  importance  that  all  citizens 
should  combine  in  duly  worshipping  those  powers  who,  in 
consideration  of  uninterrupted  worship,  vouchsafed  to  grant 
their  protection,  and  who  were  jealous  of  the  admission 
of  foreign  rivals-  It  was  therefore  a  sure  sign  of  national 
decay  if  a  people  began  to  lose  confidence  in  their  own 
paternal  religion,  and  turned  hopefuUy  to  the  gods  of  their 
neighbours.  The  Roman  government  began  to  be  alarmed. 
The  senate  commissioned  the  magistrates  to  interfere. 
Not  the  priests  or  pontifices,  who  might  be  expected  to  be 
more  directly  concerned  in  upholding  the  purity  of  religion, 
but  a  civil  magistrate — the  prsetor — caused  the  town  to  be 
cleared  of  all  the  foreign  rituals,  prayers,  and  oracles*;  and 
it  appears  that  the  people  submitted  to  this  interference 
as  to  a  legitimate  exercise  of  civil  authority,  just  as  they 
submitted  to  the  burdens  of  the  war. 
Levying  of  The  condemnation  of  Postumius  took  place  in  the 
beginning  of  the  year  212,  about  the  time  of  the  consular 
elections,  which   placed   Quintus    Tulvius    Flaccus    and 

'  Livj,  XXV.  1. 


new 
legions. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  823 

Appius  Claudius  Pulcher  at  the  head  of  the  goyenunent.     CHAP. 
Great  difficulties  had  now  been  regularly  experienced  for  v- — ,   -^ 
some  time  past  in  the  conscription  of  recruits  for  the  army,     f!^^^™ 
The  number  of  twenty-three  legions  was,  however,  completed    21 2-21 1 
for  the  impending  campaign,^  and  even  this  enormous  force 
proved  by  no  means  too  large.     In  spite  of  the  taking  of 
Syracuse,  the  year  212  was  destined  to  be  one  of  the  most 
disastrous  for  the  Romans  in  the  whole  course  of  the  war. 

The  first  calamity  was  the  loss  of  Tarentum,  which  took  Snnender 
place  even  before  the  opening  of  the  campaign.  The  t^^**' 
Itomans  had  been  themselves  the  cause  of  it  through  their  HanniUl. 
short-sighted  cruelty.  A  number  of  hostages  of  Tarentum 
and  Thurii,  detained  at  Bome,  had  made  an  attempt  to 
escape,  but  were  seized  at  Terracina,  brought  back  to 
Bome,  and  tortured  to  death  as  traitors.  By  this  act  the 
Bomans  had  themselves  cut  the  bonds  which  had  thus  far 
held  the  Tarentines  in  their  allegiance.  It  was  a  pro- 
ceeding intended  to  inspire  terror,  like  the  massacre  of 
Enna ;  but,  like  this,  it  produced  the  opposite  effect,  by  en- 
gendering only  a  feeling  of  revenge  and  implacable  hatred. 
A  conspiracy  was  immediately  formed  at  Tarentum  for 
betrajring  the  town  to  Hannibal.  Nikon  and  Philodemos,  the 
chiefs  of  the  conspirators,  under  the  pretence  of  going  out 
on  hunting  expeditions,  found  means  of  seeing  Hannibal, 
who  still  tarried  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Tarentum ; 
they  concluded  a  formal  treaty  with  him,  stipulated  that 
their  town  should  be  free  and  independent,  and  that  the 
house  of  no  Tarentine  citizen  should  be  plundered  by  the 
Carthaginian  troops.  The  situation  of  Tarentum  is  known 
from  the  history  of  the  first  war  with  Rome.*  On  the 
eastern  side  of  the  town,  where  the  narrow  peninsula  on 
which  it  lay  was  joined  to  the  mainland,  a  large  open 
space  within  the  walls  formed  the  public  burial-ground. 
In  this  lonely  place  Nikon  and  some  of  his  fellow-con- 
spirators hid  themselves  on  a  night  previously  fixed  upon, 
and  waited  for  a  fire  signal,  which  Hannibal  had  promised 

»  Livy,  xanr.  3,  6.  *  See  toI.  1.  p.  486. 

T  2 


324  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     to  give  as  soon  as  he  had  readied  the  neighbourhood.  When 
they  saw  the  signal  they  fell  upon  the  guards  at  a  gate,  cut 


down  the  Roman  soldiers,  and  admitted  a  troop  of  Gauls 
and  Numidians  into  the  town.  At  the  same  moment  Philo- 
demos,  pretending  to  return  from  hunting,  presented  him- 
self before  the  postern  of  another  gate,  whose  guards  had 
been  accustomed,  for  some  time  past,  to  open  when  they 
heard  his  whistle.  Two  men  who  were  with  him  carried  a 
huge  boar.  The  guard,  whilst  admiring  and  feeling  the 
animal,  was  instantly  pierced  by  the  spear  of  Philodemos. 
About  thirty  men  were  ready  outside.  They  entered  by  the 
postern-gate,  killed  the  other  guards,  opened  the  main 
gates,  and  admitted  a  whole  column  of  Libyans,  who 
advanced  in  regular  order,  under  the  guidance  of  the 
conspirators,  towards  the  market-place.  On  both  points 
the  enterprise  had  succeeded,  and  the  empty  space  be- 
tween the  walls  and  the  town  was  soon  filled  with  Han- 
nibal's soldiers.  The  Roman  garrison  had  not  received 
the  slightest  warning.  The  commanding  officer,  M.  Livius 
Macatus,  an  indolent,  self-indulgent  man,  had  been 
spending  the  evening  in  revelry,  and  was  in  his  bed, 
overpowered  with  wine  and  sleep,  when  the  stillness 
of  the  night  was  broken  by  the  noise  of  arms  and  by  a 
strange  sound  of  Roman  trumpets.  The  conspirators  had 
procured  some  of  these  trumpets,  and,  although  they  blew 
them  very  unskilfully,  they  yet  succeeded  in  drawing  the 
Roman  soldiers,  who  were  quartered  in  all  parts  of  the 
town,  into  the  streets  just  as  Hannibal  was  advancing  in 
three  columns.  Thus  a  great  number  of  Romans  were  cut 
down  in  the  first  confusion  and  disorder,  without  being 
able  to  make  any  resistance,  and  almost  without  knowing 
what  the  tumult  was  all  about.  A  few  reached  the 
citadel,  and  among  them  was  the  commander  Livius,  who 
at  the  first  alarm  had  rushed  to  the  harbour  and  succeeded 
in  jumping  into  a  boat. 
Proclama-  When  the  morning  dawned,  the  whole  of  Tarentum, 
Hainfbal  ^^^^  ^^®  exception  of  the  citadel,  was  in  Hannibal's  hands. 
to  the         He  caused  the  Tarentines  to  be  called  to  an  assembly,  and 

Tarentines.  ^ 


^m 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  325 

made  known  to  them  that  they  had  nothingr  to  fear  for     CHAP. 

VIII 

themselves  and  their  families ;  on  the  contrary,  that  he  -_    ,  '  ^ 
had  come  to  deliver  them  from  the  Eoman  yoke.     Only    p°^fj^ 
the  houses  and  the  property  of  the  Bomans  were  given  np    212-211 
to  plimder.     Every  house  marked  as  the  property  of  a 
citizen  of  Tarentum  was  to  be   spared;  but  those  who 
made  a  false   statement   were  threatened  with  capital 
punishment     Probably  the   Eomans  were   quartered  in 
houses   of  their  own,   or  in  houses  of  men  who  were 
partisans  of  Bome.     The  latter  were  now  made  to  suffer 
for  their  attachment  to  Eome,  which  was  a  crime  in  the 
eyes  of  their  political  opponents. 

The  citadel  of  Tarentum  being  situated  on  a  hill  Siege  o^ 
of  small  elevation  at  the  western  extremity  of  the  of  Taren^ 
tongue  of  land  occupied  by  the  town,  could  only  be  ^™- 
taken  by  a  regular  siege,  and  such  a  siege  was  hopeless 
without  the  co-operation  of  the  fleet.  In  order,  therefore, 
to  secure  the  town  in  the  meantime  from  any  attacks  of 
the  Eoman  garrison,  Hannibal  caused  a  line  of  defences, 
consisting  of  a  ditch,  mound,  and  wall,  to  be  made 
between  the  citadel  and  the  town.  The  Eomans  attempted 
to  inteiTupt  the  work.  Hannibal  encouraged  them  by  a 
simulated  flight  of  his  men,  and  when  he  had  drawn  them 
far  enough  into  the  town,  attacked  them  from  all  sides, 
and  drove  them  back  into  the  citadel  with  great  slaughter. 
The  Eoman  garrison  was  now  so  much  reduced  that 
Hannibal  hoped  to  be  able  to  take  the  citadel  by  force, 
and  he  prepared  a  regular  assault  by  erecting  the  necessary 
machines.  But  the  Eomans,  reinforced  by  the  garrison 
of  Metapontum,  sallied  forth  in  the  night,  and  destroying 
Hannibal's  siege-works,  compelled  him  to  desist  from  his 
enterprise.  Thus  the  citadel  of  Tarentum  remained  in 
the  possession  of  the  Eomans ;  and  as  it  commanded  the 
entrance  to  the  harbour,  the  ships  of  the  Tarentines 
would  have  been  locked  up,  if  Hannibal  had  not  contrived 
to  drag  them  across  the  tongue  of  land  on  which  the  town 
lay,  right  through  the  streets  running  from  the  inner 
harbour  to  the  open  sea.      The  Tarentine  fleet  was  now 


326  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     able  to  blockade  the  citadel,  whilst  a  wall  and  ditch  closed 

IV 

^,  ,  '_^  up  the  land  side.  The  possession  of  the  citadel  was 
of  the  greatest  importance  to  both  belligerents.  The 
Bomans  therefore  made  strenuoius  efforts  to  defend  it. 
They  dispatched  the  prsetor  P.  Cornelius  with  a  few 
ships  laden  with  com  for  the  supply  of  the  garrison,  and 
Cornelius,  evading  the  vigilance  of  the  blockading  squadron, 
succeeded  in  reaching  his  destination.  Thus  Hannibal's 
hope  of  reducing  the  fortress  by  famine  was  deferred,  and 
the  Tarentines  could  do  no  more  than  watch  the  Itoman 
garrison  and  keep  it  in  check. 
Alliance  of  The  example  of  Tarentum  was  soon  followed  by 
Greek  Metapontum — ^from  which  the  Boman  garrison  had  been 
CTties  with  withdrawn — by  Thurii— out  of  revenge  for  the  murdered 
hostages — and  by  Heraclea.'  Thus  the  Bomans  lost  by 
their  own  fault  these  Greek  towns,  which  had  remained 
faithful  to  them  for  so  many  years  after  the  battle  of 
Cannse.  The  only  towns  that  stood  out  against  Carthage 
were  Bhegium  and  Elea  (Velia),  with  Posidonia  or 
Psestum — ^which  in  268  had  become  a  Boman  colonv — and 
Neapolis  in  Campania.^  Hannibal  had  reason  to  be 
satisfied  with  the  first  results  of  the  campaign  of  212. 
Leaving  a  small  garrison  in  Tarentum,  he  now  turned 
northwards. 
Roman  Three  years  had  passed  since  Capua  had  revolted  to  the 

designs  , 

against  Carthaginians.  Bome  had  succeeded  in  preventing  the 
Capua,  other  larger  towns  of  Campania  from  following  her  ex- 
ample. Nola,  Neapolis,  Cumse,  Puteoli  had  remained  faith- 
ful and  were  safe ;  Casilinum  had  been  retaken ;  and  Capua 
was  hemmed  in  on  all  sides,  partly  by  these  towns,  partly 
by  fortified  Boman  camps.  The  time  was  approaching 
when  the  attempt  could  be  made  to  retake  Capua.  This 
was  now  the  principal  aim  of  the  Bomans  in  Italy,  and 
the  defection  of  the  Greek  towns,  so  far  from  inducing 
them  to  give  up  this  plan,  contributed  rather  to  confirm 
them  in  it.     If  Capua  could  be  re-conquered  and  severely 

*  Appian,  vii.  36.  *  Livy,  xxri.  39. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  827 

punished,  they  might  hope  to  put  an  end  to  all  further     CHAP, 
attempts  at  revolt  on  the  part  of  their  allies,  and  they  >_..,„-l^ 
would  have  destroyed  the  prestige  of  Hannibal  and  the    |'ou»™ 
confidence  which  the  Italians  might  be  tempted  to  place    212-211 
in  the  power  and  protection  of  Carthage.  ^'^' 

Since  their  defection  the  Capuans  had  had  little  cause  Condition 
to  approve  the  bold  step  which  they  had  taken  and  to  <>^^*P^- 
rejoice  over  the  results.  K  at  any  time  they  had  really 
entertained  the  hope  of  obtaining  the  dominion  over  Italy 
in  the  place  of  Borne,  they  were  soon  disabused  of  so  vain 
a  notion.  They  had  not  been  able  even  to  subject  the 
towns  of  Campania,  or  to  induce  them  to  enter  into  the 
alliance  of  Carthage,  and  as,  in  consequence  of  their  own 
defection,  Campania  had  become  the  principal  theatre  of 
war,  they  saw  themselves  exposed  to  the  unremitting 
attacks  of  the  Romans.  Whenever  Hannibal  left  Cam- 
pania, the  Boman  armies  approached  the  town  from  all 
sides,  returning  immediately  into  their  strong  positions 
as  soon  as  Hannibal  drew  near.  Such  a  war  as  this,  while 
it  drained  the  resources  of  the  country,  and  interfered  with 
the  regular  tillage  of  the  land  and  the  commercial  inter- 
course with  her  neighbours,  could  not  fail  soon  to  reduce 
to  distress  a  tov^n  whose  wealth  consisted  chiefly  in  the 
produce  of  her  fruitful  soil.  People  began  to  repent  the 
step  which  they  had  taken.  There  had  always  been  a 
Boman  party  at  Capua.  With  the  continued  pressure  of 
the  war,  which  this  party  had  endeavoured  to  prevent,  the 
split  among  the  Capuan  citizens  became  wider  every  day. 
As  early  as  the  year  213  we  hear  of  a  body  of  one  hundred 
and  twelve  Capuan  horsemen  deserting  to  the  Bomans 
with  all  their  arms  and  accoutrements.^  Moreover  the 
three  hundred  horsemen  who  had  been  serving  in  Sicily 
at  the  time  of  the  revolt  of  their  native  town,  and  who 
were  looked  upon  in  the  light  of  hostages,  abjured  tjieir 
allegiance  to  the  revolutionary  government  of  Capua,  and 
were  admitted  as  Boman  citizens  to  the   ftdl  franchise. 

*  Idvy,  xxiv.  47. 


328  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     Even  if  the  Carthaginian  garrison  was  not  found  irksome 


IV. 


and  onerous  to  the  people  of  Capua,  it  was  natural  that  a 
revulsion  of  feeling  should  take  place  among  them. 
Request  of  j^  the  beginning  of  the  year  212  the  Capuans  perceived 
puans  to  that  the  Romans  were  about  to  draw  the  net  round  them. 
for°u^-*^  As  the  populous  town  was  not  supplied  with  provisions  to 
plies.  resist  a  long  siege,  they  sent  in  all  haste  to  Hannibal,  who 

was  at  that  time  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Tarentum,  and 
conjured  him  to  come  to  their  aid.  In  truth  Hannibal's 
task  was  not  easy.  Being  stationed  at  one  extremity  of 
the  hostile  country,  and  fuUy  occupied  in  the  enterprise 
against  a  strong  and  important  city  ;  having  to  bestow  his 
constant  attention  to  the  feeding  and  recruiting  of  his  army; 
called  upon  to  defend  a  number  of  allies,  more  trouble- 
some than  useful  to  him ;  obliged,  moreover,  to  survey  and 
conduct  the  whole  war  in  Italy,  Spain,  and  Sicily,  to  advise 
the  home  government,  to  urge  on  the  tardy  resolutions 
of  his  ally  the  king  of  Macedonia — he  was  now  required 
to  provide  for  the  victualling  of  Capua.  The  supplies 
with  which  this  could  be  eflfected  he  was  not  able  to  send 
for  from  Africa,  and  to  direct  by  a  safe  and  easy  road  to 
the  threatened  town.  They  had  to  be  collected  in  Italy 
by  violence,  or  by  the  good  services  of  exhausted  allies ; 
and,  being  collected,  they  had  to  be  conveyed  by  land,  on 
bad  and  difficult  roads,  past  hostile  armies  and  fortresses. 
Capture  of  In  Spite  of  all  these  difficulties,  if  Hannibal  had  been 
voys^op  ^^^®  personally  to  undertake  this  task,  it  would  have  suc- 
Capua  by  ceeded  without  any  doubt,  for  wherever  he  appeared  the 
Bomans  slunk  back  into  their  hiding-places.  But  he  was 
not  able  to  leave  Tarentum,  and  therefore  intrusted  the 
victualling  of  Capua  to  Hanno,  who  commanded  in  Brut- 
tium«  Hanno  too  was  an  able  general.  He  collected  the 
supplies  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Beneventum,  and  if  the 
Capuans  had  equalled  him  in  energy  and  dispatch,  and 
had  furnished  means  of  transport  in  sufficient  quantity 
and  in  proper  time,  the  hard  problem  would  have  been 
solved  before  any  Roman  force  would  have  had  time  to 
interfere.     But,  owing  to  the  remissness  of  the  Capuans, 


the  Ro- 
mans. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  829 

a  delay  took  place.     The  Roman  colonists  of  Beneventum     CHAP, 
informed  the  consul  Q.  Fulvius  Flaccus,  at  Bovianum,  that  .   ^™'  . 
large  supplies  were  being  brought  together  near  their  town.     Fourth 
Fulvius  hastened  to  the  spot,  and,  during  the  temporary    212-211 
absence  of  Hanno,  attacked  the  camp,  filled  and  encum-       ®•^■ 
bered  with  2,000  waggons,  an  immense  train  of  cattle  and 
a  great  number  of  drivers  and  other  non-combatants.   The 
whole  convoy  was  taken.'     We  are  not  informed  if  Han- 
nibal succeeded  afterwards  in  repairing  this  loss  and  in 
sending  the  necessary  supplies  to  Capua.     But  this  seems 
highly  probable,  as  otherwise  we  could  hardly  explain  the 
long  duration  of  the  siege.     Moreover  Hannibal  himself 
appeared  soon  after  in  Campania,  and  entered  Capua ;  so 
that  if  he  brought  a  new  supply  of  provisions,  the  Romans 
at  any  rate  were  not  able  to  intercept  it  a  second  time. 
He  had  sent  a  body  of  2,000  horse  in  advance,  who  fell 
upon  and  routed  the  Romans  with  great  loss    as  they 
were  engaged  in  ravaging,  according  to  their  custom,  the 
neighbourhood  of  Capua.^  When  Hannibal  appeared  him- 
self and  offered  battle,'  the  two  consuls,  Fulvius  Flaccus 
and  Appius  Claudius,  instead  of  proceeding  with  the  siege 
of  Capua,   retired  hastily,   the  one  to  Cumse,  the  other 
into  Lucania.     Capua  this  time  was  delivered,  and  Han- 
nibal was  at  leisure  to  turn  southwards  once  more. 

Since  the  campaign  of  215  B.C.,  Tiberius  Sempronius  Defeat  and 
Gracchus  had,  with  his  army  of  liberated  slaves,  commanded  g^^^j^ 
in  Lucania,  and  had  been  on  the  whole  successful.     A  nius .« 
portion  of  the  Lucanians  had  remained  faithful  to  Rome. 
These  and  the  slave  legions  carried  on  a  kind  of  civil  war 
against  the  revolted  Lucanians.     The  Roman  general  was 
now  doomed  to  experience  the  faithlessness  of  the  Luca- 
nian   national  character,   to  which    King  Alexander  of 

'  Livy,  XXV.  14. 

*  Livy  (xxT.  18)  confesses  a  loss  of  1,500  men. 

^  Liyy  (xxy.  19)  relates  that  the  two  armies  were  actually  engaged,  but  that 
the  battle  was  soon  after  broken  o£f  on  both  sides,  because  during  the  engage- 
ment a  body  of  Boman  cavalry  appeared  in  the  distance,  and  was  mistaken  by 
Hannibal,  as  well  as  by  the  Romans,  for  a  reinforcement  of  the  enemy.  If  this 
report  is  true,  it  seems  strange  that  the  Romans  did  not  accept  battle  afterwards, 
when  they  found  out  their  error. 


Gracchus. 


330 


ROMAN  mSTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Total 
defeat  of 
Fulvius  in 
Apulia. 


Relative 
position  of 
Hannibal 
and  the 
Romana. 


Epirus  had  fallen  a  victim.^  He  was  drawn  into  an  am- 
bush bj  a  Lucanian  of  the  Roman  party,  and  cut  down. 
His  army  was  dissolved  at  his  death.  The  slaves,  liberated 
by  him,  did  not  consider  themselves  bound  to  obey  any- 
other  leader,  and  dispersed  immediately.  The  cavalry- 
alone  remained,  under  the  qusestor  Cn.  Cornelius.  It 
seems,  however,  that  some  slaves  were  collected  again  by 
the  centurion  M.  Centenius,  whom  the  senate  had  sent 
into  Lucania  with  8,000  men,  in  order  to  carry  on  a  war 
of  rapine  against  the  revolted  Lucanians,  as  Pomponius 
had  done  in  Bruttium.  This  Centenius  had  almost 
doubled  his  army  by  collecting  volunteers,  when — ^unfor- 
tunately for  him — he  encountered  Hannibal,  and  was  so 
utterly  defeated  in  this  unequal  contest  that  hardly  one 
thousand  of  his  men  escaped. 

Afber  this  easy  victory,  Hannibal  hastened  into  Apulia, 
where  the  praetor  Cneius  Fulvius,  the  consul's  brother, 
commanded  two  legions.  At  Herdonea  Fulvius  ventured, 
or  was  compelled,  to  offer  battle  to  the  dreaded  Punian, 
and  paid  for  his  rashness  by  the  loss  of  his  army  and 
camp.  Livy  reports  that  no  more  than  2,000  men  escaped 
out  of  18,000.*  It  was  a  victory  which  resembled  the 
days  of  the  Trebia,  the  Thrasymenus,  and  the  Aufidus,  and 
Bome  witnessed  again  such  scenes  of  consternation  and 
terror  as  had  followed  those  great  national  disasters. 

Thus  had  Hannibal  in  the  course  of  the  year  212  made 
himself  again  terrible  to  the  Bomans,  in  a  manner  which 
could  hardly  be  expected  after  his  comparative  inactivity 
during  the  last  three  years.  He  had  taken  Tarentum, 
destroyed  two  Boman  armies,  and  dispersed  a  third.  Apulia 
and  Lucania  were  cleared  of  Boman  troops;  the  Greek 
cities  south  of  Naples,  with  the  exception  of  Bhegium  and 
Velia,  were  held  by  the  Carthaginians.  The  weight  of 
these  disasters  was  increased  by  the  defeat  and  death  of 
the  two  Scipios  in  Spain,  and  the  loss  of  all  the  terri- 
tory and  the  advantages  which  had  been  gained  in  five 


1  See  Tol.  i.  p.  380. 


•  Livy,  XXV.  21. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  831 

campaigns.   In  Sicily  tlie  war  continued,  even  after  the  fall     CHAP, 
of  Syracuse ;  and  the  Carthaginians,  or  their  allies,  were 


in  possession  of  a  great  portion  of  the  island.  Borne  was  f  ^^^ 
nearly  exhaiusted,  and  yet  the  demands  made  upon  the  212-211 
people  went  on  increasing  year  after  year.  The  govern-  ^'^' 
ment  found  it  more  and  more  difficult  to  raise  money  for 
the  public  treasury  and  men  for  the  legions.  Nor  was  it 
the  material  resources  alone  that  began  to  fail.  Ah*eady 
many  thousands  of  citizens  of  the  military  age  had  evaded 
the  service,  and  it  had  become  necessary  to  proceed 
against  them  with  the  utmost  severity  and  to  press  them 
into  the  legions.  The  villany  of  the  army  purveyors 
exposed  the  troops  to  want  and  privations.  One  hope  after 
another  seemed  to  vanish ;  every  resource  appeared  to  fail 
at  last ;  and  not  a  single  great  man  had  as  yet  appeared, 
whom  the  struggling  republic  might  oppose  as  a  worthy 
antagonist  to  Hannibal.  The  Roman  generals  rose  nowhere 
above  mediocrity,  and  not  one  of  them  had  been  inspired 
by  genius  to  venture  beyond  the  beaten  paths  of  routine. 

Nevertheless  the  Eoman  people  did  not  despair.     They  Resolution 
continued  the  struggle  without  a  thought  of  yielding,  of  ^^^ 
reconciliation,  or  of  peace.    Every  sentiment  was  repressed  people, 
which  was  not  a  spur  to  perseverance  and  which  did  not 
intensify  the  power  of  resistance.    All  the  pleasures  of 
life,  and  aU  possessiona,  to  which  Soman  hearts  clung  so 
tenaciously,  were  cheerfully  sacrificed  for  the  public  weal. 
The  bonds  of  family,  of  friendship,  of  social  circles  were 
severed  at  the  call  of  duty.     All  thoughts,  wishes,  and 
actions  of  the  nation  tended  to  one  common  end — the 
overthrow  of  the  national  enemy ;  and  it  was  this  unani- 
mity, this  perseverance,  which  secured  a  final  triumph. 

No  sooner  had  Hannibal  left  Campania,  and  marched  Siege  of 
southwards,  than  the  Roman  armies  returned  to  their 
former  position  before  Capua.  The  two  consuls,  Appius 
Claudius  Pulcher  and  Q.  Fulvius  Tlaccus,  each  with  two 
legions,  and  the  prsetor  C.  Claudius  Nero,  with  an  equal 
force,  advanced  from  three  different  points  towards  the 
doomed  town,  and  began  to  surround  it  with  a  double  line 


332  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  of  circumvallation,  consistincr  each  of  a  continuous  ditch 
IV  ... 

—    . ' '  and  mound.     The  inner  and  smaller  circle  was  intended 


to  keep  the  besieged  within  their  walls ;  the  outer  line 
was  a  defence  against  any  army  that  might  come  to  the 
relief  of  the  town.     In  the  space  between  the  two  concen- 
tric circles,  camps  were  erected  for  an  army  of  60,000 
men.     It  was  not  the  intention  of  the  Eomans  to  take  the 
town  by  storm.     They  relied  on  the  slow  but  sure  effects 
of  hunger,  which,  in  spite  of  any  amotmt  of  collected  pro- 
visions, could  not  fail  to  make  itself  soon  felt  in  a  populous 
town  completely  cut  off  from  without.     The  wants  of  the 
besieging  army  were   amply  provided    for.      The   chief 
magazine  was  established  in  the  important  town  of  Casi- 
linum  on  the  Voltumus.     At  the  mouth  of  this  river  a 
fort  had  been  erected,  and  to  this  place,  as  well  as  to  the 
neighbouring  town  of  Puteoli,  provisions  were  sent  by 
sea  from  Etruria  and  Sardinia,  to  be  forwarded  on  the 
Voltumus  to  Casilinum.     The  several  towns  of  Campania 
in  the  possession  of  the  Eomans  served  as  outposts  and 
defences  to  the  besieging  army,  while  the  communication 
with  Rome  was  open  by  the  Appian  as  well  as  by  the 
Latin  road. 
Resistance       Tor  a  time  the  Capuans  endeavoured  to  interrupt  the 
Capuans.     work  of  circumvallation  by  desperate  sallies.     The  narrow 
space  of  a  few  thousand  paces  between  the  walls  of  the 
town  and  the  Roman  lines  became  the  theatre  of  numerous 
engagements,  in  which,  above  all,  the  excellent  Gapuan 
cavalry  maintained  its  reputation.     But  the  girdle  around 
the  town  became  from  day  to  day  firmer,  and  the  besieged 
began  anxiously  to  look  out  upon  the  heights  of  the  hill  of 
Tifata,  where  Hannibal  had  repeatedly  pitched  his  camp, 
and    whence   he  had    but  recently  pounced    upon   the 
Romans,  to  scatter  them  in  aU  directions.     But  Hannibal 
did  not  come.     After  the  destruction  of  the  army  of  M. 
Centenius  in  Lucania,  and  of  On.  Fulvius  in  Apulia,  he 
had  quickly  marched  upon  Tarentum  in  the  hope  of  sur- 
prising the  citadel,  and,  baffled  in  this  enterprise,  he  had 
turned,  in  the  same  hope,  to  Brundusium.     Here  also  he 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  333 

found  the  Boman  garrison  warned  and  prepared,  and  he     CHAP, 
now  led  his  overworked  troops  into  winter- quarters.     To 


the  Capuans  lie  sent  word  not  to  lose  courage,  promising  f^^h 
that  he  would  come  to  their  rescue  in  the  right  season,  212-211 
and  put  an  end  to  the  siege  as  he  had  done  once  before.*  ^'^' 

But  this  time  the  danger  was  more  serious,  and  the  Internal 
Romans  felt  sure  of  final  success.  The  lines  of  circum-  Qf°capua. 
yallation  were  drawn  nearly  all  round  Capua.  Before 
they  were  quite  complete  the  Eoman  senate  made  a  last 
oflfer  to  the  besieged,  promising  personal  freedom  and  the 
preservation  of  all  their  property  to  those  who  should 
leave  the  town  before  the  Ides  of  March  (at  that  period 
about  mid-winter).  The  Capuans  rejected  this  offer  con- 
temptuously. They  were  confident  of  the  help  that 
Hannibal  had  promised ;  their  strength  was  sufficient  to 
withstand  any  attack,  and  the  town  was  apparently  well 
supplied  with  provisions.  There  were  of  course  friends  of 
peace  and  friends  of  the  Romans  in  Capua,  but  we  can 
easily  understand  that  they  could  hardly  venture,  under 
the  present  circumstances,  to  make  tiieir  wishes  known, 
and  thus  to  incur  the  suspicion  of  cowardice  or  treason. 
The  government  was  in  the  hands  of  the  democratic  party, 
hostile  to  Rome,  and  it  was  supported  in  its  policy  of 
unwavering  resistance  by  the  Carthaginian  garrison.  A 
man  of  low  birth,  called  Seppius  Lcesius,  discharged  the 
chief  office  of  Meddix  Tuticus,*  and  it  is  probable  that 
the  condition  of  Capua  was  much  like  that  of  Syracuse 
during  the  Roman  siege.  The  men  in  possession  of  the 
government  were  too  much  compromised  to  hope  for 
safety  from  any  reconciliation  with  Rome ;  they  had 
staked  their  lives  on  the  great  game,  and  were  determined 
to  persevere  to  the  last. 

Meanwhile  the  consuls  of  the  year  211,  Cn.  Fulvius  Attempts 
Centumalus  and  P.  Sulpicius  Galba,'  had  entered  on  their  ^1^°^!.' 
office.     They  were  apparently  men  of  no  great  considera-  Heve 
tion,  and  the  consuls  of  the  previous  year  were  left  as     *^^^' 

*  Livy,  xxr.  22.  •  Litj,  xxvi.  6, 

»  See  Arnold,  Hist,  of  R<me,  iii.  239. 


334  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  proconsuls  in  command  of  the  army  before  Capua,  with 
_  ^'  ^  instructions  not  to  withdraw  from  the  siege  until  they  had 
taken  the  place.  After  the  fall  of  Syracuse,  the  Bomans 
justly  looked  upon  the  reduction  of  Capua  as  the  most  im- 
portant object  to  be  attained  in  Italy.  The  period  when 
Capua  would  fall  could  be  calculated  with  tolerable  ac- 
curacy. It  was  determined  by  the  quantity  of  provisions 
which  the  besieged  had  had  time  to  accumulate  before 
they  were  entirely  cut  off  from  external  suppKes.  Yet 
there  was  one  hope  left.  An  agile  Numidian  succeeded 
in  making  his  way  through  both  Boman  lines,  and  in  in- 
forming Hannibal  of  the  serious  danger  in  which  the  town 
was  now  placed.  Hannibal  immediately  broke  up  from  the 
extreme  south,  with  a  body  of  light  troops  and  thirty-three 
elephants,  and  advanced  by  forced  marches  into  Campania.' 
Having  stormed  at  Galatia  *  one  of  the  outer  posts  which 
the  Bomans  had  erected  all  round  Capua,  he  encamped 
behind  the  ridge  of  Mount  Tifata,  and  immediately 
directed  a  brisk  attack  against  the  outer  Boman  lines, 
whilst  simultaneously  the  Capuans  made  a  sally  and  tried 
to  force  the  inner  circumvaUation.  A  Spanish  cohort  had 
already  scaled  the  mound,  some  elephants  had  been  killed, 
their  bodies  filled  up  the  ditch  and  formed  a  bridge  over 
it,  others  had  penetrated  into  one  of  the  Boman  camps, 
and  had  spread  terror  and  confusion,'  But  the  Boman 
forces  were  so  numerous  that  they  were  able  to  keep  their 
ground,  and  to  repel  the  enemy  on  both  sides.  Hanni- 
bal was  obliged  to  give  up  the  plan  of  raising  the  blockade 
of  Capua  by  a  direct  attack  on  the  Boman  lines.  He  at 
once  changed  his  plan.  Whilst  the  Bomans  were  prepar- 
ing to  meet  a  second  attack,  he  left  his  camp  at  nightfall, 
gave  information  to  the  Capuans  of  his  intention,  en- 
couraged them  to  persevere,  and  set  himself  in  motion 
towards  Bome. 

*  liivy,  xrvi.  6. 

'  The  sitoation  of  GiJatia,  which  is  called  a  cattellum  (Livy,  zxvi.  5),  is  not 
known. 
'  Livy,  zzvi.  5,  §  9.    This  is  a  second  version  mentioned  hy  IAyj, 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  835 

No  event  in  all  the  wars  since  the  Gallic  conflagration     CHAP. 

.  VIII. 

produced  a  deeper  impression  on  the  excitable  masses  of   — r-^ 
the  capital  than  the  appearance  of  the  dreaded  Car-     p^^, 
thaginian  before  its  walls.  The  most  disastrous  defeats  and    212-21 1 
the  most  glorious  victories  at  a  distance  from  Bome  could 
not  work  upon  fear  and  hope  in  a  manner  so  direct  and  H^il»l 
powerful  as  the  sight  of  a  hostile  camp  before  their  eyes,  towarde 
The  terrible  words  *  Hannibal  at  the  gates ! '  never  vanished 
from  the  memory  of  the  Romans ;  and  the  fear  and  anguish 
with  which  these  words  were  first  heard  enhanced  the  satis- 
faction which  was  felt  when,  by  the  firmness  of  the  senate 
and  the  Roman  people,  the  danger  was  overcome.   For  this 
reason  the  imagination  of  narrators  was  particularly  fertile 
in  adorning  the  stoiy  of  Hannibal's  march  to  Some  in  a 
manner  flattering  to  the  national  pride.     There  arose  a 
nxmiber  of  stories,  some  altogether  fictitious,  others  sug- 
gested by  mistakes ;  and  it  is  consequently  impossible  for 
us  to  harmonise  into  a  consistent  narrative  the  statements 
of  the  two  principal  witnesses,  Polybius  and  Livy,  which 
di£Per  in  some  essential  points.     We  are  compelled  to 
make  a  selection ;  and  as  it  appears  that  the  report  of 
Livy,  though  not  free  from  errors,  is,  on  the  whole,  more  in 
harmony  with  the  general  course  of  events  than  that  of 
Polybius,  we  give  the  preference  to  it  on  this  occasion.* 

>  According  to  Polybius,  (ix.  3  ff.),  Hannibal  left  his  camp  before  Capua  so 
secretly,  and  marched  so  rapidly  that  he  appeared  before  Rome  before  the  news 
of  his  march  had  arrived.    The  Romans  therefore  believed  that  their  whole 
army  in  Campania  must  have  been  annihilated,  like  the  legions  of  Varro  and 
^milius  Paullus  at  Cannae ;  and  if  by  a  mere  chance  two  newly  raised  legions 
had  not  been  in  the  town,  there  would  have  been  no  means  of  defending  the 
walls,  except  by  the  citizens  themselves.    If  we  bear  in  mind  that  Hannibal 
could  not  march  from  Capua  to  Rome  by  the  straight  road  (the  Via  Appia) 
which  was  open  to  the  Romans,  but  that  he  was  obliged  to  take  a  circuitous 
way,  we  shall  think  it  hardly  likely  that  he  could  proceed  faster  with  the  bulk 
of  his  army,  through  a  hostile  and  mountainous  district,  than  a  messenger 
could  ride  on  the  direct  way.    Hence  we  may  rather  follow  the  account  of  Livy 
(xxvi.  7  ff.),  according  to  which  the  news  of  Hannibal's  march  preceded  him 
to  Rome,  and  Hannibal  did  not  use  the  utmost  speed,  but  purposely  delayed 
his  approach  several  days  by  laying  waste  the  country.    As  his  object  was  not 
to  surprise  and  take  Rome,  but  to  draw  away  the  blockading  army  from. 
Capua,  this  strategy  is  perfectly  intelligible.    In  preferring  this  account  to  that 
of  Polybius,  we  agree  with  Rospatt  (Feldsuffe  des  Hannibal^  p.  80),  and  differ 


336 


ROMAN  mSTORY. 


BOOK 


i)ismay  of 
the  Ro- 
mans. 


For  five  days  Hannibal  had  lingered  before  Capua,*  trying 
in  vain  to  raise  the  siege.  In  the  night  following  the  fifth 
day  he  crossed  the  Voltumus  in  boats,  and  marched  past 
the  Soman  colony  of  Gales  by  Teanum  on  the  Latin 
road  to  the  valley  of  the  Liris,  in  the  direction  of  Inter- 
amna  and  Fregell^.^  All  these  towns  were  held  by  Roman 
garrisons,  and  Hannibal  conld  not  think  of  laying  siege  to 
them.  Nevertheless  he  felt  so  safe  in  the  midst  of  the 
hostile  fortresses,  with  an  army  of  60,000  men  in  his  rear 
and  Bome  itself  before  him,  that  he  leisurely  plundered 
the  districts  through  which  he  marched,  tarried  a  whole 
day  near  Teanum,  remained  two  days  at  Oasilinum  and 
then  at  Fregellae,  and  thus  gave  time  to  the  Boman  army 
before  Capua  either  to  overtake  him  or  to  precede  him  to 
Bome  by  the  direct  road.  The  former  alternative  he  would 
probably  have  preferred,  for  he  sought  above  all  things 
to  bring  on  a  battle,  and  it  was  for  this  reason  that  he 
devastated  the  country  without  mercy.  But  the  Bomans 
steadily  adhered  to  their  plan  of  avoiding  a  battle,  and 
allowed  him  to  advance  unmolested.  From  Fregelke 
Hannibal  marched  further  north,  through  the  country  of 
the  Hemicans,  by  Frusino,  Ferentinum,  and  Anagnia,  and 
between  Tibur  and  Tusculum  reached  the  river  Anio,  which 
he  crossed  in  order  to  pitch  his  camp  in  sight  of  Bome, 
and  to  announce  his  arrival  by  the  conflagration  of  the 
surrounding  farms  and  villages. 

Terror  and  dismay  had  preceded  him.  The  fugitives, 
who  had  with  difiBlculty  escaped  the  fast  Numidian  horse- 
men, and  had  poured  into  Bome  in  vast  crowds  to  jSnd 
shelter  for  themselves,  their  property,  and  their  cattle, 
spread  heart-rending  reports  of  the  cruelties  committed  by 
the  savage  Punians.     The  rich,  well-tilled  country  about 

from  Vincke  {Der  zweiU  pun,  Kriefff  p.  282),  Mommsen  {Ram.  Gesch.  i.  649; 
English  translation,  ii.  169),  Peter  {Cresch,  Romst  i*  336)>  ai^d  Arnold  {Hist,  of 
Rvnie,  iii.  242). 

*  Polybius,  ix.  6,  §  7. 

'  The  road,  as  Livj  (xzvi.  9)  describes  it,  is  unintelligible ;  it  goes  right  and 
left,  forwards  and  again  backwards.  Either  the  names  of  places  are  written 
wrong,  or  Livy  had  an  erroneous  notion  of  the  situation  of  the  several  places 
between  Capua  and  Bome.    See  above,  p.  172. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR  837 

Eome,  which  since  the  days  of  King  Pyrrhus  had  seen  no     CHAP, 
enemy,  was  now  the  prey  of  war.     He  had  arrived  at  last, 


this  dreaded  Hannibal,  before  whose  sword  the  sons  of  ^^^^^^h 
Eome  had  fallen  fast  and  thick  as  the  ears  of  com  before  212-211 
the  mower's  scythe.  The  irresistible  conqueror,  whom  no  ^'^' 
Soman  general  ventured  to  encounter,  who  but  a  very 
short  time  before  had  annihilated  two  Soman  armies,  had 
now  arrived  to  accomplish  his  work,  to  raze  the  city  of 
Eome  to  the  ground,  to  murder  the  men,  and  to  carry 
away  the  women  and  children  into  slavery  far  beyond  the 
sea.  The  city  was  filled  with  a  tumult  and  a  confusion 
that  were  uncontrollable.  Seeing  a  troop  of  Numidian 
deserters  pass  down  from  the  Aventine,  the  people,  de- 
mented with  fright,  thought  the  enemy  was  already  in  the 
city.  Maddened  with  despair,  they  thought  of  nothing 
but  flight,  and  would  have  rushed  out  of  the  gates  if  the 
dread  of  encountering  the  hostile  cavalry  had  not  kept 
them  back.  The  women  filled  all  the  sanctuaries,  poured 
out  their  prayers  and  lamentations,  and  on  their  knees 
swept  the  ground  with  their  dishevelled  hair.* 

Yet  Eome  was  not  unprepared.  Hannibal's  intention  Measures 
of  marching  upon  Eome  had  been  made  known  by  deserters  senate, 
even  before  he  broke  up  from  Capua,'  and  even  without 
such  indirect  or  casual  information  his  march  could  not 
long  remain  a  secret.  When  the  news  arrived,  the  first 
thought  of  the  senate  was,  as  Hannibal  had  anticipated, 
to  withdraw  the  whole  army  forthwith  from  Capua  for 
the  protection  of  the  capital.  But  on  the  advice  of  the 
cautious  T.  Valerius  Placcus,  it  was  resolved  to  order  only 
a  portion  of  the  legions  linder  Pulvius  to  come  to  Eome, 
and  to  continue  the  blockade  of  Capua  with  the  rest. 
Fulvius  therefore  broke  up  with  only  16,000  men,  and 
hastened  to  Eome  by  the  Appian  road,  arriving  either 
simultaneously  with  Hannibal  or  a  very  short  time  after 
him.     As  proconsul  he  could  not  have  a  military  command 

*  Polybins.  ix.  6.    Livy,  xxvi.  9. 

*  It  seems  not  unlikely  that  Hannibal  himself  spread  this  news,  as  his  object 
vms  to  draw  away  the  blockading  army  from  Capua. 

VOL.  II.  Z 


338 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Retreat  of 
HaDuib&l 
from 
Rome. 


in  the  city  of  Borne.  A  decree  of  the  senate,  therefore, 
conferred  upon  him  a  command  equal  to  that  of  the 
consnls  of  the  year,  and  provided  for  the  defence  of  the  city. 
The  senate  remained  assembled  on  the  Foram ;  all  those 
who  had  in  former  years  discharged  the  office  of  dictator, 
consul,  or  censor  were  invested  with  the  imperium  for  the 
duration  of  the  present  crisis.  A  garrison,  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  prsetor  C.  Calpumius,  occupied  the  Capitol,  and 
the  consuls  encamped  outside  the  town  towards  the  north- 
east, between  the  Colline  and  the  Esquiline  gates.  The 
two  newly  raised  legions,  which  happened  to  be  in  Borne, 
joined  to  the  army  of  the  proconsul,  were  strong  enough  to 
bafiELe  any  attempt  of  Hannibal  to  take  the  town  by  storm. 
Accordingly  Hannibal  never  ventured  to  make  an  attack. 
He  approached  the  city  with  a  few  thousand  Numidians, 
and  leisurely  rode  along  the  walls,  eagerly  watched,  but 
undisturbed  by  the  awe-struck  garrison.*  It  was  a  trium- 
phal procession,  and  Hannibal  may  have  felt  legitimate 
pride  in  the  thought  that  he  had  so  far  humbled  his 
enemies.  But  when  he  reflected  that  Bome, though  hum- 
bled, was  still  unconquered,  all  premature  exultation  must 
have  been  suppressed,  while  his  eye  was  fixed  anxiously 
on  the  dark  future.  So  far  he  had  realised  his  own  and 
his  country's  ardent  wishes.  With  the  devastation  of 
Italy  and  the  blood  of  her  sons,  Bome  had  atoned  for 
the  wrong  which  she  had  done  to  Carthage;  but  the 
spirit  of  the  Boman  people  was  unsubdued,  and  it  stood 
even  this  severe  test  without  despairing  or  even  doubting 
of  ultimate  success. 

No  battle  was  fought  before  Bome,  as  the  Bomans  did 
not  accept  Hannibal's  challenge*'    It  could  not  be  un- 

>  According  to  Plinj  {Hist.  Not.  zzziv.  16),  he  threw  his  spear  across 
the  wall.  This  theatrical  performance  seems  hardly  worthy  of  Hannibal,  and 
the  testimony  of  Pliny  does  not  suffice  to  make  it  credible. 

'  According  to  livy  (zxvi.  11),  Flaccas,  on  two  successive  days,  drew  up  fats 
army  in  battle  array  in  front  of  the  army  of  Hannibal ;  but  each  time  a  terrible 
storm  compelled  both  armies  to  seek  shelter  in  their  respective  camps,  where- 
upon the  weather  immediately  cleared  up.  This  is  evidently  a  legend,  invented 
for  the  purpose  of  clearing  the  Bomans  of  the  reproach  of  cowardice.     Not 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


339 


known  to  Hannibal  that  a  part  at  least  of  the  blockading 
army  of  Capua  had  been  withdrawn,  and  was  now  opposed 
to  him.     Perhaps  he  hoped  that  his  plan  had  succeeded. 
If  he  could  draw  the  Bomans  from  their  fortified  position 
under  the  walls  of  Borne,  and  beat  them,  and  then  return 
to  Capua,  it  was  possible  that  the  Capuans,  if  they  had  not 
yet  broken  through  the  Boman  lines,  would  now,  in  con- 
junction with  his  army,  repeat  a  combined  attack  upon  the 
Boman  forces  left  to  continue  the  blockade,  and  it  was  not 
likely  that  this  time  such  an  attack  would  fail.     In  a  few 
days,  therefore,  he  left    the  immediate  neighbourhood 
of  Borne,  marching  in  a  north-easterly  direction  into  the 
country  of  the  Sabines,  then  to  the  south-east  through 
the  land  of  the  Marsians  and  Felignians,  to  return  to 
Campania  by  a  circuitous  route.  ^    He  marked  his  road 
with  flames  and  devastation.      The  Boman  consuls,   as 
he  had  expected,  followed  him,  trying  in  Tain  to  protect 
the  land  of  their  most  faithful  allies.     After  a  march  of 
five  days,  Hannibal  was  informed  that  the  Bomans  had 
not  relinquished  the  blockade  of  Ca.pua^  and  that  only  a 


CHAP. 
VIII. 

FoTJBTH 

Pebiod, 
212-211 

B.C. 


more  authenticated  than  this  legend  is  the  statement  that^  whilst  Hannibal  was 
before  the  gates  of  Rome,  a  reinforcement  was  sent  (Livy,  xzri.  11)»  or  was  to 
be  sent  (Zonaras,  ix.  6),  to  Spain  ;  and  the  anecdote  that  the  field  where  the 
hostile  army  whs  encamped  waa  sold  for  its  fuU  value.     If  it  was  added  that 
Hannibal,  on  hearing  this,  was  so  vexed  that,  out  of  bravado>  he  caused  the 
booths  of  the  money-changers  in  the  Roman  forum  to  be  put  up  to  auction  in 
his  camp,  we  can  only  express  our  surprise  and  regret  that  any  Boman  writer 
could  think  Hannibal  capable  of  such  childish  and  impotent  spite.     The  story 
of  the  dispatch  of  auxiliaries  for  Spain,  which  is  undoubtedly  fictitious,  sliows 
how  proud  the  Romans  were  of  the  alleged  fact,  that,  in  spke  of  Hannibal's 
advance,  they  needed  no  great  military  force  for  the  defence  of  the  capital. 
This  circumstance  throws  some  doubts  on  the  statement  that  FUlvius  marched 
with  only  16,000  men  from  Capua  for  the  relief  of  Roate.    No  other  writer 
besides  Livy  mentions  it,  and  we  are  consequently  without  the  means  of  testing 
his  trustworthiness  by  other,  independent  evidence.    But  it  is  not  at  all  impro- 
bable that  the  number  was  made  to  appear  so  small  to  bring  out  more  forcibly 
the  self-reliance  of  the  Romans.     Livy  himself  gives  expression  to  this  senti- 
ment of  pride  in  the  words  which  he  attributes  to  Fabius  Maximus  (c.  8),  for 
the  purpose  of  dissuading  the  dispatch  of  any  troops  from  Capua.    If  we  are 
entitled  to  infer  that  a  larger  portion  of  the  blockading  army  really  marched 
from  Capua  to  Rome,  we  should  come  to  the  conclusion  that  Hannibars  calcu- 
lation was  less  faulty  than  it  seems  to  have  been. 
'  Livy,  xxvi.  11. 

z  2 


340  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     portion  of  their  army  had  left  Campania.     Suddenly  he 
' r^ — '  turned  round  upon  the  pursuing  Romans,  attacked  them 


in  the  night,  stormed  their  camp,  and  routed  them  com- 
pletely. But  his  plan  was  nevertheless  thwarted.  He  found 
out,  like  Pyrrhus,  that  he  was  fighting  with  the  Hydra ; 
the  Boman  lines  round  Capua  were  sufficiently  defended ; 
and  seeing  that  there  was  no  prospect  of  success  if  he 
attempted  to  storm  them,  he  turned  aside  and  left  Capua  to 
her  fate.  By  forced  marches  he  hastened  through  southern 
Italy,  and  appeared  unexpectedly  before  Bhegium.  But 
he  was  foiled  in  the  attempt  to  surprise  this  town,  and  the 
only  result  gained  was  an  abundance  of  booty  and  prisoners, 
which  rewarded  his  soldiers  for  the  unusual  fatigues  they 
had  undergone. 
Fall  of  The  fate  of  Capua  was  now  sealed.^     The  besieged 

Capua.  made  one  more  attempt  to  call  Hannibal  to  their  rescue ; 
but  the  Numidian  who  had  undertaken  to  deliver  the 
dangerous  message  was  discovered  in  the  Boman  camp, 
and  driven  back  into  the  town  with  his  hands  cut  off. 
The  leaders  of  the  revolt  now  foresaw  what  they  would 
have  to  expect.  After  the  Capuan  senate  had  formally 
resolved  to  surrender  the  town,  about  thirty  of  the  noblest 
senators  assembled  in  the  house  of  Yibius  Yirrius  for 
a  last  solemn  banquet,  and  took  farewell  of  one  another, 
resolved  not  to  survive  the  ruin  of  their  country.  They 
all  swallowed  poison  and  lay  down  to  die.  When  the 
gates  were  thrown  open  to  admit  the  victorious  army, 
they  were  beyond  the  reach  of  Boman  revenge.  The 
other  senators  of  Capua  relied  on  the  generosity  of  Borne. 
It  is  probable  that  all  who  were  conscious  of  guilt  had 
sought  death,  and  that  the  survivors  were  not  directly 
implicated  in  causing  the  defection  of  Capua.  In  all 
such  revolutions  there  is  a  wide  difference  between  leaders 

^  LiVy  (xxvi.  12)  rel&tes  th&t  the  Roman  senate  once  more  offered  par- 
don to  the  people  of  Capua  if  thej  would  now  surrender.  This  statement, 
unless  it  is  simply  a  repetition  of  a  previous  one,  was  invented  by  the  annalists 
to  set  forth  the  magnanimity  of  the  Bomans  and  the  perversity  of  the  Capuans. 
Nobody  can  credit  it  who  knows  the  true  character  of  the  Koman  people  and 
government. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


341 


and  followers.  No  doubt  many  of  the  latter  had  no  choice  chap. 
but  to  swim  with  the  stream,  and  among  them  there  >  ^^^^'  - 
must  have  been  many  parents  or  relatives  of  the  young  ^ourth 
Capuan  knights  who  had  either  taken  no  part  at  all  in  the  212-211 
revolt,  or  had  gone  over  to  the  Eomans  in  the  course  of  **°* 
the  war.  Such  men  were  justified  in  hoping  for  mercy. 
But  Q.  Pulvius  thirsted  for  blood,  and  Eoman  policy 
demanded  a  terrific  example.  The  Capuan  senators  were 
therefore  sent  in  chains  partly  to  Cales,  partly  to  Teanum. 
In  the  course  of  the  night,  Fulvius  broke  up  with  a 
detachment  of  cavalry  and  reached  Teanum  before  dawn. 
He  caused  twenty-eight  prisoners  to  be  scourged  and 
beheaded  before  his  eyes.  Without  delay  he  hastened  to 
Cales,  and  ordered  twenty-five  more  to  be  put  to  death. 
The  awful  rapidity  with  which  he  went  through  the  work 
of  the  executioner,  without  even  the  shadow  of  discrimina- 
tion or  trial,  shows  that  his  heart  was  in  it.  It  is  said 
that,  before  he  had  done,  he  received  a  sealed  letter  from 
Borne,  which  contained  an  order  from  the  senate  to 
postpone  the  punishment  of  the  guilty,  and  to  allow 
the  senate  to  pronounce  their  sentence.  Guessing  the 
contents  of  the  letter,  Pulvius  left  it  unopened  until  all 
his  victims  were  dead.  If  this  report  is  true,  and  if  the 
Eoman  senate  really  intended  to  act  with  clemency,  they 
still  had  ample  opportunity,  even  after  the  hot  haste  with 
which  Pulvius  had  slaked  his  thirst  for  revenge.  But  as 
the  Eoman  senate,  far  from  exhibiting  a  spirit  of  clemency, 
continued  to  treat  prostrate  Capua  with  exquisite  harshness 
and  cruelty,  we  feel  it  difficult  to  credit  the  report. 

That  Placcus   had  carried  out  the  intention  of  the  Treatment 
Eoman  government  is  clear  from  the  treatment  of  the  by  the  Ro-'* 
two  small  Campanian  towns,  Atella  and  Calatia,  which  °**°^- 
had  revolted,  and  were  now  reduced  at  the  same  time  as 
Capua.     The  leading  men  of  these  two  places  were  put  to 
death.*     Three  hundred  of  the  chief  citizens  of  Capua, 


*  Concerning  their  number,  see  Weissenbom's  note  to  Livy  zxtI.  K 


342  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     Calatia,   and  Atella  *  were  dragged  to  Home,  cast    into 
s — r^ — '  prison,  and  left  to  die  of  starvation;   others  were    dis- 
tributed as  prisoners  over  the  Latin  towns,  where  they  all 
perished  in  a  similar  manner.      The  rest  of  the  guilty,  i.e. 
those  who  had  themselves  borne  arms  against  Borne,  or 
whose  relations  had  so  done,  or  who  had  discharged  any 
public  office  since  the  breaking  out  of  the  revolt,*  were 
sold  as  slaves,  with   their  wives   and   childreut      Those 
who  were  not  guilty,  i.e.  those  who  at  the  time  of  the 
revolt  had  not  been  in  Campania,  or  who  had  gone  over 
to  the  Romans,  or  who  had  taken  no  active  part  in  the 
insurrection,  lost  only  their  land  and  part  of  their  movable 
property,  but  were  left  in  the  enjoyment  of  personal  free- 
dom, and  received  permission  to   settle  within   certain 
limits  away  from  Campania.     The  towns  of  Capua,  Atella, 
and  Calatia,  and  the  whole  district  belonging  to  them, 
became  the  property  of  the  Bom  an  people.     The  right  of 
municipal  self-government  was  withdrawn,  and  a  prefect, 
annually  sent  from  Bome,  was  intrusted  with  the  ad- 
ministration  of  the   district,   which,   instead  of   a  free 
community,  contained  henceforth  only  a  motley  population 
of  workmen,  farmers  of  the  public  land  and  of  the  revenue, 
tradesmen,  and  other  adventurers — a  population  destitute 
of  all  those  hallowed  associations  and  feelings  of  attach- 
ment to  the  soil  which  to  the  people  of  antiquity  were 
the  basis  of  patriotism  and  all  civic  virtues.     The  flourish- 
ing city  of  Capua,  once  the  rival  of  Bome,  was  blotted  out 
fi'om  among  the  list  of  Italian  towns,  and  was  henceforth 
let  out  by  the  Boman  people  *like  to  a  tenement  or 
pelting  farm.'   We  cannot,  of  course,  expect  to  find  among 
the  men  that  fought  against  Hannibal  that  chivalrous 
spirit  and  generosity  which  in  general  characterise  modern 
warfare.     To  what  extent  they  acted  in  the   spirit  of 
their  contemporaries  we  can  judge  most  clearly  from  the 
manner  in  which  the  tender-hearted,  humane  Livy,  two 

>  According  to  Zonaras  (is.  6),  the  people  of  Atella  left  their  town  in  a  bodj 
{rraif^yL^X)  and  joined  Hannibal. 
*  Livy,  xxvi.  34. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  343 

centuries  later,  spoke  of  their  proceedings.  He  calls  them     CHAP, 
in  every  respect  laudable.     *  Severely  and  quickly/  he 


says,  '  the  most  guilty  were  punished ;  the  lower  classes  of    p^^J 
the  people  were  dispersed  without  the  hope  of  return ;  the    212-211 
innocent  buildings  and  walls  were  preserved  from  fire  and       **^' 
destruction;  and,  by  the  preservation  of  the  most  beautiful 
town  of  Campania,  the  feelings  of   the    neighbouring 
peoples  were  spared,  whilst  at  the  same  time  the  interests 
of  the  Soman  people  were  consulted.'^ 

The  final  decision  of  the  fate  of  Capua,  which  we  have  Execution 
here  related,  did  not  follow  immediately  after  the  hurried  ^[  -r^^^ 
punishment  of  those  who  were  principally  guilty.  It  was 
postponed  to  the  year  following,  and  by  a  decision  of  the 
popular  assembly  intrusted  to  the  senate.  Meanwhile 
Capua  was  occupied  by  a  Boman  garrison  and  strictly 
guarded.  No  one  was  allowed  to  leave  the  town  without 
permission.  Yet  there  were  some  Campanians  at  Bome ; 
perhaps  the  three  hundred  who  at  the  time  of  the  revolt 
were  serving  as  horsemen  with  the  Boman  legions  in 
Sicily,  and  who,  as  a  reward  for  their  fidelity,  had  been 
received  as  Boman  citizens.  These  unfortunate  men  also 
were  now  doomed  to  experience  the  adverse  fate  which 

'  lAry,  xxvi.  16:  '  Ita  ad  Capuam  res  eompositaB  consilio  ab  omni  parte 
laudabili:  severe  et  celeriter  in  maxime  noxios  animadrersnm ;  multitudo 
civium  dissipata  in  nollam  spem  reditus ;  non  Btevitum  incendiis  minisque  in 
tecta  innoxia  murosque,  et  cum  emolumento  qusesita  etiam  apud  socios  lenitatis 
species,  incolnmitate  urbis  nobilissimte  opxdentissimflequef  cuius  minis  omnis 
Campania,  omnes  qui  Campaniam  circa  accolunt  popnli  ingemuissent/  Compare 
Valerius  Maximus,  iii.  8,  1.  These  sentiments  scarcely  come  home  to  our 
feelings.  What  is  the  value  of  the  '  incolumitas  urbis/  which  consists  in  the 
preservation  of  stones  and  timber,  whilst  the  inhabitants  were  expelled,  sold 
into  slavery,  or  killed  ?  Is  it  not  a  mockery  of  right,  if  Livy  finds  it  meritorious 
and  laudable  that  the  houses  and  walls  were  spared,  to  the  advantage  of  the 
Boman  state  ?  There  is  perhaps  no  greater  contrast  anywhere  between  anti- 
quity and  modem  times  than  in  the  range  of  human  sympathies  and  love.  As 
eveiy  nation,  and  even  eveiy  city,  had  formerly  its  own  god  and  its  own  reli- 
gion, there  existed  no  moral  and  no  religious  obligation  with  regard  to  the 
members  of  other  communities.  It  was  only  when  mankind  gradually  rose  to 
the  conception  of  one  God  of  the  universe,  and  when  Christianity  taught  us  to 
lore  our  enemies  as  ourselves,  that  men  ceased  to  look  with  pleasure  or  indif- 
ference at  the  Bufferings  of  men  differing  from  them  in  race,  language,  or  even 
geographical  locality  alone. 


844  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     seemed   inexorably  bent  on   destroying   the   people    of 
>  Capua.*     It  happened  that  a  conflagration  broke  out  in 

Borne,  which  raged  for  a  whole  night  and  day,  destroyed  a 
number  of  shops  and  other  buildings — among  them  the 
ancient  palace  of  Numa,  the  official  residence  of  the  cbief 
pontiff — and  which  even  threatened  the  adjoining  temple 
of  Vesta.  The  style  of  building  then  prevalent  at  Eome, 
the  narrow  streets,  and  the  absence  of  fire-police  and 
engines,  rendered  such  a  calamity  no  matter  for  surprise. 
But  the  imminent  danger  which  had  threatened  one  of 
the  principal  sanctuaries  of  Rome — a  sanctuary  on  whose 
preservation  the  safety  of  the  city  depended — spread 
general  consternation,  and  suggested  the  idea  that  the 
fire  was  not  accidental,  but  caused  by  some  bitter  enemy 
of  the  commonwealth.  By  order  of  the  senate,  the  consul 
accordingly  issued  a  proclamation,  promising  a  public 
reward  to  any  one  who  would  point  out  the  men  guilty  of 
the  supposed  crime.  By  this  proclamation  a  premium  was 
offered  to  any  villain  who  might  succeed  in  concocting 
the  story  of  a  plot  plausible  enough  to  be  credited  by  the 
excited  populace.  An  informer  was  soon  found.  A  slave 
of  some  3'oung  Campanians,  the  sons  of  Pacuvius  Calavius,* 
declared  that  his  masters  and  five  other  young  Capuans, 
whose  fathers  had  been  put  to  death  by  Q.  Fulvius,  had 
conspired,  out  of  revenge,  to  set  Bome  on  fire.  The 
unfortunate  young  men  were  seized.  Their  slaves  were 
tortured  to  confess  that  they  had  caused  the  fire  by  order 
of  their  masters.  This  confession  under  torture,  the 
eternal  disgrace  of  the  Boman  law  procedure,  established 
the  guilt  of  the  Capuans  to  the  satisfaction  of  their  judges, 
and  the  men  were  all  executed,  whilst  the  informer  received 
his  freedom  as  a  reward. 

'  Livy,  xxvi.  27. 

'  See  above,  p.  260.  These  young  men  belonged,  in  aU  probability,  to  the 
Gampanian  knights  who  served  in  Sicily  at  the  time  of  the  revolt.  If  this 
coi^ectnre  is  true,  we  can  understand  why  some  of  the  victims  of  Fulvius 
hoped  for  mercy.  They  expected,  as  has  been  suggested  in  the  text  (p.  340  f.), 
that  the  faithful  services  of  their  sons  would  atone  for  any  transgressions  of 
their  own,  and  at  least  secure  them  from  capital  punishment 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  345 

It  is  not  absolutely  necessary  to  assume  that  this  revolt-     CHAP, 
ing  sentence  of  death  was  inspired  by  hatred  of  the  con-     ^^^'  - 
quered  Capuans.     The  Bomans,  in  their  savage  ignorance,     Foubth 
raged  not  less  fiercely  against  themselves,  and  had  given    212-211 
a  proof  of  this  as  late  as  331  B.C.,  by  the  execution  of  one       ^'^* 
hundred  and  seventy  innocent  matrons.^      But  the  pre-  ^P^*?*- 

•^  *  tion  of 

vailing  hatred  of  Capua  caused  the  story  of  the  wretched  Roman 
informer  to  be  received  with  ready  credulity,  just  as  the  P^"^* 
English  nation,  besotted  with  terror  at  the  time  of  the 
Popish  plot,  greedily  swallowed  auy  lies  which  villains  like 
Oates  and  Dangerfield  were  pleased  to  concoct.  The  cruel 
sentence  pronounced  on  the  young  Capuans  in  Borne  was 
a  worthy  introduction  to  the  decrees  of  the  senate  which 
blotted  out  the  old  rival  for  ever.  It  was  a  consequence 
of  the  municipal  constitution  of  the  republic  that  Bome 
could  not  brook  another  great  town  besides  herself.  This 
was  the  reason  why,  even  in  the  legendary  period,  Alba 
Longa  was  crushed,  and  at  a  subsequent  period  Yeii  was 
doomed  to  destruction.  It  was  now  the  turn  of  Capua  to 
sink  into  the  dust;  and  no  long  period  elapsed  before 
that  other  rival  city  followed  which  was  now  struggling 
desperately  with  Bome,  under  the  thorough  conviction  that 
she  must  either  conquer  or  perish.  Wherever  the  republican 
armies  planted  their  iron  foot,  they  stamped  out  the  life  of 
all  towns  which  might  enter  into  competition  with  Bome. 
It  was  not  before  Bome  itself  had  bowed  her  proud  head 
under  an  imperial  master  that  municipal  prosperity 
returned  to  the  great  centres  of  art,  learning,  and  com- 
merce in  the  subjected  countries. 

*  See  vol.  i.  p.  667. 


346  EOMAK  HISTORY. 


Fifth  Period  of  the  Hanmbalian  War* 

FBOM   THE   FALL   OF  CAPUA  TO  THE   BATTLE   OK   THE 

METAUBUSy   211-207   B.C. 

BOOR         The  re-conquest  of  Capua  marks  the  turning-point  in 
— J — '  the  second  Punic  war.     From  the  time  when  Hannibal  had 


ChftDffe  in  crossed  the  AJps  to  the  battle  of  Caome  the  destructive 
the  charac-  waves  which  had  inundated  Italy  had  risen  li%her  and 
^yar.  higher,  had  borne  down  one  obstacle  afber  another,  and  had 

threatened  to  engulf  the  whole  fabric  of  Boman  dominion. 
After  the  day  of  Cannae  the  waters  spread  far  and  wide  over 
Italy;  but  they  rose  no  higher.  Most  of  the  Boman  aUies, 
and  these  the  most  valuable,  resisted  the  impulse  to  revolt 
which  carried  along  the  Capuans  to  their  own  destruction. 
The  colonies  and  Bome  herself  remained  firm;  and  now  at 
length,  after  a  seven  years'  struggle,  a  decided  turn  of  the 
tide  took  place.  Bome  had  passed  through  the  worst ; 
her  safety  was  secured,  and  even  her  dominion  over  Italy 
seemed  no  longer  exposed  to  any  serious  danger.  Hence- 
forth she  could  continue  the  war  with  full  confidence  in  a 
final  triumph. 
Dispatch  The  firstfruit  of  the  victory  in  Campania  was  the  re- 
winfo^  storation  of  Boman  superiority  in  Spain,  which  had  been 
mente  to  lost  by  the  reverses  and  the  death  of  the  two  Scipios.  Spain 
^"°*  was  justly  looked  upon  as  an  outlying  fortress  of  Carthage, 
whence  a  second  attack  on  Italy  might  at  any  time  be 
expected.  To  prevent  such  an  attack  had  hitherto  been 
the  principal  object  of  the  Boman  generals  in  Spain.  In 
the  gloomy  period  after  the  battle  of  Cannie  the  two 
Scipios  had  succeeded  in  accomplishing  this  task  by  the 
victory  over  Hasdrubal  at  Ibera;  and  it  is  perhaps  no 
exaggeration  to  say  that  by  it  they  had  saved  Bome  from 
destruction.*     When    the    Carthaginians  had    recovered 

>  See  above,  p.  268. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


347 


from  their  defeat  at  Ibera,  and  had  victoriouslj  ended  the 
war  with  the  Numidians  in  Africa,  thej  had  resumed  the 
war  in  Spain  with  new  vigour,  and  the  consequence  was 
the  almost  total  destruction  of  the  Boman  armies  in  Spain*^ 
It  was,  for  Home,  a  most  lucky  coincidence  that  at  this 
critical  season  a  part  of  the  forces  that  had  besieged 
Capua  became  disposable  for  other  purposes.  C.  Claudius 
Nero  was  accordingly  summoned  from  Campania,  and  in 
the  course  of  the  same  summer  (211  B.C.)  sent,  with  about 
two  legions,'  to  Spain,  to  rally  the  remnants  of  the  Scipionic 
army,  and  to  incorporate  them  with  his  own.  Nero  suc- 
ceeded not  only  in  efiFectually  defending  the  country 
between  the  Pyrenees  and  the  Ebro,  but  he  is  said  even  to 
have  undertaken  an  expedition  far  into  the  Carthaginian 
possessions,  and  to  have  so  far  out-manceuvred  Hasdrubal 
that  he  might  have  made  him  prisoner  with  his  whole 
army  if  he  had  not  been  duped  by  the  wily  Carthaginian.' 
This  statement  appears  to  deserve  no  more  credit  than 
the  pretended  exploits  of  Marcius.^  The  situation  of  the 
Romans  in  Spain,  even  in  the  following  year  (210  b.o.), 
was  very  critical,  and  it  was  resolved  in  Eome  to  send 
thither  an  additional  force  of  11,000  men.  The  command 
of  this  reinforcement  was  intrusted  to  Publius  Cornelius 
Scipio,  a  young  man  only  twenty-seven  years  of  age, 
who  had  as  yet  discharged  but  one  public  office,  viz. 
that  of  eedile,  and  had  never  before  had  any  independent 
military  command,  but  who  was  destined  to  rise  suddenly 
into  distinction,  and  finally  to  triumph  over  Hannibal 
himself. 

Publius  Cornelius  Scipio  was  the  son  of  Lucius  Cornelius 
Scipio,  and  nephew  of  Publius  Cornelius  Scipio,  the  two 
brothers  who  had  fought  and  fallen  in  Spain.  His  first 
appearance  on  the  stage  of  history  is  marked  by  a  series 
of  events  which  are  startling  and  somewhat  mysterious  in 
their  character,  and  calculated  to  chaUenge  serious  doubts. 


CHAP. 
VIII. 

Fifth 
Pbriod, 
211-207 

B.C. 


Early  life 
of  PubliuB 
Cornelius 
Scipio. 


>  In  the  7ear212  or  211.    See  above,  p.  317»  note  I. 
'  He  had  12,000  foot  and  1,000  horse.    Livy,  zxri.  17. 
•  Li7y,3am.  17.  *  See  p.  317,  note  2. 


348  ROMAN  mSTOKY. 

BOOK     It  does  not  at  all  appear  that,  as  r^ards  external  attesta- 


IV. 


.  tion,  the  history  of  Scipio's  exploits  stands  on  a  higher 
level  than  that  of  the  preceding  events.  And  yet  we 
know  that  Polybius — the  most  intelligent,  sober,  and  con- 
scientions  investigator  of  facts  in  the  history  of  Borne — had 
close  and  intimate  relations  with  the  honse  of  the  Scipios, 
and  that  he  drew  his  information  directly  from  C.  Leelins, 
the  friend  and  associate  of  Scipio  himself.^  Bnt  we  find, 
both  in  Polybius  and  Liyy,  statements  regarding  Scipio 
which  remind  ns  of  the  time  when  the  Roman  annals  were 
full  of  random  assertions,  errors,  exaggerations,  and  impu- 
dent fictions.  We  are  therefore  obliged  to  sift  with  par- 
ticular care  all  those  accounts  which  refer  to  Scipio's 
character,  to  his  military  exploits,  and  the  political  trans* 
actions  in  which  he  took  a  part. 
Family  in-  for  some  generations  the  family  of  the  Scipios  had 
the  belonged  to  the  most  prominent  of  the  republic.     Since 

Sdpios  in    ^Q  ^jj^Q  ^yf  ii^Q  Samnite  wars  they  were  almost  regularly 

in  possession  of  one  or  other  of  the  great  offices  of  state. 
Their  family  pride  was  intense,  and  has  left  lasting 
monuments  in  the  epitaphs  which  have  come  down  to  us.^ 
It  is  evident  that  their  influence  among  the  noble  families 
of  Rome  was  very  considerable.  Cneius  Scipio  Asina,  who, 
in  the  fifth  year  of  the  Sicilian  war,  had,  by  his  want  of 
judgment,  caused  the  loss  of  a  Roman  squadron,  and  had 
himself  been  made  prisoner  of  war,*  was,  in  the  course  of 
the  same  war,  again  appointed  to  high  office.  In  the 
Hannibalian  war,  the  influence  of  this  family  had  risen  so 
greatly  that  the  conduct  of  the  war  in  Spain  was,  year  after 
year,  confided  to  the  two  brothers  Publius  and  Cneius 
Scipio,  in  a  manner  altogether  at  variance  with  the  regular 
practice  of  the  republic.  The  Scipios  disposed,  in  Spain, 
of  the  armies  and  the  resources  of  the  Roman  people  as 
if  they  were  the  uncontrolled  masters,  and  not  the  servants, 
of  the  state ;  and  they  conducted  the  administration  of  the 
province,  and  the  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Spanish 

*  Polybius,  z.  3.  '  See  vol.  i.  p.  459  ;  Tol.  ii.  p.  63. 

'  Sea  above,  p.  55. 


B.C. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  349 

tribes,  as  they  thought  proper.    It  seemed  that  the  senate     chap. 

had  intrusted  the  management  of  the  Spanish  war  entirely  ^ .    y_^ 

to  the  family  of  the  Scipios,  as  in  the  legendary  period     ^^^ 

the  war  with  the  Veientines  was  made  over  as  a  family    211-207 

war  *  to  the  Fabii.     Their  command  was  cut  short  only  by 

their  death,  and  it  was  now  transferred  to  the  son  of  one 

of  them,  as  if  it  was  hereditary  in  the  family.  The  manner, 

too,  in  which  this  was  done  was  strange  in  itself,  and 

had  on  no  occasion  been  known  before.     Such  men  as 

Pomponius  and  Centenius,  it  is  true,  had  in  the  course  of 

the  war  been  intrusted  with  the  command  of  detachments 

of  troops,  without  having  ever  previously  discharged  any  of 

the  offices  to  which  the  *  imperium '  was  attached.^     But 

the  troops  of  these  officers  were  wholly,  or  for  the  most 

part,  volunteers  and  irregulars,  and  they  were  bent  more 

on  plundering  and  harassing  the  revolted  allies  of  Bome 

than  on  fighting  the  Carthaginians.     On  the  other  hand, 

the  supreme  command  of  the  Boman  legions  in  Spain  was 

a  matter  of  the  greatest  importance.     The  senate  had  not 

allowed  the  brave  L.  Marcius  to  retain  the  command  of 

the  remnants  of  the  Spanish  army,  though  it  was  due  to 

him  that  any  portion  of  it  was  saved.  Nor  was  it  the  want 

of  able  generals,  such  as  the  Bomans  could  boast  of,  that 

made  it  absolutely  necessary  to  place  at  the  post  of  danger 

an  inexperienced  young  man,  who  had  not  yet  given  proofs 

of  his  ability.     C.  Claudius  Nero,  who  had  rendered  good 

service  during  the  siege  of  Capua,  and  who  afterwards 

proved  himself  a  master  of  strategy  in  the  campaign  against 

Hasdrubal,  had  already  been  sent  to  Spain.     There  was  no 

reason  why  he  should  not  be  left  there,  and  if  there  had 

been  an  objection  to  him,  there  were  other  tried  officers 

in  abundance,  fit  to  take  the  command.     The  eulogists  of 

Scipio  related  a  silly  story,  viz.,  that  nobody  came  forward 

to  volunteer  his  services  for  the  dangerous  post  in  Spain,' 

>  A  *  familiare  bellum/  as  it  is  called  by  Livy  (ii.  48). 
•  See  above,  pp.  318-330. 

■  Livy,  XX vi.  18:     'Primo  expectaverant,  ut  qui  se  tanto  imperio  dignos 
crederent,  nomina  profiterentur.    Quae  ut  destituta  expectatio  est,  redintegratos 


350 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Character 
of  Scipio. 


and  that  Scipio,  by  boldly  declaring  his  readiness  to  onder- 
take  the  command,  inspired  the  people  with  admiration 
and  confidence,  and  in  a  manner  compelled  them  to  give 
the  appointment  to  him.  The  Boman  republic  wonld 
indeed  have  been  in  a  deplorable  condition,  if  cowardice 
had  restrained  even  one  man  capable  of  command  from 
dedicating  his  services  to  the  state  in  a  post  of  danger. 
It  was  not  so.  The  appointment  of  Scipio  was  dne  to  the 
position  and  influence  of  his  family.*  It  was  one  of  the 
irregularities  caused  by  the  war,  and  a  long  time  elapsed 
before  proconsular  command  was  again  conferred  on  a  man 
who  had  not  previously  been  consul. 

Scipio  was,  however,  a  man  far  above  the  average  of  his 
contemporaries,  and  there  was  in  him  greatness  of  mind, 
which  could  not  fail  to  rivet  general  attention.*  His 
character  was  not  altogether  of  the  ancient  Boman  type. 
There  was  in  it  an  element  which  displeased  men  of  the 
old  school,  and  which,  on  the  other  hand,  gained  for  him 
the  admiration  and  esteem  of  the  people.  His  bearing  was 
proud,  his  manners  reserved.  From  his  youth  his  mind 
was  open  to  poetical  and  religious  impressions.  He  believed, 
or  pretended,  that  he  was  inspired ;  but  his  keen  under- 
standing kept  this  germ  of  fanaticism  within  the  bounds 
of  practical  usefulness  to  his  political  purposes.  Whether 
the  piety  that  he  displayed  ostentatiously,  his  visions  and 
communions  with  the  deity,  were  the  results  of  honest 
conviction,  as  his  contemporaries  believed,  or  whether 
they  were  merely  political  manoeuvres,  as  Polybius  thought,' 


luctus  accepts  dadis  desideriumque  imperatorum  amissomm/  etc 

'  fremuuty  adeo  perditas  res  desperatumqne  de  republica  esse,  ut  nemo  audeat  in 
Hispaniam  imperium  accipere ;  cum  sabito  P.  Cornelius  .  .  .  professius  se  pet^re 
in  superiore  unde  conspici  posset  loco  coDstitit,'  etc. 

'  This  is  apparent  in  his  election  to  the  sedileship  (Livy,  xxv.  2).  As  sedile 
he  made  himself  popular  by  his  liberality.  Livy,  ibid :  '  Ludi  Homani  pro  tern- 
poris  illius  copiis  magnifice  facti  et  diem  unimi  instaurati  et  congii  olei  in  ricos 
fiingulos  dati.'  In  this  passage  it  s^ems  that  before  the  word  *  congii/  a  num- 
ber has  dropped  out  of  the  text.    Compare  Weissenbom's  note. 

'  Polybius,  X.  2,  §  2 :  Ty  yap  ffx^Hhv  lwupw4<rrafrop  ainhy  ytyoviwat  r&v  vfA 
rov,  Crrrovct  fiiy  irdrrcs  •iSei'oi,  rls  iror*  ^if  ic.t.A. 

*  Polybius,  X.  2,  §  12 :  U6ir\iQS  ivtpya(6tJL€vo5  &cl  Srf^av  toIs  iroAAoi^,  &s  ner^ 


J 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  351 

intended  to  deceive  the  populace  and  to  serve  his  political     chap. 
ends,  we  can  hardlj  decide  with  any  degree  of  certainty. 


as  no  genuine  speeches  or  writings  of  his  are  preserved,  ^"h 
which  might  have  revealed  the  true  nature  of  his  mind.  211-207 
But  whatever  we  maj  think  of  the  genuineness  of  his  ^'^' 
enthusiasm,  it  appears  un-Boman  in  any  light.  His 
imaginative  mind  was  powerfully  affected  by  the  creations 
of  Greek  poetry.  It  is  not  incredible  that  he  may  himself 
have  believed  stories  like  that  of  his  descent  from  a  god.' 
If  he  did,  he  will  stand  higher  in  our  esteem  than  if  we 
look  upon  him  as  a  clever  impostor. 

In  the  autumn  of  the  year  210,'  Scipio  sailed  fr^m  the  Departure 
Tiber  under  a  convoy  of  thirty  ships  of  war,  with  fo,  s^^^. 
10,000  foot  and  1,000  horse.  The  second  in  command 
under  him  was  the  proprsetor,  M.  Junius  Silanus; 
the  fleet  was  under  the  orders  of  C.  Leelius,  Scipio's  inti- 
mate friend  and  admirer.  As  usual  the  fleet  sailed  along 
the  coast  of  Etruria,  Liguria,and  Gaul,  instead  of  striking 
straight  across  the  Tyrrhenian  Sea.  In  Emporiee,  a 
trading  settlement  of  the  Massilians,  the  troops  were 
disembarked.  Thence  Scipio  marched  by  land  to  Tarraco, 
the  chief  town  of  the  Roman  province,  where  he  spent  the 
winter  in  preparation  for  the  coming  campaign. 

The  plan  of  this  campaign  was  made  by  Scipio  with  the  Plans  of 
utmost  secrecy,  and  was    communicated  to   his    friend      ***°* 
Lselius  alone.    He  had  received  information  that  the  three 

r^s  Bttof  hcofoUtt  woioiiiwos  rhi  iirifio\J^  §if$afKrt<rr4povs  ica2  irpo9vfAOT4pavf 
KartirK€6a(t  robs  fmaru/rroyAvovs  irphs  rk  Scu^  rmv  tftr^w,  Li^y*  zzvi.  19  :  Fuit 
eoim  Scipio  non  yeris  tantum  virtutibas  mirabilis,  Bed  arte  quoque  qnad&m  ab 
iuventa  in  ostentationem  eamm  eompositos,  pleraque  apud  moltitadinem  ant 
per  noctumas  visa  species  ant  Telut  divinitns  mente  monita  agens,  sive  et  ipse 
capti  quadam  snperstitione  animi,  sive  ut  imperia  oonsiltaqne  velut  sorte  oracnli 
missa  sine  cnnctatione  ezaequerentur.  Ad  hoc  iam  inde  ab  initio  pneparans 
animos  ex  qno  togam  Tirilem  snmpsit,  nnllo  die  prina  ullam  publicum  priva- 
tamqne  rem  egit  qnam  in  Capitolinm  iret  ingressuaque  edem  consideret  et 
pleromqne  solns  in  secreto  ibi  tempns  tereret/  etc.  *  His  miraculis  ntinqnam  ab 
ipso  elasa  fides  est,  qnin  potins  ancta  arte  quadam  nee  abnuendi  tale  qnidquam 
nee  palam  afflrmandi. 

'  Ckllius,  Noctes  Attieat  vii.  1. 

'  The  time  cannot  be  fixed  accurately.  See  Becker,  Vorarbeiten  t.  zweUen 
puniseh,  Krieg,  p.  118  £E1,  and  WeiMenborn*s  note  to  LiTj,  xxviiL  16. 


352 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Siege  and 
capture 
of  r*ew 
Carthage. 


CarUiaginian  armies,  commanded  by  Mago  and  the  two 
Hasdrabals,  were  stationed  at  great  distances  from  one 
another  and  from  New  Carthago.  This  important  place 
was  intrusted  to  the  insufficient  protection  of  a  garrison 
of  only  one  thousand  men.  Thus  an  opportunity  was 
offered  of  seizing  by  a  bold  stroke  the  military  capital  of 
the  Pnnians  in  Spain,  whose  excellent  harbour  was  indis- 
pensable to  their  fleet,  and  where  they  had  their  magazines, 
arsenal,  storehouses,  dockyards,  their  military  chest,  and 
the  hostages  of  many  Spanish  tribes.  The  preparations 
for  this  expedition  were  made  with  the  greatest  secrecy. 
The  very  unlikelihood  of  an  attack  had  lulled  the  Cartha- 
ginian generals  into  a  criminal  security,  and  compromised 
the  safety  of  the  town.  If  New  Carthage  were  able  to  hold 
out  only  a  few  days,  or  if  Hasdrubal,  who  was  at  a  distance 
of  ten  days'  march,  had  the  least  suspicion  of  Scipio's  plan, 
it  had  no  chance  of  success.  It  was  bold  and  ingenious, 
and  is  so  much  more  creditable  to  its  author  as  the  sad 
fate  of  his  father  and  uncle  might  have  been  expected  to 
make  him  lean  rather  to  the  side  of  caution  and  timidity 
than  of  daring  enterprise. 

In  the  first  days  of  spring  (209  B.C.)  Scipio  broke  up 
with  his  land  army  of  26,000  infantry  and  2,500  horse, 
and  marched  from  Tarraco  along  the  coast  southward, 
whilst  Lfielius,  with  a  fleet  of  thirty-five  vessels,  kept 
constantly  in  sight.  Arriving  unexpectedly  before  New 
Carthage,'  the  united  force  immediately  laid  siege  to 
the  town  by  land  and  sea.  New  Carthage  lay  at  the 
northern  extremity  of  a  spacious  bay,  which  opened 
southwards,  and  whose  mouth  was  protected  by  an  island 
as  by  a  natural  breakwater,  so  that  inside  of  it  ships  could 
ride  in  perfect  safety.  Tinder  the  walls  of  the  town  on 
iU  ,e..L  ride,  s  Lro-  ri^p  of  I»d  w»  coW  b, 
shallow  water,  a  continuation  of  the  bay ;  and  this  sheet  of 
water  extended  some  way  northwards,  leaving  only  a  sort 
of  isthmus,  of  inconsiderable  width,  which  connected  the 

*  According  to  PolybiuB  (x.  9,  §  7),  in  only  seyen  days.  This  is  impos- 
fsible.  The  distance  from  Tarraco  to  New  Carthage  is  too  great ;  ev^n  from 
the  £bro  an  army  would  take  longer  to  march  to  Carthagena. 


B.C. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  353^ 

town  with  the  mainland  and  was  fortified  by  high  walls     CHAP. 

VIII 

and  towers.     New  Carthage  had  therefore  almost  an  in-  ..» ^1^ 

sular  position,  and  was  very  well  fortified  by  nature  and     ^^^ 
art.    But  it  had  a  weak  side,  and  this  had  been  betrayed    211-207 
by  fishermen  to  the  Eoman  general.     During  ebb  tide  the 
water  of  the  shallow  pool  west  of  the  town  fell  so  much 
that  it  was  fordable,  and  the  bottom  was  firm.     On  this 
information  Scipio  laid  his  plan,  and,  in  the  expectation 
that  he  would  be  able  to  reach  from  the  water  an  un- 
defended part  of  the  wall,  he  promised  to  his  soldiers  the 
co-operation  of  Neptune.     But  first  he  drew  off  the  atten- 
tion of  the  garrison  to  the  northern  side  of  the  town.     He 
began  by  making  a  double  ditch  and  mound  from  the  sea  to 
the  bay,  in  order  to  be  covered  in  the  rear  against  attacks 
&om  the  Punic  army  in  case  the  siege  should  be  postponed 
and  Hasdrubal  should  advance  to  relieve  the  town.     Then 
having  easily  beaten  off  the  garrison,  which  had  made  a 
foolhardy  attempt  to  dislodge  him,  he  immediately  attacked 
the  walls.     Having  an  immense  superiority  of  numbers, 
the  Eomans  might  hope  by  relieving  one  another  to  tire 
out  the  garrison.      They  tried  to  scale  the  walls  with 
ladders,  but  met  with  so  stout  a  resistance  that  after  a 
few  hours  Scipio  gave  the  signal  to  desist.     The  Cartha- 
ginians thought  the  assault  was  given  up,  and  hoped  to 
be  able  to  repose  from  their  exertions.     But  towards  even- 
ing, when  the  ebb  tide  had  set  in,  the  attack  was  renewed 
with  double  violence.    Again  the  Bomans  assailed  the 
walls  and  applied  their  ladders  on  all  parts.    Whilst  the 
attention  of  the  besieged  was  thus  turned  to  the  northern 
side,  which  they  thought  was  exclusively  endangered  by 
the  second  attack,  as  by  the  first,  a  detachment  of  five 
hundred  Romans  forded  the  shallow  water  on  the  west, 
and  reached  the  wall  without  being  perceived.     They 
quickly  scaled  it,  and  opened  the  nearest  gate  from  the 
inside.  Neptune  had  led  the  Ilomans  through  his  own  ele- 
ment to  victory.     New  Carthage,  the  key  of  Spain,  the 
basis  of  the  operations  against  Italy,  was  taken,  and  the 
issue  of  the  Spanish  war  was  determined. 

VOL.  II.  A  A 


854  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK         On  the  occasion  of  the  taking  of  New  Carthage,  Polybius 
-      /    ^  relates  the  Eoman  custom  observed  in  the  plundering  of 


Roman        ^  town  taken  by  storm.*     He  tells  us  that  for  a  time  the 
regulations  soldiers  used  to  cut  down  every  living  creature  they  met, 
Back  of        not    men    only,   but  even    brute    animals.     When   this 
towns.         butchery  had  lasted  as  long  as  the  commander  thought 
proper,  a  signal  was  given  to  call  the  soldiers  back  from 
it,  and  then  the  plundering  began.     Only  a  portion  of  the 
army,  never  more  than  one-half,  was  allowed  to  plunder, 
lest  during  the  inevitable  disorder  the  safety  of  the  whole 
might  be  compromised.   But  the  men  selected  for  plunder- 
ing a  town  were  not  allowed  to  keep  anything  for  them- 
selves.    They  were  obliged  to  give  up  what  they  had 
taken,  and  the  booty  was  equally  distributed  among  all 
the  troops,  including  even  the  sick  and  wounded. 
Disposal         The  commanding  general  had  a  right  of  disposing  of 
booty.        the  whole  of  the  booty  as  he  deemed  proper.    He  could,  if 
he  liked,  reserve  the  whole,  or  a  part  of  it,  for  the  public 
treasury.     If  he  did  so,  he  made  himself  of  course  ob- 
noxious, like  Camillus  in  the  old  legend,  to  the  soldiers ; 
and  it  seems  that,  in  the  time  of  the  Punic  wars,  it  was 
the  general  practice  to  leave  the  booty  to  the  troops.    Only 
a  portion  of  it — more  especially  the  military  chest,  maga- 
zines, materials  of  war,  works  of  art,  and  captives — was 
taken  possession  of  by  the  quaestor  for  the  benefit  of  the 
state.    The  rest  was  given  to  the  soldiers,  and  served  as 
a  compensation  and  reward  for  the  dangers  and  hardships 
of  the  service,  which  were  very  inadequately  rewarded  by 
the  military  pay. 
Plunder  of       The  booty  made  at  New  Carthage  was  very  considerable. 

^Tatv  Car*         I 

thage.  This  town  had  been  the  principal  military  storehouse  of 
the  Carthaginians  in  Spain,  and  contained  hundreds  of 
baUistse,  catapults,  and  other  engines  of  war  with  pro- 
jectiles, large  sums  of  money,  and  quantities  of  gold  and 
silver,  eighteen  ships,  besides  materials  for  building  and 

>  Polybius,  X.  15,  §  4:  'O  9>  n6ir\ios  ivtl  roi)i  tlfftXiiXvd^as  it^to^pw 
iwtXdfi^t  elKoi,  rohs  fi^y  wAeiVroi/s  i<l>riKt  Korh  rh  itap*  ovroti  Wof  M  roits  iw 
Tp    irrfXei    irapayyei\as     Krfii/§iv    rhy    Traparvx^yra     Kal     firiifyhs 


B.C. 


THE  SECOND  Pl^IC  WAR.  365 

equipping  sliips.^  The  prisoners  were  of  especial  value,  chap. 
The  garrison,  it  is  true,  was  not  numerous,  and  had  no  *- — ^-1-^ 
doubt  been  reduced  by  the  fight;*  but  among  the  prisoners  ;^^^^ 
was  Hanno,  the  commander,  two  members  of  the  smaller  211-207 
Carthaginian  council  or  executive  board,  and  fifteen  of 
the  senate,  who  represented  the  Carthaginian  government 
in  the  field.  All  these  were  sent  to  Borne.  The  inhabi- 
tants of  the  town  who  had  escaped  the  massacre,  10,000 
in  number,  as  it  is  stated,  might  have  been  sold  as  slaves, 
according  to  the  ancient  right  of  war,  but  were  allowed 
by  Scipio  to  retain  their  liberty ; '  several  thousand  skilled 
workmen,  who  had  been  employed  in  the  dockyards  and 
arsenals,  as  ship-carpenters,  armourers,  or  othenvise,  were 
kept  in  the  same  capacity,  and  were  promised  their  free- 
dom if  they  served  the  republic  faithfully  and  effectually. 
The  strongest  of  the  prisoners  Scipio  mixed  up  with 
the  crews  of  his  fleet,  and  was  thus  enabled  to  man  the 
eighteen  captured  vessels.  These  men  also  received 
the  promise  that,  if  they  conducted  themselves  well, 
they  should  receive  their  freedom  at  the  end  of  the  war. 
But  the  most  precious  part  of  the  booty  consisted  of 
the  hostages  of  several  Spanish  tribes,  who  had  been  kept 
in  custody  in  New  Carthage.*  Scipio  hoped  by  their 
means  to  gain  the  friendship  of  those  subjects  or  allies  of 
Carthage  for  whose  fidelity  they  were  to  be  a  pledge.  He 
treated  them  therefore  with  the  greatest  kindness^  and 
told  them  that  their  fate  depended  entirely  on  the  conduct 

'  As  usual  there  is  a  great  dirergenco  in  the  numbers  given  by  the  different 
writers.  According  to  Silenus,  the  Bomans  took  sixty  scorpions  (a  kind  of 
balUsta).  Valerius  Antias  raises  this  number  to  19,000.  No  wonder  that 
Livy,  who  could  digest  a  good  deal  of  exaggeration,  exclaims  (xxvi.  49) : 
*  Adeo  nullus  mentiendi  modus  est ! ' — Compare  Livy,  xxvi.  47  ;  Polybius, 
X.  17. 

^  The  same  uncertainty  as  to  numbers  meets  us  here  again.  Polybius 
states  the  number  to  have  been  1 ,000,  others  2,000,  7,000,  and  even  as  many  as 
10,000.— Livy,  xxvi.  49. 

'  Polybius,  X.  17,  §  8 :  oJhoi  iily  oZy  &fia  Baucp^omfs  Koi  x^P^^^^^  ^'"^  "^V 
ir(tpa86^<p  rrjs  fformpiat  irpoCKvirfiiTayrti  rhy  arparTiyhy  iif\(t$ii(ray, 

*  Polybius,  X.  18.  According  to  Livy  (xxvi.  49),  the  number  of  these 
hostages  varies  in  different  authors  between  300  and  3,724  !  No  wonder  that 
Livy  says,  *  Quantus  numerus  fuerit  piget  scribere.' 

A  A    2 


356 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Personal 
anecdotes 
of  Scipio. 


of  their  countrymen,  and  that  he  would  send  them  all 
home  if  he  could  be  assured  of  the  good  disposition  of  the 
Spanish  peoples.* 

The  narrative  of  the  conquest  of  New  Carthage  is 
adorned  with  some  anecdotes,  the  object  of  which  is  to  extol 
the  generosity,  the  delicacy  of  feeling,  and  the  self-control 
of  the  great  Scipio.  According  to  one  of  these  stories,' 
there  was  among  the  hostages  a  venerable  matron,  the 
vrife  of  the  Spanish  chief  Mandonius,  the  brother  of 
Indibilis,  king  of  the  Hergetes,  and  several  of  the  youthful 
daughters  of  the  latter.  These  ladies  had  been  treated 
with  indignity  by  the  Carthaginians,  but  the  sense  of 
female  modesty  at  first  kept  the  noble  matron  from  ex- 
pressing in  distinct  words  her  wish  that  the  Romans  would 
treat  them  more  as  became  their  rank,  age,  and  sex.  Scipio, 
with  fine  discrimination,  guessed  what  she  hardly  ventured 
to  pray  for,  and  granted  the  request. 

Again,  when  his  soldiers,  bringing  to  him  a  Spanish  lady, 
remarkable  for  her  dazzling  beauty,  desired  him  to  take  ber 
as  a  prize  worthy  of  himself  alone,  he  caused  the  damsel 
to  be  restored  to  her  father,  subduing  a  passion  which  had 
often  triumphed  over  the  greatest  heroes,  and  from  which  he 
himself  was  by  no  means  exempt.  This  story,  related  in 
its  credible  simplicity  by  Polybius,  was  further  enlarged 
and  adorned  by  Livy,  who  speaks  of  the  lady  as  the  be- 
trothed of  a  powerful  Spanish  prince,  to  whom  Scipio,  like 
the  hero  in  a  play,  restores  her  unharmed,  with  aU  the 
pathos  of  conscious  virtue  and  youthful  enthusiasm.  The 
rich  presents  which  her  parents  had  brought  for  her  ransom 
Scipio  gives  to  the  happy  bridegroom,  as  an  addition  to  her 
dowry.     The  Spaniard  reveres  Scipio  like  a  god,  and  finaUy 

'  Livy  (xzvi.  49)  makes  Scipio  address  the  hostages  in  the  following  words : 
'  Vcnisse  eos  in  populi  Eomani  potestatem  qui  beneficio  quam  metu  obligare 
homines  malit  extersisque  gentes  fide  ac  societate  rinctas  habere  quam  tristi 
siibiectas  senritio.*  How  could  any  Eoman,  who  knew  and  composed  the 
history  of  his  country,  write  these  words  I  Had  lAvy  forgotten,  what  he 
himself  so  often  relates,  that  the  Romans  were  in  the  habit  of  taking  hostages, 
not  only  from  recently  conquered  barbarians,  but  from  their  old  Italian  allies  ? 
(Compare  Livy,  rxv.  7  ;  xxix.  3) ;  and  what  else  was  it  but  a  *  triste 
servitium '  that  drove  the  subjected  people  of  Sicily  and  Sardinia  to  rebellion? 

*  Polybius,  X.  18.     Livy,  xxvi.  49. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  857 

joins  tlie  Boman  army  as  a  faithful  ally,  at  the  head  of  a     CHAP. 

VTTT 

picked  body  of  1,400  horse.  If  we  compare  the  simple  story  •_^ 

of  Polybius  with  the  little  novel  into  which  it  is  worked     j^'^"^ 
up  by  Livy,  we   may  in  some  measure  understand  how    211-207 
many  stories  were  expanded  by  a  natural  process  of  gradual       "'^' 
growth  and  development.     The  characteristics  of  fiction 
are  often  unmistakable,  but  it  is  not  often  possible  to 
lay  them  bare  by  documentary  evidence.     If  our  sources 
could  be  traced  even  beyond  Polybius,  we  should  perhaps 
find  that  the  whole  story  of  Scipio's  generosity  towards 
captured  ladies  emanates  from  the  desire  of  comparing 
him  with  Alexander  the  Great,  who  in  a  similar  manner 
treated  the  family  of  Darius  after  the  battle  of  Issos.^ 

In  the  narrative  of  the  great  Hannibalian  war,  which  was  Effects  of 
carried  on  simultaneously  in  so  many  different  parts,  we  New  Car- 
cannot  sometimes  avoid  shifting  the  scenes  suddenly,  and  thage. 
turning  our  attention  away  from  events  before  they  have 
reached  a  sort  of  natural  conclusion.     The  taking  of  New 
Carthage  determined  the  fate  of  the  Carthaginian  dominion 
in  Spain,  which  now  rested  on  the  distant  town  of  Gades 

*  That  thiB  comparison  is  at  the  bottom  of  the  whole  story  seems  to  result 
from  a  passage  of  Gellius  (vi.  8,  3) :  '  Lepida  qasestio  agitari  potest,  utrum 
videri  continentiorem  par  sit,  Publiumne  Africanum  Superiorem,  qui  Cartha- 
giue,  ampla  civitate  in  Hispania,  ezpugnata,  virginem  tempestivam  forma 
egregia,  nobilis  viri  Hispani  iiliam,  captam  perductamque  ad  se,  patri  in- 
violatam  reddidit;  an  regem  Alexandrum,  qui  Darii  regis  uzorem,  eandemque 
eiasdem  sororem,  proelio  magno  captam,  q\iam  esse  audiebat  exsuperanti 
forma,  ndere  noluit,  producique  ad  se  prohibuit.'  That  the  alleged  occurrence 
is  not  a  historical  fact,  but  a  mere  fiction,  follows  from  the  freedom  with  which 
Valerius  Antias  (not  a  very  trustworthy  author,  it  is  true)  relates  (according  to 
Gellius,  loc,  cit.)  the  very  opposite,  viz. :  '  Earn  puellam  non  redditam  patri, 
sed  retentam  a  Scipione  atque  in  deliciis  amoribusque  ab  eo  usurpatam/  It 
appears  that  Scipio's  virtue  was,  even  in  his  own  lifetime,  not  in  good  odour. 
If  his  friends  tried  to  give  vouchers  for  it,  by  such  stories  as  the  one  in 
question,  his  enemies  gave  them  a  wrong  turn,  which  made  them  prove  the 
very  opposite ;  and  they  could  refer  as  to  an  admitted  fact,  ^lAcryvi^y  cimi 
rhy  U6ir\toy  (Polybius,  z.  19,  §  3 ;  compare  Gellius,  vi.  8),  a  circumstance 
without  which  the  whole  story  would  be  without  a  point.  In  conclusion,  let 
us  remark  that  it  is  difficult  to  see  where  and  how  the  '  Eoman  youths '  got 
possession  of  the  noble  Spanish  lady.  If  she  was  one  of  the  hostages,  as  we 
may  infer,  she  oould  not,  as  a  chance  captive,  fall  into  the  hands  of  some 
chance  captors,  but  was,  by  her  position,  secured  from  the  brutal  treatment  to 
which  Scipio's  yonng  friends  destined  her. 


358 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Disposi- 
tion of  the 
Italian 
towns. 


Difficulties 
of  Hanni- 
bal's posi- 
tion. 


Betrayal  of 
Salapia  to 
Harcellus. 


alone ;  but  before  we  can  trace  the  sequel  of  events  which 
led  to  the  total  expulsion  of  the  Carthaginians,  we  must 
watch  the  progress  of  the  war  in  Italy,  where,  as  long  as 
Hannibal  commanded  an  unconquered  Punic  army,  the 
Bomans  had  still  most  to  fear  and  the  Carthaginians  to 
hope. 

The  re-conquest  of  Capua  in  211  B.C.  was  by  far  the 
most  decisive  success  which  the  Roman  arms  had  gained 
in  the  whole  course  of  the  war.  With  Capua  Hannibal 
lost  the  most  beautifnl  fruit  of  his  greatest  victory.  He 
had  now  no  longer  any  stronghold  in  Campania,  and  was 
in  consequence  obliged  to  retire  into  the  southern  parts  of 
the  peninsula.  It  became  more  and  more  difficult  for  him 
to  maintain  the  Italian  towns  that  had  joined  him.  The 
Italians  had  lost  confidence  in  his  star.  Everywhere  the 
adherents  of  Rome  gained  ground,  and  the  temptation 
became  greater  to  purchase  her  forgiveness  by  a  timely 
return  to  obedience,  coupled,  if  possible,  with  a  betrayal 
of  the  Punic  garrisons. 

Thus  Hannibal's  ingenious  plan  of  overpowering  Borne 
with  the  aid  of  her  allies  had  failed.  How  could  he  now 
hope,  after  the  fall  and  dreadful  punishment  of  Capua,  to 
win  over  the  smaller  Italian  towns  which  had  hitherto 
remained  faithful  to  Rome?  Those  who  had  previously 
rebelled  he  could  protect  only  by  strong  detachments  of 
his  army  from  internal  treason  and  from  the  attacks  of 
enemies  without.  But  he  could  not  spare  the  men 
necessary  for  such  a  service,  and  he  did  not  like  to 
expose  his  best  troops  to  the  danger  of  being  betrayed 
and  cut  off  in  detail.  It  seemed,  therefore,  advisable 
rather  to  give  up  untenable  towns  voluntarily  than  to  risk 
the  safety  of  valuable  troops  in  their  defence. 

The  necessity  of  such  measures  became  apparent  by  the 
treason  which  in  the  year  210  delivered  Salapia  into  the 
hands  of  the  Romans.  Salapia,  one  of  the  larger  towns  of 
Apulia,  had  joined  the  cause  of  Hannibal  soon  after  the 
battle  of  Cannse.  It  contained  a  garrison  of  five  hundred 
picked  Numidians.     After  the  fall  of  Capua,  tlie  Roman 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  359 

party  in  Salapia  regained  confidence  and  strength,  and     CHAP. 

succeeded  in  betraying  the  town  to  the  consul  Marcellus,  > ,-L^ 

on  which  occasion  the  brave  Numidians  were  cut  down  to  p^^„ 
the  last  man.^  Marcellus,  who  was  consul  for  the  fourth  211-207 
time,*  had  the  conduct  of  the  war  in  Italy,  whilst  his 
colleague,  M.  Valerius  Lsevinus,  brought  the  war  in  Sicily 
to  a  close  by  the  conquest  of  Agrigentum.'  After  gaining 
possession  of  Salapia,  he  marched  to  Samnium,  where  he 
took  a  few  insignificant  places,  and  the  Carthaginian 
magazines  which  they  contained/ 

Whilst  he  was  here  occupied  with  operations  of  little  Defeat  of 

Cn  Ful 

moment,  and  apparently  paid  little  attention  to  Hannibal's  ^^^  Cen- 
movements,  and  to  acting  in  concert  with  the  prsetor  tuiimlus 
Cn.  Fulvius  Centumalus,  who  commanded  two  legions  nea. 
in  Apulia,  the  latter  officer  and  his  army  paid  dearly  for 
the  negligence  and  unskilful  strategy  which  again  marked 
the  divided  command  of  the  Boman  generals.  He  lay 
encamped  near  Herdonea,  a  town  of  Apulia,  which,  like 
Salapia,  had  joined  the  Punians  after  the  battle  of  Cannse. 
By  the  co-operation  of  the  Roman  party  in  the  place,  he 
hoped  to  gain  possession  of  it.  But  Hannibal,  far  away 
in  Bruttium,  had  been  informed  of  the  peril  in  which  the 
town  was  placed.  After  a  rapid  march  he  appeared 
unexpectedly  before  the  Roman  camp.  By  what  stratagem 
he  succeeded  in  drawing  Fulvius  from  his  safe  position, 
or  in  forcing  him  from  it,  we  are  not  informed.  It  is  not 
at  all  likely  that,  as  Livy  relates,  the  Roman  prsetor 
voluntarily  accepted  battle,  confident  in  his  own  strength.* 
By  a  most  extraordinary  coincidence,  it  happened  that, 
in  the  same  place  where,  two  years  before,  Hannibal  had 

*  Livy,  xxri.  38. 

*  This  is  correct,  if  the  consulship  of  215  is  reckoned,  wliich  Marcellus 
was  obliged  to  lay  down  immediately  after  his  election,  as  '  vitio  creatus.* 

*  See  above,  p.  313. 

^  These  places — Marmorea  and  Moles  (Livy,  zzvii.  1) — are  not  mentioned 
anywhere  else. 

*  Livy,  zxvii.  1 :  '  Pari  audacia  Homanus  copiis  raptim  eductis  confiixit.' 
The  reason  why  Fulvius  could  not  avoid  a  battle  may  perhaps  be  looked  for 
in  the  circumstance  mentioned  by  Livy  {too,  ciL),  that  the  Koman  camp  was 
'  nee  loco  satis  tuto  posita  nee  prsesidiis  firmata.' 


360  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  defeated  the  proprsetor  Fulvius  Placcus,  he  was  now 
^  .  •  /  again  opposed  to  a  Fulvius.  The  happy  omen  which  lay 
■  in  this  casual  identity  of  name  and  place  was  improved 
by  Hannibal's  genius  to  lead  to  a  second  equally  brilliant 
victory.  The  Boman  army  was  utterly  routed,  the  camp 
taken,  7,000  men,  or,  according  to  another  report,  13,000 
men,  were  slain,  among  them  eleven  military  tribunes 
and  the  prsetor  Cn.  Fulvius  Centumalus  himself.  It 
was  a  victory  worthy  to  be  compared  with  the  great 
triumphs  of  the  first  three  glorious  years  of  the  war. 
Again  it  was  shown  that  Hannibal  was  irresistible  in  the 
field,  and  again  Bome  was  plunged  into  mourning,  and 
people  looked  anxiously  into  the  future  when  they  re- 
flected that  not  even  the  loss  of  Capua  had  broken 
Hannibal's  courage  or  strength,  and  that  he  was  more 
terrible  now  and  in  the  possession  of  a  larger  part  of  Italy 
than  after  the  day  of  Cannse. 
Destpuc-  Yet  Hannibal  was  far  from  overrating  his  success.     He 

Heritea  ^^^  «»**'  ^^  ^pi^  of  his  victory,  he  was  unable  to  hold 
by  Hanni-  Herdonca  for  any  long  time.  Accordingly  he  punished 
with  death  the  leaders  of  the  Soman  faction  in  the  town, 
who  had  carried  on  negotiations  with  Fulvius.  He  then 
set  the  town  on  fire,  and  removed  the  inhabitants  to 
Thurii  and  Metapontum.*  This  done,  he  went  in  search 
of  the  second  Roman  army  in  Samnium,  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  consul  M.  Claudius  Marcellus. 
Operations  Whether  Marcellus  might  have  prevented  the  defeat  of 
cdSw '^'  Fulvius  is  a  question  which  we  do  not  venture  to  decide. 
But  it  is  quite  evident,  even  from  the  scanty  and  falsified 
reports  of  his  alleged  heroic  exploits,  that,  after  the 
disaster,  he  did  not  venture,  with  his  consular  army  of  two 
legions,  to  oppose  Hannibal.  The  boastful  language  with 
which  Livy  introduces  these  reports  seems  to  indicate  that 
they  were  taken  from  the  laudatory  speeches  preserved  in 
the  family  archives.  Marcellus,  it  is  said,  sent  a  letter  to 
Bome,  requesting  the  senate  to  dismiss  all  fear,  for  that 

'  Livy,  xxvii.  1. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  361 

he  was  still  the  same  who  after  the  battle  of  Cannae  had  so     CHAP, 
roughly  handled  Hannibal;  he  would  at  once  march  against 


him,  and  take  care  that  his  joy  should  be  short-lived.*    The     J^^^ 
hostile  armies  met  indeed  at  Numistro,  an  utterly  unknown    211-207 
place — perhaps  in  Lucania^ — and  a  fierce  battle  ensued,       ^'^' 
which,  according  to  Livy,  lasted  without  a  decision  into  the 
night.  On  the  following  day,  it  is  further  reported,  Hannibal 
did  not  venture  to  renew  the  struggle,  so  that  the  Eomans 
remained  in  possession  of  the  field  and  were  able  to  bum 
their  dead,  whilst  Hannibal,  under  cover  of  the  subsequent 
night,  withdrew  to  Apulia,  pursued  by  the  Bomans.     He 
was  overtaken  near  Yenusia,  and  here  several  engagements 
took  place,  which  were  of  no  great  importance,  but  on  the 
whole  ended  favourably  for  the  Eomans. 

It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  the  account  of  these 
events  by  Polybius  is  lost.  Yet  we  are  not  altogether 
deprived  of  the  means  of  rectifying  the  palpable  boastings 
of  the  annalists  whom  Livy  followed.  Frontinus,  a  military 
writer  of  the  first  century  after  Christ,  has  by  chance 
preserved  an  account  of  the  battle  of  Numistro,  from  which 
we  learn  that  it  ended,  not  with  a  victory,  but  with  a 
defeat  of  Marcellus.®  So  barefaced  were  the  lies  of  the 
family  panegyrists  even  at  this  time,  and  so  greedily  and 
blindly  did  the  majority  of  historians,  in  their  national 
vanity,  adopt  every  report  which  tended  to  glorify  the 
Eoman  arms!  The  whole  success  of  which,  in  truth, 
Marcellus  could  boast  was,  in  all  likelihood,  this — that  his 
army  was  spared  such  a  calamity  as  had  befallen  Flaccus 
and  Centamalus.  The  year  passed  away  without  further 
military  events  in  Italy.     But  at  sea  the  Eomans  sustained  Defeat  of 

Art      1      'xi-  •   •  J     j_»       J  j»      ii  •  the  Roman 

fleet  with  provisions,  destined  for  the  garrison  flp^t  by  the 

of  the  citadel  of  Tarentum,  and  convoyed  by  thirty  ships  Taren- 

tines. 

>  Livy,  xxvii.  2  :  '  Enndem  se,  qui  post  CannenBem  pugnam  ferocem  yictoria 
Hannibalem  contudisset,  ire  adversus  euro,  brevem  illi  Iseiitiam  qua  exult  et 
fiituram.* 

•  Pliny,  Eist  Nat,  iii.  15. 

'  Frontinus,  Strategem,  ii.  2,  6 :  '  Hannibal  apud  Numistroni^m  contra  Mar- 
cellum  pugnaturus  caras  et  prseruptas  vias  obiccit  a  latere  ipsaque  loci  natura 
pro  munimento  usus  clarissimum  ducom  vicit/ 


862  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     of  war,  was  attacked  by  a  Tarentine  squadron  nnder  Demo- 


IV. 


'  krates,  and  completely  defeated.'     Yet  this  event  had  no 
essential  influence  on  the  state  of  things  in  Tarentum. 
The  Eoman  garrison  of  the  citadel,  though  pressed  very 
hard,  held  out  manfully,  and  by  occasional  sallies  inflicted 
considerable  loss  on  the  besiegers.  We  must  presume  that 
provisions  were  from  time  to  time  thrown  into  the  place. 
Under  these    circumstances  the    Bomans   could  calmly 
maintain    their  position,   whilst  the  populous  town   of 
Tarentum,  whose  trade,  industry,  and  agriculture  were 
paralysed,  felt  the  garrison  of  the  citadel  like  a  thorn  in 
the  flesh. 
Pressure  of      The  year  210,  as  we  have  seen,  had  produced  no  material 
the  Ro-  °"  change  in  the  situation  of  affairs  in  Italy.   The  re-conquest 
mans.         of  Salapia  and  a  few  insignificant  places  in  Samnium  was 
amply  compensated  by  the  defeats  which  the  Romans  sus- 
tained by  land  and  sea.     Hannibal,  though  driven  out  of 
Campania,  was  still  master  of  southern  Italy.    The  Romans 
had  indeed  put  two  legions  less  into  the  field — twenty-one 
instead  of  twenty-three — but  a  permanent  reduction  of 
the  burdens  of  war  was  out  of  the  question  as  long  as 
Hannibal    held  his   ground  in    Italy  unconquered  and 
threatening  as  before.     The  war  had  now  lasted  for  eight 
years.     The  exhaustion  of  Italy  became  visibly  greater. 
All  available  measures  had  already  been  taken  to  procure 
money  and  men.      The  foremost  senators  now  set  the 
example  of  contributing  their  gold  and  silver  as  a  voluntary 
loan  for  the  purpose  of  equipping  and  manning  a  new 
fleet.^    At  length  the  government  appropriated  a  reserve 
fund  of  4,000  pounds  of  gold,  which  had  in  better  times 
been  laid  by  for  the  last  necessities  of  the  state.' 

'  Livy,  xxTiii.  39.  *  Iiivy*  xxvi.  35. 

*  Livy,  xxvrii.  10.  The  'aarum  Ticesimarum  *  consisted  of  the  proceeds  of  a 
tax  of  five  per  cent,  of  the  value  of  manumitted  slaves,  which  had  been 
imposed  357  B.C.,  in  an  eltraordinarj  manner,  bj  a  popular  vote,  according  to 
tribes  in  the  camp  before  Sutrium.  That  the  proceeds  of  this  tax  vrere 
intended  to  be  used  for  the  formation  of  a  reserve  fund  was  not  mentioned 
previously,  but  comes  out  casually  on  the  present  occasion.  There  is  some* 
thing  strange,  not  to  say  mysterious,  about  the  whole  story.    Again,  there  ia 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  868 

Ab  long  as  the  undaunted  spirit  of  Boman  pride  and     CHAP, 
determination  animated  the  state,  there  was  hope  that  all 


the  great  sacrifices  had  not  been  made  in  vain.     Up  to     ]^'™ 
the  present  moment  this  spirit  had  stood  all  tests.     The    211-207 
defection  of  several  of  the  allies  seemed  only  to  have  the       ^'^' 
effect  of  uniting  the  others  more  firmly  to  Eome,  espe-  J^^"^  ^^ 
cially  the  Roman  citizens  themselves  and  the  Latins,  who  Latin  colo- 
on  all  occasions  had  shown  themselves   as  brave   and  "onti^ute 
patriotic  as  the  genuine  Romans.     But  now,  in  the  year  men  and 
209,  when  the  consuls  called  upon  the  Latins  to  furnish  tho"war°' 
more  troops  and  money,  the  delegates  of  twelve  Latin 
colonies  formally  declared  that  their  resources  were  com- 
pletely exhausted,  and  that  they  were  unable  to  comply 
with  the  request.    This  declaration  was  no  less  unexpected 
than  alarming.     When  the  consuls  made  their  report  to 
the  senate  of  the  refusal  of  the  twelve  colonies,  and  added 
that  no  arguments  and  exhortations  had  the  least  effect 
upon  the  delegates,  then  the  boldest  men  in  that  stubborn 
assembly  began  to  tremble,  and  those  who  had  not  de- 
spaired after  the  battle  of  Oannse  almost  resigned  them- 
selves to  the  inevitable  downfall  of  the  commonwealth. 
How  was  it  possible  that  Rome  should  be  saved  if  the 
remaining  colonies  and  allies  should  follow  the  example 
of  the  twelve,  and  if  all  Italy  should  conspire  to  abandon 
Rome  in  this  hour  of  need  ?* 

The    fate   of   Rome  was    trembling  in  the    balance.  Serions- 
Hannibal's  calculations  had   so  far  proved   correct  that  ^essofthe 

^         ,  crisis. 

now  even  the  Roman  senate  feared  that  his  plan  must  be 
realised.  The  fabric  of  Roman  power  had  not,  it  is  true, 
yielded  to  one  blow,  nor  even  to  repeated  blows ;  but  the 
miseries  of  a  war  protracted  through  so  many  years  had 
graduaUy  undermined  the  foundations  on  which  it  rested, 
and  the  moment  seemed  approaching  when  it  would 
collapse  with  a  sudden  crash. 
Everything    depended    on    the     attitude   which    the  ' 

no  mention  of  the  Gaulish  ransom,  which  Camilliis  is  reported  to  have  re- 
captured and  deposited  on  the  Capitol — a  certain  proof  that  no  such  sum 
existed.     See  vol.  i.  p.  273.  '  Li^y.  zxvii.  9. 


364  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     remaining  eighteen  Latin   colonies    would  assume. '    If 
they  followed  the  example  of  the  twelve,  it  was  clear  that 


Fidelity  of  ^^  further  reliance  could  be  placed  on  the  other  allies,  and 
the  re-  Eome  would  be  compelled  to  sue  for  peace.  But  forfcim- 
eighteen  ately  this  humiliation  was  not  in  store  for  her.  Marcus 
^lonies  Sextilius  of  PregellsB  declared,  in  the  name  of  the  other 
colonies,  that  thej  were  ready  to  furnish  not  only  their 
customary  and  legal  contingent  of  soldiers,  but  even  a 
greater  number,  if  necessary ;  and  that  at  the  same  time 
they  were  not  wanting  in  means,  and  still  less  in  the  will, 
to  execute  any  other  order  of  the  Soman  people.*  The 
deputies  of  the  eighteen  colonies  were  introduced  into  the 
senate  by  the  consuls,  and  received  the  thanks  of  that 
venerable  assembly.  The  Soman  people  formally  ratified 
the  decree  of  the  senate  and  added  its  own  thanks ;  and 
indeed  never  had  any  people  more  cause  for  gratitude,  and 
never  was  the  expression  of  public  thanks  more  amply 
deserved  than  by  the  eighteen  faithful  colonies.  Their 
firmness  saved  Rome,  if  not  from  utter  destruction  (for  no 
doubt  Hannibal  would  now,  as  after  the  battle  of  Cannse, 
have  been  ready  to  grant  peace  on  equitable  terms), 
at  any  rate  from  the  loss  of  her  commanding  position  in 
Italy  and  in  the  world.  The  names  of  the  eighteen 
colonies  deserved  to  be  engraved  in  golden  letters  on  the 
Capitol.  They  were  Signia,  Norba,  and  Saticula,  three  of 
the  original  cities  of  old  Latium;  Pregellse,  on  the  river 
Liris,  the  apple  of  discord  in  the  second  Samnite  war; 
Luceria  and  Venusia,  in  Apulia;  Brundusium,  Hadria, 
Firmum,  and  Ariminum,  on  the  east  coast;  Pontise,  Psestum, 
and  Cosa,  on  the  western  sea ;  Beneventum,  ^semia,  and 
Spoletium,  in  the  mountainous  district  of  the  interior;  and, 
lastly,  Placentia  and  Cremona  on  the  Po,  the  most  recent 
colonial  foundations,  which  since  Hannibal's  appearance  in 
Italy  had  been  in  constant  danger,  and  had  bravely  and  suc- 
cessfully resisted  all  attacks.  What  caused  the  division 
among  the  thirty  Latin  colonies  is  not  reported  by  our 

'  Li\7,  zxyii.  10. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


365 


informants,  nor  are  we  able  to  guess.  We  find  that,  on 
the  whole,  it  was  the  older  colonies,  lying  nearer  to  Borne, 
which  refused  further  service.  These  were  Ardea,  Nepete, 
Sutrium,  Alba,  Carseoli,  Sora,  Suessa,  Circeii,  Setia,  Cales, 
Namia,  and  Interamna.  Is  it  possible  that,  because  thej 
were  nearer  to  the  capital,  more  services  had  been  required 
of  them  during  the  war?  or  did  they  feel  more  keenly  than 
the  more  distant  colonies  their  exclusion  from  the  full 
Boman  franchise  ?  We  remember  that,  in  the  third  year 
of  the  war,  Spurius  Carvilius  proposed  in  the  senate  to 
admit  members  to  that  body  from  the  Latin  colonies* 
This  wise  proposal  had  been  rejected  with  Boman 
haughtiness  and  even  indignation.  It  is  not  improbable 
that  Spurius  Carvilius,  before  he  recommended  the  admis- 
sion of  Latins  into  the  Boman  senate,  had  convinced 
himself  that  the  colonists  also  felt  themselves  entitled  to 
a  privilege  which  they  regarded  as  their  right.  Perhaps 
if  his  counsel  had  been  taken,  the  Bomans  would  never 
have  heard  of  a  refusal  of  their  allies  to  bear  their  share 
of  the  burdens  of  the  war.  But,  in  the  total  absence  of 
direct  evidence,  we  cannot  be  sure  that  any  such  dis- 
content caused  the  disobedience  of  the  twelve  colonies. 
The  reason  which  Livy  assigns  seems  inadequate.  He 
relates'  that  the  remnants  of  the  routed  legions  of  Cannse 
and  Herdonea  were  punished  for  their  bad  behaviour  by 
being  sent  to  Sicily  and  condemned  to  serv.e  to  the  end  of 
the  war  without  pay,  under  conditions  that  were  onerous 
and  degrading.  The  majority  of  these  troops,  says  Livy, 
consisted  of  Latins;  and  as  Borne  called  for  new  efforts 
and  sacrifices  year  after  year,  for  more  soldiers  and  more 
money,  whilst  she  kept  the  veterans  in  Sicily,  the  dis- 
content of  the  colonists  swelled  to  positive  resistance. 
The  severity,  or  rather  the  cruelty,  of  Borne  towards  the 
unfortunate  survivors  of  the  defeated  armies  may  well 
have  called  forth  bitter  feelings ;  yet,  as  Borne  treated  her 
own  citizens  with  the  same  severity  as  the  Latins,  and,  as 


CHAP. 

vni. 

— — « — ' 

Fifth 
Period, 
21 1-207 

B.C. 


'  Liry,  zzyii.  9. 


866  KOMAN  mSTORY. 

BOOK     far  as  we  know,  made  no  difference  among  the  varions 
^ — r^ — '   Latin  contingents,  we  fail  to  discover  why  twelve  colonies 
out  of  thirty  considered  themselves  more  especially  ill- 
treated  and  called  npon  to  remonstrate. 

The  thanks  of  the  senate  and  the  Roman  people  awarded 
to  the  staunch  and  faithful  eighteen  colonies  was  the  only 
reproof  which  at  present  was  addressed  to  the  remon- 
strances of  the  others.  With  wise  moderation  Borne 
refirained  from  punishing  them.  The  negotiations  with 
them  were  broken  off.  Their  delegates  received  no  answer 
of  any  kind,  and  left  Borne  with  the  painful  feeling  that 
they  had  indeed  carried  their  point,  but  that  they  had  done 
so  at  the  risk  of  a  severe  retaliation  at  some  future  time, 
which  could  be  averted  only  by  speedy  repentance  and 
redoubled  zeal  in  the  service  of  Bome. 
Roman  The  fiTcat  obicct  of  the  campaimi  in  Italy  was  now  the 

prepara-  "  "^  ,  . 

tioDs  for  re-conquest  of  Tarentum.  Not  less  than  six  legions  were 
conquest  of  ^^®°^®^  nccessary  to  accomplish  this  end,  viz.,  the  armies 
Tarentum.  of  the  two  consuls  of  209 — Q.  Fabius  Maximus  and  Q.  Ful- 
vius  Flaccus — and  a  third  army  of  equal  strength  under 
Marcellus.  Besides  these  forces  there  was  in  Bruttium  a 
body  of  8,000  men,  mostly  irregular  troops,  a  motley  band 
of  Bruttian  deserters,  discharged  soldiers,  and  marauders, 
who,  after  the  ending  of  the  war  in  Sicily,  had  been  col- 
lected there  by  tJie  consul  Valerius  Lsevinus  and  sent  into 
Italy  to  be  let  loose  upon  the  allies  of  Hannibal.  There 
were,  therefore,  altogether  not  less  than  70,000  men  in  the 
south  of  Italy,  a  force  sufi&cient  to  crush  by  its  mere  weight 
any  other  enemy  of  the  numerical  strength  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian army.  But,  even  with  this  vast  superiority  of 
strength,  the  Boman  generals  were  far  from  trying  to 
bring  on  a  decisive  battle.  The  events  of  the  past  year 
had  too  much  revived  the  memory  of  Cannse,  and  no 
Boman  as  yet  ventured  to  run  the  risk  of  a  like  disaster. 
The  plan  of  the  consuls  accordingly  was  to  avoid  pitched 
battles,  and  to  retake  one  by  one  the  fortified  places  which 
had  been  lost — a  process  by  which  Hannibal  would  be  con- 
fined more  and  more  within  a  contracted  territory.     This 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  367 

was  the  plan  which  had  been  snccessfdlly  adopted  after     CHAP. 
Cann83.    Every  deviation  from  it  had  proved  dangerous.  ^_    ,  '^ 
It  was  a  slow  process ;  but,  owing  to  the  preponderance     JF*™ 
of   the    Romans    in    material   resources    and    te    their    211-207 
dogged  perseverance,  it  was  sure  in  the  end  to  lead  to       ^'^' 
victory. 

Whilst  the  consul  Q.  Fabius  Maximus  was  watching  Opemtiong 
Tarentum,  his  colleague  Fulvius  and  the  pro-consul  Mar-  ^^J Mm* 
cellus  had  orders  to  occupy  Hannibal  elsewhere.     Fulvius  cellus. 
marched  through  the  country  of  the  Hirpinians,  and  took 
a  number  of  fortified  places,  the  inhabitants  of  which 
made  their  peace  with  Borne  by  delivering  up  the  Punic 
garrisons.     Marcellus,  exhibiting  more  courage  than  dis- 
cretion,  ventured    to   advance    against    Hannibal   from 
Yenusia ;  but  he  was  so  badly  handled  in  a  series  of  small 
engagements  that  he    was  obliged    to  take  refuge    in 
Yenusia,  and  so  crippled  that  he  was  unable  to  undertake 
anything  for  the  remainder  of  the  year." 

Whilst  Hannibal  was  confronting  Marcellus  in  Apulia,  Capture  of 
a  Boman  force  of  8,000  men  had  issued  from  Bhegium  to  ^  ^ 


man  army 


^  This  is  the  bare  truth,  which  all  the  rhetorical  skill  of  Livy  (xxrii.  12-14) 
and  Plutarch  {Marcdl.  25)  cannot  hide.  According  to  the  narrative  of  the 
annalists,  Marcellus  fought  three  times  with  Hannibal.  The  first  battle  waa 
undecided ;  in  the  second  he  was  defeated ;  on  the  day  following  he  was 
Tictorious,  but  sustained  such  a  heavy  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  that  he 
could  not  pursue  Hannibal,  but  returned  to  Yenusia.  A  victory  on  the  day 
after  a  defeat — ^surely  the  most  difficult  and  the  most  glorious  feat  of  arms, 
especially  in  a  war  with  Hannibal — would  have  been  an  event  in  the  military 
annals  of  Rome  which  would  have  secured  for  Marcellus  not  only  the  grateful 
acknowledgment  of  his  countrymen,  but  immortal  fame.  But,  instead  of  this, 
we  find  (Livy,  xxvii.  20)  that  Marcellus  was  forthwith  accused  in  Home,  by  the 
tribune  C.  Publicius  Bibulus,  of  incompetency  in  the  management  of  the  war, 
and  that  he  found  it  necessary  to  hasten  from  Venusia  to  Borne,  in  order  to 
justify  himself,  and  to  prevent  the  passing  of  a  vote  of  censure,  by  which  he 
was  to  be  deprived  of  his  command.  Bibulus  asserted  (c.  21)  that  his  army 
was  twice  defeated,  and  was  now  passing  the  summer  in  inactivity  at  Yenusia. 
Marcellus  had  so  much  influence  in-  Eome  that  he  succeeded  in  clearing 
himself  of  the  charge,  and  even  secured  his  election  for  the  consulship  of  the 
ensuing  year  (208) ;  nevertheless  it  is  clear  that  the  charge  would  not  have 
been  preferred  if  he  had  been  victorious  against  Hannibal.  We  shall  again 
have  occasion  to  point  to  the  impurity  of  the  sources  from  which  the  reports 
of  the  exploits  of  Marcellus  have  been  drawn. 


Romans. 


868  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     attack  the  city  of  Caulonia  in  Bruttium.*  As  Frederick  the 

' r^ — '   Great,  in  the  eventful  year  1 756,  turned  with  the  rapidity  of 

before  lightning  from  one  defeated  enemy  to  defeat  another,  so 
Caiiionia  Hannibal  suddenly  appeared  before  Caulonia,  and,  after  a 
bai.  ^  short  resistance,  captured  the  whole  of  the  besieging  army. 
This  done,  he  immediately  hastened  towards  Tarentum, 
which  he  hoped  would  hold  out  against  Fabius  Maximus 
until  he  had  repulsed  the  other  hostile  forces. 
Taren^mn  ^  Marching  night  and  day,  he  reached  Metapontum,  where 
to  the  he  received  the  mournful  intelligence  that  Tarentum  had 
been  betrayed  into  the  hands  of  the  Eomans,  Fabius  had 
attacked  Tarentum  on  the  land  side  with  great  vehemence, 
but  without  success.  The  Tarentines,  knowing  full  well 
what  they  had  to  expect  from  Eome  if  their  town  should 
be  retaken,  defended  it  with  desperate  courage.  A  Panic 
garrison  under  Carthalo,  strengthened  by  a  detachment  of 
Bruttians,  shared  the  defence  with  the  citizens.  There 
was  no  prospect  of  taking  the  town  by  force,  and  any  day 
a  Punic  fleet  or  Hannibal's  army  might  be  expected  before 
the  town  to  raise  the  siege.  Under  these  circumstances 
the  cautious  old  Fabius  fcried  the  same  arts  by  which  two 
years  before  Hannibal  had  gained  Tarentum,  The  oflicer 
in  command  of  the  Bruttians  was  bribed  to  let  the  Bomans 
secretly  into  the  town.  Fabius  ordered  a  general  night- 
attack  on  Tarentum  from  the  citadel,  the  inner  harbour, 
and  the  open  sea,  whilst  on  the  land  side,  in  the  east  of 
the  town,  where  the  Bruttians  were  stationed,  he  waited  for 
the  signal  agreed  upon.  While  the  attention  of  the 
besieged  was  directed  to  the  three  parts  of  the  town 
which  were   apparently  most  in  danger,  the   Bruttians 

>  One  half  of  this  army  consisted  of  the  criminalp,  marauders,  and  robbers 
-whom  Leevinus  had  in  the  preceding  year  collected  in  Sicily,  and  sent  over  to 
Bruttium.  See  Livy,  zzvi.  40:  'Quatuor  milia  hominum  erant,  mizti  ex 
omni  cullavione  exules,  obsrati,  capitalia  ausi  plerique  .  .  .  per  latrocinia  et 
rapinam  tole'^ntes  vitam.  Hos  ueque  relinquere  LseTinus  in  insula  tarn 
primum  nova  pace  coalescente  velut  materiam  novandis  rebus  satis  tutum  mtus 
est,  ot  Kheginis  usui  futuri  erant  ad  populandum  Bruttium  agrum,  adsuetam 
latrociniis  quscrentibus  manum.'  Compare  Pulybius,  ix.  27.  This  highly 
characteristic  passage  shows  how  extensively  and  systematically  the  banditti 
war  was  carried  on. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


869 


opened  a  gate ;  the  Eomans  nislied  in,  and  now,  after  a 
short  and  ineffectual  resistance  of  the  Tarentines,  followed 
the  promiscuous  massacre  which  usually  accompanied  the 
taking  of  a  hostile  town  by  Eoman  troops.*  The  victors 
put  to  the  sword  not  only  those  who  still  resisted, 
like  Niko,  the  leader  of  the  treason  by  which  Tarentum 
had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  Hannibal  two  years  before, 
and  Demokrates,  the  brave  commander  of  the  Tarentine 
fleet,  so  recently  victorious  over  that  of  the  Bomans, 
but  also  Carthalo,  the  commander  of  the  Punic  garrison, 
who  had  laid  down  his  arms  and  asked  for  quarter.  In 
fact  they  slew  all  whom  they  met,  even  the  Bruttians  who 
had  let  them  into  the  town,  either,  as  Livy  observes,  by 
mistake,  or  from  old  national  hatred,  or  in  order  to  make 
it  appear  that  Tarentum  was  taken  by  force,  and  not  by 
treason.^  The  captured  town  was  then  given  up  to  be 
plundered.  Thirty  thousand  Tarentines  were  sold  as  slaves 
for  the  benefit  of  the  Eoman  treasury.'  The  quantity  of 
statues,  pictures,  and  other  works  of  art  almost  equalled  the 
booty  of  Syracuse.  All  was  sent  to  Rome ;  only  a  colossal 
statue  of  Jupiter,  the  removal  and  transport  of  which 
proved  too  difficult,  was  left  by  the  generous  Fabius.  He 
would  not,  he  said,  deprive  the  Tarentines  of  their  patron 
deities,  whose  wrath  they  had  experienced.* 

Thus  Tarentum,  which  was,  after  Oapua,  the  most  im- 
portant of  the  Italian  cities  that  had  joined  Carthage, 
was  again  reduced  to  subjection.  The  limits  were  contract- 
ing more  and  more  within  which  Hannibal  could  range 
freely.  The  whole  of  Campania,  Samnium,  and  Lucania, 
almost  all  Apulia,  were  lost.   Even  the  Bruttians,  the  only 

*  See  above,  p.  354. 

'  Compare  Plutarch,  Fabius,  22. 

*  Possibly  the  slaves  found  in  Tarentum  are  included  in  this  number. 

*  According  to  Livy*s  description  (xxvii.  16),  Pabius  took  only  smaller 
statues  and  pictures,  but  no  colossus.  But  Plutarch  (FalnuSf  22)  tells  us  that 
he  caused  a  colossal  statue  of  Hercules  to  be  transported  to  Home,  and  to  be 
put  up  on  the  Capitol.  This  statement  is  confirmed  by  Pliny  (HUt,  Ik'at. 
zzxiv.  7),  who  adds  that  he  left  untouched  a  colossus  of  Jupiter,  the  vork  of 
Lysippus,  on  account  of  its  size  and  the  difficulty  of  moving  it.  Compare 
vol.  i.  p.  5G3,  note  3. 

VOL.  IX.  B  B 


CHAP. 

VUI. 
t — -* 
Fifth 
Pebiod, 
211-207 

B.C. 


Position  of 
HanniVMl 
after  the 
fall  of 
Tarentum. 


870  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  one  of  the  Italian  races  that  had  not  yet  made  their  peace 
<-  / ^.  with  Rome,  began  to  waver  in  their  fidelity  to  him. 
Tarentum  had  been  betrayed  to  the  Eomans  by  the  Bruttian 
corps  of  the  garrison ;  and  the  tempting  offers  of  rulvius, 
who  promised  pardon  for  the  revolt,  were  readily  listened 
to  by  several  chiefs  of  this  half-barbarons  people.*  Rhe- 
gium,  the  important  maritime  town  which  kept  open 
the  communication  with  Sicily,  and,  in  conjunction  with 
Messana,  closed  the  straits  to  the  Carthaginian  ships,  had 
always  remained  in  the  possession  of  the  Romans.  The 
impoverished  Greek  towns  and  the  narrow  strip  of  land 
from  Lucania  to  Sicily  were  all  that  was  left  to  Hannibal 
of  the  promising  acquisitions  made  after  the  first  few 
brilliant  campaigns.  Pushed  back  into  this  comer,  like 
the  Duke  of  Wellington  behind  the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras, 
the  unconquered  and  undaunted  Hannibal  waited  for  the 
moment  when,  in  conjunction  with  his  brother,  whom  he 
expected  from  Spain,  he  could  with  renewed  vigour  assail 
Rome  and  force  her  to  make  peace. 
Fifth  The  taking  of  Tarentum  at  the  same  time  with  the  fiaJl 

of  MftTCci-  ^^  ^^^  Carthage  was  a  compensation  for  the  efforts  and 
lu»-  .  losses  of  the  year  209.  The  remainder  of  this  year  passed 
^without  any  further  military  events,  and  for  the  succeeding 
year,  as  has  been  already  stated,  MarceUus  was  for  the 
fifth  time  raised  to  the  consulship.  His  colleague  was  T. 
Quinctius  Crispinus,  one  of  the  many  Roman  nobles  whose 
names  call  forth  no  distinct  pictures  in  our  imagination, 
because  they  mark  nothing  but  the  average  mediocrity  of 
their  class.  The  campaign  of  this  year  had  for  its  object, 
as  it  appears,  the  re-conquest  of  Locri,  the  most  important 
of  the  towns  still  in  Hannibal's  possession.  The  Romans 
steadily  adhered  to  their  plan  of  avoiding  battles  as  much 
as  possible,  and  of  depriving  the  enemy  of  his  means  for 
continuing  the  war  in  Italy  by  taking  from  him  the  sup- 
port of  fortified  places.  Seven  legions  and  a  fleet  were 
destined  to  operate  for  this  end  in  the  south  of  Italy. 

*  Livy,  xxvii.  15. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  871 

Whilst  the  two  consuls,  with  two  consular  armies,  covered     CHAP, 
in  the  rear  by  a  legion  in  Campania,  occupied  Hannibal,  ^  _    }    ^ 
Q.  Claudius,  who  commanded  two  legions  in  Tarentum,  was    ^'"'h 
ordered  to  advance  on  Locri  by  land,  and  L.  Cincius  was    211-207 
to  sail  from  Sicily  with  a  fleet  and  attack  Locri  from  the       ^^* 
sea  side.  Hannibal,  who  was  opposing  the  combined  armies 
of  the  consuls,  was  informed  of  the  march  of  the  Boman 
army  along  the  coast  from  Tarentum  to  Locri.    He  sur- 
prised it  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Petelia  and  inflicted  a 
severe  defeat,  killing  several  thousands  and  driving  the 
remainder  in  a  disorderly  flight  back  to  Tarentum.* 

Thus,  for  the  present,  Locri  was  out  of  danger,  and  Dw^th  of 
Hannibal  was  at  leisure  to  turn  against  the  two  consuls,  "^ 
whom  he  hoped  to  force  to  accept  a  decisive  battle.  But 
MarceUus  and  Crispinus  were  resolved  to  be  cautious. 
They  were  not  going  to  allow  Hannibal  to  try  one  of  his 
stratagems  and  to  catch  them  in  a  trap,  as  he  had  so 
often  done  with  less  experienced  or  less  carefdl  opponents. 
The  sexagenarian  MarceUus  himself  headed  a  recon- 
naissance, accompanied  by  his  colleague,  his  son,  a  number 
of  officers,  and  a  few  hundred  horsemen,  to  explore  the 
country  between  the  Boman  and  the  Carthaginian  camps. 
On  this  expedition  the  brave  old  soldier  met  his  death. 
From  the  wooded  recesses  of  the  hills  in  front  and  in  the 
flank,  Numidian  horsemen  rushed  suddenly  forward.  In 
a  moment  the  consuls'  escort  were  cut  down  or  scattered ; 
Crispinus  and  the  young  MarceUus  escaped,  severely 
wounded,  and  MarceUus  feU  fighting  like  a  brave  trooper, 
closing  his  long  life  in  a  manner  which,  though  it  might 
befit  a  common  soldier,  was  hardly  worthy  of  a  statesman 
and  a  general.  His  magnanimous  enemy  honoured  his 
body  with  a  decent  funeral,  and  sent  the  ashes  to  his  son. 

If  we  calmly  examine  what  is  reported  of  the  virtues  of  Chaniot«T 
MarceUus,  we  shaU  come  to  the  conclusion  that  he  is  one  of  Marcel^ 
of  those  men  who  are  praised  far  beyond  their  merits.  ^^• 
This  is  caused  partly  by  the  circumstance  that,  owing  to 

*  Livy,  xxvii.  26. 
»  11  2 


372  RO:VIAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     the  scarcity  of  men  of  eminent  abilities,  the   Soman 
^^        historians  were  almost  driven  to  speak  in  high  praise  of 
men  scarcely  raised  above  mediocrity,  because  otherwise 
they  would  have  had  nobody  to  compare  with  the  great 
heroes  and  statesmen  of  Greece,  by  whose  greatness  thej 
loved  to  measure  their  own.   If  it  happened  that  a  Eoman 
possessed  a  little  more  than  the  average  amount  of  national 
virtues — if  by  family  connexions,  noble  birth,  and  wealth 
he  was  marked  out  for  the  high  offices  of  state,  and  if  he 
was  fortunate  enough  to  find  on  the  occasion  of  his  funeral 
a  sufiiciently  skilful  and  not  too  bashful  panegyrist,  his 
fame  was  secured  for  ever.    All  these  favourable  circum- 
stances were  combined  in  the  case  of  Marcellus.     He  was 
a  brave  soldier,  a  firm  intrepid  patriot,  and  an  unflinchiug 
enemy  of  the  enemies  of  Some.     But  to  extol  him  as  an 
eminent  general,  or  even  as  a  worthy  opponent  of  Hannibal, 
argues  want  of  judgment  and  personal  or  national  par- 
tiality.    He  was  not  much  better  than  most  of  the  other 
Boman  generals  of  his  time.     The  reports  of  his  victories 
over  Hannibal  are  one  and  all  fictitious.     Thus  much  is 
evident  from  what  has  been  said  before,  for  the  tissue 
of  falsehood  is  after  all  so  thin  that  it  covers  the  truth 
but  imperfectly ;  but  it  can  also  be  proved  from  the  state- 
ment of  Polybius.     This  historian  says,  evidently  for  the 
purpose  of  refuting  assertions  current  in  his  own  time, 
that  Marcellus  never  once  conquered  Hannibal.^    After 
such  emphatic  evidence  as  this,  we  are  allowing  a  great 
deal  if  we  admit  that,  perhaps  once,  or  even  on  several 
occasions,  Marcellus  succeeded  in  thwarting  the  plaus  of 
Hannibal,  by  beating  oflF  attacks  or  withdrawing  from  a 
conflict  without  the  total  rout  of  his  army.     Something  of 
this  sort  must  have  supplied  the  materials  for  exaggera- 
tions for  which  there  may  have  been  some  pretext  or 
excuse.    Accordingly,  if  Cicero  calls  Marcellus  fiery  and 

'  Plutarch  (compare  Pelopid.  et  Marcdl.  1):  Ayvi$eaf  9h  MdpKtWos,  &t  ol 
fiiy  X€p4  UoK^fiiop  Xiyova-ij  ov9k  fijraj  Mmia'fy.  Compare  Cornelias  Nepos, 
Hannib.  6 :  '  Quamdia  in  Italia  fuit  (Hannibal)  nemo  ei  in  acie  restitit,  nemo 
adversus  eum  post  Cannensem  pugnam  in  campo  castra  posuit.* 


B.C. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  373 

dashing,^  he  no  doubt  speaks  the  truth  ;  but  if  he  extols  CHAP, 
his  clemency  towards  the  conquered  Sjracusans,  it  is  clear  ^,_  ^  •_ ^ 
that  he  only  employs  him  as  a  foil  for  the  purpose  of  ^"" 
placing  in  a  more  glaring  light  the  horrible  Tillauy  of  211-207 
Verres.*  How  Marcellus  treated  the  Sicilians  we  learn 
from  the  events  which  followed  the  capture  of  Syracuse. 
He  waS;  in  truth,  a  merciless  destroyer  and  insatiably 
greedy.  When  the  Sicilians  heard  that,  in  the  year  210, 
he  was  again  to  take  the  command  in  their  island,  they 
were  distracted  with  terror  and  despair,  and  declared,  in 
Borne,  that  it  would  be  better  for  them  if  the  sea  were  to 
swallow  them  up,  or  if  the  fiery  lava  of  Mount  ^tna  were 
to  cover  the  land ;  they  assured  the  senate  that  they  would 
much  rather  leave  their  native  country  than  dwell  in  it 
for  anytime  under  the  tyranny  of  Marcellus.*  So  vigorous 
and  so  just  was  the  protest  of  the  Sicilians  that  Marcellus 
was  obliged  to  exchange  provinces  with  his  colleague 
Valerius  Lsevinus,  and  to  take  the  command  in  Italy 
instead  of  Sicily,  which  had  been  awarded  to  him  by  lot. 
That  he  exceeded  the  limits  of  Boman  severity  is  evident 
from  the  decree  of  the  senate,  which,  though  it  does  not 
exactly  censure  his  proceedings  in  Syracuse,  or  annul  the 
arrangements  which  he  had  made,  yet  enjoined  his 
successor  Lsevinus  to  provide  for  the  welfare  of  Syracuse, 
as  far  as  the  interest  of  the  republic  allowed.^  The  old 
Fabius  Maximus  was  surely  a  genuine  Eoman,  but  he 
a<;ted    very    differently    from    Marcellus.      He    warmly 

'  Cicero,  De  Repuh.  y.  8 :  *  acer  et  pngnax/ 

*  Cicero,  Verr,  ii.  2,  2.     Compare  aboTe,  p.  312,  note  3. 

■  Liyy,  xxtI.  29. 
'  *  Livy,  zxtI.  32 :  '  Ut  quod  sine  iactnra  rei  publicse  6eri  posset,  fortunis 
eins  civitatis  consoleret.'  It  appears,  hoirever,  that  the  wretched  people  of 
Syracuse  did  not  gain  much  by  this  humane  injunction.  For  when  Scipio 
came  to  Syracuse  in  205  b.c.,  he  was  assiduous  in  protecting  them  from  the 
continued  rapacity  of  indiridual  Romans,  to  which  they  had  been  exposed. 
LiTy,  zzix.  1 :  *■  Orseci  res  a  quibnsdnm  Italici  generis  eadom  ri,  qua  per  belluni 
cfperant,  retinentibus  concessas  sibi  a  senatu  repetebant.  Scipio  omnium 
primum  ratus  tueri  publicam  fidem,  partim  edicto  partim  iudiciis  etiam  in 
pertinaces  ad  obtinendam  iniuriam  redditis  suas  res  Syracusanis  restituit/  We 
may  perhaps  doubt  if  this  put  an  end  to  the  oppression  of  Syracusans  l>y 
Italians. 


374  BOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     pleaded  in  the  senate  in  favour  of  the  Tarentiiies  whom 
^^ — r^ — f  he  had  reduced,  and  he  shielded  them  from  the  rapacitj 


and  revenge  of  men  who,  like  Marcellus,  delighted  in 
venting  their  evil  passions  on  helpless  foes.*  We  can  see 
clearly  that  public  opinion  no  longer  declared  it  to  be  a 
Boman  virtue  to  treat  conquered  enemies  with  excessive 
severiiy,  that  feelings  of  humanity  began  to  influence  the 
more  refined  minds,  and  that  the  panegyrists  (those,  for 
example,  of  the  Scipios)  found  it  necessary  to  throw  over 
their  heroes  the  colour  of  kindliness  and  clemency.' 
Source  of  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  from  what  source  the 
geratioM  "^^^  exaggerations  and  fictions  are  derived  which  have 
in  the  the  praises  of  Marcellus  for  their  object.  Perhaps  we 
Haicellus.  shall  not  go  wrong  in  supposing  that  their  fountain-head 
was  the  funeral  speech  delivered,  according  to  Livy,  by  the 
son  of  Marcellus.'  This  document  seems,  however,  not  to 
have  met  with  unconditional  credence  at  first,  as  may  be 
inferred  from  the  quoted  declaration  of  Polybius,  and  ftt)m 
Livy  himself.^  But  when  the  Emperor  Augustus  had 
selected  M.  Claudius  Marcellus,  the  descendant  of  the  con- 
queror of  Syracuse,  for  the  husband  of  his  daughter  Julia, 
a  new  period  of  glorification  began  for  the  family  of  the 
Marcelli.  A  careful  search  was  now  made  fyr^  everything 
that  redounded  to  the  ppi^ise  of  the  ancestors  of  the  young 
man  in  the  glorious  times  of  the  older  republic.  Augustus 
himself  composed  an  historical  work  on  this  subject,^  and 
we  cannot  fail  to  perceive  that  Livy  wrote  under  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Augustan  court.  He  treats  Marcellus  as  a 
favourite  hero,  and  even  in  Plutarch  we  can  trace  this 
preference  accorded  to  Marcellus.  If  we  deduct  all  that 
family  conceit  and  national  pride  have  invented  about 

'  Livy,  xxvii.  25.  Compare  also  the  proceedings  of  Cornelius  Cethegns  in 
Sicily,  who  supported  the  accusations  directed  against  Marcellus. 

'  Mommsen  (Bim,  Gesch,  i.  621 ;  English  translation,  ii.  140)  has  a  much 
higher  opinion  of  Marcellus  than  we  can  subscribe  to. 

■  LiTy,  xxvii.  27. 

*  According  to  Livy  (xxvii.  27),  Coelius  rejected  the  evidence  of  young 
Marcellus. 

*  Plutarch,  Marcdl,  30.    Id.  comparatio  Velojp.  ei  MarceU,  1. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  375 

Marcellus,  there  remains^  indeed^  the  image  of  a  genuine     CHAP. 
Eoman  of  the  old  type,  of  an  intrepid  soldier,  and  an  '  - 

energetic  officer ;  bnt  the  parallel  between  Marcellus  and     ^^™, 
Felopidas  seems  inappropriate,  and  all  comparison  between    211-207 
him  and  Hannibal  is  absnrd. 

The  death  of  Marcellus  and  that  of  his  colleague  Oris-  Raising  of 
pinus,  who  very  soon  after  died  of  his  wounds,  appears  to.  l^jS!^^  ^ 
have  paralysed  the  action  of  the  two  consular  armies  for 
the  whole  of  the  campaign,  though  they  had  remained 
intact  when  their  leaders  were  cut  oflPl  It  is  very  strange 
that  the  Eoman  people,  which  year  after  year  found  new 
commanders-in-chief,  now  allowed  four  legions  to  remain 
inactive  for  at  least  half  a  year  because  both  consuls  had 
by  chance  fallen  in  the  field.  If  it  be  indeed  true,  as  is 
related,  that  the  armies  suffered  no  further  losses — m  other 
words,  that  after  the  death  of  Marcellus  they  were  not 
attacked  and  beaten  by  Hannibal — the  strategy  of  the 
Bomans  appears  in  a  sorry  light.  One  of  the  two  armies 
retired  to  Yenusia,  the  other  even  as  far  as  Campania,  and 
they  left  the  Carthaginian  general  at  liberty  to  put  an  end 
to  the  siege  of  Locri,  which  had  been  again  undertaken. 
The  pr»tor  Lucius  Cincius  had  obtained  from  Sicily  a 
great  quantity  of  engines  necessary  for  a  siege,  and  had 
attacked  Locri  vigorously,  both  by  land  and  sea.  Already 
the  Punic  garrison  was  much  reduced,  and  despaired  of 
being  able  to  hold  the  town  much  longer,  when  Hannibal's 
Numidians  showed  themselves  in  the  neighbourhood  and 
encouraged  the  garrison  to  make  a  sally.  Attacked  in 
front  and  rear,  the  Bomans  soon  gave  way,  left  all  their 
siege  engines  behind,  and  took  refuge  on  board  their 
ships.     Locri  was  saved  by  the  mere  arrival  of  Hannibal.^ 

Through  the  failure  of  the  attack  on  Locri,  the  campaign  Brospecu 
of  208  proved  entirely  fruitless  to  the  Eoznans,  and  all  tts.. 
further  military  proceedings  were  suspended.     For  the 
first  time  since  the  establishment  of  the  republic  both 
consuls  had  fallen  in  battle.     The  commonwealth  was 

'  Livv,  xxrii.  28, 


376  ROMAN  HISTORr. 

BOOK  bereaved,  and  religiotis  fears  and  scruples  no  doubt  con- 
V- — ^ — '  tributed  to  paralyse  military  action  for  the  time.  It  was 
most  fortunate  for  Bome  that,  in  consequence  of  her  in- 
defatigable perseverance  and  gigantic  efforts,  SLannibal  1 
had  been  pushed  into  the  defensive,  and  was  no  longer 
able  to  carry  on  the  war  on  a  large  scale.  For  at  this  very 
time  the  signs  of  discontent  and  disobedience  multiplied 
among  the  subjects  of  Bome  in  Italy,  whilst  the  news  that 
arrived  from  Spain,  Massilia,  Africa,  and  Sicily  left  little 
doubt  that  the  time  had  come  at  last  when  the  long  pre- 
pared expedition  of  Hasdrubal  from  Spain  into  Italy 
might  be  looked  for  as  imminent.  It  seemed  as  if  the 
war,  which  had  now  lasted  ten  years,  instead  of  gradually 
flagging  and  drawing  to  a  close  was  to  begin  afresh  with 
renewed  vigour. 
piFcontent  Ti^g  refusal  of  the  twelve  Latin  colonies  to  bear  any 
longer  the  burdens  of  the  war  could  not  fail  to  produce  an 
effect  on  the  other  allies  of  Bome.  Soon  after  there 
appeared  most  alarming  signs  of  growing  discontent  in 
Etruria.  This  country  had  hitherto  been  almost  exempt 
from  the  immediate  calamities  of  war.  Hannibal,  it  is 
true,  had  in  his  first  campaign  touched  a  part  of  Etruria, 
and  had  on  Etruscan  soil  fought  the  battle  of  Thrasymenus. 
But,  as  he  wished  to  conciliate  the  allies  of  Bome  and  to 
appear  as  their  friend,  he  had  probably  spared  the  country 
as  much  as  possible.  In  the  succeeding  years  the  theatre 
of  war  had  been  shifted  to  the  south  of  Italy,  and  whilst 
Apulia,  Lucania,  Campania,  and,  above  all,  Bruttium  were 
exposed  to  all  the  horrors  of  war,  and  whilst  the  African, 
Spanish,  and  Gaulish  barbarians  in  Hannibal's  army  pene- 
trated with  fire  and  sword  into  the  interior  of  Samnium  and 
Latium,  nay  even  to  the  very  gates  of  Bome,  Etruria  had 
heard  the  storm  rage  at  a  distance,  and  had,  almost  without 
interruption,  enjoyed  practically  the  blessings  of  peace.  The 
countryman  had  securely  tilled  his  field,  the  shepherd  had 
tended  his  flock,  the  artisan  and  the  tradesman  had  each 
plied  his  craft.  In  its  fidelity  to  Bome,  Etruria  had  hitherto 
remained  unshaken.    It  was  an  Etruscan   cohort  from 


.^\ 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE. 


377 


Perusia,  which,  side  by  side  witii  one  from  Pneneste,  had 
heroically  resisted  the  Carthaginians  in  the  protracted 
siege  of  Casilinnm,^  Without  any  donbt  the  Etruscans  had 
supplied  their  full  contingents  to  all  the  armies  and  fleets  of 
the  Bomans,  and  nothing  but  the  customary  injustice  of 
the  Boman  annalists  has  ignored  this  co-operation  of  their 
allies.^  Financially,  too,  the  rich  towns  of  Etruria  had 
helped  to  bear  the  burdens  of  the  war.  Of  especial  im- 
portance were  the  supplies  of  grain  that  came  from  this 
country.  We  cannot  suppose  that  the  Eoman  treasury 
was  in  a  condition  to  pay  for  this  grain  in  cash,  and 
probably  the  price  was  fixed  very  low,  in  the  interest  of 
the  state.  Thus  it  was  that  Etruria  also  began  to  feel  the 
pressure  of  the  war ;  and  the  desire  for  peace  showed  itself 
naturally  in  an  unwillingness  to  comply  with  farther 
demands  on  the  part  of  Eome.  As  early  as  212  b.o.  the 
first  symptoms  of  discontent  had  become  apparent.  On 
that  occasion  a  Boman  army  was  sent  to  Etruria  to  keep 
the  country  in  check.'  Three  years  later  the  agitation 
became  much  more  critical.  It  showed  itself  especially  in 
Arretium,  a  town  which  at  one  time  was  reputed  as  one 
of  the  foremost  of  the  Etruscan  people,^  and  which,  as  an 
old  friend  and  ally  of  Bome,^  might  consider  itself  entitled 
to  be  treated  with  some  degree  of  preference  and  indul- 
gence. Marcellus,  who,  immediately  after  his  election  to  the 
consulship  of  208  B.C.,  was  sent  to  Arretium,  succeeded  for 
the  moment  in  quieting  the  people ;  but  when  he  had  set  out 
on  his  campaign  in  the  south  of  the  peninsula,  where  he 
was  soon  afterwards  killed  in  ambush,  the  Etruscans  again 
became  troublesome,  and  the  senate  now  dispatched  0. 
Terentius  Varro,  the  consul  of  216,  with  military  authority, 
to  Arretium.  Varro  occupied  the  town  with  a  Boman 
legion,  and  required  hostages  from  the  Arretine  senate. 
Finding  that  the  senators  hesitated  to  comply  with  his 


CHAP, 
vin. 

Fifth 

PXBIGD, 

211-207 


'  See  above,  p.  265. 
■  LJTy,  xxT.  3. 


•  LiTy,  IX  82. 


»  See  vol.  i.  p.  276. 
*  Livy,  ix.  37 ;  x.  37. 


878 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Events  in 
Spain. 


order^  he  placed  sentinels  at  the  gates  and  along  the 
walls^  to  prevent  anybody  leaving  the  place.  Nevertheless 
seven  of  the  most  eminent  men  escaped  with  tlxeir 
fitmilies.  The  property  of  the  fiigitives  was  forthwith 
confiscated,  and  one  hundred  and  twenty  hostages,  taken 
from  the  families  of  the  remaining  senators,  were  sent 
to  Borne.  The  unsatisfactory  state  of  Etruria  seemed, 
however,  to  require  a  better  guarantee  than  a  few  hostages 
from  a  single  town.  The  senate  therefore  dispatched  a 
legion  to  back  the  measures  which  were  everywhere  taken 
for  keeping  the  country  in  subjection  and  for  crushing  in 
the  bud  every  attempt  at  revolution.^ 

This  growing  discontent  among  a  considerable  portion 
of  the  most  faithful  and  valuable  allies  caused  the  more 
anxiety  in  Bome  as  about  the  same  time  disquieting  news 
arrived  of  the  movements  of  Hasdrubal.  As  early  as 
two  years  before  (in  210  b.o.)  the  admiral  M.  Valerius 
Messala  had  sailed  from  Sicily  with  fifty  vessels  to  Africa, 
to  obtain  accurate  information  about  the  plans  and  pre- 
parations of  the  Carthaginians.  He  returned  after  an 
absence  of  thiirteen  days  to  Lilybeeum,  and  reported  that 
the  CarthagiBians  were  making  armaments  on  a  large 
scale  to  increase  Hasdrubal's  army  in  Spain  and  to  carry 
out  at  last  the  plan  of  sending  him  with  a  strong  force 
across  the  Alps  to  Italy .^  This  news  was  confirmed  by  the 
Carthaginian  senators  taken  prisoners  by  Scipio  at  New 
Carthage,'  who,  as  commissioners  of  the  Carthaginian 
government,  were  necessarily  well  informed  of  the  plan  of 
war  and  of  the  progress  of  the  armaments  in  Carthage.^ 
It  was  now  of  the  utmost  importance,  just  as  in  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  to  detain  Hasdrubal  in  Spain ;'  and 
after  the  decided  progress  which  the  Boman  arms  had 
made  in  Spain  during  the  last  year,  after  the  conquest  of 


'  lavy,  zzvii.  21.  '  Livy,  zzvii.  6. 

•  See  p.  366.  *  Livy,  xxrii.  7. 

*  This  was  probably  the  order  of  the  senate  which  Leelius  conveyed  to 
Scipio  (Polybius,  x.  37i  §  6).  Compare  Vincke,  Ikr  zvmte  funische  Krieg 
p.  312. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAK. 


379 


CHAP. 

vin. 

"  ■      » 

Fifth 
Pbriod 
211-207 

B.C. 


New  Carthage  and  the  revolt  of  numerous  Spanish  peoples 
from  the  Carthagmians,  this  appeared  a  comparatiTely 
easy  task  for  so  enterprising  a  general  as  Scipio,  He  had 
been  enabled,  bj  means  of  the  hostages  found  in  New 
Carthage^  to  gain  the  friendship  of  many  Spanish  chiefs, 
among  whom  Indibilis  and  Mandonius  are  especiallj 
mentioned  as  the  most  powerftil  and  hitherto  most  faith- 
ful allies  of  Carthage.^  After  such  results  it  seems  strange 
that  Scipio  remained  inactive  for  almost  a  whole  year 
before  he  thought  of  moving  southwards  from  Tarraco. 
Where  the  three  Carthaginian  generals  were  during  all 
this  time,  and  what  they  did,  we  do  not  know.*  All  the 
events  that  took  place  in  Spain  during  the  whole  war  are 
hidden  in  such  obscurity  that,  by  comparison  with  them, 
the  campaigns  in  Italy  and  Sicily  appear  as  in  the  clear 
light  of  historical  truth.  The  Bomans  were  so  ignorant 
of  the  geography  of  Spain,  the  distance  of  that  country 
from  Eome  was  so  great,  and  the  intercourse  so  limited, 
that  fancy  ranged  freely  in  all  the  narratives  of  Spanish 
affairs. 

We  have  already  seen,  on  a  former  occasion,*  how  the  Battle  of 
annalists  made  use  of  this  circumstance,  and  we  have  now  much  of 
again  an  opportunity  for  noticing  the  same  thing.     They  HaadmbaL 
reported  that  Scipio  encountered  Hasdrubal  at  Bsecula, 
a  place  situated  probably  between  the  Beetis  (Guadalquivir) 
and  the  Anas  (Guadiana),  and  defeated  him  with  a  loss  of 
20,000  men.*    One  might  suppose  that  such  a  decisive 
victory  as  this  would  have  led  to  the  most  important 
results,  and  would  at  any  rate  have  paralysed  all  frirther 
enterprises  of  Hasdrubal;  but  we  find  that  Hasdrubal  was 
able  immediately  after  this  battle  to  carry  into  execution 
the  plan  which  had  been  delayed  by  adverse  circumstances 

'  Liry,  zzvii.  17. 

'  What  is  related  of  their  want  of  agreement  (Polybins,  x.  Z7,  §  2)  seems 
to  be  a  vagne  and  unfounded  report,  and  is  contradicted  by  the  narrative  of 
the  arrangements  which,  according  to  Liry  (zzrii.  20),  they  concerted  among 
themselves  for  the  continuation  of  the  war  upon  a  common  plan. 

*  See  above,  pp.  314,  817. 

*  Livy,  zxvii.  18,  19.    Polybius,  x.  39. 


380  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  for  eight  years.  From  the  battle-field  he  inarched  unpnr- 
/  .  sued,  witii  his  defeated  and  crippled  army  (if  Eoman  ac- 
counts are  to  be  trusted),  through  the  centre  of  the  penin- 
sula, crossed  the  Pyrenees  by  one  of  the  western  passes,' 
and  had  actually  reached  Gaul,  while  Scipio,  in  total  igno- 
rance of  his  movements,  was  in  hopes  that  he  could  stop 
his  march  somewhere  between  the  Ebro  and  the  Pyrenees, 
on  the  road  which  Hannibal  had  taken  ten  years  before. 
It  is  hard  to  understand  how,  under  such  circumstances, 
the  battle  at  Bsecula  can  hare  resulted  in  a  Eoman 
victory.  Perhaps  it  was  only  an  insignificant  encounter 
of  the  Carthaginian  rear-guard  with  the  Eoman  legions, 
which,  afber  their  usual  fashion,  the  Eoman  annalists  mag- 
nified into  a  great  battle  and  glorious  victory.*  Anyhow 
the  strategic  success  was  entirely  on  the  side  of  the 
Carthaginians,  and  Scipio  had  to  confess  that  he  was  not 
equal  to  the  task  which  he  had  undertaken ;  it  was  his 
fault  that  Italy  was  exposed  to  a  new  invasion,  and  that 
on  Italian  soil  a  struggle  was  renewed  on  whose  doubtful 
issue  depended  not  only  the  supremacy  but  the  very 
existence  of  Eome.' 

'  Appian,  vi.  28. 

•  According  to  Polybius  (x.  39,  §  7),  Hasdrubal  broke  ofF  the  fight  (t^ 
^vX'^y^X*^^  M^XP^  "^^^  ^ffX^"^^  ^Xir/8o5  &irc8oic(fia<rf ),  sent  forward  his  elephants 
and  bis  military  chest,  and  marched  northwards.  According  to  Livy  (xxvii.  19), 
Hasdrubal  had  sent  on  the  elephants  and  the  money  before  the  battle,  and 
was  therefore  already  on  his  march,  in  which  he  was  not  interrupted  by  the 
Romans.  We  can  hardly  help  being  reminded  of  the  encounter  between  the 
Roman  and  the  Carthaginian  cavalry  on  the  Rhone  in  218  b.c.  It  appears 
that  on  both  occasions  the  Carthaginian  generals  avoided  a  serious  engage- 
ment, which  would  have  interrupted  their  march.  The  two  victories  of  the 
father  and  the  son  have  a  striking  family  likeness. 

■  The  panegyrists  of  Scipio  explained  this  in  the  following  manner  (Livy, 
xx\di.  20):  The  Carthaginians  despaired  of  successfully  encountering  Scipio 
in  Spain  on  account  of  the  influence  he  exercised  over  the  minds  of  the 
Spaniards  ;  they  saw  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  shift  the  scene  of  the 
war  either  to  the  uttermost  parts,  near  the  ocean,  which  yet  knew  not  the 
Romans  ('ignaram  adhuc  Romanorum'),  or  else  to  Italy,  in  order  that  Hasdi-ubul 
might  be  able  to  withdraw  his  soldiers  from  beyond  the  magic  circle  of 
Scipio's  name  {*  ut  Hispanos  omnes  procul  ob  nomine  Scipionis  ex  Hispania 
abduceret ').  Thus  the  expedition  to  Italy,  which  was  part  of  the  original 
plan  of  the  Carthaginians,  and  which  the  Romans  had  so  long  tried  to  baffle, 
is  represented  as  a  csisual  expedient,  adopted  by  Hasdrubal  Wcause  Scipio's 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  VfAIL  881 

In  IkaJy  the  approaching  danger  called  forth  the  most     CHAP, 
serious  apprehensions.^     The  combined  assault  of  the  two   /^^'^ 
sons  of  Hamilcar  on  Italian  soil,  which  the  senate  had      Fifth 
been    so   anxious    to  elude,   was    now   imminent.    The    211-207 
military  history  of  the  preceding  year  was  not  calculated        ®*^* 
to  inspire  much  confidence-   The  siege  of  Locri  had  failed.  ^"^^^  ^^ 
The  consuls  with  their  combined  armies  had  not  been  able 
to  keep  Hannibal  in  check,  and  both  had  actually  fallen. 
Their  legions  had  retired  to  the  shelter  of  fortified  places, 
and  Hannibal  was  undisputed  master  of  Bruttium  and 
Apulia.     The  twelve  remonstrating  colonies  still  refused 
to  furnish  troops.     Etruria  was  discontented,  almost  in 
open  rebellion ;  the  Glauls  and  Ligurians  were  ready  to 
make  another  inroad  into  Italy.     The  news  from  Spain, 
even  if  it  was  coloured  as  favourably  as  it  appears  in  Livy's 
narrative   (a  circumstance  much  to  be  doubted),  could 
not  deceive  the  senate  on  the  subject  of  Scipio's  real  suc- 
cess.   There  was  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  Italy  would 
ag^in  have  to  bear  the  brunt  of  war,  and  that  now,  after 
ten  years  of  exhausting  warfare,  she  would  scarcely  be  able 
to  resist  a  double  assault.    The  Romans  might  well  ask, 
what  gods  would  watch  over  their  town  in  such  perilous 
times,^  when,  in  spite  of  all  their  prayers  and  all  their 
vows  and  sacrifices,  the  paternal  deities  had  shown  them- 
selves inexorable  or  else  powerless  to  ward  o£F  the  devas- 
tation of  Italy  and  disasters  like  those  of  Thrasymenus  and 
Oannse.     Again — as  always  happens  in  days  of  extreme 
danger — the  popular  mind,  tortured  by  religious  terrors, 
saw  everywhere  signs  of  the  divine  anger ;  and,  in  the  eflFort 
to  avert  this  anger,  it  gave  itself  up  to  horrid  delusions, 

ascendancy  oyer  the  Spaniards  left  him  no  other  choice.  We  are  really  at  a 
loss  to  decide  which  is  more  extraordinary,  the  boldness  of  this  conceit  or  its 
utter  stupidity.  Heeren  {Ideen,  ii.  1,  p.  291)  observes  very  justly:  *  If 
Hasdrubal  had  not  succumbed  to  the  Roman  arms  in  Umbrin,  the  deified 
Scipio  would  have  been  deprived  of  his  glory.'  Mommson  implies  the  same 
(Rom.  Gtich.  i.  643)  when  he  says :  '  The  gods  covered  the  faults  of  their 
favourite  with  laurels.'  We  see  from  Livy  (xxviii.  42)  that  Scipio's  proceed- 
ings in  Spain  were  sharply  criticised  in  Rome. 

*  Livy,  xzvii.  35 :  *  Periculosissimus  annus  iraminere  videbatur.' 
'  Livy,  xxvji.  40 :    *  Quos  tam  propitios  urbi  atque  imperio  f jre  deos,  ut 
eodem  tempore  utrobique  res  publica  prospere  gorcrotur.' 


382  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  and  to  the  cruelty  of  superstition.'  Again  it  rained 
% — ^L^^  stones,  rivers  ran  with  blood,  temples,  walls,  and  gates 
of  towns  were  struck  by  lightning.  But  more  than  usual 
terror  was  caused  by  the  birth  of  a  child  of  uncertain  sex, 
and  so  large  that  it  seemed  to  be  four  years  old.'  Soothsayers 
were  specially  sent  for  from  Etruria,  and  at  their  suggestion 
the  wretched  creature  was  placed  in  a  box  and  cast  into 
the  sea  far  from  the  coast.  Then  the  pontifices  ordained 
the  celebration  of  a  grand  national  festival  of  atonement. 
From  the  temple  of  Apollo  before  the  town,  a  procession 
marched  through  the  Porta  Carmentalis,  along  the  Yicus 
Jugarius  to  the  Forum.  At  the  head  of  the  proces- 
sion walked  two  white  cows,  led  by  sacrificial  servants ; 
behind  them  were  carried  two  statues  of  the  royal  Juno, 
made  of  cypress  wood;  then  followed  three  times  nine 
virgins  in  long  flowing  garments,  walking  in  a  single  line 
and  holding  on  to  a  rope,  singing  to  the  measured  time 
of  their  footsteps,  in  honour  of  the  goddess,  a  hjmn,  which 
Livius  Andronicus,  the  oldest  Boman  poet,  had  composed 
for  this  special  occasion,  and  which  later  generations — 
justly,  no  doubt — considered  a  specimen  of  ancestral 
rudeness.  At  the  end  of  the  procession  came  the  ten 
ofiScers  who  presided  over  sacrificial  rites  (decemviri  sacris 
faciundis),  crowned  with  laurel  and  clothed  in  purple- 
bordered  togas.  From  the  Forum  the  procession  went, 
after  a  short  pause,  through  the  Vicus  Tuscus,  the  Vela- 
brum,  and  the  Forum  Boarium,  up  the  Clivus  Publicius,  to 
the  temple  of  Juno  on  the  Aventine.  Here  the  two  cows 
were  sacrificed  by  the  ten  sacrificial  priests,  and  the  statues 
were  put  up  in  the  temple  of  the  goddess.  This  simple 
and  dignified  solemnity  is  interesting,  not  only  because, 
being  taken  from  the  priestly  archives,  the  narrative  is  no 
doubt  authentic  and  trustworthy,  but  because  it  shows,  in 
a  very  clear  and  unmistakable  manner,  to  what  extent 
the  Boman  mind  was  at  that  period  already  penetrated  by 

*  liivy*  xxvii.  87. 

'  Liyy,  /oc.  ciir,  'Liberatas  religioDO*  mentes  tnrbavit  rorsus  xmntiAtmn 
FntfliDODe  natnn  in&Dtem  esse  qnadrimo  parem,  nee  magnitudine  torn  mimn- 
dum,  qiiam  quod  incertUB,  mas  on  femioa  esset,  natus  erat.* 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


383 


CHAP. 
VIU. 


Fifth 

PSBIOD, 

211-207 

B.C. 


Greek  ideas.  The  Soman  pontifices  arrange  a  festival  in 
honour  of  a  Boman  deity,  Juno  the  Queen.  The  religious 
procession,  with  rhythmical  walking  and  singing,  is  like- 
wise Eoman,  but  the  procession  starts  from  the  temple  of 
the  Greek  Apollo;  the  ten  officers,  the  keepers  of  the 
Sibylline  oracles  of  the  same  god,  perform  the  sacrifice, 
while  a  poet  of  Greek  extraction,  Andronikos,  who  sixty- 
four  years  before  had  been  dragged  into  slavery  from 
conquered  Tarentum,  composed  the  solemn  hymn,  which, 
in  spite  of  its  hard  and  uncultivated  lang^ge,  marked,  no 
doubt,  an  immense  progress  when  compared  with  the  old 
and  scarcely  intelligible  litanies  of  the  Bomulean  '  fratres 
arvales.'  In  the  very  midst  of  a  war  which  threatened 
Eome  and  Italian  culture  with  ruin,  we  can  watch  the 
signs  of  the  increasing  ascendancy  of  the  Hellenic  mind. 

Amidst  their  prayers  for  divine  protection,  the  Romans  HiUtsry 
did  not  forget  to  take  measures  for  confronting  the  im-  ^*5ie'** 
pending  danger.    The  number  of  the  legions  was  in-  Bomans. 
creased  fix>m  twenty-one  to  twenty- three.     The  conscrip- 
tion was  enforced  with  the  greatest  severity;   even  the 
maritime  colonies,  which  had  hitherto  been  exempt  from 
service,  were  compelled  to  furnish  troops.      Ostia  and 
Antium  alone  remained  exempt,  but  were  ordered  to  keep 
their  contingents  in  constant  readiness.'    From  the  Spanish 
legions  2,000  foot  and  1,000  horse  were  detached  and  sent 
to  Italy,  besides  8,000  Spanish  and  Gaulish  mercenaries  ; 
from  Sicily  came  2,000  slingers  and  archers.    The  two 
legions  of  liberated  slaves,  which,   since  the  death  of 
Gracchus,  had  been  neglected,  were  re-organised  and  com- 
pleted, and  thus  a  military  force  was  set  on  foot  large 
enough  to  take  the  field  as  well  against  Hannibal  as 
Hasdrubal. 

The  consuls  selected  for  the  momentous  year  207  were  ^5^?*"^" 
Caius  Claudius  Nero  and  Marcus  Livius  Salinator.    The  ciHudina 
former — the  great  grandson  of  the  celebrated  censor  Appius  S®  l*°^ 
Claudius  the  Blind — had,  immediately  after  the  taking  of  Saliimtur. 
Capua  in  211  B.C.,  been  sent  as  propreetor  with  an  army  to 

*  LiTy,  xxTii.  37. 


38-4  ROM.iN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     Spain,  to  retrieve  the  fortunes  of  war  in  that  country  after 
IV  .  * 

the  destruction   of  the  Soman  armies  under  the  two 

Scipios.    His  alleged  successes  over  Hasdrubal  are  either 
entirely  fictitious  or  greatly  exaggerated.     It  was  said 
that  he  had  outmanoeuvred  the  Punic  general,  and  might 
have  made  him  prisoner  with  his  army,  but  allowed  him- 
self to  be  delayed  by  negotiations  about  an  armistice 
until  the  whole  hostile  force  had  had  time  gradually  to 
escape  from  its  critical  position.     In  his  command  in 
Spain  he  was  superseded,  in  210,  by  the  younger  Scipio. 
In  what  manner  he  so  gained  the  confidence  of  the  people 
as  to  be  intrusted  with  the  consulship  in  207,  we  are  not 
told.     His  colleague,  Livius  Salinator,  was  a  tried  old 
soldier,  who  twelve  years  before  had  conducted  the  Illyrian 
war  successfully,  and  ended  it  with  the  last  triumph  that 
Bome  had  witnessed.    But  from  that  time  he  had  been 
lost  to  his  country.     He  had  been  accused  and  condemned 
for  an  unjust  distribution  of  the  Illyrian  booty,'  and  had 
felt  so  hurt  at  this  indignity  that  he  had  retired  into  the 
country,  had  allowed  his  beard  and  hair  to  grow,  and  had 
refused  for  eight  years  to  take  part  in  the  affairs  of  state, 
until  in  the  year  210  the  consuls  Marcellus  and  Valerius  in- 
duced him  to  return  into  the  town.    The  censors  of  the 
same  year  Yeturius  and  Licinius  re-introduced  him  into 
the  senate,  fr^m  which  he  had  probably  been  expelled  in 
consequence  of  his  public  condemnation ;  still  his  wrath 
was  not  appeased.     He  never  took  part  in  the  discussions, 
but  sat  moodily  listening  in  silence,  until  at  last  the 
accusation  of  one  of  his  relations,  M.  Livius  Macafcus,  who 
by  his    negligence  had  caused  the  loss  of  Tarentum, 
induced  him  to  speak.     Now,  when  the  people  needed  a 
good  general,  they  bethought  themselves  of  the  tried  old 
soldier,  and,  in  spite  of  his  remonstrances,  elected  him  as 
the  colleague  of  Claudius  Nero.     But  a  difficulty  had  still 
to  be  overcome  before  the  intention  of  the  people  could 
be   realised.    Nero    and  Livius  were  personal  enemies. 
How  was  it  possible  to  intrust  the  welfare  of  the  state  in 

'  Frontinus,  Straieg,  iv.  1  ,45. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  385 

such  a  critical  period  to  men  who  hated  one  another?     CHAP. 

It  was  not  enough  to  separate  the  consuls  in  their  com-  * ^1^ 

mand,  by  sending  one  southward  against  Hannibal,  and     p^^ 
the  other  against  Hasdrubal  into  the  north  of  the  penin-     211-207 
sula.     The  division  of  the  supreme  command  among  two        ^'^* 
men,  which  had  so  often  been  the  source  of  weakness  in 
the  wars  of  the  Soman  republic,  was  surely  ruinous  if 
such  an  enemy  as  Hannibal  were  opposed  by  men  who 
hated  one  another.     It  was  absolutely  necessary  not  only 
to    reconcile  the  two    consuls,   but  to   unite   them   by 
cordial  friendship.     This  arduous  task  was  accomplished 
by  the  senate.      Both  Nero  and  Livius  overcame  their 
personal  feelings    of   resentment,    and  this  triumph    of 
patriotism  over   personal  passion  was   a  happy   augury 
and  almost  a  guarantee  of  the  final  triumph  over  the 
foreign  enemy. 

The  Bomans  were  far  from  having  finished  their  pre-  Has- 
parations  for  the  ensuing  campaign  when  the  allied  Mas-  <iriibai'8 
silians  brought  the  news  of  Hasdrubal's  march  through  through 
Gaul,  and  made  it  evident  that  he  would  cross  the  Alps  in  ^^^^' 
the  early  part  of  the  spring.  He  had  marched  from  the 
western  Pyrenees  right  across  southern  Graul  to  the  Bhone, 
had  been  hospitably  received  by  the  Arvemi  and  other 
tribes,  had  enlarged  his  army  by  newly  enlisted  merce- 
naries, and,  after  passing  the  winter  in  Gaul,  was  preparing 
to  cross  the  Alps  by  the  same  road  which  his  brother  had 
taken  eleven  years  before.  It  was  evident  that  neither 
the  difficulties  of  the  Alpine  passes  nor  the  hostilities  of 
the  mountaineers  would  deter  him.  The  passes  offered 
no  insurmountable  difficulties  in  the  good  season,  and  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Alps  had  learnt  by  experience  that  the 
Carthaginian  armies  had  not  come  to  make  war  on  them, 
but  only  to  march  through  their  country.  If  the  Eomans 
wished  to  avoid  the  mistake  of  218,  and  to  meet  the  Car- 
thaginians at  the  foot  of  the  Alps,  the  utmost  dispatch  in 
the  movement  of  their  armies  was  imperatively  demanded. 
Every  step  that  Hasdrubal  made  in  a  southerly  direction, 
after  crossing  the  Alps,  brought  him  nearer  to  his  brother 

VOL.  II.  c  0 


386  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     and  increased  the  danger  which  the  union  of  the  two 


IV. 


brothers  threatened  to  bring  upon  Borne. 


Movements      Hannibal  had  probably  wintered  in  Apulia^^  and  at  the 
baL  °°''     beginning  of  spring  marched  into  Bruttium  to  collect  and 
organise  the  troops  in  that  country.   Thereupon  he.  started 
northwards,  and  encountered  the  consul,  Claudius  Nero, 
who,  with  an  army  of  40,000  foot  and  2,600  horse,  was 
posted  near  Grumentum,  in  Lucania,  to  stop  his  advance. 
An  engagement  took  place,  in  which  Nero  claimed  the 
victory,  and  Hannibal  is  reported  to  have  lost  8,000  dead 
and  700  prisoners.^    But  this  seems  not  to  agree  with  the 
statement  that  Hannibal  continued  his  march  and  soon 
after  halted  near  Yenusia.     Here  he  paused,  hardly,  as  it 
would  appear,  because  he  was  afraid  of  the  Boman  army 
which  followed  him,  and  which,  at  the  worst,  was  able  only 
to  annoy,  but  not  to  harm,  him ;  he  was  probably  waiting 
for  news  from  his  brother,  in  order  to  be  sure  on  which 
road  and  at  what  time  he  should  march  northwards  to 
meet  him.     On  receiving  no  news  of  any  sort,  he  turned 
back  again  to  Metapontum,  to  join  another  reinforcement 
which  his  lieutenant  Hanno  had  in  the  meantime  collected 
in  Bruttium.     Whether  it  was  his  intention  to  induce  the 
Boman  consul  to  follow  him  southwards,  or  to  draw  him 
into  an  ambush,  we  cannot  tell.      Nero  followed  him 
closely,  and  when  Hannibal  soon  afber  turned  again  north- 
wards and  encamped  at  Canusium,  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  glorious  battle-field  of  Cannae,  Nero  had  again 

*  This  may  bo  inferred  from  the  circumstance  that,  according  to  Livy 
(zxYii.  40),  Hannibal,  qaite  in  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  marched  through 
the  district  of  Larinnm,  into  the  country  of  the  Sallentinians,  i.e.  from  north  to 
south.  The  remark  of  Arnold  (HisL  of  Borne,  iii.  363)  is  very  much  to  the 
point:  *At  no  part  of  the  history  of  this  war  do  we  more  feel  the  want  of  a 
good  military  historian  than  at  the  opening  of  this  memorable  campaign. 
What  we  have  in  Livy  is  absolutely  worthless  ;  it  is  so  vague  as  well  as  so 
falsified  that  the  truth  f^m  which  it  has  been  corrupted  can  scarcely  be 
discovered.* 

*, Summing  up  all  the  killed  and  prisoners  which  Hannibal  is  said  to  ha^'e 
lost  in  these  marches,  we  get  a  total  of  about  15,000  men.  Very  properly, 
Arnold  (loc»  cU,)  calls  these  statements  'absurdities  in  which  we  cannot 
but  recognise  the  perversions  of  Valerius  Antias,  or  some  annalist  equally 
nntruBtwortliy.' 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  387 

taken  up  his  position  close  to  him,  and  from  the  mounds     chap. 
of  their  respective  camps  the  Eoman  and  the  Carthaginian  >_Z^^* 


sentinels  were  idly  watching  each  other  whilst,  at  a  dis-     ^ifth 
tance  of  a  few  days'  march  further  northwards,  the  fate  of    211-207 
Borne  and  Carthage  was  decided.  "•^* 

Haying  crossed  the  Alps,  Hasdrubal  had  met  with  no  Capture  of 
Eoman  army  in  Cisalpine  Gaul.  The  prsetor  L.  Porcius  ^^^^^^f 
Licinus,  who  commanded  two  legions,  either  came  too  Hafldrudal. 
late  or  did  not  venture  to  penetrate  far  beyond  the  Po. 
Eeinforced  by  Gauls  and  Ligurians,  Hasdrubal  tried  to 
take  Placentia  by  storm,  but  was  soon  compelled  to  give 
up  this  enterprise,  for  which  he  had  neither  means  nor 
time ;  and  he  now  advanced  southwards  on  the  Flaminian 
road  by  Ariminum.  It  was  his  intention  to  meet  Hannibal 
in  TJmbria,  and  then  to  march  with  the  combined  armies 
upon  Namia  and  Eome.^  He  communicated  this  plan  to 
Hannibal  in  a  letter,  which  he  dispatched  by  the  hands  of 
four  Gaulish  and  two  Numidian  horsemen  through  the 
whole  length  of  Italy,  across  a  thickly-peopled  hostile 
country,  where  at  every  step  they  ran  the  risk  of  being 
discovered  and  hunted  down.  The  undaunted  horsemen 
made  their  way  as  far  as  Apulia,  but  could  not  find  Han- 
nibal, and,  roaming  about  in  search  of  him  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Tarentum,  were  at  last  discovered  and  made 
prisoners.  Thus  Nero  was  apprised  of  Hasdrubal's  march 
and  of  his  plans,  whilst  Hannibal  was  waiting  in  vain  for 
news  from  his.  brother.  Now  was  the  time  for  forming  a 
quick  and  bold  resolution — such  a  resolution  as,  under 
ordinary  circumstances,  was  quite  beyond  the  conception 
of  a  Soman  general.'  It  was  necessary  to  deviate  from 
the  ordinary  routine  and  from  the  prescribed  order. 
Apulia  and  Bruttium  had  been  assigned  as  the  provinces 

*  Livy,  xxvii.  43. 

*  *  Claudius  non  id  tempus  esse  rei  publics  ratus  quo  consiliis  ordinariis 
provincise  sue  quisque  finibus  per  exercitus  buos  cum  hoste  destinato  a  eeuatu 
bellum  gereret ;  audendum  aliquid  improvisum,  inopinatum,  quod  cceptum  non 
minorem  apud  cives  quam  liostes  terrorem  faceret,  perpetratum  in  magnam 
Isetitiam  ex  magno  metu  verteret.'— Livy,  xxTii.  43. 

c  c  2 


388 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


March  of 
Nero. 


of  Nero;  it  was  his  task  to  keep  Hannibal  in  check, 
whilst  his  colleague,  Livius  Salinator,  confronted  Has- 
drubal  in  the  north.  Shonld  he  take  upon  himself  to 
leave  the  province  assigned  to  him,  to  encroach  upon  the 
province  of  his  colleague,  and  to  o£Per  an  uncalled-for 
aid  ?  If  the  haughty  Livius,  who  had  only  just  subdued 
his  old  animosity  at  the  call  of  his  country,  should  reject 
the  proffered  aid — if  he  should  come  too  late — if  Hannibal 
should  discover  his  march,  pursue  and  overtake  him — ^if 
from  any  other  cause  the  enterprise  should  fail,  Claudius 
Nero  was  doomed  to  be  for  ever  branded  as  the  author  of  the 
greatest  calamity  that  could  befall  his  country,  and  Borne 
would  be  given  up  to  the  mercy  of  the  conquerors.  By 
silencing  all  scruples  and  taking  upon  himself  the  weighty 
responsibility,  Nero  showed  a  moral  firmness  and  strategic 
ability  which  far  surpassed  the  average  qualifications  of 
which  Soman  generals  could  boast.  Even  the  failure  of 
his  plan  would  not  have  sufficed  to  condemn  him  before 
the  impartial  tribunal  of  history;  but,  fortunately  for 
Bome,  his  just  calculations  and  his  bold  resolve  were 
destined  to  be  crowned  with  complete  and  overwhelming 
success.^ 

Nero  informed  the  senate  of  Hasdrubal's  plans,  and  of 
what  he  himself  was  resolved  to  do.  He  recommended 
the  government  to  send  two  legions  which  were  stationed 
at  Rome  up  the  Tiber  to  Namia,  for  the  purpose  of  block- 
ing up  that  road  in  case  of  necessity,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  replace  them  in  the  capital  by  one  legion,  which 
was  stationed  in  Campania  under  the  command  of  Fulvius. 
He  then  selected  out  of  his  army  7,000  of  the  best  foot 

'  According  to  the  narrative,  as  transmitted  to  us,  Nero  formed  his  resolution 
of  marching  to  the  assistance  of  Livins  on  the  strength  of  the  information 
which  he  casually  obtained  respecting  Hannibal's  march  from  the  six  inter- 
cepted messengers.  But  we  can  hardly  suppose  that  Nero  had  no  direct  news 
from  Livius  of  the  direction  of  Hasdrubal's  march.  There  was  nothing  to 
prevent  the  two  Roman  generals  from  keeping  up  a  continuous  correspondence 
with  one  another,  for  they  were  not  separated  by  any  hostile  fj»rces.  It  would 
surely  have  been  an  unpardonable  negligence  if  Nero  had  heard  of  his 
colleague's  dangerous  position  only  by  a  despatch  of  the  enemy,  which  a  mere 
accident  had  thrown  into  his  han^. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  389 

soldiers  and  1,000  horse,'  and  left  his  camp  30  quietly  that     CHAP. 
Hannibal  did  not  perceive  his  march.    The  inhabitants  of         ,   1^ 
the  country  through  which  he  passed,  the  Larinatians,     p^^^ 
Frentanians,  Marrucinians,   and  Praetutians' — had  been    211-207 
informed  of  his  approach,  and  called  upon  to  furnish  pro-       "'^' 
visions  for  his  troops  as  well  as  horses,  draft  cattle,  and 
vehicles  for  the  transport  of  the  baggage  and  of  the  men 
that  might  break  down  on  the  road.     The  sentiments  of 
the  population  of  Italy  now  became  unmistakably  apparent 
in  a  genuine  outburst  of  enthusiasm  and  of  devotion  for 
the  cause  of  Eome,  which  was  the  cause  of  all  Italy. 
Every  man  was  eager  to  help,  to  contribute  something 
towards  putting  down  the  common  enemy.  Old  and  young, 
rich  and  poor,  hurried  to  the  places  where  Nero's  soldiers 
were  expected  to  pass,  supplied  them  with  food  and  driok, 
warmed  them  by  their  sympathies,  followed  them  with 
the  most  ardent  wishes  for  victory,  while  thousands  of 
,«.ng  „,«  ^  «t««  «,Hier,Ved   the  »..,  « 
volunteers.* 

The  march  was  pressed  on  without  delay.  The  soldiers  Bftttle  of 
would  scarcely  indulge  in  so  much  rest  as  nature  impera-  Metaurus. 
tively  required;  they  were  inspired  by  their  enthusiasm 
with  superhuman  strength.    In  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
colony  of  Sena,  to  the  south  of  the  river  Metaurus,  Nero 
found  his  colleague  Livius,   and  not  far  from  him  the 

*  According  to  Frontinus  {Strateg,  i.  1,  9)  he  took  with  him  a  force  of 
10,000  men. 

*  The  order  in  which  Livy  mentions  these  peoples  (xxrii.  43)  is  not  correct, 
and  famishes  another  proof  of  his  ignorance  of  the  geography  even  of  Italy. — 
Compare  above,  p.  172,  and  p.  336,  note  2. 

'  It  is  worth  while  to  read  the  description  of  Livy  (xxyii.  45),  one 
of  the  best  in  his  whole  work:  'Per  instructa  omnia  ordinibns  vironim 
muliemmque  nndiqne  ex  agris  efiiisoram  inter  vota  et  preces  et  landes  ibant : 
illos  pnesidia  rei  pnblicse,  rindices  urbis  Bomane  imperiique  appellabant ;  in 
illorum  armis  doxtrisque  suam  liberoramqne  suorum  salntem  ac  libertatem 
repositam  esse.  Beos  omnes  deasqne  precabantnr,  nt  illis  faustum  iter 
felixque  pugna  ac  matura  ex  hostibns  victoria  esset,  damnarenturque  ipsi 
votonim,  quse  pro  iis  snscepissent,  ut  quemadmodum  nunc  soUiciti  prose- 
querentnr  eos,  ita  paucos  post  dies  Iseti  ovantibns  victoria  obviam  irent. 
Invitare  inde  pro  se  quisqne  et  offerre  et  fatigare  precibns,  ut  quse  ipsis  iumen- 
tisquc  Usui  esscnt,  ab  se  potissimum  sumcrent ;  benigne  omnia  cumulata  dare.' 


390  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  prBBtor  L.  Porcius  Licinus^  each  encamped  with  two  legions 
opposite  Hasdrubal.  In  the  stilhiess  of  the  night  Nero 
and  his  troops  were  received  into  the  consular  camp,  and 
distributed  into  the  tents  of  their  comrades,  so  that  the 
area  of  the  camp  was  not  enlarged.  It  was  the  intention 
of  the  Eoman  consuls  to  withhold  from  Hasdrubal  the 
knowledge  of  the  arrival  of  reinforcements,  in  order  to 
induce  him  the  more  readily  to  accept  battle.  At  any  rate 
a  battle  must  be  fought  before  Hannibal  should  become 
aware  of  Nero's  march  and  hasten  to  support  his  brother. 
On  this  depended  the  success  of  the  whole  campaign.  In 
case  of  need  the  consuls  would  have  been  compelled  to 
attack  the  Carthaginian  camp.  Hasdrubal,  however,  was 
not  long  ignorant  that  both  consuls  were  confronting  him. 
The  double  signals  which  he  heard  from  the  Eoman  camp 
since  Nero's  arrival  left  no  doubt  of  the  fact,  and  the 
troops  which  had  just  arrived  exhibited  manifest  signs 
of  a  long  and  fatiguing  march.  Hasdrubal  could  explain 
the  arrival  of  the  second  consul  only  by  supposing  that 
Hannibal's  army  was  defeated  and  annihilated,  and  he 
resolved  accordingly  to  return  into  the  country  of  the 
Grauls,  and  there  to  wait  for  accurate  information.  In 
the  same  night  he  gave  orders  to  retire  beyond  the 
Metaurus.  But,  by  the  faithlessness  of  his  guides,  he 
missed  the  way,  wandered  long  up  and  down  the  river 
without  finding  a  ford,  and  when  morning  dawned,  saw 
his  disordered  and  exhausted  troops  pursued  and  attacked 
by  the  Bomans.  He  had  no  longer  time  to  cover  himself 
by  throwing  up  fortifications  for  a  camp.  In  the  most 
disadvantageous  position,  with  a  deep  river  in  his  rear,  he 
was  obliged  to  accept  battle,  and,  from  the  very  first,  he 
felt  the  necessity  of  either  conquering  or  dying.*  The 
battle  lasted  from  morning  till  noon.  The  Spaniards  on 
Hasdrubal's  right  wing  fought  with  the  inborn  bravery  of 
their  race  against  the  legions  of  Livius.     The  Glauls  on 

*  Poly  bios,  xi.  1,  §  3  :  irpoBitiKri^s  Bri  Bu  Karh,  rhv  TopSrra  Kiy^woy  yuc§if  4^ 
BifilfrKMiy, 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  391 

the  left  wing  occupied  an  unassailable  position.     Nero,  on     CHAP, 
the  right  wing  of  the  Soman  line,  saw  that  he  had  no  ^   ^™'_ 
chance  of  producing  an  impression  on  them  ;  he  therefore     ^^fth 
shifted  his  position,  marched  with  his  men  behind  the  rear    211-207 
of  the  Soman  line  to  the  left,  and  attacked  the  Spaniards       ^'^' 
in  flank  and  rear.    This  manoeuvre  decided  the  battle. 
The  Grauls  on   Hasdrubal's    left  wing  appear   to  have 
behaved  very  badly.     They  did  not  avail  themselves  of 
Nero's  retreat  for  the  purpose  of  pushing  forward,  but 
gave  themselves  up  to  sloth  and  rioting,  and  were  after- 
wards found  lying  for  the  most  part  drunk  and  helpless  on 
the  ground,  so  that  they  could  be  slaughtered  without 
offering  resistance.     When  Hasdrubal  saw  his  best  troops 
falling  under  the  overwhelming  attack  of  the  Somans  and 
that  all  was  lost,  he  rushed  into  the  thickest  throng  of 
battle  and  was  slain.     Nothing  was  wanting  to  make  the 
Soman  victory  complete.    Ten  thousand  of  the  enemy,  for 
the  most  part  Spaniards,  fell  in  the  battle.^  The  Gauls  and 
Ligurians  fled  in  the  utmost  disorder,  and  tried  to  gain 
their  respective  homes.     Of  ten  elephants  six  were  killed, 
four  taken.     The  Carthaginian  army  was  destroyed ;  and, 
for  the  first  time  in  the  course  of  the  war,  the  Somans 
could  boast  that  they  had  on  Italian  soil  revenged  the 
fatal  day  of  Cannse. 

Nero's  plan  of  marching  northward  had  become  known  ^^ect  of 
in  Some ;  the  town  had  not  ceased  to  be  agitated  with  oiTtle  ^ 
feverish    excitement.      Everybody  felt    that   a    decisive  ^™a°«- 
moment  was  approaching,  and  there  were  many  who  were 
far  from  approving  Nero's  bold  resolution.^    The  senate 

*  According  to  Polybius  (xi.  8),  the  Carthaginians  lost  10,000,  the  Romans 
2,000.  It  is  impossible  to  reconcile  with  this  statement  that  of  Liry,  who 
(xxrii.  49)  speaks  of  66,000  Carthaginians  killed  and  5,400  taken,  and 
estimates  the  loss  of  the  Romans  at  8,000.  These  numbers  are  probably  too 
high.  It  was  the  intention  of  some  Roman  annalists  to  contrast  the  battle  of 
the  Metanms  with  that  of  Cannie  (Liyy,  loe,  eit, :  '  reddita  sequa  Cannensi 
clades  videbatur '),  and  thej  were  therefore  prone  to  exaggerate  rather  freely. 
The  numbers  of  Polybius  seem  to  deserve  more  credit,  though  we  must  not 
forget  that  his  partiality  for  the  Scipios  may  hare  induced  him  somewhat  to 
depreciate  the  Tictory  of  Nero  and  Livius.    Compare  Appian,  vii.  32. 

'  Livy,  xxrii.  44, 


392  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  remained  assembled^  day  after  day,  from  early  mom  until 
/  ^  evening,  supporting  and  counseUing  the  civic  magistrates; 
the  people  thronged  the  streets  and  especially  the  Forum ; 
all  the  temples  resounded  with  the  prayers  of  the  women. 
Suddenly  an  uncertain  rumour  ran  through  the  crowd 
that  a  battle  had  been  fought  and  a  victory  gained.  But 
the  hopes  of  the  people  had  been  deceived  so  often  that 
they  refused  to  believe  what  they  wished  for  with  agonising 
eagerness.  Even  a  written  despatch  of  Lucius  Manlius, 
sent  from  Namia,  met  with  but  partial  credit.  At  last  the 
news  spread  that  three  men  of  senatorial  rank,  delegated 
by  the  consuls,  were  approaching  the  city.  The  excite- 
ment of  impatience  now  reached  its  highest  point,  and 
masses  of  the  population  rushed  out  of  the  gates  to  meet 
the  messengers.  Every  man  was  anxious  to  be  the  first 
to  hear  certain  news,  and  as  the  crowd  picked  up  scraps  of 
information  from  the  messengers  or  their  attendants,  the 
joyful  tidings  travelled  fast  from  lip  to  lip.  Still  no  formal 
announcement  was  made,  and  slowly  the  messengers 
rode  onwards  through  the  swelling  throng  to  the  Forum. 
It  was  with  difficulty  that  they  could  penetrate  to  the 
senate-house.  The  crowd  pressed  after  them  into  the 
building,  and  could  scarcely  be  kept  from  invading  the 
sacred  precincts  where  the  senate  was  assembled.  The 
official  report  of  the  consuls  was  at  length  read  in  the 
senate,  and  then  Lucius  Veturius  stepped  out  into  the 
Forum  and  communicated  to  the  people  the  ftiU  tidings  of 
victory — that  the  two  consuls  and  the  Soman  legions  were 
safe,  the  Punic  army  destroyed,  and  Hasdrubal,  its  leader, 
slain.  Now  all  doubts  were  removed,  and  the  people  gave 
themselves  up  to  boundless  joy.  The  first  feeling  was  that 
of  gratitude  to  the  gods.  At  last  they  had  heard  the 
prayers  of  their  people,  had  overthrown  the  national 
enemy  and  saved  Italy.  The  senate  decreed  the  celebra- 
tion of  a  public  thanksgiving,  which  was  to  last  three  days. 
The  Eoman  people,  tired  and  sick  of  war,  fondly  nourished 
the  fairest  hopes  of  peace,  and  seemed  almost  to  forget 


THE  SECOND  PUNIO  WAE.  398 

that  Hannibal  still  occupied  Italian  soil,   nnconqiiered     CHAP, 
and  terrible  as  ever.*  .,    .  '.* 


Prom  the  field  of  battle  on  the  Metaurus  Nero  marched,  ^^^ 
with  the  same  rapiditj  with  which  he  had  come,  back  into  211-207 
his  camp  near  Cannsium,'  where  Hannibal  was  still  waiting  ^*^* 
for  news  from  his  brother.  This  news  was  now  brought  ^^j^^ 
in  an  unlooked-for  manner.  Hasdrubal's  head  was  cast  by 
the  Romans  before  the  feet  of  his  outposts,  and  two  Car- 
thaginian captives,  set  free  for  this  purpose  by  Nero,  gave 
him  an  account  of  the  disastrous  battle  which  had  wrecked 
all  his  hopes.  When  Hannibal  recognised  the  bloody  head 
of  his  brother  he  foresaw  the  fate  of  Carthage.*  He  im- 
mediately broke  up  with  his  army,  and  marched  southward 
into  Bruttium,  whither  his  victorious  opponent  did  not 
venture  to  follow  him.  The  war  in  Italy  was  now  to  all 
appearances  decided.  It  was  in  the  highest  degree  un- 
likely that  Carthage  would  repeat  the  enterprise  of  another 
invasion  of  Italy,  which  had  just  signally  failed.  After 
the  loss  of  Sardinia  and  Sicily,  soon  to  be  followed  by  that 
of  Spain,  it  seemed  to  be  of  little  use,  in  a  military  point  of 
view,  to  retain  any  longer  a  comer  of  Italy,  especially  as  an 
attack  upon  the  Carthaginian  possessions  in  Africa  might 
now  be  expected.  Nevertheless  Hannibal  could  not  make 
up  his  mind  to  leave  of  his  own  accord  a  country  which 
had  been  the  theatre  of  his  great  deeds,  and  where  alone, 
as  he  was  convinced,  a  mortal  blow  could  be  dealt  at  Some. 
For  four  years  longer  he  clung  with  astounding  tenacity 
to  the  hostile  soil,  and  for  all  this  time  his  name  and  his  im- 
conquered  arms  continued  to  strike  terror  throughout  Italy. 

At  the  close  of  the  year  which  determined  the  successful  Triumph 
issue  of  the  war,  Rome  had,  for  the  first  time  after  a  long  ^ng^, 
interval,  days  of  national  rejoicing,  and  the  consuls  cele- 
brated a  well-deserved  triumph.    After  the  fall  of  Syracuse 

*  Livy,  xxvii.  60,  61. 

*  According  to  Livj  (zxrii.  51),  Nero  took  no  more  than  six  days  for  this 
march  of  about  260  miles,  -which  seems  utterly  impossible. 

■  Livy,  xxvii.  61 :  *  Hannibal  tanto  simul  publico  familiarique  ictus  luctu 
agnoscere  se  fortonam  Carthaginis  fertnr  dixisse.' 


394 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


the  senate  had  refused  to  accord  to  Marcellus  the  triumph 
which  he  eagerly  coveted,  and  an  ovation  on  the  Alban 
mount  was  but  a  poor  substitute  for  the  usual  display  of 
triumphal  pomp  within  the  walls  of  Bome.  Fabius  indeed 
had  triumphed  when  he  had  been  fortunate  enough  to  get 
possession  of  Tarentum  by  the  treachery  of  the  Bruttian 
garrison.  Bufc,  in  spite  of  the  great  show  of  treasures  and 
works  of  art  which  he  displayed  before  the  gazing  mul- 
titude, nobody  was  deceived  as  to  his  real  merits  in  a 
military  point  of  view.  Now  at  length  Boman  generals 
had  fought  a  pitched  battle  and  had  overcome  an  enemy 
second  in  reputation  only  to  Hannibal.  The  senate  decreed 
that  both  consuls,  as  they  had  fought  side  by  side,  should 
be  united  in  their  triumph.  They  met  at  Prseneste,  Livius 
at  the  head  of  his  army,  Nero  alone,  as  his  legions  had  been 
ordered  to  remain  in  the  field  to  keep  Hannibal  in  check. 
Livius  entered  the  city  on  the  triumphal  car,  drawn  by  four 
horses,  as  the  real  conqueror,  because  on  the  day  of  battle 
he  had  had  the  aiispices,  and  the  victory  had  been  gained  in 
his  province.  Nero  accompanied  him  on  horseback ;  but, 
though  the  formal  honours  accorded  to  him  were  inferior, 
the  eyes  of  the  crowd  were  chiefly  directed  on  him,  and  he 
was  greeted  by  the  loudest  applause,  as  the  man  to  whose 
bold  resolution  the  victory  was  principaUy  due.» 


Sixth  Period  of  the  Hannibalian  War, 


FROM   THE   BATTLE   ON  THE   METATTRUS   TO  THE   TAKING   OP 

LOCRI,   207-206  B.C. 

Character        From  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  the  great  victory  at 

ffinfwTand   ^^^°^®  ^®  ^^  ^^  Carthage  had  been  in  the  ascendant. 
Roman        The  defection  of  Capua,  Syracuse,  Tarentum,  and  numerous 
other  allies  of  the  Eomans  was  the  fruit  of  this  rapid 


conquests 
in  Spain. 


^  L\yj,  xzviii.  9 :  '  Itaqne  iret  alter  consul  snblimis  cnrm  multiiugis,  tn 
Tellet,  equis :  uno  equo  per  nrbem  yerum  triumphiun  rehi,  Neronemqne  etiam 
si  pedes  incedat,  rel  parta  eo  bello  rel  spreta  eo  triumpho  gloria  memorabilem 
fore  .  .  .  Notatum  eo  die  plnra  carmina  militaribus  iocis  in  C.  Clandinm 
qnam  in  eonsnlem  sunm  iactata.' 


B.C. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  395 

succession  of  victories.  But  the  fortunes  of  Carthage  did  CHAP, 
not  rise  higher,  and  soon  the  re-conquest  of  Syracuse,  of  >,  ,  L.^ 
Capua,  and  of  Tarentum  marked  the  steps  by  which  Borne  ^,™ 
gradually  rose  to  her  ancient  superiority  over  her  rival.  207-205 
The  annihilation  of  Hasdrubal's  army  was  the  severest 
blow  which  she  had  yet  inflicted,  and  it  proved  the  more 
disastrous  to  the  cause  of  Carthage  as  Hasdrubal's  expe- 
dition into  Italy  had  been  effected  only  at  the  price  of  the 
virtual  abandonment  of  Spain.  Whatever  may  have  been 
the  tactical  result  of  the  battle  of  Bsecula,'  in  which 
Scipio  claimed  the  victory,  its  results  were,  as  far  as  he 
alone  and  the  campaign  in  the  Spanish  peninsula  were 
concerned,  those  of  a  great  military  success ;  for  the  best 
and  largest  portion  of  the  Carthaginian  forces  in  Spain 
withdrew  immediately  after  and  left  him  almost  undisputed 
master  of  all  the  land  from  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Straits  of 
Calpe  (Gibraltar).  An  additional  advantage  for  Scipio 
was,  that  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  Punic  army  more  and 
more  of  the  Spanish  tribes  embraced  the  cause  of  the 
Somans,  whose  dominion  had  not  yet  had  time  to  press 
heavily  on  them,  and  through  whose  help  they  hoped,  in 
their  simple-mindedness,  to  recover  their  independence.^ 
This  vacillation  of  the  Spanish  character  explains  to  some 
extent  the  sudden  and  wholesale  vicissitudes  of  the  war  in 
that  country.  Nothing  appeared  easier  than  to  conquer 
Spain ;  but  nothing  was,  in  reality,  more  difficult  than  to 
keep  permanent  possession  of  it.  Thus  the  first  Car- 
thaginian conquests  in  Spain,  under  Hamilcar  Barcas  and 
his  son-in-law  Hasdrubal,  had  been  effected  with  wonder- 
ful rapidity,  owing  to  internal  divisions  among  the  Spanish 
tribes.  Hannibal  had,  on  his  march  to  Italy,  subdued,  as 
he  thought  permanently,  all  the  country  between  the 
IberuB  and  the  Pyrenees;  but  the  mere  appearance  of 
the  Soman  legions  under  the  Scipios  had  swept  away  this 
acquisition,  and  in  their  very  first  campaigns  the  two 

1  See  above,  p.  379. 

*  Livy,  zxvii.  17 :  '  Velnt  fortnita  inclinatio  animorum  Hispaniam  omnem 
arejterat  ad  Romnnum  a  Punico  imporio.' 


396  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  Boman  generals  penetrated  far  to  the  south,  into  the  heart 
V,  /  -^  of  the  Carthaginian  possessions.  When  the  Carfchaginians 
were  entirely  expelled  from  Spain,  it  took  the  Bomans 
two  hundred  years  of  hard  fighting  before  they  could  say 
that  the  whole  of  Spain  was  in  their  possession  and 
pacified.^  In  the  first  ten  years  of  the  Hannibalian  war 
they  persistently  reinforced  their  armies  in  Spain  at  the 
greatest  cost,  and  their  perseverance  was  not  without  its 
effect ;  for  the  hold  that  the  Carthaginians  had  on  Spain 
was  materially  weakened,  and  they  could  no  longer  draw 
from  it  the  large  supplies  of  soldiers  and  treasure  which 
they  had  received  from  that  country  in  the  beginning  of 
the  war.  It  lost  accordingly  much  of  the  importance 
which  it  had  had  in  their  eyes.  Yet  it  was  not  entirely 
given  up  by  them,  even  after  Hasdrubal  had  evacuated  it 
with  the  best  part  of  the  Carthaginian  forces.  Another 
Hasdrubal,  the  son  of  Gisgo,  a  very  able  general,  and 
Hannibal's  youngest  brother  Mago  remained  still  at  the 
head  of  respectable  armies  in  Spain,  and  were  receiving 
reinforcements  from  Africa.  Nevertheless,  it  is  not  diffi- 
cult to  perceive  that  the  power  of  Carthage  was  now  on  the 
wane.  Not  a  single  vigorous  effort  was  made  to  regain 
what  had  been  lost.  The  theatre  of  war  was  transferred 
more  and  more  southward,  into  the  neighbourhood  of 
Gades,  the  last  town  of  any  importance  which  had  re- 
mained of  the  whole  of  the  Punic  possessions  in  the 
peninsula.  It  seemed  that  the  Carthaginians  placed  all 
their  hopes  of  final  success  on  the  issue  of  the  war  in 
Italy,  and  that  firom  the  victory  of  the  two  sons  of  Barcas 
in  Italy  they  expected  the  recovery  of  Spain  as  a  natural 
consequence. 
Alleged  Under   such    circumstances    the  task  of  Scipio    was 

exploits  of  comparatively  easy;  and  however  much  his  panegyrists 

'  No  terms  can  be  more  to  the  point  than  those  by  which  JAvy  (zxir.  42) 
characterises  the  Spaniards  as  a  '  gens  nata  instanrandis  reparandisque  bellis.' 
This  was  felt  not  onlj  bj  the  Romans,  but  in  modem  times  by  the  French. 
Equally  appropriate  is  Livy*s  expression  at  another  place  (xxviii.  12):  *  His- 
pania  non  quam  Italia  modo,  sed  quam  uUa  pars  terramm  bello  reparando 
aptior  erat  locorum  hominumque  ingeniis.' 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  397 

endeavoured  to  extol  his  exploits  in  Spain  and  to  represent     CHAP, 
him  as  a  consummate  hero,  they  have  not  succeeded  in 


convincing  us  that,  in  a  military  point  of  view,  he  had    p^^™ 
an  opportunity  of  accomplishing  great  things.     We  see    207-206 
clearly  that  the  glory  of  Scipio  is  the  engrossing  topic  of       ^'^' 
the  writers  who  record  the  progress  of  affairs  in  Spain.  ^V}^  "^ 
His  individual  action  is  everywhere  conspicuous.   We  can 
almost  fancy  that  we  are  reading  an  epic  poem  in  his 
honour,  and  some  of  the  scenes  described  unmistakably 
betray  their  origin  in  the  poetical  imagination  of  the 
original  narrator  or  in  an  actual  poem.^    It  is  not  difficult 
to  discover  these  traces  of  poetry.     But  as  we  possess  no 
strictly  sober  and  authentic  report  of  events  by  the  side 
of  the  poetically  coloured  narrative,  we  are  unable  to 
separate  fiction  from  truth  by  any  but  internal  criteria, 
and  in  many  instances  this  separation  must  be  left  to  the 
tact  and  individual  judgment  of  the  critical  reader. 

On  his  first  appearance  in  Spain,  Scipio  had  won  the  Popularity 
hearts  of  the  people.  When,  after  the  capture  of  New  ^^^^^1,° 
Carthage,  they  had  seen  his  magnanimity  and  wisdom, 
their  admiration  for  the  youthful  hero  rose  to  such  a 
height  that  they  began  to  call  him  their  king.  At  first 
Scipio  took  no  notice  of  this.  But  when,  after  the  battle 
of  Bsecula,  he  liberated  the  prisoners  without  ransom,  and 
the  Spanish  nobles,  seized  with  enthusiasm,  solemnly  pro- 
claimed him  their  king>*  Scipio  met  them  with  the  decla- 
ration that  he  claimed  indeed  to  possess  a  royal  spirit, 
but  that,  as  a  Boman  citizen,  he  could  not  assume  the 
royal  title,  but  was  satisfied  with  that  of  Imperator. 
Polybius  makes  this  the  opportunity  for  extolling  Scipio's 
moderation  and  republican  sentiments,  and  he  expresses 

*  Such  a  passage  is  that  where  the  meeting  of  Scipio  and  Masinissii  is 
described  (Livy,  xxviii.  35):  'Goeperat  iam  ante  Numidam  ex  fuma  rerum 
gestarum  admiratio  riri  substitueratque  animo  speciem  quoque  corporis  amplam 
ac  magnificam :  ceterum  maior  pnesentis  veneratio  cepit ;  et  praeteiquam  quod 
suapte  natura  multa  maiestas  inerat,  omabat  promissa  csesaries  habitusque 
corporis  non  cultus  munditiis  sed  virilis  rere  ac  militaris  et  setas  in  medio 
virium  robore/  etc. 

*  Polybius,  X,  40.    Livy,  xxvii.  19. 


393  KOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  surprise  khat  he  stretched  out  his  hand  to  seize  a  crown 
neither  on  this  occasion  nor  at  a  later  period  when,  after 
the  overthrow  of  Carthage  and  Syria,  he  had  reached 
the  height  of  glory,  and  *  had  free  scope  to  obtain  royal 
power  in  whatever  part  of  the  earth  he  wished.'  *  This 
opinion,  so  unhesitatingly  expressed  by  Polybius,  is  in  the 
highest  degree  strange  and  startling.  It  proves  beyond 
dispute  that  in  his  time,  i.e.  in  the  first  half  of  the  second 
century  before  our  era,  the  establishment  of  monarchical 
government  was  a  contingency  which  the  imagination  of 
the  Romans  did  not  place  beyond  the  reach  of  possibility ; 
that  at  any  rate  distinguished  members  of  the  nobility 
were  reputed  capable  of  aspiring  to  a  position  above  the 
republican  equality  which  befitted  the  majority  of  citizens. 
It  is  true  we  find  this  idea  expressed  by  a  Greek,  who 
perhaps  had  no  conception  of  the  deep-seated  horror  with 
which  a  genuine  Roman  looked  upon  the  power  and  the 
very  name  of  a  king,  and  whom  the  history  of  his  own 
nation  since  the  time  of  Alexander  the  Great  had  made 
familiar  with  the  assumption  of  royal  dignity  by  successful 
generals.      Moreover,   Polybius    intimates  that,    in    his 

'  The  passage  of  Polybius  (z.  40)  is  of  great  significancei  and  deserres  to  be 
quoted  at  full  length:  Aih  Ktd  avvaBpoiaas  nrohs  '^Ifimpas  /ScuriAuc^s  yukv  1^ 
fiouKtoBcu  Ktd  KeytcBai  xapb.  Tourty  Ktd  reus  itkriBeiais  infApx^i^f  fiwriXtis  ye 
fi^v  olrrc  i$€Ktiy  tlvai  olfTc  KiytaBai  irap'  ovScvt.  Tavra  8^  ciV^v  Tap^yywiXe 
arfwrriyhy  avrhy  xpoa^yw,  "Itrvs  fi^p  oZv  koX  rArt  Zucalvs  &y  ris  hr^ffti/iitifaro 
rijv  fieyaKo^vx^  riufJiphSf  f  KOfuSp  y4os  &y  Ktd  rris  r^xi|S  cfirrf  trvv^K^pa^^ns 
M  roaovToVf  &<rr€  ir(£vras  rovs  &KOTarrofA4vous  4^  airr&v  hri  t€  toOtiiv  Karwy^' 
X^v'w  'Hjv  tidXiir^iv  ical  r^v  hpoiMarUw^  tyMS  iv  4avT^  ii4ft€iy€  icai  iretpipTetro  r^r 
Toimnnv  ipfA^p  Ktd  ^tamturiay,  TLoKv  5c  fiakKoy  &tf  ru  $auf»dtrtu  rj^y  brtpfioX^ 
rrjs  vcpl  rhy  &v5pa  fieydKot^vxica  fi\4^tu  tls  robs  itrx^fovs  rov  fitov  Ktupobs^ 
ilvUca  vpibs  ro7s  Kork  r^v  *lfii:ipitiy  fpyois  irarccnrp^ifwro  fiku  Kapx>fioylovs  Koi 
rh  TKturra  Ktd  KdWurra  ii4pfi\  r^s  litfi6fis  iath  r&y  ^lAofrov  $»fi&y  €ots  'HpeucAcfcvr 
trniKvy  &Kh  T^y  rijs  waTpiSos  ilovcrlay  ffycryc,  KaT€trTp4^ro  8^  tV  *Anlay  Ktd 
roifs  riis  Svpfeis  fiaatXtis  Ktd  rh  KdJiXitrrtty  Ktd  fx4yurroy  fi4pos  rvs  olKOi^4nis 
\nt4iKoo¥  ivoiiitrt  'PwfialoUf  fXajSc  8i  Katpols  els  rb  T«piiroy^tratr$ai 
Zvvatrrflav  0atri\iKiiv  iv  oJs  &v  4Ti$d\oiTo  Ka\  /SovAijOcfif  rSvois 
rris  olKovfi4viij5,  With  these  startling  words  we  may  compare  Dion  Cassius 
(frgm.  Ivii.  36):  trt  {'XKixUity)  fieiCwy  rris  Kotyrjs  iur^>d\ias  4yfy6yei  .... 
throes  [x^  lavrois  ritpaywov  tt^txlperoy  4natrKiiirwriy  ('P«/icub<),  and  Zonaras 
(ix.  11) :  o{  5i  iy  r^  P^f*V  •  •  •  •  ^6fitp  /i^  tntfp^poviitTas  rvptxyyitrp  iiyeKts\4tTttyro 
wr6y. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


399 


opinion,  Scipio  might  haye  made  use  of  his  influence  and 
of  circumstances  to  obtain  royal  authority,  not  in  Bome, 
but  in  Spain,  Asia,  or  elsewhere.  Perhaps  he  thought  such 
a  regal  or  yice-regal  position  not  incompatible  with  the 
duties  of  a  Boman  citizen  and  general,  much,  perhaps,  as 
the  men  of  the  house  of  Barcas  had  been  defdcto  kings  in 
Spain,  and  had  yet  continued  to  serve  the  Carthaginian 
state  as  dutiful  subjects ;  but,  in  spite  of  aU  these  conside- 
rations, the  judgment  of  Polybius,  with  regard  to  Scipio's 
refusal  of  the  royal  title,  must  be  looked  upon  as  a  sign  of 
the  times.  It  is  the  first  faint  shadow  which  coming  events 
cast  before  them.  The  dominion  of  Bome  over  the  pro- 
Tinces  made  it  necessary  to  confer  upon  individuals  from 
time  to  time  monarchical  powers;  and  these  temporary 
powers  were  the  steps  to  the  throne  of  the  Boman  em- 
perors. Spain  was  the  first  country  that  witnessed  the 
autocratic  power  of  Boman  nobles;  and  it  was  in  the 
family  of  the  Scipios  that  this  became  first  apparent.  It 
grew  from  generation  to  generation,  and  under  its  weight 
the  republic  was  crashed.  There  had  been  a  time  in 
Bome,  and  it  was  not  far  back,  when  not  even  the  thought 
of  the  possibility  of  monarchical  power  could  have  been 
entertained  by  any  one.  In  the  Samnite  wars,  in  the  wax 
with  Pyrrhus,  and  in  the  first  war  with  Carthage,  the  soul 
of  every  Boman  was  filled  by  the  republican  spirit  alone. 
Another  form  of  government  than  that  of  the  free  republic 
was  inconceivable  in  Bome,  just  as  it  is  inconceivable  at 
the  present  day  in  Switzerland  and  in  the  United  States 
of  America.  All  the  accusations  brought  by  the  Boman 
annalists  against  Spurius  Cassius,  Spurius  Meelius,  and 
Marcus  Manlius,  for  alleged  attempts  to  seize  monarchical 
power,  are  nothing  but  inventions  of  a  later  period.  But 
this  period  begins,  as  we  now  see,  after  the  Hannibalian 
war,  when  a  writer  like  Polybius  could  find  reason  to 
praise  Scipio  for  refusing  the  royal  title  and  for  abstain- 
ing from  the  assumption  of  royal  authority. 

In  spite  of  the  republican  sentiments  and  the  modera- 
tion which  Scipio  displayed  wii  h  regard  to  the  offer  of  the 


CHAP. 
VIII. 

w 

Sixth 
Pkkiod, 
207-205 

B.C. 


Magnifi- 
cence and 
power  of 
Scipio. 


400 


KO^LVN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Capture  of 
Oringis 
by  the 
Komans. 


royal  title,  his  conduct  and  demeanour  showed  a  kind  of 
royal  bearing  and  of  conscious  superiority  over  his  felloiwr- 
citizens.     He  was  surrounded  by  something  like  a  court 
on  a  small  scale.     His  first  confidential  adviser  and  most 
trusty  servant  was  Caius   Leelius/   who   was  employed 
especially  to  execute  delicate  commissions  and  deliver 
messages  in  Bome,   to    sound    Scipio's   praise    and    to 
keep  together  his  friends  in  the  senate.      Besides  this 
diplomatic  agency  he  was  also  intrusted  with  military 
duties,  like  Scipio's  elder  brother  Lucius,  and  like  Caius 
Marcius,  the  brave  tribune  who  in  the  year  212  had 
saved  the  remnants  of  the  Boman  army  from  utter  de- 
struction.    Even  the  propnetor  Marcus   Junius  Silanus 
received  orders  from  him  as  if  he  were  an  imperial  legate,* 
whilst  the  commander-in-chief  directed  the  movements  of 
his  inferiors  from  his  head-quarters  at  Tarraco. 

The  year  207  B.C.,  which  was  so  decisive  for  the  war  in 
Italy,  seems  not  to  have  been  marked  by  any  noteworthy 
events  in  Spain.  Afber  Hasdrubal  had  marched  with  his 
army  across  the  Pyrenees  and  Alps,  it  appears  that  the 
Carthaginians  did  not  feel  strong  enough  for  any  offensive 
operations,  and  Scipio  too  was  weakened,  as  he  had  sent 
a  part  of  his  forces  for  the  protection  of  Italy ••  He  re- 
mained stationary  in  Tarraco,  where  he  had  wintered,  and 
we  hear  only  of  a  march  of  Lselius  to  Bsetica  in  the  ex- 
treme south  of  the  peninsula,  where  he  encountered  and 
worsted  Hannibal's  brother  Mago,  and  captured  a  Punic 
general  named  Hanno.  The  only  other  event  assigned  to 
this  year  is  the  taking  of  a  place  called  Oringis,*  by  Scipio's 
brother  Lucius,  on  which  occasion  2,000  enemies  and  not 
more  than  ninety  Bomans  are  said  to  have  fallen.^ 


^ 


'  Polybius,  X.  3,  §  2 :  Fcfeoj  Aai\tos  iiri  y4ov  fterttrxnif^t  «*Tf  iravrhs  Hpyov 

'  Livy  (xzvi.  19)  calls  him  Scipio^s  '  adiutor  ad  res  gerendas.' 

*  See  above,  p.  383.    Nevertheless  Livy  says  (zxriii.  1)  that    in  Spain 
*  renatum  snbito  par  priori  bello,*  which  is  merely  an  empty  phrase. 

*  Whether  this  place  is  identical  with  Auringis,  mentioned  before  by  Liry 
(xxiv.  42),  and  "where  it  was  situated,  we  do  not  know. 

*  Livj*,  xxriii.  3. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  401 

The  succeeding  year,  206  b.c.,  witnessed  the  total  ex-     CHAP, 
tinction  of  Punic  dominion  in  Spain.    Scipio  had  probably    ,—  ,  \^ 
again  reinforced  his  army  after  the  battle  on  the  Metaurus.     p^™^ 
The  news  of  that  victory  produced  a  great  effect  in  Spain,    207-205 
and  gained  new  allies  for  the  Bomans.     Scipio  marched       *'^' 
again  southwards,  and  met  a  second  time  at  Baecula  a  ^^^^^f 
large   Carthaginian  army  under  Hasdrubal,  the  son  of  Beecula. 
Gisgo,  which,  after  a  severe  struggle,  he  compelled  to 
retreat  into  its  camp,  and  drove  further  and  further  south 
shortly  after.'     Hereupon  he  returned  by  slow  marches  to 
Tarraco,   leaving  Silanus  behind  to  pursue  the  broken 
hostile  army.     This  army,  it  appears,  dwindled  away  fast. 
The  Spanish  troops  deserted  and  went  to  their  respective 
homes,  while  the  Punians  retreated  to  the  island  town  of 
Gades.     Thus  the  war  was  brought  to  an  end  on  the  con- 
tinent of  Spain.     Here,  as  well  as  in  Sicily  and  Sardinia, 
the  superior  strength  and  perseverance  of  Bome  had  pre- 
vailed over  the  Carthaginian  armies,  which  were  apparently 
better  led,  but  composed  of  worse  materials. 

The  contagion  of  defection,  which  in  great  part  had  OreTtures 
caused  the  loss  of  Spain,  now  began  to  attack  the  native  ni^«^ 
African  troops,  which,  more  than  any  other  portion  of  the  Scipio. 

*  This  second  victoiy  of  Bsecula  is  exposed  to  as  serious  historical  douhts 
as  the  first.  Even  the  name  of  the  locality  is  uncertain ;  for  Livy  (xzviii.  12) 
mentions  the  name  Silipa,  besides  Bsecula  ;  the  manuscripts  of  Polybius  have 
Elinga,  which  has  been  corrected  into  Ilipa ;  and  Appian  calls  the  place  by 
the  strange  name  of  Karmon.  Great  victories  make  even  insignificant  places, 
such  as  Cannse,  celebrated ;  and  it  seems,  therefore,  to  be  rather  a  questionable 
triumph  of  which  not  even  the  locality  is  fixed  and  known.  It  can  further 
be  shown  that  Scipio*s  firiends  were  guilty  of  great  exaggerations.  Livy,  who 
is  not  generally  inclined  to  understate  the  results  of  Roman  feats  of  arms 
says  that  the  army  of  Hasdrubal  was  64,000  strong,  but  that  some  writers 
made  it  20,000  more.  He  does  not  mention  Polybius;  but,  by  chance,  a 
fragment  of  this  historian  has  been  preserved  (xi.  20  if.)  in  which  the  battle 
is  very  fully  related,  and  from  which  it  appears  that  he  is  the  authority  for 
the  greater  number.  This  statement,  accordingly,  may  be  considered  to  be 
based  on  family  traditions  of  the  Scipios.  Lastly,  the  reported  issue  of  the 
battle  is  such  that  it  betrays  the  false  colouring  to  anyone  slightly  accustomed 
to  judge  such  reports.  The  numbers  of  the  killed  and  captured  Carthaginians 
are  not  given ;  the  battle  is  said  to  have  been  interrupted  by  a  sudden  thunder- 
storm, and  the  Carthaginians,  as  well  as  the  Eomans,  retire  into  their  neigh- 
bouring camp.     After  this,  what  remains  of  the  alleged  victory? 

VOL.  II.  D  I> 


402 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Relations 
of  Scipio 
with 
Syphax. 


Carthaginian  armies,  had  hitherto  been  the  terror  of  the 
legions.  Masinissa,  the  brave  Numidian  prince,  who  a 
few  years  before  had  fought  against  the  rebellious  Syphax, 
and  had  since  then  rendered  the  most  important  services 
in  Spain  with  his  excellent  cavalry,  was  beginning  to  find 
out,  with  the  native  shrewdness  of  a  barbarian,  that  the 
cause  of  his  friends  and  patrons  was  lost,  and  he  was 
anxious,  before  it  should  be  too  late,  to  secure  for  himself  a 
safe  retreat  into  the  catnp  of  the  conquerors.  He  was  shut 
up  in  Gades  with  the  remnant  of  the  Carthaginian  army, 
but  found  an  opportunity  of  treating  with  Silanus,*  and 
is  even  related  to  have  had  a  secret  interview  with  Scipio 
himself,  in  which  the  terms  of  an  alliance  between  him  and 
Eome  were  discussed,  and  his  co-operation  was  promised 
in  case  the  war  should  be  carried  into  Africa.*  Thus  the 
first  preparations  were  made  for  the  execution  of  the  plan 
which  Scipio  Was  already  maturing  in  his  mind,  viz.,  of 
bringing  the  war  to  a  conclusion  in  that  country,  where 
the  most  deadly  blows  could  be  inflicted  on  Carthage. 

But  before  Masinissa's  help  was  quite  secured,  Scipio 
endeavoured  to  restore  and  to  strengthen  the  amicable 
relations  which  for  several  years  had  existed  between  Rome 
and  Syphax,  the  most  powerful  prince  of  the  western 
Numidians  or  Masssesylians.  In  the  year  215  Syphax  had, 
in  the  hope  of  aid  from  Bome,  taken  up  arms  against 
Carthage.  But  he  seems  to  have  been  left  to  his  own 
resources,  and  the  few  Roman  officers  whom  the  two 
Scipios  had  sent  to  him  from  Spain  *  had  proved  unable  to 
convert  his  unruly  Numidians  into  anything  like  a  regular 
and  steady  infantry.  He  was  accordingly  worsted  and 
expelled  from  his  kingdom  by  the  Carthaginians  and  their 
allies,  the  Numidians,  under  King  Gula  and  his  son 
Masinissa.      Under  what  conditions    the  Carthaginians 

*  Livy,  zzviii.  16. 

*  Livy,  xxviii.  35.  It  seems  hardly  probable  that  Scipio,  merely  for  the 
purpose  of  conferring  secretly  with  Masinissa,  went  from  one  end  of  Spain 
(Tarraco)  to  the  other  (Gades).  The  meeting  of  Scipio  and  Masinissa  is 
probably  only  a  poetical  pendant  to  the  meeting  with  S}  phaz,  which  is  equally 
fictitious.  '  See  above,  p.  315. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAJft,  403 

afterwards  made  peace  with  him  and  allowed  him  to  return     CIIAP. 
into  his  country,  we  are  not  informed.   We  hear  only  that, 


with  the  subtle  treachery  of  a  barbarian,  he  sent  an  p  **^^ 
embassy  to  Bome  in  210,  to  assure  the  senate  of  his  207-205 
friendship,  whilst  he  was  in  amicable  relations  with  ^'^' 
Carthage.  The  secret  intrigues  carried  on  with  him  and 
with  Masinissa  are  not  known  to  us.  It  may  be  that 
Scipio  wished  to  gain  the  friendship  and  alliance  of  both. 
But  it  was  in  the  nature  of  things  that  neither  Borne  nor 
Carthage  could  be  on  good  terms  with  one  of  the  two  rivals 
without  making  an  enemy  of  the  other.  The  two 
Numidian  chiefs  could  not  be  on  the  same  side,  for  each  of 
them  aimed  at  obtaining  exclusive  possession  of  the  whole 
of  Numidia.  As  long  as  Masinissa  was  faithful  in  the 
service  of  the  C^haginians,  Syphax  tried  to  keep  on  good 
terms  with  Bome  \  but  as  soon  as  he  heard  that  Masinissa 
had  betrayed  his  friends  and  gone  over  to  the  Bomans,  it 
was  no  longer  possible  for  him  to  remain  in  a  neutral  or 
even  hostile  position  to  Carthage.  If  one  of  the  two 
Numidian  chiefs  turned  to  the  rightj  it  was  necessary  for 
the  other  to  turn  to  the  left.  It  was  therefore  a  vain 
attempt  on  the  part  of  Scipio  to  secure  the  co-operation  of 
Syphax  in  the  war  with  the  Carthaginians  after  he  had 
detached  Masinissa  from  their  side. 

Livy  gives  a  long  and  graphic  description  of  a  dangerous  Alleged 
voyage  of  Scipio  to  a  Numidian  port ;  of  his  meeting,  by  an  ^^g^jpf^, 
extraordinary  coincidence,   with   Hasdrubal,   the  son  of  with 
Gisgo,  in  the  yery  house  and  at  the  table  of  Syphax ;   of  '^^^ 
negotiations  there  conducted,  on  which  occasion  Scipio's 
personal  qualities  again  drew  forth  the  admiration  of  his 
enemies,  and  lastly  of  an  alliance  concluded  with  Syphax.^ 
The  whole  of  this  narrative  belongs,  in  all  probability,  to  the 
domain  of  fiction.  It  looks  like  a  rhapsody  in  the  epic  poem 
of  the  great  Scipio.     The  facts  related  are  nothing  but 
the  personal  adventures  of  a  few  heroes ;  they  have  not  the 
slightest  influence  on  the  course  of  eyents,  and  cannot  even 

*  Livy,  xzriii.  18. 
D  D  2 


404  KOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     be  made  to  liarmonise  with  it.     The  alleged  treaty  with 

TV 

^  ,  Syphax  *  turns  out  to  be  a  fable,  and  the  Quixotic  voyage 


to  Africa  cannot  be  fitted  chronologically  into  the  year 
206.*  If  therefore  negotiations  really  took  place  between 
Scipio  and  Syphax,  it  is  probable  that  Lselius,  or  some  other 
confidential  agent,  was  the  negotiator,  and  not  the  com- 
mander-in-chief himself.' 
Story  of  Not  a  whit  more  authentic,  and  not  a  whit  more  in- 

fl»m«8°at*^  teresting  as  bearing  on  the  course  of  events,  is  the  detailed 
New  Car-  narrative  given  by  Livy  *  of  the  magnificent  funeral  games 
^^^'  which  Scipio  celebrated  in  New  Carthage  in  honour  of  his 
father  and  his  uncle.  The  gladiatorial  combats  on  this 
occasion  were  not  of  the  kind  usually  exhibited  in  Rome 
at  the  funerals  of  great  men.  Instead  of  hired  gladiators, 
free  and  noble  Spaniards,  who  had  offered  themselves 
voluntarily  and  with  a  chivalrous  zeal,  fought  with  one 
another  to  do  honour  to  the  great  Scipio.  Nay,  the  mortal 
combat  was  turned  into  an  ordeal.  Two  kinsmen,  rival 
claimants  of  a  disputed  crown,  resolved  to  decide  their 
quarrel  by  an  appeal  to  arms,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
enhance  the  brilliancy  of  Scipio's  funeral  games  by  their 

*  Livy(xxriii.  18):  •  foedusictum/ 

*  Compare  Weis8enbom*8  note  toLivyxxviii.  16.  The  faotis,  too  many  erents 
are  crowded  into  the  year  206  ;  first,  the  march  of  Scipio  fromTarraco  into  the 
valley  of  the  Beetis  (Andalusia)  and  the  battle  of  BaBcnla ;  this  alone  takes, 
according  to  Livy  {loc.  cit.  §  10),  at  least  five  months  ;  secondly,  the  voyage  to 
Numidia  (Livy,  xxviii.  17);  thirdly,  the  taking  of  Illiturgi,  Castulo,  and 
Astapa  (ch.  1 9  ff.)  which  presupposes  a  second  expedition  from  the  north  of 
Spain  into  Andalusia ;  fourthly,  the  funeral  games  (ch.  21);  fifthly,  Scipio's 
illness  and  the  mutiny  of  the  army  (ch.  24-29) ;  sixthly,  the  campaign  across 
the  Ebro  against  Mandonius  and  Indibilis  (ch.  31  ff.);  seventhly,  Scipio*s 
journey  to  Masinissa,  being  the  third  expedition  into  Andalusia  (ch.  35) ; 
eighthly,  Scipio's  journey  to  Rome  before  the  end  of  the  year,  for  the  purpose 
of  securing  his  election  to  the  consulship  of  205.  Weissenborn  proposes  to 
apportion  some  of  these  events  to  the  year  207  ;  but  even  if  this  were  done, 
there  would  still  remain  a  good  deal  to  be  apportioned  to  the  limbo  of  fiction. 

'  An  analogous  case  of  misrepresentation  occurs  at  a  later  period  of  the 
war.  In  the  year  203  B.C.,  negotiations  again  took  place  between  Scipio  and 
Syphax  (Livy,  xxx.  3),  which,  according  to  the  general  account  of  the  annalist8, 
were  conducted  by  messengers.  But  here  again  one  writer — Valerius  Antias, 
not  notorious  for  his  veracity— preferred  a  more  striking  account,  and  related  a 
personal  interview  in  Scipio's  camp,  for  which,  of  course,  he  had  to  draw  on 
his  imagination.  *  Liry,  xxviii.  21. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  405 

personal  encounter.      Scipio's   refined   hnmanity  was  of    ClfAP. 

.      .  .  VIII 

course  revolted  at  this  singular  and  atrocious  suggestion ; ^-^ 

lie  sought  to  persuade  the  rivals  to  desist  from  their  inten-  j^j™ 
tion,  but,  being  unable  to  do  so,  he  consented  at  last  to  this  207-206 
singular  trial  by  battle,  which  was  at  the  same  time  a  show 
for  his  troops,  and  in  which  one  of  the  two  princes  was 
killed  after  a  severe,  and  no  doubt  interesting,  fight.  What 
are  we  to  think  of  historians  who  gravely  accept  such  wild 
flights  of  imagination  as  actual  facts,  to  be  recorded  in 
sober  historical  prose,  and  who  dwell  upon  them  with 
visible  satisfaction  ?  A  single  chapter  of  such  history  as 
this  is  sufficient  to  cast  doubt  on  other  stories  connected 
with  Scipio's  doings,  even  though  they  should  not  in  them- 
selves be  fantastic  or  ridiculous. 

When  the  Carthaginians  had  evacuated  all  Spain  with  storming 
the  smgle  exception  of  Gades,  there  remained  nothing  for  °^™*^^- 
Scipio  to  do  but  to  make  war  upon  those  of  the  former 
Carthaginian  allies  who  might  not  be  found  willing  to 
exchange  the  dominion  of  one  foreign  and  alien  power  for 
that  of  another,  or  upon  those  tribes  which  had  distin- 
guished themselves  by  their  hostility  to  Home.  To  the 
latter  belonged  the  town  of  lUiturgi  on  the  river  Bsetis. 
The  inhabitants  of  this  place,  formerly  subject  to  Carthage, 
had  joined  the  Bomans  in  the  beginning  of  the  war,  but 
after  the  defeat  of  the  two  Scipios  they  had  made  their 
peace  with  Carthage,  by  killing  the  Boman  fugitives  who 
had  fled  into  their  town  from  the  battle-field.*  This  cruel 
treachery  now  called  for  vengeance.  lUiturgi  was  taken 
by  storm.  All  the  men,  women,  and  children  were  killed 
indiscriminately,  and  the  town  was  levelled  with  the 
ground.* 

'  Livy,  xxviii.  19. 

^  Li^'y,  xzyiii.  20 :  *  Turn  vero  apparuit  ab  ira  et  ab  odio  urbem  expugnatam 
esse :  nemo  capiendi  vivos,  nemo,  patentibus  ad  direptionem  omnibus,  prsedse 
memor  est:  trucidant  inermes  iuxta  atque  armatos,  feminas  pariter  ac  viros, 
usque  ad  infantiam  csedem  ira  crudelis  pervenit.  Ignem  deinde  tectis  iniiciunt 
ac  diruunt  quae  incendio  absumi  nequeunt.'  The  evident  satisfaction  \7ith 
vrhich  Livy  paints  this  scene,  and  which  is  hardly  disguised  by  the  qualification 
of  ira  as  crudelis^  shows  that  the  barbaric  practices  of  ancient  warfare  caused 
little  compunction  even  to  the  humanity  and  refinement  of  the  Augustan  age. 


406  '      ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK         The   neighbouring  town  of  Castulo  was   treated  less 
severely,  because,  terrified  by  the  fate  of  lUiturgi,  it  had 


IV. 


Destruc-      Surrendered  to  Marcius  and  delivered  up  a  Punic  garrison,' 

tion  of  Marcius  then  inarched  upon  Astapa  (the  modem  Estepa, 
south  of  Astigi).  This  unfortunate  town  became  the  scene 
of  one  of  those  horrible  outbreaks  of  frenzied  patriotism 
and  despair  of  which  the  natives  of  Spain  in  ancient  and 
modem  times  have  given  several  examples.  The  men  of 
Astapa  raised  in  their  town  a  huge  funeral  pile,  cast  all 
their  treasures  on  it,  killed  their  wives  and  children,  and 
let  the  fiames  consume  all,  whilst  they  themselves  rushed 
against  the  enemy  and  fell  in  battle  to  the  last  man.' 
They  had  had  no  choice  left  between  this  terrible  end  and 
the  still  more  terrible  one  of  Illiturgi,  and  they  thought 
that  the  bitterness  of  death  would  be  less  at  the  hands 
of  sacrificers  than  of  butchers. 

lUnesBof        Hitherto  Scipio  had  met  with  uninterrupted  success. 

Scipioand   The  Oarthaffinians  were  driven  out  of  Spain;   all  the 

mutiny  of  *^  i  i  .    . 

troope.  native  peoples  were  subdued  or  had  voluntarily  joined  the 
I&oman  cause ;  negotiations  had  been  entered  into  with  the 
two  most  powerful  Numidian  chiefs,  who  promised  their 
assistance  in  the  further  prosecution  of  the  war  in  Africa, 
when  suddenly  the  promising  result  was  jeopardised — for 
Scipio,  the  man  on  whom  everything  depended,  was 
suddenly  taken  ill.  Even  the  bare  rumour  of  this  cala- 
mity, exaggerating  his  illness  the  further  it  spread, 
caused  disquietude  in  the  whole  province ;  and  not  only  the 
fickle  Spanish  allies,  but  even  the  Boman  legionary  soldiers, 
unexpectedly  evinced  a  spirit  of  insubordination  and  even 
mutiny.'  A  body  of  eight  thousand  Eoman  soldiers, 
stationed  near  Sucro,  had  even  before  this  time  been 
animated  by  a  bad  spirit;  they  had  complained  that 
their  pay  was  withheld,  that  they  had  been  forbidden  to 
despoil  the  Spaniards,  and  that  they  were  kept  too  long 

*  This  was  probably  the  remnant  of  the  broken-up  Carthaginhin  army. 
'  On  a  similar  deed  of  the  Saguntines,  see  Livy,  zxi.  14. 

*  Livy,  xxviii.  21:'  Apparuitque  qnantam  ezcitatura  molcm  vem  faiaset 
dades  cum  ranus  rumor  tantas  prccellas  cxcivisset' 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  "WAR. 


407 


on  foreign  service.  Now,  when  the  news  of  Scipio's  illness 
had  reached  them,  their  discontent  broke  out  into  open 
resistance  to  the  orders  of  the  legionary  tribunes ;  they 
elected  two  private  soldiers  as  their  leaders,*  plundered  the 
surrounding  country,  and  seemed  to  be  about  to  imitate 
the  example  of  the  Campanian  legion  in  the  war  with 
Pyrrhus,  in  renouncing  the  authority  of  Borne,  and  in  esta- 
blishing somewhere  an  independent  dominion  of  their  own. 
As  yet,  however,  they  had  not  been  guilty  of  any  open  act 
of  violence  and  bloodshed,  and  had  ventured  on  no  outrage 
against  the  majesty  of  Rome  beyond  the  violation  of 
military  discipline  and  subordination,  when  the  news 
arrived  that  Scipio  was  not  dead,  nor  hopelessly  ill,  but 
that  he  had  recovered,  and  that  he  ordered  them  to  march 
to  New  Carthage,  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  the  pay 
that  was  due  to  then^.  They  obeyed,  and  were  soon 
brought  to  their  senses.  Scipio  caused  them  to  be  sur- 
rounded and  disarmed  by  faithful  troops,  the  ringleaders 
to  be  seized  and  executed,  and  order  and  discipline  to  be 
restored  without  further  difficulty.  The  danger  dis- 
appeared as  if  by  magic,  and  it  was  shown  again  what  a 
power  Scipio  possessed  over  the  n^inds  of  his  soldiers.* 

The  mutiny  of  the  army  being  suppressed,  the  re- 
bellious Spaniards  were  soon  punished.  Scipio  crossed 
the  Ebro,  penetrated  into  the  land  of  the  llergetes  and 
Laretani,  on  th^  north  side  of  this  river,  defeated  the 
brothers  Mandonius  and  Jndibilis,  and  forced  them  to 
submission  and  to  the  paynuent  of  a  sum  of  money. 

Before  the  year  closed,  Gades  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
EomQiUS.  For  a  regular  siiBge  of  this  strong  island  town, 
Scipio  would  have  needed  not  only  a  considerable  army 
but  also  a  large  fleet.  But  he  could  not  avail  himself  of 
his  ship99  as  he  had  taken  the  rowers  from  them  to  employ 


CHAP. 

vui. 
— — « — — ' 

Sixth 
Period, 
207-205 

B.C. 


Defeat  of 
Mandouias 
and  Indi- 
bilifl. 


Fall  of 
Gadea. 


>  The  oames  of  these  n^en  were  C.  Atriiu  and  C.  Albius,  i.e,  John  Blaek 
and  John  White  (Livyt  zxYiii.  21),  and  they  seem  hardly  historical. 

'  The  story  of  the  mutiny  at  Sacro  contains  nothing  that  is  improbable  in 
itself;  bat  the  intention  is  evident  to  glorify  Scipio  as  the  apholder  of  Boman 
discipline.    M  ^QJ  T^t^  too  much  has  been  made  of  the  affair* 


'408  ROMAN   niSTOKY. 

BOOK     on   land    service.     He   songht,  therefore,    to    gain    the 

*- r^ — '  town  by  treason,  a  plan  which  had  succeeded  in  so  many 

instances,  and  which  promised  an  easier  and  speedier 
result.  Negotiations  were  begun.  In  Grades,  as  well  as 
in  all  places  occupied  by  the  Carthaginians,  it  was  easy 
to  find  traitors  who  declared  their  readiness  to  deliver  the 
town,  as  well  as  the  Punic  garrison,  into  the  hands  oi 
the  Bomans.*  But  the  plot  was  discovered,  and  the  ring- 
leaders were  seized  and  sent  to  Carthage,  to  await  their 
punishment.  Nevertheless,  the  Carthaginians  seem  to 
have  despaired  of  holding  Gades  permanently.  The  inha- 
bitants were  Punians,  but  not  Carthaginians.  They  were 
in  the  condition  of  subject  allies,  a  condition  which  was, 
no  doubt,  felt  to  be  burthensome  and  unsatisfactory.  They 
took  very  little  interest  in  the  struggle  for  supremacy 
between  Bome  and  Carthage,  for  neither  the  one  state 
nor  the  other  allowed  them  an  independent  position. 
Perhaps  the  commercial  rivalry  of  Carthage  was  con- 
sidered to  interfere  with  the  prosperity  of  Gades,*  whilst 
nothing  was  to  be  apprehended  from  Bome  on  this  score ; 
and  the  whole  trade  in  the  western  seas  was,  after  the 
humiliation  of  Carthage,  sure  to  fall  into  the  hands  of 
Gades,  under  the  protection  of  the  Bomans.  Such  dispo- 
sitions as  these,  on  the  part  of  the  population  of  Gades, 
would  explain  the  severity  with  which  Mago  was  ordered 
by  the  home  government  to  treat  the  town — a  severity 
which  could  aim  not  at  maintaining  possession  of  Gudes, 
but  at  exacting  from  it  mercilessly  the  means  for  con- 
tinuing the  war  with  Bome,  and  then  giving  it  up.  Ma^ 
plundered  not  only  the  public  treasury  and  the  temples,' 
but  even  private  citizens,  and  then  left  the  port  of  Gades 
with  the  whole  fleet  and  all  the  forces.  In  this  undignified 
way  the  Carthaginians  abandoned  the  last  hold  they  still 

*  Livy,  zxviii.  23. 

'  With  shortsighted  selfishness  the  Carthaginians  had  sacrificed  the  interest 
and  prosperity  of  the  provincial  towns  for  the  benefit  of  the  capital  (see 
aboTe,  p.  11),  just  as  the  maritime  powers  of  modem  Europe  formerly  did  with 
regard  to  their  colonial  possessions. 

■  Livy,  zxviii.  36. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  409 

had  on  Spanish  soil.   Gades,  of  course,  opened  its  gates  to     CHAP. 

the  Bomans,  and  obtained  favourable  conditions  of  peace,    ^—1^ 

under  which  it  continued  for  a  long  time  to  flourish,  as     p^^,^ 
an   allied  city,  subject  indeed  to  Borne,  but  enjoying    207-206 
perfect   freedom   in  the  management  of  its  own  local 
affairs.' 

Thus   Spain  was  lost,  not  in  consequence  of  a  great  Signifl- 
decisive  battle,  but  by  the  gradual  retreat  and  exhaustion  the  battle 
of  the  Carthaginians.     The  last  effort  for  the  defence  of  9j^}*® 
Spain  had  been  made  when  Hasdrubal  Barcas  appeared 
with  the  Spanish  army  on  Italian  soil.     It  was  on  the 
Metaurus  that  the  Bomans  conquered  Spain,  and  Scipio 
had  nothing  to  do  but  to  follow  the  traces  of  the  wounded 
lion  to  the  last  recesses,  and  to  scare  him  away.     Before 
the  year  closed,  he  could  look  upon  this  task  as  done. 
He  intrusted  the  chief  command  to  his  legate,  M.  Junius 
Silanus,^  and  returned  to  Bome,  accompanied  by  La^lius, 
to  secure  his  election  for  the  consulship  of  the  ensuing 
year,  and  to  mature  his  plans  for  carrying  the  war  into 
Africa. 

The  hopes  which  Hannibal  had  entertained  from  the  Policy  of 
alliance  and  co-operation  of  King  Philip  of  Macedon  had  jj^^J^on. 
not  been  realised.  Instead  of  taking  an  active  part  in  the 
operations  in  Italy,  where  his  excellent  Macedonian  troops 
would  infallibly  have  decided  the  war  in  favour  of  the 
allied  powers  soon  after  the  battle  of  Cannae,  Philip  at- 
tacked those  countries  on  the  east  of  the  Adriatic  for  which 
he  had  stipulated  as  his  share  of  the  booty  after  the  defeat 
of  Bome,'  taking  it  apparently  for  granted  that,  even 
v^ithout  his  help,  Hannibal  would  be  able  to  accomplish 
the  conquest  of  Italy.  He  succeeded  in  gaining  consider- 
able advantages  in  Illyria,  and,  regarding  himself  as  already 
undisputed  master  of  the  countries  north  of  the  Ambracian 
Gulf,  he  seemed  to  be  bent  on  changing  the  influence 
which  he  enjoyed,  as  the  protector  of  some  of  the  Greek 
states,  into  a  real  dominion  over  all.     He  laid  aside  more 

«  Liry,  xxYiiL  37 ;  nxii.  2.    Cicero,  Pro  Balho,  16,  34 ;  18,  41. 
»  Pol^bius,  xi.  33,  §  8.  'See  above,  p.  230. 


410 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Condition 
of  the 
Greek 
statog* 


and  more  the  qualities  of  a  leader  of  the  Greeks,   and 
assumed  those  of  an  Asiatic  despot.     The  amiable  cha- 
racter which  he  had  exhibited  in  his  youth  gave  way  to 
low   Yoluptuousness,   falsity,   and   cruelty   when  he   had 
become  a  man*     He  fior&ited  the  confidence  and  attach- 
ment of  his  best  friends,  the  Achseans,  when  he  endea- 
voured, by  cunning  and   cruelty,  to  keep  possession  of 
Messenia.     The  royal  debauchee  was  not  ashamed,  whilst 
he  was  a  guest  in  the  house  of  his  old  friend  Aratos,  to 
dishonour  the  wife  of  his  son,  and,  when  Aratos  reproached 
him,  to  cauge  his  death  by  poison.     The  old  jealousy  and 
all  the  passione  and  internal  disputes  of  the  Greeks,  which 
were  to  have  been  buried  for  ever  by  the  peace  of  Nau- 
paktos,  in  217,*  revived  at  once,  and  it  was  not  difficult 
for  the  Eomans  to  kindle  again  the  flames  of  war,  and 
then  to  leave  the  king  of  Macedonia  so  much  to  do  in  his 
own  country  that  he  was  obliged  to  give  up  the  attempt 
of  a  landing  in  Italy. 

There  is  little  use  in  attepipting  i^  determine  who  was 
guilty  of  having  caused  the  interference  of  Rome  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  Greece.  Owing  to  the  preyaleniee  of 
small  independent  states,  the  spirit  of  nationality  could 
not  embrace  all  the  Greek  peoples,  and  bind  them  durably 
together  for  common  action  against  any  enemies  what- 
ever. No  abstract  considerations  of  public  moralitj  or 
national  duty  ever  prevented  any  Greek  community  from, 
seeking  the  alliance  of  a  foreign  power ;  they  accepted  it 
without  the  least  scruple,  if  it  promised  immediate  mate- 
rial advantages.  Few  Greeks  ever  felt  patriotic  scruples 
in  availing  themselves  of  Persian  money  or  Macedonian 
troops  to  strike  down  their  own  immediate  neighbours 
and  Hellenic  compatriots.  Even  the  great  national 
sti-uggle  against  Asiatic  barbarism,  under  Miltiades  and 
Themistokles,  had  not  united  all  the  Greeks  in  their 
common  cause,  and  since  that  time  no  equally  grand 
national  enthusiasm  had  raised  them   above  the   petty 


*  See  above,  p.  278. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  411 

jealousies  of  local  interests.    A  short  time  before  the  inter-     chap. 
ference  of  the  Komans,  the  Achaean  league  had  appealed 


to    the  Macedonians,   and   made    them    the   arbitrators     ^ixth 

,  ^  Pkkiod, 

in  the  internal  affairs  of  Hellas.  If,  therefore,  on  the  207-205 
present  occasion,  the  ^tolians  called  in  the  Romans,  we  ^'^' 
can  only  condemn  them  of  having  committed  a  sin  against 
their  own  nation  which  none  of  the  other  Greeks  would 
have  scrupled  to  commit,  a  sin  which  is  the  inevitable 
curse  of  internal  division  in  every  nation  of  ancient  or 
modem  times. 

Nevertheless    we  must  acknowledge  that  the  league  Lengu** 
which  the  -Sitolians  now  concluded  with  the  Bomans  !f*^^i?" 

.  tho^to- 

was  distinguished  by  peculiar  turpitude.  It  waa  an  en-  lians  and 
gagement  by  which  the  whole  j^tolian  people  became  Romans 
Boman  mercenaries,  and  stipulated  that  their  hire  should 
be  the  plunder  of  the  neighbouring  (Jreek  cities.  They 
agreed  to  make  common  cause  with  the  Bomans,  like  a 
band  of  robbers.  The  Bomans  were  to  furnish  ships,  the 
j^tolians  troops ;  the  conquered  countries  and  towns  were 
to  become  the  spoil  of  the  ^tolians^  the  movable  booty 
that  of  the  Bomans.  If  w<e  recoUect  that  this  '  movable 
booty '  included  the  inhabitants  who  might  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  conquerors,  and  who  would  consequently  be 
sold  into  slavery,  we  ghall  duly  appreciate  the  sense  of 
national  dignity  that  could  animate  the  j^tolians  and  induce 
them  to  conclude  so  disgraceful  an  alliance  with  foreign 
barbarians  for  the  enslaving  of  their  countrymen.  And  even 
this  conduct  might  perhaps  have  been  excused  or  palliated 
to  some  extent  if  extreme  danger,  or  the  necessity  of  self- 
defence,  had  urged  the  ^toUans,  as  a  last  resource,  to 
secure  foreign  help  on  these  terms.  But  it  was,  in  truth, 
nothing  but  their  native  robber  instinct  that  induced 
them,  instead  of  honestly  cultivating  their  fields,  to  plough 
with  the  spear  and  to  reap  with  the  sword.  They  suc- 
ceeded by  their  league  with  the  Bomans  once  more  in 
setting  Greece  in  a  blaze  of  war,  in  filling  the  whole 
length  and  breadth  of  the  land  with  untold  misery,  and 
in  preparing  for  subjection  to  a  foreign  yoke  the  nation 


412 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Effects  of 
the  league 
with  the 
iEtolians. 


War  be- 
tween the 


which  would  not  submit  to  the  discipline  of  a  national 
state.  Our  indignation  at  their  conduct  is  mingled  with 
a  feeling  of  satisfaction  when  we  remember  that  they 
were  the  first  to  feel  the  weight  of  this  yoke,  and  that  they 
were  almost  driven  to  despair  and  madness  when  they  felt 
how  galling  it  was. 

After  the  fall  of  Syracuse  and  Capua,  M.  Valerius 
Lsevinus  crossed  over  to  Greece  with  a  fleet  of  fifty  ships 
and  one  legion,*  and  made  his  appearance  in  the  popular 
assembly  of  the  -Sltolians,  the  leading  men  of  which  had 
been  previously  persuaded  to  favour  the  Koman  proposals. 
He  found  no  difficulty  in  prevailing  upon  them  to  renew 
the  war  with  Philip,  as  he  held  out  the  prospect  of  con- 
quering the  Acarnanian  country,  which  they  had  coveted 
for  a  long  time,  and'  of  regaining  the  numerous  towns 
taken  from  them  by  the  Macedonians.  It  was  supposed 
that  all  would  join  the  alliance  who,  from  their  own  in- 
terest, or  from  old  hostility,  were  the  natural  enemies  of 
Macedonia,  such  as  the  Thracian  barbarians  in  the  north, 
the  chiefs  Pleuratus  and  Skerdilaidas  in  lUyria,  the  Mes- 
senians,  Eleans,  and  Lacedaemonians  in  Peloponnesus ; 
lastly,  in  Asia,  King  Attains  of  Pergamum,  who,  feeling 
unsafe  in  his  precarious  position  between  the  two  great 
monarchies  of  Macedonia  and  Syria,  welcomed  the  Romans 
as  his  patrons,  and  thus  made  an  opening  for  their  diplo- 
macy to  interfere  in  the  political  afTairs  of  the  distant 
East.  Valerius  promised  to  assist  the  ^tolians  with  a 
fleet  of  at  least  twenty-five  ships,  and  both  parties  en- 
gaged not  to  conclude  a  separate  peace  with  Macedonia. 
Thus  the  Eomans  had  let  loose  upon  Philip  a  pack  of 
hounds,  numerous  enough  to  keep  him  at  bay  in  his  own 
country  and  to  prevent  him  from  thinking  of  an  invasion 
of  Italy.  They  were  relieved  from  all  anxiety  on  this  score, 
and  were  not  even  obliged  to  make  great  efforts  for  the 
defence  of  their  eastern  coast. 

It  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  follow  in  detail  the  course  of 


*  Livy,  xxvi.  1,  24. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  413 

the  war  in  Greece.     It  was  marked,  not  by  ffreat  decisive     CHAP. 

.  VIII 

actions,  but  by  a   number  of  petty  conflicts    and  bar-  . ^L^ 

barous  atrocities,  by  which  the  strength  of  the  nation  was     p^™ 
sapped  and  wasted.    The  source  of  the  greatest  calamities    2u7-20d 

*  B  C 

was  this,  that  the  hostile  territories  were  not  compact 
masses,  separated  from  one  another  by  a  single  line  of  fnd  PMHp 
frontier,  but  detached  pieces,  scattered  about  irregularly,  of  Mace- 
and  intermingled  in  the  Peloponnesus,  in  central  Greece,  °  ** 
and  on  the  islands.  Thus  the  war  was  not  confined  to  one 
locality,  but  raged  simultaneously  in  every  quarter.  In 
the  Peloponnesus  the  Achseans  were  harassed  continuously 
by  the  ^tolians  and  the  Lacedaemonians,  who,  in  this 
last  period  of  their  independence,  had  exchanged  their 
venerable  hereditary  monarchy  and  their  aristocratic  con- 
stitution for  the  government  of  a  tyrant.  The  proud 
Spartans,  formerly  the  sworn  enemies  and  opponents  of 
tyranny  in  all  parts  of  Greece,  had  at  last  succumbed  to  a 
tyrant  themselves.  Machanidas,  a  brave  soldier,  had 
made  himself  their  master,  and  exercised  a  military  de- 
spotism in  a  state  which  at  one  time  appeared  to  the 
wisest  of  the  Greeks  the  model  of  political  institutions. 
The  coasts  of  the  Corinthian  Gulf  and  the  ^gsean  Sea 
were  visited  by  Roman,  ^tolian,  and  Pergamenian  fleets, 
that  plundered  and  devastated  the  towns  and  carried 
away  the  inhabitants  into  slavery.  From  the  north, 
hordes  of  barbarians  broke  in  upon  Macedonia.  Philip 
was  compelled  to  hasten  from  one  place  to  another.  When 
he  was  confronting  the  Thracians,  he  was  called  away  by 
messengers  to  protect  his  Peloponnesian  allies;  and  scarcely 
had  he  marched  southwards,  when  his  hereditary  dominions 
were  invaded  by  Illyrians  and  Dardanians.  He  conducted 
this  difficult  war  not  without  vigour  and  ability,  and  suc- 
ceeded, by  his  restless  activity  and  quickness,  in  showing 
himself  superior  to  his  enemies  in  every  part,  in  driving 
back  Pleuratus  and  Skerdilaidas  in  Illyria,  in  beating  the 
^tolians  (210  b.o.)  near  Lamia,  and  chasing  them  into 
their  own  country.  Attains  of  Pergamum  was  surprised  by 
Philip,  near  the  town  of  Opus,  which  he  had  taken  and 


414 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


JJOOK 
IV. 


Return  of 
Si'ipio  to 
Rome. 


was  just  in  the  act  of  plundering.  Barely  managing  to 
escape  captivity,  he  returned  into  Asia,  and,  being  occupied 
in  disputes  with  his  neighbour,  King  Prusias  of  Bithynia, 
paid  no  more  attention  to  the  affairs  of  Greece.  The 
Bomans  took  very  little  part  in  the  war.  Under  these 
circumstances,  some  of  the  neutral  powers,  the  Khodians 
and  the  king  of  Egypt,  almost  succeeded,  as  early  as 
208  B.C.,  in  bringing  about  the  restoration  of  peace  be- 
tween King  Philip  and  the  ^tolians.  But  the  Romans 
made  the  negotiations  abortive  by  now  resuming  the  war 
with  increased  vigour  on  their  part.*  After  a  short  armis- 
tice, hostilities  were  continued;  and  if  Philip  had  possessed 
a  respectable  fleet,^  he  would  have  had  no  difficulty  in 
reducing  the  exhausted  iBtolians  to  submission.  In  206 
B.C.  he  penetrated  a  second  time  to  Thermon,  the  capital 
of  their  country.  His  allies,  the  Achseans,  under  the 
command  dF  the  able  general  PhilopcBmen,  gained  a  de- 
cisive victory  over  the  Spartans,  in  which  the  tyrant 
Machanidas  was  killed ;  and  as  the  Eomans  neglected 
more  and  more  to  render  the  services  to  which  they  had 
bound  themselves  in  the  treaty,  the  -SJtolians  were  com- 
pelled at  last,  in  205  B.C.,  to  conclude  a  separate  peace 
with  Macedonia,  in  formal  violation  of  their  engagements 
with  Rome. 

On  his  return  from  Spain  in  the  year  206,  Scipio  enter- 
tained not  unfounded  hopes  that,  at  an  age  when  other 
men  began  to  prepare  themselves  for  the  higher  military 
commands  and  oflBces  of  state,  he  would  be  rewarded  with 
a  triumph,  the  greatest  distinction  to  which  a  Soman  citi- 
zen could  aspire,  as  the  crowning  honour  of  a  life  devoted 
to  the  public  service.  He  had  not  indeed  been  invested 
with  a  regular  magistracy.  Without  having  been  praetor 
he  had  been  sent  to  Spain,  with  an  extraordinary  command 
as  propnetor ;  nor  had  any  but  the  regular  magistrates 
ever  celebrated  a   triumph.     But  the  Hannibalian  war 


'  Livy,  xxTiii.  30. 

*  Hf!  resolved  in  the  year  208  to  build  a  hundred  ships  of  war ;  but  we  do 
not  know  if  this  plan  was  ever  carried  into  osecution. — Livy,  xxviii.  8. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


41. 


CHAP. 
VIII. 


Sixth 
Pkriod, 
207-205 

B.C. 


had  made  people  familiar  with  many  innovatioDS,  and 
among  these  innovations,  Scipio's  extraordinary  command 
was  so  prominent  that  the  concession  of  a  triumph,  as 
a  natural  consequence  of  it,  seemed  hardly  likely  to 
meet  with  any  serious  opposition.  In  the  temple  of 
BeUona'  accordingly,  before  the  walls  of  the  city,  Scipio 
enumerated  before  the  assembled  senate  all  his  exploits  in 
Spain ;  he  told  them  how  many  battles  he  had  fought,  how 
many  towns  he  had  taken,  what  nations  he  had  brought 
under  the  dominion  of  the  Boman  people,  and,  though  he 
did  not  distinctly  ask  for  a  triumph,  he  expected  that  the 
senate  would  of  its  own  accord  decree  the  honour  he  so 
much  coveted.  But  he  was  disappointed.  His  opponents 
insisted  that  there  was  no  valid  reason  for  departing  from 
the  old  custom,  and  Scipio  had  to  content  himself  with 
displaying  as  much  pomp  and  show  as  he  could  when  he 
made  his  entry  into  Bome  as  a  private  citizen,  without  the 
solemn  formalities  of  a  triumph.*  Hereupon  the  consular 
elections  for  the  next  year  took  place  amidst  unusual  acti- 
vity on  the  part  of  the  people.  From  all  parts  the  Boman 
citizens  came  in  great  numbers,  not  only  to  vote,  but 
simply  to  see  the  great  Scipio.  They  thronged  round  his 
house,  followed  him  to  the  Capitol,  where,  in  fulfilment  of 
a  vow  made  in  Spain,  he  offered  a  sacrifice  of  a  hundred 
oxen.  He  was  unanimously  elected  consul  by  all  the 
centuries,  and  in  their  imagination  the  people  saw  him 
already  carrying  the  war  into  Africa  and  ending  it  with 
the  destruction  of  Carthage. 

But  the  senate  was  far  from  exhibiting  the  enthusiasm  l^ebntos  on 
and  unanimity  of  the  people.     The  friends  and  adherents  tioVto^*^^^* 
of  Scipio  found  themselves  opposed  by  independent  men  -A.frica 
who  did  not  possess  unbounded  confidence  in  him,  and  who 
thought  there  was  too  much  risk  in  an  attack  upon  Africa 
so  long  as  Hannibal  had  not  evacuated  Italy.     At  the 
head  of  these  men  was  the  aged  Q.  Pabius  Maximus. 

'  Livy,  xxviit.  38, 

'  Appian  (vi.  38)  inaccurately  calls   ihia  entry  into  Bome  a  triumph :  Kol 


416  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  His  system  of  a  pertinacious  defensive  warfare  and  of  a 
slow  and  cautious  advance  to  the  offensive  had  so  far 
proved  eminently  successful.  By  it  Hannibal  had  gra- 
dually been  compelled  to  give  up  central  Italy  and  to  fall 
back  upon  the  narrow  peninsula  of  Bruttium.  Tabius 
could  see  no  cause  why  this  system  should  now  be  aban- 
doned. It  was  to  be  expected  that,  if  it  was  persisted  in 
for  some  time  longer,  Hannibal  would  lose  Thurii,  Locri, 
and  Croton,  the  last  strongholds  in  his  power,  and  would 
thus  be  compelled  to  retire  from  Italy.  But  if,  in  order 
to  carry  the  war  into  Africa,  Italy  were  drained  of  troops, 
it  might  be  apprehended  that  Hannibal  would  again  sally 
forth  from  Bruttium  and  threaten  Samnium,  Campania, 
or  Latium.  The  plan  of  Scipio  and  his  party  was,  without 
any  doubt,  grander  and  more  worthy  of  the  Boman  people. 
It  was  reasonable  to  expect  that  a  vigorous  attack  on  the 
Carthaginians  in  Africa  would  at' once  lead  to  the  recall  of 
Hannibal  from  Italy.  Moreover  it  had  ever  been  the  custom 
of  the  Bomans  to  attack  their  enemies  in  their  own  coun- 
try. It  was  thus  that  they  had  warred  in  ancient  times  with 
the  Etruscans,  the  Latins,  and  the  Samnites.  They  had 
gone  as  far  as  Heraclea  and  Beneventum  to  meet  Pyrrhus. 
In  the  first  Punic  war  they  had  made  Sicily  the  battle-field, 
and  in  the  second  they  had  sent  out  their  armies  and  fleets 
to  Spain  and  across  the  Adriatic.  It  is  true  they  had  not 
forgotten  the  Caudine  passes,  nor  the  rout  of  Regulus  in 
Africa ;  but,  after  all,  the  greatest  calamities  had  broken 
upon  Home  when  her  enemies  had  been  allowed  to  ap- 
proach her  too  near,  on  the  Allia,  near  the  Thrasymenus, 
and  at  Cannse.  The  time  had  come  at  last  when  they 
could  attempt  that  expedition  to  Africa  which  had  been 
part  of  the  original  plan  of  the  Bomans,  and  which  the  con- 
sul Sempronius  had  actually  been  commissioned  to  under- 
take in  the  first  year  of  the  war.  At  that  time  Hannibal's 
invasion  of  Italy  had  thwarted  this  well-considered  plan. 
But  now  Hannibal  was  so  enfeebled  that  two  consular 
armies  were  sufficient  to  keep  him  in  check ;  he  barely 
maintained  himself  in  Bruttium ;  the  remainder  of  Italy 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  417 

was  free  from  danger ;  in  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  Spain  the     CHAP, 
war  was  practically  at  an  end ;  in  Macedonia,  where  it  had  s...    ,  L> 
never  been  serious,  it  could  at  any  time  be  ended  by  the     p^^ 
conclusion  of  peace.    It  was  therefore  most  assuredly  the    207-205 
time  now   to  abandon  the  Fabian  principle  of  cautious       ^'^' 
defence,  which  was  calculated  to  prolong  indelSnitely  the 
excitement,  the  disquiet,  and  the  sufferings  of  the  war,  and 
to  gather  up  the  whole  energy  of  the  nation  for  a  bold  de- 
cisive blow,  as  the  previous   generation  had  done  with 
glorious  success  in  the  Sicilian  war. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  most  weighty  arguments  Position  of 
brought  forward  against  this  plan  were  based  on  the 
presence  of  Hannibal  in  Italy,  who,  though  terribly  ex- 
hausted and  lefb  almost  without  resources,  still  shielded  his 
country  by  the  mere  terror  of  his  name.  If  personal  satis- 
faction and  his  own  glory,  so  distinctly  acknowledged  by 
his  enemies,  could  have  been  a  compensation  to  him  for 
.the  wreck  of  his  hopes,  he  must  surely  have  been  consoled 
and  even  gratified  in  watching  this  involuntary  tribute  to 
his  greatness.  But  it  was  his  ambition  to  establish  the 
greatness  of  his  country,  and  he  knew  no  personal  glory 
apart  from  the  prosperity  and  independence  of  Carthage. 

The  majority  in  the  senate  were  not  favourable  to  Scipio's  Compro- 
plans.     He  had  foreseen  this,  and  he  was  prepared  to  ^t^g^u 
carry  out  his  project  Avithout  the  consent,  and,  if  necessary,  Scipio  and 
against  the  will,  of  the  senate.     It  was  rumoured  that  he     ^^^  ^' 
intended  to  avail  himself  of  the  favourable  disposition  of 
the  masses,  and  to  obtain,  without  the  authority  of  the 
senate,  a  decision  of  the  popular  assembly  by  which  he 
would  be  commissioned  to  carry  the  war  into  Africa  and 
to  raise  the  necessary  forces.     Such  a  procedure  would 
not  have  been  unconstitutional,  but  it  would  have  been 
contrary   to   the   usual  practice,  which  had  almost  the 
power  of  law,  and  by  which  the  chief  direction  of  the  war, 
and  especially  the  distribution  of  the  provinces,  was  lefb 
entirely  to  the  discretion  of  the  senate.     This  body  was 
therefore   thrown   into  great  consternation  when  Scipio 
showed  himself  resolved,  as  a  last  resource,  to  set  their 

VOL.  II.  £  £ 


418 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Voluntary 
coDtribu- 
tioDs  for 
the  fleet 
and  anny 
of  Scipio. 


authoiitjr  at  naught,  and  to  appeal  to  the  decision  of  the 
people.  Violent  debates  took  place,  and  at  last  the  ple- 
beian tribunes  effected  a  compromise  by  which  Scipio 
abandoned  the  idea  of  provoking  a  decision  of  the  people, 
and  promised  to  be  guided  by  a  decree  of  the  senate,  on 
the  understanding,  however,  that  the  senate  would  not 
oppose  his  plan  in  principle.  Hereupon  the  senate  re- 
solved to  give  permission  to  Scipio  for  crossing  over  from 
Sicily  into  Africa;'  but  they  voted  means  so  inadequate  for 
carrying  out  this  plan  that  Scipio  was  obliged  first  to 
create  for  himself  an  army  and  a  fleet  before  he  could  hope 
to  carry  out  his  design  with  any  chance  of  success.  By 
this  decision,  the  obstructive  party  in  the  senate  had,  at 
any  rate,  postponed  his  expedition,  and  they  might  hope 
that  in  the  meanwhile  events  would  happen  to  make  a 
landing  in  Afidca  unnecessary. 

Scipio's  colleague  in  the  consulship  was  Publius  Licinius 
Crassus,  who,  being  at  the  same  time  pontifex  maximus, 
was  not  permitted  to  leave  Italy.  He  was  therefore 
commissioned,  in  conjunction  with  a  prsetor,  and  at  the 
head  of  four  legions,  to  operate  in  Bruttium,  where  he  had 
to  watch  and  keep  Hannibal  in  check,  but  where,  during 
the  whole  course  of  the  year,  nothing  of  importance  took 
place.  Scipio  had  assigned  to  him  only  thirty  ships  of 
war  and  the  two  legions  composed  of  the  fugitive  troops 
of  Cannae  and  Herdonea.*  No  conscription  was  ordered 
for  new  troops  to  serve  under  Scipio ;  but  he  was  allowed 
to  enlisb  volunteers,  and  to  call  upon  the  towns  of  Etruria 
to  contribute  materials  for  the  fitting  out  of  a  fleet.'  Thus 
a  force  of  about  7,000  men  was  collected,  especially  in 
Umbria,  the  country  of  the  Sabines,*  Marsians,  and  Pelig- 

m 

'  Livy,  xxviii.  45 :  *  pemiissum,  nt  in  Africam,  81  id  e  re  publica  esse 
censeret,  traiiceret.  •  See  al)ove,  p.  365. 

■  No  measure  was  so  much  calculated  to  raise  the  Roman  nobles  to  a 
position  above  that  of  private  citizens,  and  to  prepare  the  advent  of  monarchy, 
as  the  permission  given  them  to  collect  armies  of  volunteers,  and  to  use  their 
private  means  and  their  credit  for  equipping  ships  of  war.  Men  like  Wallen- 
Btein  cannot  permanently  n*main  subjects. 

*  Livy  (xxviii.  45)  enumerates  particularly  th";  to'.vns  of  Xarsia,  Rciie,  ani 


B.C. 


Roman 
troops. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  419 

nions.     The  town  of  Camerintim,  in  TTmbria,^  alone  sent     CHAP. 

a  cohort  of  600  men.    Other  towns  contributed  arms,  pro-  . ^^ 

visions,  and  various  articles  for  the  fleet ;  Caere  gave  com,  p^™ 
Populonia  iron,  Tarquinii  sail-cloth,  VolaterrsB  timber*  207-205 
and  com.  Arretinm,  witti  a  liberality  and  zeal  prompted 
perhaps  by  the  desire  of  proving  its  doubted  fidelity,  sup- 
plied thousands  of  helmets,  shields,  lances,  various  utensils, 
and  provisions  ;  Perusia,  Clusium,  and  KuseUse  gave  com 
and  timber.  It  is  an  agreeable  surprise  for  us  to  find 
these  towns,  some  of  which  appeared  to  have  fallen  into 
decay  or  oblivion,  taking  an  active  part  in  the  war ;  and 
the  inference  is  justified  that  Etruria  had,  in  comparative 
obscurity,  enjoyed  some  of  the  blessings  of  peace. 

By  their  contributions  Scipio  was  enabled  to  order  the  state  of  the 
building  of  thirty  new  ships,'  and  he  went  to  Sicily,  there 
to  complete  his  preparations.  Besides  the  two  legions  from 
Cannse  and  Herdonea,  he  found  in  Sicily  a  great  number 
of  the  old  soldiers  of  Marcellus,*  who  after  their  discharge 
had  apparently  remained  in  Sicily  of  their  own  accord, 

Amiternum,  and  besides  them  he  names  SSabinus  omnis  ager.*  This  ex- 
pressioD  is  very  strange,  as  the  three  towns  just  named  were  precisely  the 
principal  places  of  this  very  'Ager  Sabinus.'  From  the  most  ancient  times 
there  prevailed  great  ragueness  with  regard  to  the  geographical  limitation  of 
the  Sabine  country.  (See  vol.  i.  p.  103).  The  Subines,  who,  on  the  termina- 
tion of  the  third  Samnite  war,  were  received  into  the  second  class  of  Roman 
citizens  (see  vol.  i.  p.  474),  appear  not  to  have  been  the  people  of  Nursia, 
Keate,  Amiternum,  and  '  Sabinus  omnis  ager,'  for  Livy  in  oar  present  passage 
(xxviii.  45)  evidently  refers  only  to  those  volunteers  who  were  not  Roman 
citizens.  Where  in  all  the  world  those  Sabines  had  their  local  habitation  is  a 
mystery  that  I  cannot  solve.  I  am  inclined  to  think  thatLivy's  {Epit.  xi.)  state- 
ment, according  to  which  the  Sabines  were  reduced  by  Curius  Bentatus  in  the 
same  year  as  the  Samnites,  is  one  of  the  frequent  duplications  of  the  same  fact 
which  the  compiling  historians  are  so  fond  of,  and  that  it  was  caused  by  the 
circumstance  that  some  annalists  called  the  people  conquered  by  Curius 
Dentatus  the  Samnites,  others  the  Sabinites,  Saunites,  or  Sabines.  This  would 
explain,  or  rather  get  rid  of,  the  strange  fact,  that  the  Sabines,  who  were  not 
mentioned  in  the  history  of  Rome  for  a  century  and  a  half,  suddenly  reappear 
on  the  stage  by  the  side  of  the  Samnites  as  conquered  enemies. 

*  Livy,  ix.  30.     See  Weissenbom's  note. 

'  '  Interamenta.'    See  Weissenborn's  note  to  Livy  xxviii.  46. 

'  On  this  occasion  the  ships  were  again  built,  as  in  the  first  Punic  war  (see 
above,  p.  53,  note  4)  with  almost  miraculous  rapidity,  being  finished  in  forty-five 
days. — Livy,  xxviii.  45.  *  Li^'y,  xxix.  1, 

H  K  2 


420  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     liad  squandered  the  booty  made  in  war,  and,  disdaining  to 
^    ^'     .  return  to  a  life  of  honest  toil  and  civil  order,  were  ready 


to  try  again  the  fortune  of  battle.     The  long  war  could 
not  fail  to  create  a  kind  of  professional  soldiery,  consisting 
of  men  who  had  become  unfit  for  agriculture  and  other 
peaceful  pursuits  and  who  began  to  look  upon  war  as  their 
trade.     The  licentiousness  and  savagery  into  which  some 
portions  of  the  Boman  armies  had  by  that  time  fallen  had 
been  shown  by  the  mutiny  of  Scipio's  soldiers  in  Spain ; 
but  the  doings  of  these  mutineers  were  soon  thrown  into  the 
shade  by  atrocities  of  a  far  more  hideous  and  alarming 
character,  which  betrayed  the  existence  of  the  most  dan- 
gerous elements  in  the  ranks.      The  incidents  in  Locri 
formed  only,  as  it  were,  an  intermezzo  in  the  grand  drama 
of  the  war,  and  did  not  essentially  influence  the  course  of 
events  and  the  final  issue ;  but  they  are  too  highly  charac- 
teristic of  the  public  morals  of  the  time  to  be  passed  over 
in  silence,  especially  as  it  is  of  far  more  importance  for  us 
to  form  a  picture  of  the  moral  and  intellectual  status  of 
the  Roman  people  than  to  follow  the  details  of  battles,  to 
which,  for  the  most  part,  little  credit  is  to  be  given. 
Snrprise  Jq  gpite  of  the  attempts  to  take  Locri  which  the  Romans 

aQu  cap-  , 

ture  of        had  made  since  208,  it  was  still  in  Hannibal's  possession, 

^'^^^  and  was  now  his  principal  base  of  operations  in  Bruttium. 

The  Roman  partisans  among  the  Locrians  had  fled  from 

the  town  when  it  revolted  to  the  Carthaginians,  and  had 

betaken  themselves  chiefly  to  the  neiglibouring  town  of 

Rhegium.     Prom  that  place  they  opened  communications 

with   some  of  their  countrymen  at  home,  and  the  latter 

promised  to  admit  Roman  troops  by  means  of  ladders  into 

the  citadel.     The  treason  was  carried  into  eflfect  in  the 

usual  way.     As  soon  as  the  citadel  was  in  the  power  of 

the   Romans,    the  town   joined  their  cause ;  the  Punic 

garrison  retu'ed  into  a  second  citadel  in  another  part  of 

the  town,  where  it  was  at  last  compelled  to  surrender. 

This  successful  surprise  was  planned  and  executed  not  by 

the  consul  Licinius,  who  commanded  in  Bruttium,  but  by 

Scipio,  who  was   at  that    time   commanding   in   Sicily, 


THE  SECOND  PljNIC  WAR.  421 

because  Hannibal  and  his  army,  standing  between  Locri     CHAP. 

and  the  four  legions  in  Bruttium,  prevented  Licinius  from  . ,  '■. 

penetrating  into  the  neighbourhood,  whilst  the  nearness  of    -p^™ 
Rhegium  and  Messana  favoured  the  plan  of  making  an    207-205 
attack  upon  Locri  from  Sicily.  ^'^' 

Thus  it  happened  that  Scipio  had  the  good  fortune  and  Atrocities 
the  merit  of  gaining  an  important  advantage  beyond  the  Roman 
limits  of  his  own  province.     With  this  step,  however,  he  «oidieps 
also  took  upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  the  further  capture  of 
proceedings  at  Locri,  and  these  were  of  such  a  nature  that  ^^"• 
they  offered  an  occasion  to  his  enemies  for  questioning 
his  ability  as  a  general  in  one  essential  point.     He  caused 
the  chiefs  of  the  Carthaginian  party  in  Locri  to  be  put  to 
death,  and  their  property  to  be  distributed  among  their 
political  opponents.      If  he  had   stopped  here,  nobody 
would  have  blamed  him,  for,  according  to  the  prevailing 
principle  of  justice,  he  had  not  been  guilty  of  undue  seve- 
rity.    But  such  a  measure  of  punishment  did  not  satisfy 
the  rapacity  of  his  troops.      These  troops,  treating  Locri 
like  a  town  taken  by  assault,  not  only  plundered  it,  but 
indulged  against  the  wretched  inhabitants  of  both  sexes 
their  beastly  lusts  and  their  sanguinary  ferocity.'    At  last 
they  broke  open  the  temples  and  ransacked  even  the  sanc- 
tuary of  Proserpina,  which,  though    lying  unprotected 
before  the  town,  had  hitherto  been  respected  by  enemies 
and  even  by  vulgar  robbers.*    The  legate  Pleminius,  who 
had  been  intrusted  by  Scipio  with  the  command  in  Locri, 
not  only  permitted  all  these  atrocities,  but  took  his  share 
in  the  plunder  and  protected  the  plunderers.  Two  legionary 
tribunes,  called  Sergius  and  Matienus,  who  were  under 
his  orders,  strove  to  check  the  violence  of  the  soldiers.' 

'  Lirj,  xxix.  8 :  '  In  corpora  ipsorum  {i.e.  the  Locrians),  in  liberos,  in  coningeg 
infandtt  contumeliae  editee.' 

*  According  to  a  tradition,  Pyrrhus  had  despoiled  it;  but  the  ships  in 
Tfhich  the  treasures  were  laden,  were  wrecked  on  the  neighbouring  coast ;  and 
Pyrrhus,  under  the  impulse  of  religious  scruples,  caust^d  all  the  treasures  to 
be  restored. — Valerius  Maximus,  i.  1,  ext.  1.    Appian,  iii.  12. 

'  This  is  Livy's  report  (xziz.  9).  Diodorus,  on  the  other  hand,  says  (fragm. 
libr.  27,  p.  108,  Tauchnitz)  that  they  acted  not  from  a  feeling  of  indignation 


422 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


MeflflorM 
of  the 
Roman 
senate  and 
people  on 
the  com* 
plaints  of 
the 
Locrians. 


A  fight  took  place  between  the  soldiers  of  the  two  tribunes 
and  the  rest.  Pleminius  openly  took  the  part  of  the  licen- 
tious plunderers,  ordered  Sergius  and  Matienus  to  be 
seized,  and  was  on  the  point  of  causing  them  to  be  exe- 
cuted by  his  lictors  when  their  soldiers  arrived  in  larger 
numbers,  rescued  the  tribunes,  ill-treated  the  lictors,  seized 
Pleminius,  slit  up  his  lips,  and  cut  off  his  nose  and  ears.  All 
bonds  of  military  discipline  were  cast  aside,  and  the  Roman 
soldiers  had  become  a  riotous  rabble. 

Upon  the  news  of  these  disgraceful  and  alarming  pro- 
ceedings, Scipio  hastened  from  Messana  to  Locri,  re-esta- 
blished order,  and,  acquitting  Pleminius  of  all  guilt,  left  him 
in  command  at  Locri,  whilst  he  ordered  the  tribunes  Sergius 
and  Matienus  to  be  seized  as  ringleaders  of  the  mutiny  and 
to  be  sent  to  Rome  for  trial.  This  done  he  immediiitely  re- 
turned to  Sicily.  He  was  scarcely  gone  when  Pleminius  gave 
full  vent  to  his  revenge,  and,  instead  of  sending  the  two  tri- 
bunes to  Borne,  caused  them  to  be  scourged  and  put  to  death, 
after  exquisite  tortures.  Then  he  turned  with  the  same  bar- 
barous fury  against  the  most  distinguished  citizens  of  Locri, 
who,  as  he  was  informed,  had  accused  him  before  Scipio. 
Some  of  these  unfortunate  men  escaped  to  Borne.  They 
threw  themselves  in  the  dust  before  the  tribunal  of  the 
consuls  in  the  Forum,  imploring  protection  for  their  lives 
and  property,  and  mercy  for  their  native  town.  The 
senate  was  greatly  moved  by  proceedings  so  dishonourable 
to  the  Boman  name.  It  seemed  that  Scipio  himself  could 
not  be  free  from  guilt.  He  was  certainly  responsible  for 
the  discipline  of  his  soldiers,  and  he  seemed  tacitly  to 
approve  of  the  atrocities  of  Pleminius,  which  he  had  not 
punished.  It  was  not  the  first  time  that  such  disorders 
had  broken  out  among  troops  under  his  command,  though 
the  insubordination  of  his  soldiers  in  Spain  was  tiifiing 
compared  with  what  had  happened  now.      His  political 

at  the  wrong  committed,  but  because  they  found  that  they  did  not  g^t  their 
proper  share  of  the  fipoils.  Tovro  d*  iirpeerro¥  wk  M  rotn  ytuofiipois  0^0- 
voicToDrrci  i^X*  M  r^  rh  iiipot  fi^i  €t\itiip4ptu  r&9  tr^wKufiiiftiP  xpVh^f^^ 
iyKaKnwrts  rh  ir\rififi4\iifia.  On  this  supposition  we  can  explain  S.'ipio's 
aoTerity  against  the  tribunes,  which  otherwise  would  be  nnjnntifinble. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


423 


enemies,  numerous  and  influential  in  the  senate,  charged 
him  with  corrupting  the  spirit  of  the  army,  and  insisted 
that  he  should  be  recalled  from  his  command.     The  lamen- 
tations of  the  wretched  Locrians  called  forth  general  sym- 
pathy, and  their  undeserved  sufferings  demanded  redress 
and  satisfaction.     After  a  long   and   angry  discussion, 
Scipio's  friends  at  last  were  so  far  successful  that  he  was 
not  condemned  without  a  previous  investigation.      The 
praetor  Marcus  Pomponius  was  dispatched  to  Locri  with  a 
commission  of  ten  senators  to  send  Pleminius  and  the 
associates  of  his  guilt  for  trial  to  Rome,  to  restore  to  the 
people  of  Locri  the  plunder  which  the  soldiers  had  taken, 
more  especially  to  set  free  the  women  and  children,  who 
had  been  treated  as  slaves,  to  replace  doubly  the  treasures 
taken  from  the  temples,  and  to  appease  the  anger  of  Pro- 
serpina by  sacrifices ;  moreover  to  inquire  if  the  lawless 
actions  of  the  troops  in  Locri  had  been  committed  with 
the  knowledge  and  consent  of  Scipio,  and  if  this  should  be 
pr4)ved,  to  bring  back  Scipio  from  Sicily,  and  even  from 
Africa,  to  Rome.     For  this  purpose  two  tribunes  of  the 
people  and  an  sedile  were  added  to  the  commission,  who, 
by  virtue  of  their  sacred  office,  should,  in  case  of  necessity, 
seize  the  general,  even  in  the  midst  of  his  troops,  and  con- 
vey him  away.     When  the  commission  had  reached  Locri, 
and,  after  discharging  the  first  part  of  their  duty,  had  ex- 
pressed to  the  Locrians  the  regret  and  sympathy  of  the 
Roman  senate  and  people,  as  well  as  the  assurance  of  their 
friendship,   the  Locrians  did  not  further  insist  on  their 
charges  against  Scipio,  and  thus  saved  the  commission  a 
delicate  and  perhaps  difficult  task.     It  is  not  stated,  but 
we  may  perhaps  be  justified  in  supposing,  that  this  gene- 
rous resignation  on  the  part  of  the  Locrians  was  the  result 
of  an  expressed  or  implied  wish  on  the  part  of  the  com- 
missioners, and  could  be  obtained  by  a  very  gentle  pressure, 
even  if  the  Locrians  did  not  see  how  desirable  it  was  to 
avoid  the  hostility  of  a  powerful  Roman  noble  like  Scipio, 
and  of  his  party.     The  commission  therefore  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  Scipio  had  no  share  in  the  crimes  com- 


CHAP. 

vni. 

Sixth 
Pjbiod, 
207-205 

B.C. 


424 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Prepara- 
tions of 
Scipio  for 
the  descent 
on  Africa. 


mitted  at  Locri,  and  Pleminius  only  wafi  brought  to  Eome, 
with  about  thirty  of  his  accomplices.  The  trial  was  con- 
ducted with  great  laxity,  and  Scipio's  friends  hoped  that 
the  excitement  of  the  public  would  gradually  cool  down, 
and  that  by  delaying  the  decision  as  much  as  possible 
they  would  in  the  end  secure  impunity  for  the  accused. 
But  this  intention  was  foiled  by  PlemiDius  himself,  who,  in 
his  audacious  recklessness,  went  so  far  as  to  cause  some 
ruffians  to  set  fire  to  Borne  in  several  places  during  a 
public  festivity,  in  the  hope  of  escaping  in  the  general 
confusion.  *  The  conspiracy  miscarried,  and  Pleminius  was 
thrown  into  the  dismal  TuUianum,  the  prison  vault  under 
the  Capitol,  from  which  he  never  came  forth  again.  He 
was  dead  before  his  trial  in  the  popular  assembly  came  on. 
Whether  he  died  of  hunger,  or  by  the  hands  of  the 
executioner,  and  what  became  of  his  accomphces,  is  not 
known. 

The  senatorial  commission  proceeded  from  Locri  to 
Sicily,  to  be  convinced  by  their  own  eyes  of  the  condition 
of  Scipio's  army.  Here  they  found  everything  in  good 
order,  and  they  were  able  to  report  to  Eome  that  nothing 
was  omitted  to  secure  the  success  of  the  African  expedi- 
tion. Scipio  had  done  all  in  his  power  to  organise  and  to 
increase  his  army,  and  to  furnish  it  with  all  the  materials 
of  war.  For  this  purpose  he  disposed  of  the  resources  of 
Sicily  without  the  least  limitation,*  but,  owing  to  the 
obstructive  economy  of  the  Boman  senate,  and  its  evident 
disapproval  of  the  African  expedition,  he  was  prevented 
from  making  his  preparations  as  fast  as  he  wished.'  The 
whole  of  the  year  205  passed  away  before  he  was  ready. 
In  the  course  of  it  Lselius  had  sailed  with  thirty  ships  to 


*  This  wfts  the  account  given,  according  to  Livy  (xxix.  22),  by  an  annalist, 
called  ClodiiiB  Licinius. 

'  Liv}',  xxix.  1 :  '  frumentum  Siciilomm  civitatibns  imperat.' 
'  For  this  reason  the  great  hurry  in  the  building  of  the  new  ships  of  urar  is 
hardly  intelligible  (see  abore,  p.  419).  If  these  ships  reached  Sicily  so  early, 
they  were  useless  for  a  long  time.  Perhaps  the  statement  of  the  forty-five 
days  belongs  to  the  poetical  fancies  with  which  the  story  of  Scipio's  exploits 
was  decorated. 


B.C. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  425 

the  African  coast,  probably  for  the  purpose  of  concerting  CHAP, 
measures  with  Sjphax  and  Masinissa  for  the  impending  —  ^  ',.. 
combined  attack  on  Carthage.  But  the  two  Numidian  p^^^^ 
chiefs,  as  was  to  be  expected,*  had  ranged  themselves  on  207-206 
two  opposite  sides.  As  soon  as  Masinissa  had  openly 
declared  himself  in  favour  of  Borne,  Syphax  was  not  only 
reconciled  with  Carthage,  but  closely  allied  with  it  ;*  and 
the  first  use  he  made  of  this  accession  of  strength  was  to 
make  war  upon  his  troublesome  rival  Masinissa,  and  to 
expel  him  from  his  country.  Accordingly,  when  Lselius 
landed  at  Hippo,  he  found  Masinissa,  not  as  he  had  hoped, 
in  the  position  of  a  powerful  ally,  but  of  a  helpless  exile, 
wandering  about  at  the  head  of  a  few  horsemen,  and  so 
far  from  being  able  to  render  active  help,  that  he  implored 
the  Bomans  to  hasten  their  expedition  into  Africa,  in  order 
to  rescue  him  from  his  position.  We  do  not  know  what 
impression  this  alteration  in  the  state  of  things  produced 
on  Lselius  and  Scipio.  By  it  the  hope  of  Numidian 
support  was  considerably  reduced ;  especially  when 
Syphax  soon  afterwards  formally  announced  his  alliance 
with  Carthage,  and  warned  Scipio  against  an  undertaking 

*  See  aboTo,  p.  402  f. 

*  These  vicissitudes  in  the  relations  of  Sypbax  and  Masinissa  to  Carthage 
furnished  the  materials  for  the  romances  of  the  beautiful  Carthaginian  lady, 
Sophonisbe,  the  daughter  of  Hasdrubal  Gisgo.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say 
that  all  these  stories  are  part,  not  of  history,  but  of  those  poetical  fictions 
"with  vhich  the  exploits  of  Scipio  Africanus  have  been  adorned.  As  before,  in 
the  story  of  the  fair  Spanish  captive  (see  p.  356),  so  we  find  here  also  a 
gradual  growth  and  development  of  the  fiction  from  a  simple  narrative  to  one 
more  complicated  and  elaborate.  According  to  a  version,  which  spems  to  be 
the  older  one,  Sophonisbe  was  given  in  marriage  to  Syphax,  in  order  that  he 
might  be  gained  for  the  Carthaginian  cause.  This  is  in  itself  not  improbable. 
The  Carthaginian  lady  was  an  honorary  present  for  the  royal  harem,  whereby 
the  barbarian  must  have  felt  flattered.  It  was  then  added  (Appian,  viii.  10) 
that  Sophonisbe  had  been  previously  betrothed  to  Masinissa,  that  Masinissa 
loved  her  passionately,  and,  to  revenge  himself  on  Carthage  for  her  loss, 
became  the  ally  of  Scipio.  At  a  later  period  of  the  war,  it  was  said, 
Masinissa's  love  for  Sophonisbe  revived ;  after  the  defeat  of  Syphax  he  took 
her  to  wife,  and  when  Scipio,  fearing  the  influence  of  her  Carthaginian 
patriotism  on  the  mind  of  her  husband,  demanded  that  she  should  be  given 
up  to  him,  Masinissa  made  her  drink  poison.  The  whole  of  the  story  is  a  fit 
subject  for  a  tragedy,  and  has  frequently  been  dramatised. 


426  R03kUN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     in  which  he  would  have  to  encounter  not  only  the  Cartha- 


IV. 


ginians,  but  also  the  whole  power  of  Nuinidia.^ 


Expedition  These  incidents  were  in  themselves  calculated  to  show 
of  Mago  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  an  African  expedition,  and 
Minorca,  to  justify  the  hesitation  of  those  cautious  men  of  the 
Fabian  school  who  shrunk  from  the  bold  plan  of  Scipio. 
At  the  same  time  the  Carthaginians  made  another  de- 
sperate effort  to  keep  the  Koman  forces  at  home  for  the 
defence  of  Italy.  It  does  not  indeed  appear  from  our 
sources  that  they  sent  direct  reinforcements  to  Hannibal, 
but  they  would  attain  the  same  object  if  they  repeated  the 
attempt  of  penetrating  with  an  army  into  the  north  of 
Italy,  and  thus  threatening  Home  from  two  sides.  For 
this  purpose  Mago,  Hannibal's  youngest  brother,  after  the 
evacuation  of  Spain,  spent  the  winter  from  206  to  205  in 
the  island  of  Minorca,  occupied  in  raising  a  new  army ;  and 
in  the  summer  of  205,  whilst  Scipio  was  busy  in  Sicily  with 
the  preparations  for  his  African  expedition,  he  sailed  with 
14,000  men  to  the  coast  of  Liguria,  took  Genoa,  called  upon 
the  Ligurians  and  Gauls  to  renew  the  war  with  Rome, 
swelled  his  army  with  volunteers  from  their  ranks,  and 
marched  into  Cisalpine  Gaul,  in  order  to  advance  from 
thence  southwards  as  from  his  base  of  operations.  In 
Rome  nothing  less  was  apprehended  than  a  repetition  of 
the  danger  from  which  the  unexpected  victory  on  the 
Metaurus  had  saved  the  republic.  Again  were  two  sons 
of  Hamilcar  Barcas  in  Italy,  determined,  with  united 
strength,  to  accomplish  the  object  which  they  had  set 
before  themselves  as  the  chief  task  of  their  lives.  Carthage, 
far  from  pursuing  the  suicidal  policy,  as  has  since  been 
asserted,  of  leaving  Hannibal  without  support,  strained 
every  nerve  to  carry  out  his  plans,  and  even  at  this 
moment,  when  Africa  was  threatened  with  invasion,  de- 
spatched to  Mago  a  reinforcement  of  6,000  foot  and  eight 
hundred  horse.  From  the  Roman  point  of  view  it  was 
therefore  not  an  unreasonable  wish  to  keep  together  as 

'  Livy,  xxix.  23. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR,  427 

mucli  as  possible  the  military  strength  of  exhausted  liaXjy     CHAP, 
so  that  at  all  risks   Rome  might  be  covered  before  a  >,    ,    ,. 
decisive  attack  should  be  directed  against  Carthage.  PjImod 

The  decision  and  firmness  of  character  which  Scipio  207-206 
exhibited  in  his  opposition  to  all  hindrances  and  difficulties  **^* 
mark  him  as  a  man  of  unusual  power.  He  was  capable  of  ^^^J ^''" 
bold  conceptions,  and  without  heeding  secondary  considera-  Scipio  at 
tions,  he  went  on  straight  to  the  object  he  had  proposed  to  ^  ^  *""^' 
himself.  By  this  concentration  of  his  will  he  accomplished 
great  things,  though  in  other  respects  he  did  not  rise  far 
above  the  average  level  of  the  military  capacity  displayed 
by  Roman  generals.  The  African  expedition  was  due  to 
him  and  to  him  alone.  He  had  planned  it  when  he  was 
in  Spain,  and  he  carried  it  out  in  spite  of  the  determined 
resistance  of  a  powerful  opposition  in  the  senate.  Half  a 
year  had  been  taken  up  with  preparations.  Now,  in  the 
spriijg  of  204  B.C.,  the  army  and  the  fleet  were  collected  at 
Lilybeeum.  Pour  hundred  transports  and  forty  ships  of 
war  crowded  the  port.  The  statements  of  the  strength  of 
the  army  vary  from  12,500  to  35,000  men.*  According  to 
the  annalist  Coelins,  quoted  by  Livy,  the  number  of  men 
who  went  on  board  the  transports  was  so  great  that  it 
seemed  that  Sicily  and  Italy  must  be  drained  of  their 
population,  and  that,  from  the  cheering  of  so  many  thou- 
sands, the  birds  dropped  from  the  air  on  the  ground.^  It 
can  hardly  be  doubted  that  such  bombastic  phrases  were 
taken  from  some  poetical  narrative  of  the  embarkation. 
The  same  poetical  colouring  can  be  traced  in  other  features 
of  Livy's  account.  When  all  the  ships  were  ready  to  sail, 
Scipio  caused  a  herald  to  command  silence,  and  pronounced 
a  solemn  prayer  to  all  the  gods  and  goddesses,^  wherein 

*  Livy,  xxix.  25.  •  Compare  Valerias  Maxirous,  iv.  8,  6. 

'  Livy,  xxix.  27  :  'Turn  Scipio  silentio  per  prseconem  facto,  **  Divi  divjeque," 
inquit,  "  qui  maria  terrasque  colitis,  vos  precor  qua^soque,  uti  quae  in  meo  imperio 
gpsta  sunt,  genintur,  postque  gerentur  ea  mihi  populo  plcbique  Komanie,  Sociis 
nominique  Latino,  qui  popnJi  Komani  quique  meam  sectam  imperium  auspicium- 
que  terra,  mari,  amnibusquc  sequuntur,  bene  verruncent,  eaque  vos  omnia  bene 
iuvetis,  bonis  auctibus  auxitis ;  salvos  incolumesque,  victis  perduellibusvictores, 
spoliis  decoratos,  prseda  onustos  triumphantcsque  mecam  domos  reduces  sis- 


428 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


L&ndinff 
of  Scipio 
in  Africa. 


he  implored  them  to  grant  him  protection,  victory,  spoils^ 
and  a  happy  and  triumphant  return,  after  inflicting  on  the 
Carthaginian  people  all  those  evils  with  wliich  they  had 
threatened  the  commonwealth  of  Bome.  Then  he  cast  the 
crude  entrails  of  the  sacrificial  animal  into  the  sea,  and 
ordered  the  trumpets  to  give  the  signal  for  departure. 
The  walls  of  Lilybseum  and  the  whole  coast  on  the  right 
and  on  the  left  were  lined  with  spectators,  who  had 
assembled  from  all  parts  of  Sicily,  Qnd  followed  the  fleet 
with  their  hopes  and  forebodings  until  it  vanished  on  the 
horizon.  Many  squadrons  had  lefb  Libybseum  in  the 
course  of  the  war,  but  never  such  an  armada,  which  carried 
with  it  the  vows  of  all  Italy  for  the  speedy  termination  of 
the  struggle.  Yet,  compared  with  the  colossal  fleets  of  the 
first  Punic  war,  the  fleet  of  Scipio  was  almost  insignificant. 
When  the  two  consuls  Marcus  Begulus  and  Lucius  Manlius 
sailed  with  their  combined  armies  to  Africa  in  256  B.C.,  the 
ships  of  war  alone  equalled  in  number  the  total  of  Scipio's 
fleet,  and  the  army  was  then  twice  or  three  times  as  large 
as  now.  But  in  the  year  256  Italy  had  not  been  wasted, 
as  in  204,  by  a  war  of  fourteen  yeaTS,  and  no  Boman  army 
had  then  perished  in  Africa.  Now  it  was  known  what 
dangers  the  legions  might  have  to  encounter,  and  their 
fears  were  consequently  intensified  for  the  much  smaller 
force  which  had  undertaken  to  revenge  Begulus  and 
Bome. 

In  spite  of  the  long  preparations  for  the  African  expedi- 
tion, which  were  well  known  in  Carthage,  in  spite  of  the 
certainty  that  it  would  sail  from  Lilybseum,  and  in  spite  of 
the  apparent  ease  with  which  from  the  port  of  Carthage  a 
fleet  might  have  sailed  to  intercept  the  passage  of  the 


tails ;  inimicoruni  hostiamque  ulciscendorum  copiam  faxitis ;  quseque  popolus 
Carthaginiensis  in  dvitatem  nostram  facero  molitus  est,  ea  ut  mihi  populoque 
Romano  in  civitatem  Carthaginiensium  exempla  edendi  facnltatem  detis.'' ' 
This  characteristic  prayer,  if  not  literally  spoken  by  Scipio,  is  no  doubt 
such  as  might  have  been  spoken.  It  exhibits  a  language  as  careful  and 
precise  as  that  of  a  lawyer  s  contract,  quite  in  the  spirit  of  the  Roman 
religion,  which  regulated  the  intercourse  between  the  gods  and  their  people  on 
the  legal  footing  of  stipulations,  services,  and  obligations  binding  both  parties. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  429  ' 


namerouB  transports  and  to  overpower  the  forty  ships  of    CHAP. 

war,  Scipio  met  no  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Cartha-  . ,  '.^ 

ginians,  and  landed  undisturbed,  on  the  third  day,  near  the    ^^«^^th 
Fair  Promontory,  close  to  Utica.*  204-201 


B.C. 


Seventh  Period  of  the  Hannibalian  War. 

THE   WAB  IN   AFBICA   TO   THE   CONCLUSION   OF   PEACE, 

204-201  B.C. 

The  details  of  the  short  war  in  Africa  would,  if  faithfully  Character 
recorded,  be  amongst  the  most  attractive  and  the  most  {q  Africa, 
interesting  of  the  whole  struggle.  We  should  leam  from 
them  more  of  the  conduct  of  the  Carthaginian  people  than 
from  all  the  campaigns  in  Italy,  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  Spain. 
A  veil  would  be  lifted,  so  that  we  could  look  into  the  interior 
of  that  great  city,  where  the  nerves  of  the  widely  extended 
state  met  as  in  a  central  point.  We  should  see  how  nobles 
and  people,  senate,  officials,  and  citizens  thought,  felt,  and 
acted  at  the  near  approach  of  the  final  decision  of  the  war. 
We  should  become  acquainted  with  the  spirit  which  moved 
the  Carthaginian  people,  and  should  be  able  in  some  measure 
to  judge  what  the  fate  of  the  old  world  would  have  been  if 
Carthage,  instead  of  Borne,  had  been  victorious.  But  in 
place  of  a  history  of  the  African  war,  we  have  only  reports 
and  descriptions  of  the  victorious  career  of  Scipio,  drawn 
up  by  one-sided  Boman  patriotism.     Only  the  great  and 

'  The  poetical  Darratire  of  CcbHus  (Livy,  xxix.  27)  dwelt  on  the  dangers  of 
the  Bea,  told  of  storms  and  shipwrecks,  and  related  that  at  last  the  crews 
abandoned  the  sinking  vessels  and  gained  the  land  in  boats.  Livy's  account 
also  is  clearly  incorrect.  He  says  that  Scipio  intended  to  land  on  the  const  of 
the  Emporiae,  i.e.  in  the  Lesser  Syrtis,  and  that  ho  lost  his  course,  owing  to 
fogs  and  contrary  winds.  We  cannot  imagine  it  possible  that  Scipio  intended 
to  begin  his  campaign  at  so  great  a  distance  from  Carthage  as  the  coast  of  the 
Emporise.  Bat  if  he  did,  then  he  would  surely  not  have  given  up  his  plan, 
and  have  begun  his  operations  from  a  place  to  which  mere  chance  had  brought 
him.  It  seems  certain  that  it  was  Scipio*s  intention  to  begin  with  taking 
Utica,  and  thus  to  gain  a  commodious  port  for  his  commimication  with  Sicily, 
and  a  basis  of  operations  for  his  advance  upon  Carthage.  It  was  for  this 
purpose  that  he  took  a  complete  siege  train  with  him  (Livy,  xxix.  35,  8),  which 
would  have  been  of  no  uso  to  him  in  the  Syrtis. 


430 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Plans  of 
Scipio. 


iSiege  of 
Utica. 


leading  events  are  ascertainable  with  any  degree  of  cer- 
tainty. The  details,  which  might  have  enabled  us  to  judge 
of  the  manner  in  which  the  war  was .  conducted,  of  the 
plans,  exertions,  sacrifices,  and  losses  of  both  belligerents, 
are  either  entirely  lost,  or  are  disguised  by  party  spirit. 
At  no  period  of  the  war  do  we  more  keenly  feel  the  want 
of  a  Carthaginian  historian.^ 

Scipio's  object,  in  the  first  instance,  was  the  gaining*  a 
strong  position  on  the  coast,  where,  by  means  of  a  secure 
communication  with  Sicily,  he  could  establish  a  firm  basis 
for  his  operations  in  Africa.  For  this  purpose  he  selected 
Utica,  the  ancient  Phoenician  colony  allied  with  Carthage, 
and  situated  on  the  western  side  of  the  wide  Carthaginian 
gulf.  During  the  war  with  the  mercenaries  Utica  had  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemies  of  Carthage,  but  after  the 
suppression  of  the  rebellion  she  was  again  most  intimately 
connected  with  Carthage.  In  spite  of  the  burdens  which 
the  campaigns  of  Hannibal  imposed  on  the  Carthaginians, 
as  also  upon  their  allies  and  subjects,  we  hear  of  no  revolt 
or  discontent  on  their  part,  such  as  broke  out  in  Italy 
among  the  Capuans  and  among  many  others.  Up  to  the 
time  of  the  landing  of  Scipio,  it  is  true,  the  Bomans  had 
only  appeared  on  the  African  coast  now  and  then,  to  ravage 
and  plunder  rather  than  to  make  war.  No  Roman 
Hannibal  had  established  himself  in  the  interior  of  the 
country,  or  challenged  the  allies  to  revolt  from  Carthage. 
For  this  reason  Scipio  might  entertain  the  hope  that,  after 
the  great  exhaustion  and  the  innumerable  troubles  of  the 
war,  the  subjects  of  Carthage  would  be  ready  to  revolt 
now,  as  they  had  been  during  the  invasions  of  Agathokles 
and  Regulus.  Perhaps  he  thought  thus  to  obtain  easy 
possession  of  Utica. 

But  it  appears  that  the  state  of  things  in  Africa  was 
this  time  different.  The  reason  is  unknown  to  us;  but 
the  fact  is  certain  that  Scipio  found  among  the  Cartha- 
ginian   subjects  no  readiness    for  revolt  or    ti'eachery. 

*  Arnold  {Hiit.  of  Borne,  iii.  449)  says  justly,  •  Wherever  the  fiimily  of 
Scipio  is  concerned,  the  impartiality  of  Polj'bius  becomes  doubtful.' 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR. 


481 


TJtica  had  to  be  besieged  in  due  form,  and  it  offered  such 
determined  resistance  that  the  siege — which  lasted,  with 
occasional  pauses,  almost  to  the  conclusion  of  peace, 
that  is,  nearly  two  years — remained  without  result.  If 
Scipio  had  been  so  fortunate  as  to  take  TJtica,  many  par- 
ticulars of  this  remarkable  siege  would  no  doubt  have 
been  preserved.  But  the  Eoman  chroniclers  passed  briefly 
over  an  undertaking  which  contributed  in  no  way  to  swell 
their  national  renown,  and  the  Carthaginian  writings, 
which  would  have  exhibited  in  a  proper  light  the  bravery 
of  the  Uticans,  are  unfortunately  lost.  We  know  there- 
fore but  little  of  an  event  which  was  of  the  very  greatest 
importance  to  the  war  in  Africa,  and  what  has  been  pre- 
served cannot  be  considered  authentic  in  detail,  because  it 
comes  from  Soman  sources. 

After  Scipio  had  landed  his  army,  he  took  up  a  stroug 
position  on  a  hill  near  the  sea,  and  repulsed  the  attack  of 
a  troop  of  cavalry,  which  had  been  sent  out  from  Carthage 
to  reconnoitre,  on  the  news  of  a  hostile  landing.^  He  then 
sent  his  transport  ships,  laden  with  the  spoils  of  the  sur- 
rounding open  country,  back  to  Sicily,  and  advanced  to 
TJtica,  where,  at  the  distance  of  about  a  mile  from  the  town, 
he  established  his  camp.^  After  a  short  time  the  transport 
ships  returned  from  Sicily,  bringing  the  remainder  of  the 
siege  train,  which  Scipio,  from  want  of  room,  had  not  been 
able  to  take  with  him  before.  The  siege  wa^  now  begun,* 
and  it  appears  to  have  lasted  the  whole  summer  without 

*  Some  writers  made  of  this  single  eDgagement  two  battles,  in  each  of 
which  a  Carthaginian  general  of  the  name  of  Hanno  was  taken.  On  this 
occtision  Livy  (xxix.  86,  2)  remarks :  *Duo8  eodem  nomine  Carthaginiensium 
duces  duobns  equestribus  proeliis  interfectos  non  omnes  anctores  siint,  veriti, 
credo,  ne  falleret  bis  relata  eadem  res.*  Ccelius  and  Valerius  knew  how  to  get 
over  this  difficulty.  They  related  that  one  of  these  Hannos  was  not  killed, 
but  made  prisoner,  and  afterwards  exchanged  for  Masinissa's  mother.  This 
old  lady  had  to  play  her  part  in  the  fables  of  the  African  war.  She  was  a 
prophetess,  and  helped  to  discover  a  conspiracy  against  Scipio. — Zonaras, 
ix.  12. 

■^  Livy,  xxix.  34,  3. 

'•  Livy,  xxix.  35,  6 :  *  Ad  oppugnandam  Uticam  omnes  belli  vires  convertit, 
cam  deinde  si  cepisset  sedem  ad  cetera  exser)netida  habiturus.'  Compare 
Appian,  viii.  IG. 


CHAP. 
VIII. 

Sbvrntii 
Fbriod, 
204-201 

B.C. 


Vigorous 
resistance 
of  the 
Uticans. 


432  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

any  considerable  interruption.^  Scipio  took  up  his 
position  on  a  hill  close  to  the  walls  of  the  town,  and 
attacked  them  with  all  the  appliances  of  the  ancient  art 
of  siege.  The  trenches  were  filled  up  by  mounds  of  earth ; 
battering-rams  were  pushed  forward  under  protecting 
roofs  to  open  breaches,  and  at  the  same  time  ships  were 
coupled  together  and  towers  for  attacking  the  sea  walls 
were  erected  on  them.  But  the  defence  was  still  more 
vigorous  than  the  attack.  The  Uticans  undermined  the 
mounds,  so  that  the  wooden  structures  on  them  were 
thrown  down;  by  letting  down  beams  from  the  walls 
they  weakened  the  blows  of  the  battering-rams,  and  made 
saUies  to  set  the  works  of  the  besiegers  on  fire.  The 
whole  of  the  citizens  were  inspired  by  the  spirit  which, 
half  a  century  before,  had  rendered  Lilybeeum  impregnable. 
When  towards  the  end  of  the  summer,  as  it  appears,  the 
Carthaginian  army  under  Hasdrubal^  advanced,  united 
with  a  Numidian  army  under  Syphax,  Scipio  found  him- 
self obliged  to  raise  the  siege.  He  confined  himself  now, 
as  Marcellus  had  done  before  Syracuse,  to  occupying  a 
fortified  camp  in  the  neighbourhood,  from  whence  he 
could  observe  Utica,  and  at  any  time  begin  a  fresh  attack. 
This  camp,  known  even  in  Caesar's  time  as  the  ^  Cornelian 

*  Livy's  statement,  that  it  lasted  forty  days,  is  probably  to  be  understood  of 
the  period  of  actual  assault,  and  does  not  include  the  time  required  for  the 
preliminary  -works. 

»  This  was  Hasdrubal  (Gisgo*s  son),  who  distinguished  himself  in  tho 
Spanish  campaign,  and  was,  after  Hannibal  and  his  brothers,  the  most  eminent 
of  all  the  Carthaginian  generals.  It  is  highly  characteristic  of  the  sources 
from  which  the  account  of  the  war  in  Africa  is  taken,  that  Appian  (viii.  9) 
seriously  reports  that  the  Carthaginians,  upon  the  news  of  Scipio's  armaments 
in  Sicily,  dispatched  this  Hasdrubal  to  hunt  elephants  {M  Oripw  ike4>dirr»w 
i^hnfATTuy).  Mommsen  accepts  this  statement  as  simple  truth  (Bom.  Gesck. 
i.  662 ;  English  translation,  ii.  182)  as  if  the  Carthaginians  had  had  no  better 
employment  for  their  principal  general  than  to  go  out  on  a  hunting  expedition. 
To  judge  of  the  probability  of  the  fact,  we  should  bear  in  mind  that  elephants 
are  found  wild  only  in  that  part  of  Africa  which  is  south  of  the  great  desert 
of  Sahara.  The  Carthaginians  obtained  their  supply  probably  from  the 
Senegal,  by  ship.  In  spite  of  the  statements  of  JElian  {Nat,  Animal,  x.  1 )  and 
of  Pliny  {Hist.  Nat.  yiii.  11),  we  cannot  believe  that  elephants  were  ever  found 
in  a  wild  state  in  Mauritania.  The  climate  and  vegetation  of  the  country 
make  it  impossible. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  483 

camp,'  was  on  the  peninsula  which  runs  eastward  from     chap. 
Utica  towards  the  sea.     Scipio  here  drew  his  ships  ashore       ^^* 


to  protect  them,  and  so  he  passed  the  winter  nncomfort-    ^^^jwth 
ably  enough,  enjoying  only  this   advantage,  that,  being    204-201 
in  communication  with  Sicily  and  Italy,  he  was  preserved       "•^* 
from  want  by  the  continual  conveyance  of  supplies,  arms, 
and  clothing,  and  was  enabled  to  collect  together  means 
for  the  next    campaign*      Hasdrubal  and    Syphaz  en- 
camped in  the  neighbourhood,  and  it  appears  that  during 
the  winter  (204  to  208)  nothing  of  importance  was  under- 
taken on  either  side.* 

On  Scipio's  landing  in  Africa,  Masinissa  immediately  Alliance  of 
joined  him,  at  the  head  of  only  two  hundred  horsemen.'  ^•^"*'** 
He  was,  as  has  been  already  mentioned,  expelled  from  his  Sdpio. 
kingdom  by  Syphax  and  the  Carthaginians.  His  adven- 
tures, which  Livy  relates  in  detail,*  correspond  exactly  to 
the  circumstances  under  which  the  Berber  races  lived  for 
centuries,  and  live  stiU.  Some  chief  holds  hereditary 
authority  over  a  tribe.  A  dispute  with  a  neighbour  drives 
him,  after  a  short  struggle,  to  take  flight  into  the  desert. 
He  returns  with  a  few  horsemen,  collects  a  troop  of 
followers  around  him,  and  lives  for  a  time  on  plunder. 
TTiH  band  grows,  and  with  it  grows  his  courage.  The  men 
of  his  tribe,  and  the  old  subjects  of  his  family,  flock  around 
him.  The  struggle  with  his  rival  begins  anew.  Cunning, 
dissimulation,  treachery,  courage,  fortune  decide  who  shall 
keep  the  mastery,  and  who  shall  suffer  imprisonment,  flight, 
or  death.  Such  a  struggle  is  never  decided  until  one  of 
the  two  combatants  is  killed ;  for  no  dominion  is  established 
on  a  flrm  basis,  and  the  personal  superiority  of  the  one 
who  is  to-day  vanquished  may,  without  any  material  cause, 
become  to-morrow  dangerous  to  the  conqueror.  Thus 
Masinissa,  although  a  dethroned  prince,  was  nevertheless 
a  welcome  ally  to  the  Bomans.  In  addition  to  this, 
he  was  not  a  mere  barbarian.     To  the   cunning  and 

*  Livj,  xxiz.  29.  According  to  some  statements  he  had  2,000  men  with 
him.  This  dirergence  is  a  sample  of  the  nnsatisfactoiy  character  of  the  souxces 
for  the  narrative.  •  Livy,  x  ix.  29,  33. 

VOL.  11.  F  P 


434 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Destrac- 
tion  of  the 
African 
camps. 


cruelty,  to  the  perseverance  and  the  wild  audacity  of  the 
barbarian,  he  added  a  knowledge  and  experience  of  the 
arts  of  war  which  gaye  him  an  immeasurable  superiority 
over  others  of  his  class.  He  had  been  brought  np  in 
Carthage,  had  served  for  several  years  under  the  best 
generals  in  Spain ;  he  knew  the  military  organisation  and 
politics  of  the  Carthaginians,  their  strength  and  their 
weakness,  and  he  had  long  foreboded  their  inevitable 
downfall.  For  this  reason,  and  not,  as  has  been  said,  ont 
of  chagrin  at  the  loss  of  a  Carthaginian  lady-love,  he 
espoused  the  cause  of  the  Eomans.  He  knew  that  only 
from  them  he  could  obtain  the  secure  possession  of  his 
paternal  heritage,  and  an  extension  of  his  power  over  the 
Numidians ;  and  he  never  doubted  the  realisation  of  his 
plan,  even  when,  as  related,  he  lay  defeated  and  wounded 
in  a  cavern  of  the  desert,  and  when  his  life  was  saved  only 
by  the  devoted  attentions  of  a  few  faithful  followers. 

The  value  of  the  advice  and  assistance  of  Masinissa  was 
soon  made  evident  to  the  Romans.  He  alone  could  have 
originated  the  scheme  of  setting  fire  in  the  night  to 
the  enemy's  camp.  Masinissa  knew  the  style  of  building 
adopted  in  the  Numidian  and  Carthaginian  camps,  which 
consisted  of  wooden  huts  covered  with  rushes  and  branches, 
and  he,  as  a  Numidian,  knew  best  how  to  surprise  and  attack 
the  Numidians.  Hasdrubal  and  Syphax  were  encamped, 
during  the  winter,  at  a  short  distance  from  each  other  and 
from  Utica,  and  awaited,  as  it  appears,  the  opening  of  the 
campaign  by  Scipio,  whose  fortified  camp  they  dared  not 
attack.  The  strength  of  the  Carthaginian  army  is  reported 
to  have  been  33,000  men,  that  of  the  Numidians  60,000, 
among  whom  were  10,000  horsemen.  Scipio  pretended 
that  he  wished  to  enter  into  negotiations  for  peace,  and 
sent  during  the  truce  his  most  skilful  officers  as 
messengers  to  the  camp  of  Syphax,  who  had  undertaken 
to  act  as  mediator  between  the  Bomans  and  Carthaginians.* 

*  According  t»  Valerius  Antias,  quoted  by  Livy  (xxx.  3),  Syphax  came 
himself  into  the  camp  of  Scipio.  The  stories  of  such  personal  interviews 
were  in  great  favour  with  a  certain  class  of  writers.     They  afforded  exceUent 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAE.  435 

But  the  negotiations  were  a  mere  pretence.  Scipio  wished     CHAP, 
to  get  accurate  information  as  to  the  position  and  arrange- 


ments of  the  enemy's  camp.    He  now  gave  notice  of  a    ^''^** 
renewal  of  hostilities^  and  acted  as  if  he  were  going  to    204-201 
renew  the  attack  upon  Utica.      Seeing  the  enemy  in       *'°' 
perfect  security,   he   made  a  night  attack^  first  on  the 
NumidiaiL  and  then  on  the  Carthaginian  camp.     He  suc- 
ceeded in  setting  fire  to  both,  in  penetrating  to  the  interior, 
and  causing  a  terrible   slaughter,  killing,  according  to 
Livy's  report,  40,000  men,  and  capturing  5,000.  Polybius^ 
represents  the  success  of  the  Bomans  as  still  greater, 
saying  that  of  the  93,000  Carthaginians  and  Numidians 
only  2,500  escaped,  and  calling  this  the  grandest  and 
boldest  exploit  that  Scipio  ever  carried  out.^ 

If  th^  losses  of  the  Carthaginians  had  been  anything  like  Defeat  of 
the  numbers  reported  by  the  Scipionic  accounts,  we  should  ^^^^^^ 
expect  that  Utica  must  have  surrendered  immediately.  Syphax. 
But  Utica  remained  firm,  and  in  the  course  of  thirty 
days,  a  new  Numido-Carthaginian  army  of  30,000  men, 
under  Hasdrubal  and  Syphax,  stood  in  the  field.'    Among 
these  there  were  4,000  Spanish  mercenaries,  who  had  only 
just  arrived  in  AMca.     Scipio  was  obliged  once  more  to 
interrupt  the  siege  of  Utica  and  to  march  against  this 
army.     He  gained  a  complete  victory  on  the  so-called 
*  Large  Plains,'*  after  which  Sjrphax,  with  his  Numidians, 

opportunities  for  composing  speeches  and  displaying  rhetorical  skill.  They 
calminate  in  the  interview  of  Scipio  and  Hannibal  before  the  final  battle  of 
Zama.    Compare  above,  p.  403.  '  Polybins,  ziv.  5. 

'  This  opinion  is  rather  strange,  as  it  seems  to  place  the  surprise  near 
TJtica  above  the  great  victory  of  Scipio  over  Hannibal  at  Zama.  The  night 
attack  was,  after  all,  not  an  honest  open  fight,  but  a  stratagem  worthy  of  a 
barbarian  like  Masinissa;  and  the  losses  of  the  Carthaginians  are  palpably 
exaggerated.  Unless  we  suppose  that  they  were  not  only  struck  deaf  and 
blind,  but  at  the  same  time  paralysed  and  unable  to  run  away,  we  cannot 
understand  how  40,000  (not  to  speak  of  the  90,000  of  Polybius)  could  be 
killed  like  sheep  in  a  pen.  There  were,  however,  several  divergent  reports  of 
the  whole  affair.  According  to  Appian  (viii.  19-23)  Scipio  attacked  only  the 
camp  of  Hasdrubal ;  while  Syphax,  who  was  encamped  at  a  short  distance, 
hearing  of  Hasdrubal's  disaster,  retreated  on  the  following  day  without  loss. 
Compare  also  Zonaras,  ix.  12.  '  I^ivy,  xxx.  7. 

*  Polybius,  xiv.  8,2:  MeydJ^a  ircSta.  Livy,  xxx.  8 :  *  Magni  campi.'  The 
locality  is  unknown. 

F  F  2 


436  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     separated  himself  from  the  Carthaginians,  and  returned 
^^   ,'   -  to  his  own  dominions. 


Capture  of  ^^  ^^^  ^^  ^o^  come  when  Masinissa  could  prove 
gyphax  by  j^  yalue  as  an  ally.  Strengthened  by  a  Roman  detach- 
ment  under  Lselius,  he  followed  Syphax  to  Numidia.  The 
eastern  part  of  this  country,  the  land  of  the  Massylians, 
which  was  contiguous  to  the  Carthaginian  frontier,  was 
Masinissa's  paternal  kingdom.  Here  he  was  welcomed 
with  enthusiasm  by  his  former  subjects  and  companions- 
in-arms.  IVom  an  exUe  he  became,  all  at  once,  again  a 
powerful  sovereign.  His  power  grew  daily.  He  had  the 
good  fortune  not  only  to  conquer  Syphax,*  but  (what  was  of 
much  more  importance)  to  take  him  prisoner,  and  thus 
with  one  blow  to  put  an  end  to  the  war  in  Numidia.*  The 
importance  of  this  event  can  hardly  be  rated  too  high.  Up 
to  this  time  Scipio's  success,  in  spite  of  the  two  victories, 
had  been  far  from  decisive.  Now,  however,  the  power  of 
Numidia  was  no  longer  arrayed  against  him,  but  ranged 
on  his  side,  and  Carthage  was  obliged  to  carry  on  the  war 
against  two  allies,  each  of  which  alone  was  a  match  for  her. 
Defeat  of  Notwithstanding  this  unfortunate  turn  of  affairs,  the 
flee?*bythe  ^^  Continued  with  unabated  vigour,  and  only  a  few 
Cartha-  yoices  in  Carthage  were  heard  wishing  for  peace.  Han- 
nibal, the  invincible,  was  still  in  Italy  with  his  armj, 
and  his  brave  brother  Mago  was  in   Gkiul,  ready  to  co- 

>  According  to  Appian,  Masinissa  and  Syphax  met  in  single  combat.  Com- 
pare what  has  been  said  p.  434,  note. 

'  Cirta,  the  capital  of  Nnmidia  (the  modem  town  of  Constantine)  snrren- 
dered  when  Syphax  was  exhibited  before  the  walls  in  chains.  In  Cirta,  the 
royal  treasures  feU  into  the  hands  of  the  conqueror,  as  well  as  Sophonisbe, 
the  Carthaginian  consort  of  Syphax.  The  tragical  story  of  this  second 
Helen  went  on  to  relate  'that  Masinissa,  upon  seeing  her,  felt  his  old  love 
reTive,  and  took  her  to  wife  forthwith ;  that  Scipio  feared  that  her  influence 
on  Masinissa  would  estrange  him  from  the  cause  of  Bome,  just  as  she  had 
convert«d  Syphax  from  an  enemy  to  be  a  friend  of  Carthage ;  that  Scipio 
accordingly  demanded  her  surrender,  and  that,  to  prevent  it,  Masinissa  offered 
her  the  poisoned  cup,  which  she  drank  with  dignity  and  courage.  It  is 
much  to  be  regretted  that  the  ancient  historians  dwelt  with  particular  pre- 
dilection and  at  full  length  on  such  Tagaries  of  fancy,  whilst  they  relate  the 
most  important  events  superficially  and  negligently.  Compare  above,  p.  425, 
note  2. 


B.C. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  437 

operate  with  him.  Dxuing  the  long  time  since  his  landing  CHAP. 
Scipio  had  not  even  been  able  to  conquer  Utica.  How  w  ,  '  ^ 
could  he  think  of  attacking  the  mighty  Carthage?  It  is  ^^ 
true,  a  detachment  of  the  Eoman  army  had  advanced  into  204-201 
the  neighbourhood  of  Carthage  and  had  taken  possession  of 
Tunes,  which  the  Carthaginians  had  voluntarily  evacuated ; 
but  this  march  upon  the  capital  of  the  empire  made  no 
more  impression  on  it  than  Hannibal's  appearance  before 
Bome  had  made  upon  the  Eomans.  While  Scipio  lay  in 
Tunes,  a  fleet  of  a  hundred  ships^  left  the  harbour  of 
Carthage,  to  attack  the  Boman  fleet  before  Utica,  and 
Scipio  was  obliged  to  return  thither  with  all  haste.  As  he 
had  applied  his  ships  of  war  to  carry  the  machines  employed 
in  the  siege,  and  had  thus  made  them  useless  for  a  naval 
battle,^  he  could  not  go  to  meet  the  Carthaginian  fleet,  but 
had  to  keep  on  the  defensive.  He.  lashed  his  ships  of 
burden  together  in  a  line  four  deep,  and  manned  them, 
like  a  sort  of  camp  rampart,  with  his  land  troops.  Of  the 
result  of  the  battle  that  ensued  we  have  but  a  garbled 
report,  made  for  the  purpose  of  representing  the  losses  of 
the  Eomans  as  slight  as  possible.  Livy  says  that  about  six 
Boman  ships  of  burden  were  detached  and  carried  away ; 
according  to  Appian  one  ship  of  war  and  six  ships  of 
burden  were  lost.'  The  losses  of  the  Bomans  must,  how- 
ever, have  been  much  more  considerable,  as  Scipio  found  it 
advisable  to  relinquish  entirely  the  siege  of  Utica.*  Having 
made  an  attempt  to  take  Hippo,  and  meeting  with  no 

'  Appian,  ylii.  24.    This  fleet  carried  also  a  detachmeDt  of  land  troops. 

*  Liyy,  zxx.  10 :  '  Qui  enim  restitissent  agili  et  nautico  instrumeato  apt» 
et  armatie  dassi  naves,  tormenta  machinasqneportantes,  et  aut  in  onerariarum 
nifum  Terste  aut  ita  appulsa  ad  muros  at  pro  aggere  ac  pontibus  prsebere  ascensus 
possent  ? ' 

*  It  is  clear  that  Appian*s  statement  (viii.  30)  has  reference  to  the  fight  in 
question.  There  existed,  however,  another  report  still  less  unfavourable  to 
the  Romans,  of  which  Appian  has  also  availed  himself  (viii.  25).  According 
to  this  report^  the  Carthaginians  suffered  great  losses  and  retired,  towards 
evening,  in  total  exhaustion,  whereupon  the  Romans  issued  from  the  port,  and 
towed  away  as  prize  an  abandoned  Carthaginian  vessel.  Zonaras  (ix.  12)  makes 
the  battle  last  two  dayR,  which  enables  him  to  utilise  both  reports ;  on  the 
first  day,  he  says  the  Romans  beat  off  the  attack  of  the  Carthaginians,  but  on 
the  second  they  were  considerably  worsted  (wo\b  ^XAam^0-«y). 

*  It  is  only  Appian  that  relates  this  (viii.  40).    The  omission,  by  Livy,  of 


438 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Negotia- 
tions for 
peace. 


better  success,  he  set  fire  to  all  his  siege-works  and  engines^ 
and  occupied  himself  for  the  remainder  of  the  year  in 
marching  through  the  Carthaginian  territory,  and  enrich- 
ing his  soldiers  with  the  spoils. 

In  spite  of  the  late  success  against  the  Roman  fleet,  the 
conviction,  since  the  defeat  and  capture  of  Syphax,  became 
more  and  more  general  in  Carthage,  that  the  resistance 
against  Roman  invasion  could  no  longer  be  continued 
with  the  existing  forces.*  The  democratic  war  party  was 
obliged  to  retire  from  the  government,  and  to  leave  to  the 
opposition  the  task  of  negotiating  with  Borne  for  peace. 
The  successes  of  Scipio  had  not  up  to  this  time  been  such 
as  to  enable  him  to  oppose  the  conclusion  of  a  peace  on  fa.ir 
terms.  He  possessed  the  natural  and  just  ambition  not  to 
leave  to  his  successor  the  glory  of  bringing  the  long  war  to 
a  close,  and  he  therefore  agreed  with  the  Carthaginian 
ambassadors  on  preliminaries  of  peace,  which  were  to  be 
presented  for  approval  to  the  senate  and  people  of  Rome  as 
well  as  of  Carthage.  It  was  agreed  that  the  Carthaginians 
should  give  up  all  prisoners  of  war  and  deserters,  should 
recall  their  armies  from  Italy  and  Gaul,  resign  Spain  and 
all  the  islands  between  Africa  and  Italy,  deliver  all  their 
ships  of  war  but  twenty,  and  pay  5,000  talents  as  a  con- 
tribution of  war,  and  moreover  a  sum  equal  to  double 
the  annual  pay  of  the  Roman  army  in  Africa.* 

It  is  plain  that,  in  this  preliminary  treaty,  the  conditions 

this  most  significant  circumstance  suffices  to  give  a  wrong  colouring  to  the 
whole  narratiTe. 

'  Liyy,  zzx.  16:  '  Carthaginienses  non  brevi  solum,  sed  prope  vano  gaudio 
ab  satis  prospera  in  pnesens  oppugnatione  classis  perfusi,  post  famam  capti 
Sjphacis,  in  quo  plus  prope  quam  in  Hasdrubale  atque  exercitu  suo  spei 
reposuerant,  perculsi  ....  oratores  &d  pacem  petendam  mittunt.* 

'  There  is  some  difference  in  the  statements  of  the  terms  proposed,  with 
regard  to  the  sum  of  money.  Appian  gives  it  as  1,600  talents.  Livy  says 
(xxx.  16):  'Pecunis  summam  quantam  imperaverit,  parum  convenit:  alibi 
quinque  millia  talentum,  alibi  quinque  millia  pondo  aigenti,  alibi  duplex 
stipendium  roilitibus  imperatum  invenio.'  Whereas  6,000  talents  would  be 
more  than  a  million  pounds,  6,000  pounds  of  silver  would  be  about  16,000/. 
What  the  double  pay  for  the  troops  amounted  to  is  doubtful,  especially  as  the 
length  of  time  for  which  the  pay  was  to  be  given  by  the  Carthaginians  is  not 
staled.    From  the  analogy  of  other  instances,  we  may  guess  that  a  year's  pay 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  439 

of  a  peace  and  those  of  an  armiBtice  have  been  mixed  np     CHAP. 

together.     The  demand  of  pay  for  the  Boman  troops  for  ^ ,-L-* 

the  duration  of  a  truce  had  long  been  customary.     This    ^^^" 
money  was  paid  immediately  by  the  Carthaginians.^     In    204-201 
the  same  manner  the  evacuation  of  Italy  by  the  Cartha- 
ginian  army  was  certainly  a  condition  preliminary  to  the  ^^J^e  °^" 
negotiations  for  peace,  i.e.  a  condition  of  the  armistice.    It  armiatice. 
could  not  possibly  be  the  intention  of  the  Eomans  that, 
while  the  armies  were  at  rest  in  Africa,  the  war  should 
still  be  carried  on  in  Italy.    We  know  very  well  that  the 
greatest  desire  of  the  Boman  people  was  the  withdrawal  of 
Hannibal  from  Italy.'    We  also  know  that  the  senate,  on 
principle,  negotiated  with  no  enemy  for  peace  so  long  as 
hostile  troops  were  in  Italy.'    It  is  therefore  certain  that 
the  recall  of  Hannibal  and  Mago,  which  in  a  treaty  of 
peace  was  a  matter  of  course,  belonged  not  to  the  con- 
ditions of  peace  but  to  those  of  an  armistice,  and  this 
supposition  is  absolutely  necessary  if  we  wish  to  under- 
stand the  conduct  of  the  Carthaginians  on  the  renewal  of 
hostilities,  which  took  place  soon  after. 

When  the  Carthaginian  ambassadors  reached  Bome,  seceptiou 
Lcelius  had  just  been  there  with  the  captive  Syphax  and  an  ®/  ^^®  p^^' 
embassy  from  Masinissa,  and  both  senate  and  people  had  ambassa- 
convinced  themselves,  by  personal  observation,  that  Car-  ^J^*' 
thage,  deprived  of  her  most  powerful  ally,  would  not  be  in  a 
position  to  carry  on  the  war  much  longer.     This  accounts 
for  the  contemptuous  treatment  which  the  Carthaginians 
met  with  in  the  senate.   Although  the  Boman  prisoners  had 
been  abeady  released,  in  the  expectation  that  the  conditions 

vas  demanded.  Such  a  payment  was  the  UBiial  condidon  of  an  annistice.— ^ 
See  LiTj,  viii.  2 ;  Tiii.  86 ;  iz.  41. 

'  Appian,  Tiii.  31. 

'  When  Hannibal  did  leare  Italy,  a  thank-offering  of  120  laige*  animals 
was  made,  and  a  festival  of  fiye  days  celebrated  (Livy,  xzz.  21),  and  the 
senate  and  people  yoted  to  the  old  Fabius  a  crown  of  grass. — Pliny,  SRst.  Nat, 
zxii.  6,  10. 

'  According  to  Zonaras  (iz.  13)  the  senate  refased  to  admit  the  Cartha- 
ginian ambassadors  until  this  condition  should  be  complied  with. — Compare 
Dion  Cassius,  figm.  ix.  153. 


440  BOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  of  peaxse  would  be  accepted,'  the  ambaflsadors  were  not 
—  ,'„>  admitted  before  the  senate  till  after  the  departure  of 
Hannibal  and  Mago  from  Italj.^  Then  new  difiBlculties 
were  raised.  According  to  the  report  of  Livy  the  peace 
was  not  ratified,  and  the  Carthaginian  ambassadors 
returned  home  almost  without  an  answer.*  Polybius  says 
that  the  senate  and  people  in  Bome  approved  the  conditions 
of  peace/  J£  this  last  report  be  true,  some  alterations  in. 
the  treaty  must  have  been  proposed  in  Bome,  on  the 
acceptance  of  which  by  Carthage  the  peace  depended. 
On  this  supposition  only  can  we  understand  how  in  Bome 
and  in  the  Scipionic  camp  the  peace  could  be  considered  to 
be  concluded,  while  in  point  of  fact  the  war  continued  up 
to  the  time  when  Carthage  would  have  consented  to  the 
proposed  alterations. 
Eec^  and  i^  Carthage  there  had  been  for  some  time  past  a  grow- 
Mago.  ing  opinion  that  Hannibal  ought  to  be  recalled  from  Italy,' 
but  before  entering  into  negotiations  for  peace  with  Scipio 
the  senate  had  adhered  strictly  to  its  old  plan  of  keeping 
the  enemy  occupied  in  his  own  country.  When  the 
Boman  expedition  to  Africa  was  in  contemplation,  Mago 
had  received  a  considerable  reinforcement,^  had  marched 
from  Genoa  over  the  Apennines,  and  had  again  roused  the 
Gauls  to  renew  the  war  against  Bome.  He  met  in  the 
country  of  the  Insubrians  a  Boman  army  of  four  legions, 
under  the  prsetor  P.  Quintilius  Varus  and  the  proconsul 
M.  Cornelius  Cethegus;  and  in  the  battle  which  ensued  the 
Bomans  could  hardly  have  been  victorious,  as  they  own  to 
heavy  losses  and  do  not  boast  of  having  taken  any 
prisoners.  Mago,  however,  was  severely  wounded,  and  this 
mishap  was  sufficient  to  cripple  his  movements.  Under 
these  circumstances  the  order  reached  him  from  Carthage 
to  leave  Italy.    He  returned  to  Genoa  and  embarked  his 

'  According  to  Liv7(xxx.  16)  the  Carthaginians  restored  only  200  prisoners ; 
according  to  Dion  Gassins  (frgm.  Id3)  they  sent  them  all  back. 

'  This  is  particularly  evident  from  the  narrative  uf  Dion  Cassius  (frgm.  153) 
'  Livy,  Z2Z.  23 :  '  Legati  pace  infecta  ac  prope  sine  responso  dimissi.' 

*  PolybiuSi  XV.  1,  4,  8. 

•  Livy,  XXX.  9.  ■  See  above,  p.  426. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  441 

Rrmy,  but  died,  in  consequence  of  his  wounds,  before  he     CHAP. 

reached  Africa.'      His   army,  however,  arrived,  without   s. . ^ 

hindrance  or  loss,  clearly  under  the  protection  of  the     plJ^J^ 
armistice.  204>20i 

The  time  had  now  come  when  Hannibal  was  at  last       ^'^ 
obliged  to  renounce  his  long-cherished  hopes  of  over-  l^^ons 
throwing  the  Eoman  power  on  Italian  soil.     The  last  balwith 
three  years  brought  him  one  bitter  disappointment  after  '5  Ma»S 
another.   Aft^er  the  defeat  and  death  of  Hasdrubal  and  the  donia. 
loss  of  Spain,  one  faint  hope  still  remained — a  vigorous 
participation  in  the  war  on  the  part  of  Macedonia.     But 
this  hope  also  disappeared.     King  Philip  did  nothing  to 
carry  the  war  into  Italy,  and  confined  himself  to  keeping 
the  chief  power  in  Greece  and  conquering  a  part  of  Illyria. 
The  Eomans  had  since  207  devoted  but  little  attention  to 
aiEa^irs  on  the  east  of  the  Adriatic  Sea,  and  when,  in  the 
year  205,  they  could  not  prevent  the  hard-pressed  -SJtolians 
from  concluding  a  peace  with  Philip,'  they  did  the  same, 
and  in  order  to  satisfy  the  Macedonian  king,  they  resigned 
to  him  a  part  of  their  possessions  in  Illyria.'    Afber  this, 
a  new  prospect  opened  for  Hannibal.    The  march  of  Mago 
to  the  north  of  Gaul  was  the  last  attempt  which  Carthage 
made  to  carry  out  Hannibal's  original  plan.   It  was  under- 
taken with  great  energy,  and  seemed  to  promise  success, 
when  the  negotiations  for  peace  put  an  end  to  it.     As 
for  Hannibal's  strategy  in  the  last  years  of  the  war,  it 

'  Whoerer  is  tolerably  funiliar  with  the  character  of  Boman  descriptionfl  of 
hatUee  cannot  fail  to  see  that  Mago  was  Tictorious  in  his  last  engagement 
with  the  Boman  legions.  Livy  (xzz.  18)  finishes  with  the  remark  '  that  the 
battle  would  have  lasted  longer  if,  by  the  wound  of  the  Carthaginian  leader, 
Tictory  had  not  been  acknowledged  to  be  on  the  Boman  side.'  No  lost  battle 
ends  like  this.  If  the  severely  wounded  Mago  had  been  defeated,  it  is  quite 
evident  that  the  four  legions  must  have  pursued  and  overtaken  him  on  the 
long  march  from  the  Milanese  to  Genoa.  But  the  Oarthaginians  were  not 
even  harassed  on  their  march.  This  can  be  explained  only  by  the  circum- 
stance that  their  march  was  undertaken  in  consequence  of  an  order  horn  home, 
and  not  of  a  defeat.  According  to  Livy's  narrative,  it  happened  by  the  merest 
chance  that  the  order  to  return  reached  Mago,  when  he  had  already  deter- 
mined to  return,  and  was  actually  engaged  in  embarking  his  troops.  Such  a 
coincidence  is  possible,  but  hardly  probable. 

*  See  above,  p.  414.  '  Livy,  zxiz.  12. 


442  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     was  confined  to  defending  that  comer  of  Italy  which  he 


IV. 


*  still  occapied,  and  the  area  of  which  was  growing  less  from 
year  to  year.  How  Locri  was  lost  has  already  been  re- 
lated. Hannibal's  last  stronghold  was  Croton.  From  that 
place  he  still  defied  the  Boman  legions,  and  sacceeded, 
when  hard  pressed,  in  inflicting  serious  losses.^  At  no 
period  does  the  generalship  of  Hannibal  appear  in  a  more 
brilliant  light.*  How  he  succeeded,  with  the  scanty  rem- 
nants of  his  victorious  army,  with  the  pressed  Italian 
recruits,  emancipated  slaves  and  fugitives,  without  any 
other  resources  than  those  which  the  small  exhausted  land 
of  the  Bruttians  afforded,  in  keeping  together  an  armed 
force,  animated  with  warlike  spirit,  severely  trained  to 
discipline  and  obedience,  supplied  with  arms  and  other 
necessaries  of  war — ^an  army  which  was  capable  not  only  of 
steady  resistance,  but  which  repeatedly  inflicted  on  the 
enemy  bloody  repulses — ^this  the  Boman  annalists  have  not 
related.  If  they  had  been  honest  enough  to  represent  in 
true  colours  the  greatness  of  their  most  formidable  enemy 
in  his  adversity,  they  would  have  been  obliged  also  to  paint 
the  incompetence  of  their  own  consuls  and  praetors,  and  to 
confess  with  shame  that  they  had  not  one  single  man  able 
to  cope  with  the  great  Punian. 
The  bronze  Hannibal,  as  if  he  had  had  a  foreboding  of  his  enemies' 
Haimfbal.  1^^®  ^^  detraction,  made  use  of  the  leisure  which  their  fear 
granted  him  to  record  his  exploits  in  Italy.  Like  all 
great  men,  he  was  not  indifferent  to  the  judgment  of 
posterity,  and  he  foresaw  that  this  judgment  must  be 
unfavourable  to  him  if  it  rested  on  Boman  reports  alone. 

'  LiTy,  zzix.  36,  4.  *The  Roman  writers  have  recorded  victories  over 
Hannibal  too  mendadons  for  themselves  to  believe  *  (Arnold,  Hiti,  of  Rome^ 
iii.  443).  A  sample  of  snch  lies  is  found  in  Livy  xxx.  19,  where  the  author  is 
honest  enough  to  remark  :  *  Obscura  eius  pugnse  famn  est.  Valerius  Antias 
quinque  millia  hostium  csesa  nit,  qusB  tanta  res  est,  ut  aut  impudenter  ficta  sit, 
aut  negligenter  preetermissa/  In  the  spirit  of  the  oldest  annals,  the  same 
event  is  related  several  times ;  for  instance,  the  taking  of  Consentia  three 
times  (Livy,  xxv.  1  j  xxix.  38 ;  xxx.  19) ;  that  of  Clampetia  twice  (Livy, 
zxix.  38  ;  xxx.  19). 

Livy  does  not  say  a  word  too  much  in  the  beautiful  passage  (xxviii.  12)  in 
which  he  expresses  this  opinion. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAK. 


443 


CHAP. 
VIII. 


Skventh 
Pbbiod, 
204-201 

B.C. 


He  therefore  caused  to  be  engraved  on  bronze  tablets  in 
the  temple  of  Juno  on  the  Lacinian  promontory,  near 
Croton,  an  account  of  the  principal  events  of  the  war,  in 
the  Greek  and  Punic  languages.  These  bronze  tablets 
Poljbius  saw  and  made  use  of,  and  we  may  be  sure  that 
the  most  trustworthy  accounts  of  the  second  Punic  war 
were  taken  from  this  source.  Unfortunately  the  history  of 
Polybius  is  completely  preserved  only  for  the  period  ending 
with  the  battle  at  Cannse.  Of  the  latter  books  of 
Polybius  we  have  mere  fragments,  the  only  complete  and 
connected  account  of  the  Hannibalian  war  being  that  of 
Livy,  who  unhesitatingly  made  use  of  the  most  mendacious 
Eoman  annalists,  such,  for  instance,  as  the  impudent 
Valerius  of  Antium.  Thus  the  memoirs  of  Hannibal  are 
for  the  most  part  lost  to  us,  owing  to  the  same  cruel  fate 
which  persecuted  him  to  his  death  and  even  after  his 
death ;  and  Bome  not  only  prevailed  over  her  most  formid- 
able enemy  in  the  field,  but  her  historians  were  enabled  to 
obtain  for  themselves  alone  the  ear  of  posterity,  and  thus 
to  perpetuate  to  their  liking  the  national  triumph. 

Thus  alone  can  it  be  explained  that  historians,  even  up  slanderous 
to  the  present  day,  have  recorded,  as  Hannibal's  last  act  in  ^^^H 
Italy,  a  crime,  which,  if  it  deserved  credit,  would  place  Hannibal. 
him  among  the  most  execrable  monsters  of  all  times.     It 
is  affirmed  that  he  ordered  those   Italian  soldiers^  who 
declined  to  follow  him  into  Africa  to  be  murdered  in  the 
sanctuary  of  the  Lacinian  Juno,  and  that  he  thus  violated 
with  equal  scorn  all  human  feelings  and  the  sanctity  of  the 
temple.*    We  have  had  already  an  opportxmity  of  refuting 
charges  such  as  these,'  and  we  do  not  hesitate  to  call  this 
accusation  a  gross  calumny.     The  act  cannot  be  recon- 
ciled with  Hannibal's  character.     He  was  not  capable  of 

>  According  to  Dicdoms  (xxrii.  p.  Ill,  Tauchnitz)  tbeir  number  was  2,000. 
Livy  (xxx.  20)  says  they  were  *  many.' 

'  Appian  (rii.  58)  adds  that  Hannibal  caused  those  Italian  towns  which 
were  still  in  his  possession  to  be  plundered,  for  the  purpose  of  satisfying  his 
army,  and  that  this  gave  occasion  to  murders,  violation  of  women,  the  capture 
of  men,  and  all  the  horrors  to  which  towns  taken  by  storm  are  exposed. 

*  See  above,  p.  252. 


444  BOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     gratoitous  cruelty,  and  it  would  have  been  nothing  but  gra- 


IV. 


^  tuitous  cruelty^  to  massacre  the  poor  Italians,  who  could 
have  been  of  no  use  to  him  in  Africa,  and  could  do  him  no 
harm  if  left;  in  Italy.  We  cannot  believe  that  Hannibal, 
who  before  his  march  over  the  Pyrenees  dismissed  many 
thousand  Spaniards  to  their  homes  because  they  showed 
unwillingness  to  accompany  him,  would  now  have  acted 
so  differently  in  Italy.  If  Italian  soldiers  met  their  death 
in  the  sanctuary  of  Juno,  it  was  much  more  likely  that  they 
were  men  who,  like  the  noble  Capuans  before  the  taking 
of  the  town,  preferred  to  die  a  voluntary  death  rather 
than  allow  themselves  to  be  tortured  by  the  Romans  in 
punishment  of  their  rebellion.* 
^cai?  o^  Hamilcar  Barcas,  obeying  the  call  of  his  country,  had, 
from  Italy,  forty  years  before,  left  the  theatre  of  his  heroic  deeds,  un- 
conquered.  If,  with  heavy  heart,  he  discharged  a  motimfol 
duty,  he  had  at  least  hopes  of  a  better  future  for  his 
people.  He  devoted  his  life  to  bring  this  better  future  about. 
Now  his  son,  greater  and  mightier  than  he,  had  sought^  in 
a  fifteen  years'  stru^^le,  to  solve  the  father's  problem,  and 
the  end  of  his  effoS  L,d  of  his  glorions  5ctories  was 
that  he  also  had  to  bow  his  head  before  an  inexorable  fate. 
The  anguish  of  his  soul  can  be  imagined  only  by  those 
unhappy  men  who  have  seen  before  them  the  down&ll  of 
their  fatherland,  and  who  loved  it  and  lived  for  it  like 
Hannibal.  He  obeyed  the  order  which  recalled  him,  and 
was  ready  now,  as  ever,  again  to  try  the  fortune  of  battle ; 
but  when  he  surveyed  the  progress  of  the  war,  and  con- 
templated the   continually  increasing  preponderance   of 

'  According  to  Appian  (vii.  59)  indeed  he  butchered  these  men,  lest  they 
should  ever  become  useful  to  the  Bomans. 

'  The  speech  which  Livj  (xxx.  20)  makes  Hannibal  deliver  on  his  departure 
from  Italy,  is  too  absurd  to  deserve  serious  criticism.  Nevertheless  it  has 
found  a  place  in  almost  all  histories  of  the  war,  and  it  may  therefore  be 
worth  while  to  refer  to  it  at  least  in  a  foot-note.  In  it  Hannibal  laments  that 
the  Carthaginian  government,  from  jealousy  and  envy,  left  him  without 
suppprt,  and  had  not  shrunk  from  risking  even  the  safety  of  Carthage 
itself,  so  that  they  might  overthrow  him.  The  whole  course  of  the  war  is  an 
uninterrupted  refutation  of  these  views,  which  have  been  sufficiently  discussed 
bove,  p.  161,  note  1. 


THE  SEC0N1>  PUNIC  WAR.  445 

power  on  the  side  of  Eome,  he  could  scarcely  entertain     chap. 

any  other  hope  than  that  of  mitigating  to  some  extent  ^ r-^ 

the  fate  which  was  inevitable.  PmoD^ 

With  the  best  men  of  his  army  Hannibal  sailed  from    204-201 
Croton  in  the  antmnn  of  the  year  203.     He  held  his 
course,  not  direct  to  Carthage,  but,  probably  in  consequence  Hannibal 
of  a  tbrmal  stipulation  in  the  armistice,  to  Leptis,  ahnost  at  Leptis. 
on  the  extreme  southern  boundary  of  the  Carthaginian 
territory,  where  he  was  as  far  as  possible  removed  from 
the  Boman  and  Numidian  armies  and  frt)m  the  capital. 
To  the  same  place,  as  it  seems,  came  the  army  of  Mago 
from  Genoa,  and  Hannibal  spent  the  winter  there  in  com- 
pleting his  army  and  providing  it  with  horses,  elephants, 
arms,  and  all  necessaries,  so  that,  in  case  of  a  failure  of  the 
peace  negotiation,  he  could  renew  the  war  in  the  follow- 
ing year. 

The  peace  was  not  concluded.  We  have  aheady  seen  Fsilnre  of 
that  the  Eoman  senate  delayed  the  Carthaginian  embassy  ^1^^ 
until  the  hostile  armies  had  left  Italy,  and  then  ratified  tions. 
the  treaty  of  peace  only  afber  introducing  certain  altera- 
tions. This  intelligence  reached  Carthage  before  the 
embassy  itself  had  returned.'  All  hopes  of  peace  at  once 
vanished,  and  instead  of  complete  reconciliation  the 
greatest  animosity  was  felt.  The  democratic  party  had 
been  in  favour  of  war  fr^m  the  beginning,  had  conducted 
it  vigorously  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  an  aristocratic 
minority,  and  had  reluctantiy  submitted  to  the  necessity 
of  accepting  conditions  of  peace.  Now  this  party  again 
had  the  upper  hand,  after  the  more  moderate  men  and 
the  friends  of  peace  had  been  foiled  in  their  attempt  to 
make  peace  with  Bome  on  equitable  terms.  It  has  often 
happened  that  in  a  supreme  crisis,  when  foreign  enemies 
have  threatened  the  existence  of  a  state,  an  internal 
revolution  has  suddenly  broken  out,  and  that  a  nation, 
believing  itself  betrayed,  has  fallen  a  victim  to  ungovem- 

'  This  follows  from  a  comparison  of  events  in  their  internal  connexion  of 
canse  and  effect. 


446 


ROMAN  HISTORy. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Shipwreck 
of  a 


able  fury  and  blind  passion.*  It  was  tbus  in  Carthage. 
The  advocates  of  peace  were  now  persecuted  as  traitors 
and  foes  of  their  country,  and  the  government  fell  again 
entirely  into  the  hands  of  the  fanatical  enemies  of  Borne. 
Hasdrubal,  the  son  of  Gisgo,  according  to  all  appearance 
a  moderate  man  and  by  no  means  on  principle  an  opponent 
of  the  family  of  Barcas,  had  till  now  conducted  the  war. 
After  Hannibal  he  was  the  most  distinguished  general 
that  Carthage  possessed,  and  it  was  necessary  that  the 
negotiations  for  peace  with  Scipio  should  be  conducted  by 
him.  The  people,  disappointed  in  their  hope  of  peace,  now 
turned  their  rage  against  this  man.^  He  was  recalled  from 
the  command  and  condemned  to  death,  on  the  charge  of 
having  mismanaged  the  war  and  of  having  had  treacherous 
dealings  with  the  enemy.  The  high-minded  patriot  suf- 
fered the  iniquitous  sentence  to  be  passed,  and  continued, 
although  condemned  and  outlawed,  to  serve  his  country. 
He  collected  an  army  of  volunteers,  and  carried  on  the 
war  on  his  own  account.  But  after  all  he  fell  a  victim  to 
the  unreasonable  hatred  of  the  populace.  He  ventured 
to  show  himself  in  the  town,  was  recognised,  pursued,  and 
fled  to  the  mausoleum  of  his  own  family,  where  he  eluded 
his  pursuers  by  taking  poison.  His  body  was  dragged  out 
into  the  street  by  the  populace,  and  his  head  carried  about 
in  triumph  on  the  top  of  a  pole. 

After  such  an  outbreak  of  fury  against  supposed  in- 


*  An  illustration  in  point  is  the  murder  of  the  brothers  De  Witt  in 
Holland  in  1672 ;  and  whilst  these  lines  are  written  (September  8,  1870)  we 
can  witness  the  action  of  the  same  force  in  Paris :  the  defeat  of  Napoleon  is 
followed  by  an  internal  revolution. 

'  This  combination,  it  must  be  confessed,  rests  on  coi^jecture  alone.  Accord- 
ing to  Appian  (viii.  24)  Hasdrubars  trial  took  place  earlier,  viz.,  after  the 
catastrophe  which  befell  him  in  conjunction  with  Syphax,  when  his  camp  was 
burnt  (p.  434  f.).  But  this  statement  is  evidently  false,  for  Polybius  and  Livy 
speak  of  Hasdrubal  as  commanding  the  Carthaginian  army  in  the  battle  on  the 
'  Laige  Plains '  (p.  435,  note  4),  a  battle  wliich  Appian  does  not  refer  to.  Neither 
Polybius  nor  Livy  relate  the  accusation  and  death  of  Hasdrubal,  but  their 
silence  would  not  justify  us  in  condemning  the  detailed  narrative  of  Appian  as 
entirely  fictitious.  Livy  has  passed  over  many  interesting  details,  and  the 
narrative  of  Polybius  may  be  among  the  lost  chapters. 


THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  447 

temal  enemies^  it  may  easily  be  imagined  that  the  populace     CHAP. 

of  Carthage  were  not  very  conscientions  in  the  observance  > ,  \^ 

of  the  law  of  nations  towards  the  Eomans.    The  truce,  as    ^J^J^" 
the  Soman  historians  report,  had  not  yet  expired  when    204-201 
a  large  Boman  fleet,  with  provisions  for  Scipio's  army,       ^'^' 
was  driven  ag^ainst  the  coast  in  the  Carthasfinian  bay,  and  ^™*° . 

^  °  .      convoy  in 

wrecked  before  the  eyes  of  the  people.  The  town  was  in  the  bay  of 
a  state  of  the  greatest  excitement.  The  senate  consulted  ^^' 
as  to  what  was  to  be  done.  The  people  pressed  in  among 
the  senators  and  insisted  on  plundering  the  wrecked 
vessels.  The  government  determined,  either  voluntarily 
or  tinder  compulsion,  to  send  out  ships  to  tow  the  stranded 
vessels  to  Carthage.  Whether  and  how  this  resolution  was 
carried  out  may  be  doubtful ;  but  thus  much  is  certain,  that 
the  Boman  ships  were  plundered,  perhaps  by  the  licentious 
populace,  without  the  authority  or  approval  of  the  govern- 
ment. Scipio  sent  three  ambassadors  to  Carthage, 
demanding  satisfaction  and  compensation.  The  embassy 
received  a  negative  answer,  and  the  attempt  was  even  made 
on  the  part  of  Carthage  to  detain  them  as  hostages  for  the 
safety  of  the  Carthaginian  ambassadors  who  were  still  in 
Bome.'  This  attempt  failed.  The  three  Bomans  escaped, 
with  much  difficulty.  Scipio,  instead  of  retaliating, 
allowed  the  Carthaginian  ambassadors,  who  shortly  after- 
wards fell  into  his  hands  on  their  return  from  Italy,  to 
leave  his  camp  unmolested.  After  all  hopes  of  an  imme- 
diate peace  had  vanished,  he  prepared  for  a  renewal  of 
the  war,  which  now,  since  Hannibal  was  opposed  to  him, 
had  assumed  a  far  more  serious  character.^ 

'  Appian,  viii.  34. 

'  No  event  in  the  war  has  been  so  thoroughly  misrepresented  as  the  so- 
called  breach  of  the  truce  by  the  Carthaginians.  Some  Eoman  writers  were 
anxious  to  show,  by  a  striking  example,  that  the  charge  of  faithlessness,  so 
universally  brought  against  the  Punians,  was  well  founded,  and  in  their 
patriotic  seal  they  Tied  with  each  other  in  making  the  most  atrocious  charges. 
Though  Folybius  (xy.  2,  §  15)  and  Livy  (xxx.  25,  8)  admit  that  the  Roman 
ambassadors  returned  safe  to  Scipio,  Appian  (viii.  34)  relates  that  some  of  them 
were  killed  (kcI  r&y  irpdirfitdy  rtytt  ix  To|«vfuiTwy  i,w40atny).  As  there  were 
only  three  ambassadors,  the  expression  *  some  of  the  ambassadors '  can  hardly 
be  justified,  and  the  reading  is  probably  corrupt.    Perhaps  irp^(r/3€«y  has  to  be 


448  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK         What  has  been  said  already  with  regard  to  our  imper- 
^   , '  ,^  feet  knowledge  of  the  war  in  Africa  applies  especially  to 
Operations  ^^^  period  between  the  landing  of  Hannibal  and  the  battle 
of  Hanni-    ^bt  Zama.'     Livy  and  Polybins  say  nothing  at  all  about  it, 
MiuiiDissa.  SO  that  we  cannot  understand  how  the  hostile  armies,  at 
the  distance  of  a  five  days'  march,  encounter  each  other  to 
the  west  of  Carthage*    Fortunately  we  find  some  indicar- 
tions  in  Appian  and  Zonaras,  derived  from  an  independent 
source,  which  enable  us  to  form  a  proximate  notion  of  the 
course  of  the  campaign.    It  appears  from  these  indica- 
tions that  the  war  was  brought  to  a  close  through  the 
Numidians  and  in  Numidia.     From  Leptis  Hannibal  had 
marched  to  Hadrumetum,  where  he  spent  the  winter. 
But  instead  of  marching  from  this  place  to  Carthage,  and 
against  Scipio,  he  turned  in  a  southerly  direction,  towards 
Numidia.     He  considered  it  his  first  duty  to  restore 
Carthaginian  influence  in  this  territory,  to  weaken  Masi- 
nissa,  and  to  draw  off  its  forces  to  the  Carthaginian  side. 
Hannibal  secured  the  support  of  some  Numidian  chiefs, 
especially  of  Yermina,  the  son  of  Syphax ;  he  succeeded 
in  defeating  Masinissa,  in  taking    several  towns,  and 
in  laying  waste  the  country.    Hereupon  Scipio  marched 
from  Tunes,  where  he  had  taken  up  his  position  for 
the  second  time,  and  came  to  relieve  his  ally,  threaten- 
ing Hannibal  on  the  east,  whilst  the  Numidians  were 

changed  into  iwifiar&w.  It  would  take  too  long  to  point  out  all  the  contra- 
dictions in  the  several  statements.  They  strike  even  the  superficial  reader. 
If  we  had  the  Carthaginian  version,  we  should  probably  learn  that  the 
Bomans  were  not  so  innocent  as  the  lamb  in  the  fable,  and  that  the  Cartha- 
ginians were  not  so  demented  as  to  give  their  overpowering  enemies  a  pretext 
for  renewing  a  war  the  termination  of  which  they  were  prepared  to  poichase 
with  great  sacrifices.  We  surmise  that  the  Carthaginians  did  not  provoke 
hostilities  until  they  knew  the  resolution  of  the  Bomans  to  continue  the  war ; 
and  we  have  no  reason  to  doubt  that  a  state  like  the  Carthaginian  respected 
the  law  of  nations  at  least  as  much  as  the  Bomans,  and  that  accordingly  the 
alleged  violation  of  it  by  the  populace  of  Carthage  was  justified  by  acts  on  the 
part  of  the  Bomans.  If  we  recollect  the  story  of  the  Caudine  Passes,  we 
shall  feel  persuaded  that  Borne  did  not  scruple  to  accept  the  benefits  of  an 
armistice  without  performing  the  conditions  stipulated  in  it. 

>  Compare  TJ.  Becker,  Vorarheiten  eu  einer  GescMchte  des  rweiten  pwiiscken 
KriegeSt  p.  186  ff. 


i 


THE  SECONIX  FUNIC  WAR.  449 

advancing  against  him  from  the  west.    Hannibal  was     CHAP, 
worsted  in  a  cavalry  engagement  near  Zama,  one  of  his 


commissariat  trains  was  cut  off  by  the  Bom'ans  nnder  the  ^^?*™ 
legate  Thermus,  and,  after  fruitless  negotiations  for  peace,  204-201 
the  decisive  battle  at  last  was  fought.^  "'^ 

The  uncertainty  of  the  history  of  this  last  year's  cam-^  The  so- 
paign  is  strikingly  characterised  by  the  fact  that  neither  the  ^^^  . 
time  nor  the  place  of  this  battle  is  exactly  known*  One  Zama. 
thing  is  certain^  that  the  battle  of  Zama,  as  it  is  called  in 
history,  was  fought,  not  at  Zama,  but  several  days'  march 
to  the  west  of  it,  on  the  river  Bagradas,  at  a  place  the 
name  of  which  is  given  di£Ferently  by  different  authors,  and 
which  was  perhaps  called  Naraggara.  The  date  of  the 
battle  is  also  uncertain.  Not  one  of  the  extant  historians 
names  even  the  season  of  the  year.  On  the  authority  of  a 
statement  in  Zonaras'  that  the  Carthaginians  were  ticrrified 
by  an  eclipse  of  the  sUn,  the  19th  of  October  has  been  fixed 
upon  as  the  day  of  the  battle,  as,  according  to  astrono-^ 
mical  calculations,  an  eclipse  of  the  sun,  visible  in  North 
Africa,  took  place  on  that  day  in  the  year  202  b.c.^ 
This  calculation  agrees  perfectly  with  the  course  of  events 
as  it  appears  probable  from  the  narratives  of  Appian 
and  Zonaras ;  for  the  campaign  in  the  wide  deserts  of 
Numidia  may  very  well  have  lasted  through  the  whole 
summer  of  that  year. 

The  battle  of  Naraggara,  which,  in  order  to  avoid  a 

^  The  story  of  an  Interview  of  the  two  leaders  is  probabljr  nothing  but  ond 
of  the  idle  inventions  in  Which  the  history  of  the  Funic  war  abounds,  from 
the  time  that  Scipio  took  a  leading  part  in  it.  It  is  not  taken  from  the  con- 
temporary annals,  but  &om  one  of  the  poetical  or  rhetorical  works  on  the 
subject.  If  more  was  preserved  of  the  poems  of  Ennius  than  the  few  scanty 
fragments  which  were  noted  down  by  the  later  grammarians  for  the  curious 
or  antiquated  words  they  contained,  we  should  probably  be  able  to  traoa- 
back  to  him  a  great  number  of  these  fictions.  They  originated,  for  the  most 
part,  in  the  family  circle  and  among  the  clients  of  the  Scipios,  and  had  already 
gained  consistency  when  Polybius  obtained  in  this  quarter  his  materials  for 
the  history  of  the  Hannibalian  waf. 

'  Zonaras,  ix.  14. 

'  This  date  agrees  with  the  statement  of  Livy  (xxx.  30),  according  to  which 
the  Kumidian  chief  Vermina  attacked  the  Bomans  qfier  the  battle,  on  the 
first  day  of  the  Saturnalia,  t.s.  in  the  month  of  October* 

VOL*  II.  o  a 


450  EOMAN  mSTOEY. 

BOOK  misunderstanding,  we  must  call  the  battle  of  Zama,  is 
% — ,1^  described  in  detail  by  Polybius  and  by  Livy,  After 
what  we  have  said  above,  of  the  inaccuracy  of  these  authors 
as  to  the  war  in  Africa,  it  would  hardly  be  worth  while  to 
copy  their  battle-pieces  here,  however  much  we  may |  desire 
to  have  a  true  picture  of  this  battle,  which,  though  it 
did  not  decide  the  issue  of  the  seventeen  years*  war — 
for  this  had  been  long  decided — ^yet  brought  the  long 
struggle  to  a  close.  But  the  battles  of  the  ancients, 
compared  with  those  of  modem  times,  were  so  easy  to 
survey;  their  battle-fields,  even  when  the  greatest  forces 
fought,  were  so  small,  and  the  battle  array  and  tactics  of 
their  troops  so  xmiform  and  simple,  that  it  was  not  impos- 
sible to  obtain  a  clear  conception  of  the  course  of  a  battle  ; 
and  where  there  was  no  intention  to  deceive,  the  accounts  of 
eye-witnesses  maybe  received  as,  on  the  whole,  trustworthy. 
Disposi-  According  to  Appian'  Hannibal  brought  into  the  field 

t^^^""  60,000  men  and  eighty  elephants,  Scipio  84,500,  without 
forces.        counting  the  Numidians  whom  Masinissa  and  Dacamas,  an- 
other Numidian  chief,  had  brought  to  his  aid.  According  to 
the  account  of  Polybius,*  both  armies  were  equally  strong  in 
infantry.  HannibaPs  army  consisted  of  three  different  corps, 
drawn  up  one  behind  the  other  in  a  treble  line  of  battle.  In 
the  first  rank  were  placed  the  mercenaries,  the  Moors,  the 
Gauls,  the  Ligurians,  the  Balearic  contingent,  and  the 
Spaniards ;  then,  in  the  second  line,  the  Libyans  and  the 
Carthaginian  militia;    and  in  the  third  line  the  Italian 
veterans,  mostly  Bruttians.    The  eighty  elephants,  drawn 
up  before  the  front,  opened  the  attack  on  the  Eomans.    In 
cavalry  the  Eomans  were  superior  to  Hannibal,  by  the  aid 
of  their  Numidian  auxiliaries.'   It  appears  that  Hannibal's 
Numidian  ally  Vermina  had  not  arrived  with  his  troops  on 
the  day  of  the  battle.^    He  did  not  attempt  an  attack  on 

■  Appian,  Tiii.  41.  *  Polybius,  xv.  14,  §  6. 

*  Besides  his  Italian  cavalry,  Scipio  had  4,000  Numidian  hone,  under 
Masinissa. — ^Xivy,  xzx.  29. 

^  The  nntrustworthiness  of  the  Kumidians,  as  of  their  aUies  in  general,  and 
of  their  mercenaries,  was  the  principal  element  of  the  weakness  of  the  Cartha- 
ginians.    What  strong  reasons  Hannibal  had  for  mistrusting  the  Numidiana 


THK  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  461 

the  Bomans  until  after  the  battle,  and  was  then  defeated     CHAP, 
with  a  loss  of  16,000  men.*  -  ^™-  - 

The  Boman  legions  were  generally  drawn  np  in  three    ®"""*" 
lines,  in  manipnli  or  companies  of  120  men  each,  in  such  a    204>20i 
manner  that  the  manipuli  of  the  second  line,  the  principes,       ^^' 
came  to  stand  behind  the  intervals  left  by  the  manipuli  ^Vf  ^** 
of  the  first  line,  the  hastati,  and  that  on  advancing  Boman 
they  could  form  one  unbroken  line  with  them.     The  ^^°^' 
manipuli  of  the  third  line,  the  triarii,  were  half  as  strong  as 
those  of  the  two  first — sixty  men  each ;  but  they  were  formed 
of  veterans,  the  most  trusty  soldiers  in  the  legion.    They 
were  again  disposed  so  that  in  advancing  they  filled  up 
the  intervals  in  the  second  line*    The  different  manipuli 
were  therefore  drawn  up  like  the  black  squares  of  a  chess- 
board. The  light  troops,  armed  with  spears  and  intended  to 
open  the  battle,  skirmished  before  the  first  line  and  retired 
into  the  intervals  between  the  maniptdi,  as  soon  as  more 
serious  fighting  began.     The  cavalry  stood  on  both  wings* 
This  battle  array  was  almost  as  invariable  as  the  order  of  the 
camp,  and  the  Boman  generals  had  but  little  opportunity 
for  tiie  development  of  individual  tactics.     Still  Scipio  is 
said  to  have  deviated  from  the  usual  rules  at  Zama.  Instead 
of  drawing  up  his  manipuli  like  the  black  squares  of  a 
chess-board,  he  placed  them  one  behind  the  other,  like  the 
rounds  of  ladders.    This  was  intended  to  leaVe  straight 
openings,  through  which  the  elephants  might  pass  with- 
out  trampling  down  or  tearing  asunder    the  infantry 
battalions.    Hie  elephants  seem  to  have  been  of  little  use 
to  the  Carthaginians;  but  we  do  not  know  whether  on 
account  of  this  manoeuvre,  or  for  some  other  reason,  a 
number  of  them,  driven  aside  by  the  Boman  skirmishers, 

18  eYident  from  the  Btatement  of  Appian  (riiu  38),  that  he  caused  4,000 
Numidiana,  who  had  joined  him  aa  deserters  from  Kastnissa,  to  be  pnt  to 
death.  May  we  not  presume  that,  even  after  such  a  harsh  and  wholesale 
punishment,  there  were  stiU  traitors  in  his  army?  Bnriog  the  battle,  300 
Spaniards  and  800  Numidians  deserted  to  the  enemy  (Appian,  viii.  48).  Such 
a  treason  during  ihM  batUe^  is  alone  sufficient  to  account  for  the  defeat  of 
Hannibal.  We  hear  also  that  in  the  battle  the  foreign  mercenaries  turned 
upon  the  Carthaginians.— Folybius,  xv.  13,  §  4.  Liry,  zzz.  34. 
'  Livy,  zzz.  36. 

o  o  2 


452  BOMAK  mSTOBY. 


BOOK     threw  the  CartJiftginiaTi  cayalrr  into  such  disorder  that 

IV 

_      '   ^  thej  were  unable  to  resist  the  attack  of  the  Boman  and 


Nmnidian  horse.  After  a  long  and  obstinate  conflict,  the 
first  Boman  line,  the  hastati^  threw  the  Carthaginian 
mercenaries  back  npon  their  resenres,  the  Libyan  and 
Punic  troops.  It  is  even  said  that  the  latter  came  to 
blows  with  the  fugitiTes,  either  in  consequence  of  mutual 
distrust,  or  treason,  or  because  bj  Hannibal's  orders  the 
national  troops  tried  to  drive  the  venal  and  cowardly  mer« 
cenaries  back  into  the  fight.  At  any  rate  the  confusion 
which  thus  ensued  was  most  fortunate  for  the  Romans. 
8cipio  advanced  with  his  second  and  third  lines,  and 
attacked  Hannibal's  veterans,  who  alone  preserved  good 
order  and  were  able  to  offer  further  resistance.  The 
combat  raged  long  and  fiercely  and  without  approaching 
a  decision,  until  the  Boman  and  Numidian  cavalry,  re- 
turning from  the  pursuit  of  the  Carthaginians,  fell  upon 
the  enemy's  rear  and  thus  decided  the  battle. 
Complete        The  defeat  of  the  Carthaginians  was  complete.    Their 

theOtftha-  ^^-""^y  ^^^  ^^*  ^^7  routed  but  destroyed.  Those  who 
giniftoi.  escaped  from  the  horrible  slaughter  were  for  the  most  part 
surrounded  and  taken  prisoners  by  the  victorious  cavalry. 
The  battle  was  in  many  respects  a  parallel  to  that  of 
Cannffi,  and  it  was  especially  by  the  bravery  of  the  legions 
of  CanncD  that  this  victory  was  gained,  and  that  the 
military  honour  of  the  Boman  soldiers  was  retrieved.^ 
For  Scipio  the  battle  of  Zama  was  a  double  success. 
It  put  an  end  to  the  war,  and  it  secured  for  him  the  glory 
and  the  triumph.  If  the  decision  had  come  only  a  short 
time  later,  Scipio  would  have  been  obliged  to  share  the 

>  Not  more  probable  than  the  personal  interview  of  Hannibal  and  Scipio 
hrfor$  the  battle  is  their  meeting  hand  to  hand  during  the  battle,  and  the  single 
combat  of  Hannibal  and  Maeiniasa,  both  of  which  are  serionelj  related 
(Appian,  Tiii.  45,  46;  Zonarae,  ix.  14).  We  can  see  that  the  writen  of 
historical  romance  omitted  no  opportunity  for  disoovering  and  painting  poetical 
situations.  The  statements  of  the  losses  on  both  sides  vsry  as  nsnal,  and  are 
not  to  be  tmsted.  According  to  Polybius  (zr.  14,  |  0),  the  Romans  lost  more 
than  1.600  killed,  the  Carthaginians  more  than  20,000,  and  almost  as  many 
prisoners.  According  to  Appian  (viii.  48),  the  Romans  lost  2,600  men,  Masi- 
nissa  somewhat  more ;  the  Carthaginians  26,000  killed,  8,600  prisoners,  and 
1,100  deserters. 


THE.  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR.  459 

command-in-chief  in  Africa  with  his  snccesson    Tiberius     CHAP. 
Claudius  Nero,  one  of  the  consuls  for  the  year  202,  was 


Sbtbntk 


already  on  his  way  with  a  consular  army, .  and  only  bad  ^^^^ 
weather  had  delayed  his  passaged  Hence  it  appears  204-201 
certain  that,  even  if  the  battle  of  Zama  had  ended  dif- 
ferently, the  war  might  indeed  have  been  prolonged,  but  the 
final  result  would  have  been  the  same.  The  Carthaginians 
had  indeed  long  been  overcome,  and  in  all  their  battles 
and  exertions  of  thelast  few  years,  especially  since  the  battle 
at  the  Metaurus,  th^y  were  prompted  more  by  the  reck- 
lessness of  despair  than  by  wellrfounded  hope  of  victory. 

Hannibal  had  not  seen  his  native  town  since  ha  had  Hetumof 
gone  to  Spain  with  lii3  father  as  a  boy  nine  years  old.  S*5«.^ 
He  was  not  destined,  after  an  absence  of  siz-and-thirty  ^''fi^* 
years,  when  he  had  filled  the  world  with  his  glory,  to  come 
back  as  a  triumphant  victor.^  He  returned,  after  the 
destruction  pf  the  last  Carthaginian  army,  to  tell  his 
feUow-citizens  that  not  only  tha  battle  hrA  the  war  was 
lost.  His  t^sk  was  now  to  secure  the  nu>st  fitvourable 
conditions  ip,  the  unavoidable  peace*  His  return,  and  the 
continuance  of  his  authority  and  influence  in  Carthage, 
sufficiently  prove  that  he  had  always  acted  by  the  orders 
andhad  entered  into  the  views  of  ttie  Carthaginian  govern- 
ment.  If  it  had  been  true  that  he  had  begun  and  carried 
on  the  war  out  of  personal  motives,  or  even  against  the  wish 
of  his  fellow-citizens,  he  would  hardly  have  dared  now  to 
appear  in  a  eity  wherie  .unisucceq^ful  generals,  even  when  not 
guilty  of  criminal  contumacy,  were  in  danger  of  crucifixion. 

From  Zama,  Scipio  had  marched  directly  upon  Car-r  Policy  of 
thage,  whilst  a  fleet  of  fifty  ships  which  had  just  arrived  ^P'®» 
under  Lentulus  tluHsatened  the  town  from  the  sea*    But 
the  siege  of  so  welL-fortified  a  town  0.S  Carthage  could  not 
be  extemporised,  and  Scipio's  attacks  on  Utica  and  Hippo 
could  hardly  have  given  hiqi  hopes  of  rapidly  ending  the 

»  Livy,  XXX.  89. 

'  This  is  the  more  general  statement,  with  which,  howeyer,  a  passage  in 
Livy  (xxi.  3)  does  not  agree,  according  to  which  Hannibal  spent  his  youth  in 
Carthage,  nntil  his  brother-in-law*  Hasdmbal,  after  the  death  of  Hamilcv 
Barcas,  sent  for  him  to  come  to  Spain.  .        ' 


454 


ROMAN  mSTOBY. 


BOOK 

IV. 


State  of 
parties  in 
Carthage. 


war  by  the  capture  of  Carthage.  The  importance  of  a 
fortified  capital  was  much  greater  in  ancient  than  in 
modem  times*  How  often,  for  instance,  had  the  wave  of 
an  invading  army  been  broken  by  the  walls  of  Syracuse, 
after  the  Syracusan  armies  had  been  routed,  and  the 
whole  of  their  territory  overran.  Thus  even  Carthage, 
trusting  in  the  strength  of  her  position,  could  now  enter 
into  negotiations  with  Borne  as  a  power  not  yet  subdued^ 
Scipio  was  prepared,  more  than  any  other  Soman  could 
be,  to  grant  favourable  conditions ;  for  he  knew  that 
a  hostile  party  in  the  Boman  aristocracy  was  endeavour- 
in  g  to  bring  about  his  recall  before  the  conclusion  of  the 
treaiy,  in  order  to  deprive  him  of  the  honour  of  ending* 
the  long  war'  by  a  glorious  peace.  This  party  was  sup- 
ported, not  by  the  people  of  Bome,  but  by  the  senate,  and 
could  easily  now,  .as  on  a  former  occasion,  retard  the 
negotiations  and  finally  make  them  abortive.  In  the  be- 
ginning of  the  year  a  vote  of  the  people  had  intrusted 
Scipio  with  the  command-in-chief  in  Africa,  but  never- 
theless the  senate  had,  on  its  own  authority,  dispatched 
the  consul  Tiberius  Claudius  Nero  with  a  fleet,  and 
had  co-ordinated  him  with  Scipio  in  the  command.* 
Nero  had  been  detained  by  contrary  winds,  and  had  not 
reached  Africa.  The  same  opposition  against  peace 
and  against  Scipio  was  again  exhibited  after  the  battle  of 
Zama.  The  newly  elected  consul  Cn.  Lentulus  was  impa- 
tient to  undertake  the  command  in  Afirica,*  and  whilst 
Scipio  ?ras  conducting  the  peace  negotiations,  violent  dis- 
cussions and  dissensions  took  place  in  Bome,  which  at  last 
led  to  the  decision  that  Lentulus  should  be  intrusted  with 
the  command  of  the  fleet,  and  that,  if  peace  was  not  con- 
cluded with  Carthage,  he  should  sail  to  Africa  and  there 
undertake  the  command'-in*chief  of  the  fleet,  whilst  Scipio 
should  retain  the  command  of  the  land  forces. 

In  Carthage  also  there  were,  even  after  the  battle  of 

*  For  Bome  the  war  had  lasted  sixteen  jears  (218-202  b.c.),  for  Carthage 
one  year  longer,  if  the  siege  of  Saguntnm  is  reckoned. 
»  Livy,  jox.  27.  •  Livy.  xzx.  40. 


TH£  SECX)ND  FUNIC  WAS.  455: 

Zama,  some  fanatics  who  would  still  have  continued  the    CHAP. 
war  with  Borne.    We  are  told  that  Hannibal  with  his  own  *  - 

hands  palled  down  from  the  platform  one  of  these  dema-    |^^** 
gogues  that  was  attempting  to  inflame  the  populace,  and    204-201 
that  the  people  forgave  its  deified  hero  this  militaiy  con-       ''^' 
tempt  of  civil  order.    It  is  equally  creditable  to  Hannibal 
and  the  democratic  party  in  office  during  the  whole  of  the 
war  and  to  their  political  opponents,  the  aristocratic  peace 
party,  which  had  now  to  conduct  the  negotiations  with 
Bome,  that  they  arrived  at  a  friendly  understanding,  and 
joined  in  common  measures  for  the  public  weal. 

We  hear  of  no  revolution  in  Carthage,  not  even  of  out-  Tems  of 
breaks  of  rage  and  despair  directed  against  the  supposed  ^^*^' 
authors  of  the  national  calamity-  The  senate  sent  a  de- 
putation to  Scipio,  and  it  seems  that  the  negotiations  were 
resumed  without  any  difficulty  on  the  basis  of  the  con-* 
ditions  which  had  once  already  been  accepted.  In  some 
points,  certainly,  they  were  made  more  severe.  Scipio 
required  of  Carthage  the  surrender  of  all  elephants,  of  all 
ships  of  war  but  ten,  the  payment  of  10,000  talents  iu 
ten  years,  a  hundred  hostages  between  fourteen  pjid  Ijxirty 
years  of  age,  and  (what  was  most  serious  of  all)  the  engage- 
ment that  she  would  wage  no  war  either  in  Africa  or  else- 
where without  the  permission  of  the  Bopoan  people.  By  the 
acceptance  of  this  condition  Carthage  evidently  renounced 
her  claim  to  be  an  independent  state,  and  admitted  that  her 
safety  and  her  v^^  existence  were  at  the  pleasure  of  Bome. 

Still  the  chance  of  battles  had  decided,  and  after  the  Trnoa  for 
preliminaries  of  peace  had  beisn  accepted,  Scipio  granted  ^^"^^tt^ 
a  truce  for  three  months,  which  Carthage  had  to  purchase 
with  a  sum  of  25,000  pounds  of  silver,  ostensibly  as  a  com- 
pensation for  the  Boman  ships  that  had  been  plundered 
during  a  former  truce.  In  addition  to  this  the  Cartha- 
ginians had  to  pay  and  provision  the  Boman  troops  during 
the  truce,  while  the  latter  in  return  refrained  from  plunder- 
ing the  Carthaginian  territory.^    Hereupon  a  Carthaginian 

>  On  Una,  as  ou  a  former  occasion  (compare  above,  p.  430),  the  oonditions 
of  peace  are  not  kept  snfficientlj  distinct  from  the  terms  of  the  armistioerr 
JAvy,  zzz.  37. 


45^  HOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     embaa^  was  sent  to  Borne  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining^  fbzr 
/   -  this  peace  the  sanction  of  the  senate  and  of  the  Bomaxi 


people. 
Joy  in  The  news  of  Scipio's  yictorj  at  Zamahad  been  receiTedL 

the  tidiDgB  ^  Bome  with  boundless  enthusiasm.    When  the  legate  Ij. 
of  Scipio's    Veturius  Philo  had  delivered  his  message  to  the  senate, 

victory, 

he  was  obliged  to  repeat  it  on  the  Forum  before  the* 
assembled  people,  as  on  a  former  occasion  the  messengers 
had  twice  to  proclaim  the  news  (^  the  yictorj  on  the 
Metauros.    All  the  temples  of  the  town  were  opened  for 
a  festive  rejoicing  of  three  days.    The  crowd  had  long^. 
desired  peace  in  vain,  and  now  came  peace  accompanied  by 
victory.    The  new  consul  Cn.  Lentulus  and  his  party  in 
the  senate  vainly  attempted  once  more  to  delay  the  con- 
clusion of  peace.*     The  pressure  exerted  by  the  popular 
party  and  by  Scipio's  adherents  was  too  great.    The  people 
did  not  wish  to  be  cheated  out  of  their  hopes  of  peace,  nor 
would  they  allow  their  favourite  Scipio  to  be  deprived  of 
the  credit  of  victory.    They  resolved,  on  the  motion  of  two 
tribunes  of  the  people,  that  the  senate  should  conclude  the 
peace  with  Carthage  through  P.  Scipio,  and  that  none  other 
than  he  should  bring  back  the  victorious  army  to  Bome. 
A  commission  of  ten  senators  was  a^  once  sent  to  Africa 
to  communicate  this  decision,  and  to  give  to  Scipio  their 
counsel  and  assistance.      As  «.  proof  that  with  the  con-i 
elusion  of  peace  all  hatred  and  dissension  were  to  be  put 
aside,  the  Carthaginian  ambassadors  were    allowed  to. 
choose  two  hundred  of  their  countrymen  who  were  in 
Bome  as  prisoners  and  to  take  them  home  without  any 
ransom. 
^*^<^-      •  In  Carthage  the  news  of  peace  was  not  received  with 
Cartha-       equal  joy,  however  desira})le  it  might  appear  to  the  people, 
gmmn         rj]jQ  surrender  of  the  Boman  prisoners  to  the  number  of 
4,000  was  no  act  of  free  generosity,  but  a  confession  of 
defeat  that  had  been  extorted  from  them.    The  pecuniary 
sacrifices  which  they  had  to  make  were  felt  still  mora 

'  Livy,  szx.  43 :  '  Inclinatis  omniom  ad  pacem  animiB,  Cn.  Lentulus  codbuI 
^  •  .  senatas  coosulto  intefcesait,* 


THE. SECOND  PUNIC  WAB.  457 

painfallj.    But  Trhen  the  Carthag^ian  fleet  was  towed     CHAP, 
out  of  the  harbour  and  fired  within  sight  of  the  town,    -.  ,  '  /, 
such  a  lamentation  arose  as  if,  with  these  wooden  walls    ^^^ 
of  the  mistress  of  the  seas,  the  town  itself  were  delivered    204-201 
to  the  flames.*  ""^ 

For  Scipio  nothing  remained  to  be  done  in  Africa  but  Rewanils 

to  diBpenfle  reward  and  pumshmant.  Directly  after  the  JrC^ 
yictory  over  Syphax  he  had,  before  the  ji»ssembled  armj,  lussa. 
decorated  Masinissa  with  the  crown,  sceptre,  and  throne, 
with  the  embroidered  toga  and  tunic,  as  ally  and  friend  of 
the  Roman  people*^  The  senate  approved  of  this  dis-? 
tinction  bj  a  regular  resolution.'  Scipio  now  added 
the  most  valuable  gift  to  these  dplendid  and  glittering 
decorations,  bj  bestowing  on  Masinissa  a  part  of  the  king- 
dom of  Sjphax,  which  they  had  conquered  together,  and 
its  capital,  Cirta.  But  the  cautious  Boman  politicians 
conld  not  plaee  full  confidence  in  the  barbarian.  Thej 
found  it  advisable  to  leave  a  rival  by  his  «ide,  and  there- 
fore they  restored  to  Yermina^p  the  son  of  Syphax,  a  part  of 
his  father's  kingdom,  in  spil^  of  his  hostility  during  the 
late  war.  Tbe  punishment  of  the  deserters  delivered 
np  by  Carthage  fonned  the  bloody  epilogue  to  this 
war.  The  Latins  amongst  them  were  beheaded,  and  the 
Boman  citizens,  deemed  deserving  of  a  severer  penalty, 
were  crucified.* 

Scipio's  journey  to  Sopxe  was  an  uninterrupted  triumphal  Triumph 
procession.  IVom  IMjbesum  he  sent  a  considerable  part  of  ®^  ^^^P^^*- 
his  army  by  sea  io  Ostia ;  he  himself  travelled  by  land 
through  Sicily  aud  somthem  Italy^  Everywhere  the  people 
of  the  towns  and  fillages  came  out  to  meet  him,  and  wel- 
comed him  as  victor  and  deliverer.  His  entry  into  Bome 
was  celebrated  by  thousands  of  Boman  soldiers  whom  he 
had  delivered  from  Carthaginian  captivity,  and  who  loudly 
extolled  him  as  their  saviour.    It  must  remain  doubtful 


>  Livy,  XXX.  43.  •  Li?y,  xxx.  16.  *  Livy,  xxx.  17. 

*  Livy,  XXX.  43.  Yaleriiu  Maximns,  ii.  7,  12.  It  is  possible  that  the 
Bomans  borrowed  from  the  CarthaginiauB  the  Onental  pauishment  of  cruci- 
fixion. 


458  ROMAK  HI8T0BY. 

BOOK     whether  the  Nomidian  king  Syphax  walked  before  his 

tw. .,' f  triumphal  car;  for«  though  Polybins  affirms  this,  Livy  states 

distinctly  that  he  had  previously  died  at  Tibur.^  On  the 
other  hand  we  may  take  for  granted,  even  without  any 
particular  testimony,  that  the  legions  of  CannsB,  which 
had  been  so  undeserredly  punished,  more  for  their 
misfortune  than  their  fault*,  pow  brilliantly  established 
themselves  in  the  esteem  of  their  fellow-citizens,  as  they 
marched  as  conquerors  behind  the  triumphal  chariot 
of  the  general  who  by  their  arms  had  obliterated  the 
disgrace  of  Cann9, 


GENERAL  BEMABES  ON  THE  HANNIBALUK  WAB,  ETC.  459 


CHAPTER  IX* 

GEKEBAIi    BEMABES    ON    TEE   HANNIBALIAN  WAB  AND    THE 

COBBESPONDINO  PEBIOD. 

The  second  Punic  or  Hannibalian  war  has  always  justly     chap. 
attracted  the  special  attention  of  historians.    Apart  from 


the  thrilling  events,  the  grand  military  operations  and  Kealngni- 
efforts  both  of  the  Romans  and  of  the  Caxthagmians,  and  ficance  of 
the  surprising  vicissitudes  of  this  great  war— apart  from  ^^JT"" 
the  personal  sympathy  which  Hannibal's  deeds  and  suf-  ^"' 
ferings  inspire,  and  the  dramatic  interest  which  is  thus 
imparted  to  the  narrative,  we  cannot  fail  to  see  that  this 
struggle  has  been  of  the  greatest  importance  in  the 
history  of  human  civilization,  and  therefore  deserves  the 
most  careful  study.  Not  only  did  this  war,  the  second  of 
the  three  waged  between  Rome  and  Carthage,  bring  about 
the  irrevocable  decision,  but  by  this  decision  the  question 
was  settled  whether  the  states  of  the  ancient  world  were 
to  continue  to  exist  separately,  in  continual  rivalry,  in 
local  independence  and  jealousy,  or  whether  they  should 
be  welded  into  one  great  empire,  and  whether  this  empire 
should  be  founded  by  the  Grseco-Italic  or  by  the  Semitic- 
Oriental  race.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that,  if  Rome  instead 
of  Carthage  had  been  completely  humiliated,  the  Punic 
empire  and  Punic  civilization  would  have  spread  to  Sicily, 
to  Sardinia,  and  probably  even  to  Italy,'  and  that  for  cen- 
turies it  would  have  determined  the  history  of  Europe. 
What  would  have  been  the  result  of  this  consummation, 
whether  the  development  of  the  human  race  would  have 

>  Polybins,  xr.  9,  }  5 :  Ob  yup  rnr  Aifi^s  aMjtt  o&5l  riis  Zhp^mnis  ifuXXow 
iofpu^iw  oi  rf  fJxf  (as  Zama)  ttpcniffamts  iMJk  luX  rSh  $\Xmw  fitpihf  r^t 
olKOV|Un|t,  tea  yur  ir^tMctr  dv6  r\w  yroptar. 


460  BOMAK  HISTORY. 

BOOK     been  impeded  or  advanced,  we  cannot  attempt  to  decide. 
Oar  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  national  mind  and  char- 


racter  of  the  Carthaginians  prevents  ns  from  giving  an 
opinion.  Historians  are  generallj  satisfied  with  the 
supposition  that  the  victory  of  Rome  was  equivalent  to  the 
deliverance  of  the  Grseco-Italic  mind  from  Oriental 
stagnation  and  intellectmal  oppression,  and  this  conviction, 
which  at  any  rate  is  consoling,  may  make  onr  sympathy 
with  a  great  and  glorious  nation  less  painful ;  but  it  can 
in  no  way  diminish  the  importance  which  we  justly 
ascribe  to  the  Hapnibalian  war.  We  miast  pronounce  Livy  '^ 
right  in  his  opinion,  that,  of  all  wars  that  had  ever  been 
waged,  this  was  the  most  noteworthy;  and,  as  Heerea 
justly  remarks,  the  nineteen  centuries  that  have  passed 
since  Livy  wrote  bave  not  deprived  it  of  it?  interest.' 
Th,B«».  ThiB  interest  i8  owing  in  g^atpaxt  to  the  fortnmatecir- 
Li^  cumstance  that  for  the  Hannibalian  war  the  continuous. 

PoWbius,  I  narrative  of  Liyy  gjid  the  val^iable  fragments  pf  Polybiua 
^ftoriau.  enable  us,  more  than  hitherto  in  Bon^n  history,  to  examine 
the  inner  working  of  the  powers  which  this  war  put  in 
^notion.  Having  parted  witb  Livy  before  the  close  of  the 
third  Samnite  war,  at  the  end  of  his  tenth  book?  we  have 
missed  his  not  always  trustworthy,  but  still  useful,  guidance 
during  the  war  with  Pyrrhus,  and  .ajso  during  the  first 
Punic  and  the  Gallic  and  Illyrian  wai:$,  where  we  found  a 
piost  valuable  substitute  in  the  short  sketches  of  Folybius* 
Then  with  the  siege  of  Saguntum,  we  take  up  again  the 
narrative  of  Livy  in  the  twentj-first  book  of  his  volumi- 
lious  work,  ten  books  of  which  relate  the  events  of  every 
year  to  th,e  conclusion  of  peace,  someti^ies  with  unneces- 
sary breadth  and  with  rhetorical  verbosity,  afid  not  with* 
out  omissions  and  errors,  but  i^till  with  conscientious  use 
of  such  historical  evid^^oe  as  be  had  at  his  command,  and 
in  language  the  beauty  of  which  is  unsurpassed  in  the  histo- 
rical literature  of  Kome.  For  the  first  two  years  of  the  war 
we  have,  in  addition  to  Livy's  narrative,  that  of  Poly  bins, 

'  JAvjt  iLjfi.  I ;  '  Bfillwm  maxime  omninm  mirabile  qm  uaqjtam  gegta  sunt.' 
*  Soo  Heeren,  Staaten  dc$  AlUrthumBg  p.  396* 


GENERAL  REMAKES  ON  THE  HANNIBALUN  WAR,  ETC.  461 

wHich  leaves  hardly  anjtiiing  to  be  desired  as  regards  CHAP, 
clearness,  credibility,  and  sound  judgment,  but  of  which,  _  /  - 
unfortunately,  for  the  remainder  of  the  war,  only  a  few  de- 
tached fragments  are  preserved.  There  are  also  many  par- 
ticulars to  be  gleaned  from  the  fragments  of  Dion  Cassius 
and  the  abridgment  of  his  work  by  Zonaras.  Even  Appian's 
narrative,  though  based  on  false  views  and  full  of  the  gross- 
est exaggeration,  is  not  useless  when  critically  considered. 
In  addition  to  these,  Diodorus,  Frontinus,  and  others  occa-  * 
sioually  help  us;  but,  in  spite  of  this  comparative  abundance 
of  authorities,  we  are  conscious  that  in  the  Hannibalian  war 
there  remain  many  unsolved  problems  and  difficulties  with 
respect  to  numbers,  places,  and  secondary  events,  and  also 
that  we  are  in  the  dark  as  to  many  of  the  conditions  of 
success,  and  as  to  the  intentions  and  plans  which  determined 
on  a  large  scale  the  action  of  both  the  belligerent  powers. 

The  main  cause  of  the  superiority  of  Borne  over  Car-  Re<il 
ihage'  we  have  found  in  the  firm  geographical  and  ethno-  Koman^ 
graphical  unity  of  the  Boman  state  as  compared  with  the  ■???" 
chequered  character  of  the  nationalities  ruled  over  by 
Carthage,  and  in  the  disjointed  configuration  of  its  terri- 
tory, scattered  over  long  lines  of  coast  and  islands;  The 
history  of  the  war  shows  us  clearly  how  these  fundamental 
conditions  acted.  Whilst  Carthage,  by  the  genius  of 
her  general  and  by  the  boldness  of  her  attack,  thwarted 
the  Boman  plans  and  destroyed  one  army  after  another, 
the  fountain  of  the  Boman  power,  the  warlike  population 
of  Italy,  remained  unexhausted,  and  flowed  more  freely  in 
proportion  as  Carthage  found  it  more  and  more  difficult 
to  replenish  her  armies.  Thus  the  war  was  in  reality 
decided,  not  on  the  field  of  battle,  as  the  Persian  war  was 
decided  at  Salamis  and  at  Platsea,  nor  through  the  genius 
of  a  general  and  the  enthusiastic  bravery  of  the  troops,  by 
which  small  nations  have  often  triumphed  over  far  supe- 
rior foes.  It  was  decided  long  before  the  battle  of  Zama 
by  the  inherent  momentum  of  these  two  states,  which 
entered  the  lists  and  continued  to  fight,  not  with  a  part  of 

*  See  abore,  p.  6. 


462  BOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     their  forces  only,  but  with  their  whole  strength.      As, 
.^    , '  ,^  often,  between  two  equally  matched  pugilists,  the  victory  is 


decided  not  by  one  blow  or  by  a  succession  of  blows — ^the 
question  being  who  can  keep  his  breath  longest  and 
remain  longest  on  his  legs — so,  in  the  conflict  between 
Bome  and  Carthage,  not  skill  and  courage,  but  nerve  and 
sinew,  won  the  victory. 
The  The  advantage  involved  in  the  geographical  conforma* 

fortrewes.  ^on  of  Italy  was  increased  by  the  surprising  number  of 
strong  places,  and  by  the  circumstance  that  the  capital  of 
the  country,  the  heart  of  the  Boman  power,  was  situated, 
not  at  one  extremity,  but  in  the  centre  of  the  long  penin- 
sula. The  difficulties  which  the  Italian  fortresses  opposed 
to  Hannibal's  progress  appear  on  every  page  of  the  history 
of  the  war.  These  difficulties  were  the  more  serious  as 
the  art  of  siege  was  comparatively  unknown  in  antiquity, 
and  particularly  in  Carthage.  Thus  we  see  how,  even  in 
Guul,  the  cities  of  Placentia,  Cremona,  and  Mutina, 
though  hardly  fortified)  defied  the  enemy  during  the  whole 
course  of  the  war,  and  formed  a  barrier  towards  the  north. 
Of  the  many  Etruscan  cities,  not  one  fell  into  Hannibal's 
power.  After  the  battle  at  the  lake  Thrasymenus  even 
the  small  colony  at  Spoletium  could  resist  him.  In 
Apulia,  in  Samnium,  Lucania,  and  Bruttium  we  hear  of  a 
great  number  of  fortified  places,  otherwise  unknown,  bat 
which  in  this  war,  if  they  did  not  fall  by  treason,  were 
able  to  disturb  the  march  of  the  victorious  enemy.  We 
know  more  of  the  Greek  towns,  and  of  the  fortresses  in 
Campania ;  and  if  we  remember  how  Hannibal's  attacks  on 
Naples,  on  Cumse,  Nola,  and  Puteoli  failed,  and  how  the 
little  place  of  Casilinum  could  for  months  oppose  a  despe- 
rate resistance  to  the  besieging  army,  we  can  easily  un* 
derstand  that  the  conquest  of  Italy  was  a  very  different 
undertaking  from  that  of  the  Carthaginian  territory, 
where,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  seaports,  there  were  only 
open  towns,  a  rich  and  easy  spoil  for  any  aggressor. 

The  importance  of  the  central  position  of  Borne  is  self- 
evident.  That  position  prevented  Hannibal  from  cutting  off 


GENERAL  BEMARES  ON  THE  HANNIBALIAN  WAR,  ETC.  468 

the  whole  of  Italy  at  once  from  Borne,  and  at  the  same  time     CHAP, 
nniting  all  the  peoples  against  Bome.    He  had  to  choose  -    ^'    - 
either  the  northern  or  the  sonthem  part  of  the  peninsnla 
as  a  basis  of  operations ;  and  when  he  took  up  a  position  in 
Apnlia  and  Brattinm  he  lost  his  commnnication  with  Ganl. 
The  maintenance  of  this  commnnication  was  rendered  ex- 
tremely difficnlt  by  the  narrowness  of  the  peninsnla  ;  and 
thns  we  see  why  the  transport  of  Grallic  anxiliaries  for 
Hannibal's  army  ceased  after  the  first  years  of  the  war, 
and  how  Hannibal  had  then  to  rely  npon  the  resources  of 
the  sonth  of  Italy  alone.    We  need  hardly  remark  how 
nsefnl  this  central  position  of  Bome  was  in  the  decisiye 
moment  of  the  war,   during  Hasdmbars  invasion,  nor 
how  it  facilitated  the  yictory  on  the  Metanrus.    The  same 
circumstances  were  repeated    after   Mago's    landing   at 
Genoa,  and  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether,  even  under 
the  most  favourable  conditions,  Mago  would  have  been 
able  to  effect  a  junction  with  Hannibal  for  the  purpose  of 
making  a  combined  attack  on  Bome. 

If  we  can  hardly  suppose  that  the  Carthaginians  were  Reasons 
ignorant  of  these  circumstances,  which  were  all  in  febvour  ^J^. 
of  Bome,  the  undeviating  persistency  with  which  they  ginjan  in- 
continued  to  attack  Bome  frt)m  the  north  of  Italy  is  itaiy  from 
the  more  surprising.    That  it  was   impossible,  or  even  the  north, 
dangerous,   to  transport  an  army  by  sea  to   the  south 
of  Italy  we  cannot  suppose.    The  landing  of  Mago  on  the 
coast  of  Liguria  would  completely  invalidate  such  a  sup* 
position,  and  still  more  the  landing  of  Scipio's  army  in 
the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  Utica.    The  ships  of  the 
ancients  drew  so  little  water  that  they  could  approach 
almost  any  part  of  the  coast,  and  it  was  by  no  means 
necessary  to  be  in  possession  of  a  fortified  harbour  before 
they  could  venture  to  disembark  troops.    The  ships  could 
be  drawn  on  shore  and  protected  from  attacks  of  the 
enemy ;  and,  indeed,  the  Boman  fleet  had,  during  the  three 
years'  war  in  Africa,  no  other  protection  but  that  which 
was  afforded  by  such  a  fortified  camp  of  ships.    We  can 
think^  of  no  other  reason  for  the  attacks  of  Hannibal^ 


464 


ROMAN  mSTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Naval 
inactivity 
of  the 
Cartha- 
ginians. 


Hasdmbal,  and  Mago  from  tlie  north  of  Italy  but  the 
hope  of  gaining  Grallic  auxiliaries,  and  this  very  circam- 
stance  betrays  the  scantiness  of  the  resources  upon  which 
Carthage  drew  for  the  recruiting  of  her  armies. 

It  is  more  difficult   to  understand    why  she  almost 
entirely  abstained  from  vigorously  carrying  on  the  war  at 
sea.    In  the  first  war  several  great  naval  battles  were 
fought,  and  the  decision  was  brought  about  by  the  victory 
of  Catulus  near  the  ^gatian  Ishmds ;  but  in  the  second 
Punic  war  the  importance  of  the  fleet  appears  surprisingly 
diminished,  both  on  the  Boman  and  on  the  Carthaginian 
side.    Not  one  great  battle  was  fought  at  sea.    Even  the 
number  of  ships  which  Bome  employed  on  the  wide  battle* 
field  on  the  coasts  of  Spain,  Gaul|  Liguria,  Italy,  Sicily, 
Corsica,  Sardinia,  and  in  the  East^  was  in  no  year  equal 
to  the  number  of  those  that  fought  at  Ecnomus  alone. 
Further,  whilst  in  the  Sicilian  war  the  quinqueremes  had 
almost  entirely  taken  the  place  of  the  triremes,  we  now 
again  find  triremes  frequently  mentioned.    Sepeatedly  we 
hear  of  the  ships  being  ^thdrawn  from  service,  and  the 
troops  that  manned  them  being  employed  for  the  war  on 
land.    If  we  are  surprised  to  hear  this  of  the  Homans, 
who  owed  so  much  to  their  former  success  at  sea,  and 
who  were  so  justly  proud  of  it,  it  is  stiU  more  surprising 
with  regard  to  Carthage.    The  Bomans  had  been  attacked 
and  could  not  determine  whether  land  or  sea  should  be 
the  theatre  of  the  war.     They  were  obliged  to  meet 
Hannibal  on  land,  and  as  long  as  they  remained  on  the 
defensive  they  could  not  pay  much  attention  to  the  naval 
war ;  but  why  Carthage  neglected  her  fleet,  and  did  not 
make  better  use  of  her  superiority  as  mistress  of  the  seas, 
the  absence  of  Carthaginian  historians  makes  it  impossible 
for  us  to  explain.    It  must  have  been  possible,  we  might 
suppose,  to  intercept  the  Boman  transports  of  troops  and 
materials  of  war  that  were  sent  from  Italy  to  Sardinia 
iftnd  to  Spain,  and  particularly  those  that  were  destined 
for  Africa,  or  at  any  rate  to  make  this  conveyance  very 
difficult.    Yet  we  hear  but  little  of  the  capture  of  Boman 


GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  THE  HANNIBALIAN  WAR,  ETC.  465 

convoys  by  Carthaginian  ships.'  The  Roman  fleets  sailed  CHAP, 
in  every  direction  ahnost  unmolested.  In  the  decisive  -  _  /  ^ 
operations  of  the  war,  the  Carthaginian  navy  made  no 
attempt  to  take  an  active  part.  In  fact  during  the  siege 
of  Syracuse  their  fleet  actually  declined  a  battle  with 
the  Romans,  and  thus  brought  about  the  loss  of  that  im- 
portant town.  Further,  we  flnd  Scipio  landing  unopposed 
almost  within  sight  of  Carthage,  and  if  the  Roman  trans- 
ports sometimes  suffered  from  storms,  they  were  never 
attacked  by  Carthaginian  cruisers.  They  sailed  with  the 
greatest  regularity,  almost  as  in  times  of  peace,  and  during 
the  first  winter  provided  the  Roman  army  with  all  neces- 
saries at  a  time  when  it  must  have  perished  without  such 
supplies.  The  minute  description  of  unimportant  naval 
conflicts,  as  for  instance  that  of  one  Carthaginian  quinque- 
reme  and  eight  triremes  against  one  Roman  quinquereme 
and  seven  triremes,  is  an  indirect  proof  of  the  decay  of 
both  navies.'  Nor  is  this  an  exceptional  case.  In  the 
Greek  states  the  old  naval  superiority  had  long  disappeared. 
The  Achseans  and  the  royal  successors  of  Alexander  could 
launch  no  fleet  that  would  bear  comparison  with  those  of 
the  Hellenic  republics  when  at  the  height  of  their  power. 
It  produces  a  melancholy  impression  when  we  read  how 
the  Achaean  league  sent  out  a  fleet  of  ten  ships  against  the 
pirates  of  Ulyria,  and  that  King  Philip,  having  borrowed 
five  war  ships  of  them,'  at  length  determined  to  build  a 
fleet  of  a  hundred  ships.^  Whilst  the  old  rulers  of  the 
sea  retired  exhausted,  the  barbarian  pirates  became 
bolder  and  bolder,  and  their  armed/ boats  swept  the  seas 
and  the  coasts  where  once  the  proud  triremes  of  the  free 
Greeks  had  reigned  supreme. 

In  the  absence  of  all  information  which  might  enable  Prubabie 
us  to  account  for  the  diminished  importance  of  the  Car-  Jhe*d©«iv ' 
thaginian  fleet,  this  neglect  of  their  naval  force  may  of  the 
perhaps  be  explained  partly  by  the  &ct  that  Hannibal  and  ginian ' 

navy. 
'  Compare  p.  213.  •  Livy,  xxviii.  36. 

•  Livy,  xxvii.  30.  •  Livy,  xxviii.  8. 

VOL.  II.  H  H 


466 


BOMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Boman 
military 
organisa- 
tion. 


Length- 
ened 
term  of 
military 
service. 


his  brothers,  and  eyen,  before  them,  Hamilear  Barcas, 
the  chief  moyers  and  leaders  of  the  war,  had  deyoted 
themselves  by  preference  to  the  war  by  land,  and  excelled 
in  this  branch  of  military  science.  They  were  persuaded 
that  Borne  must  be  attacked  and  subdued  in  Italy. 
They  therefore  naturally  advocated  the  application  of  all 
the  national  resources  to  the  army,  and  their  advice  was 
always  followed  in  Carthage.  No  doubt  they  were  right 
in  this,  and  Carthage  would  probably  have  been  exhausted 
much  sooner  if  she  had  divided  her  strength  between  the 
army  and  the  fleet  more  than  she  actually  did. 

The  military  system  and  organisation  of  the  Bomans 
underwent  no  important  changes  during  the  Hannibalian 
war ;  but  a  war  which  put  so  great  a  strain  on  the  national 
resources  could  not  fail  to  bring  about  some  innovations. 
We  see  more  clearly  than  before  the  first  signs  of  a  stand- 
ing and  of  a  mercenary  army,  and  the  gradual  formation 
of  a  class  of  professional  soldiers  distinct  from  the  civil 
population ;  and,  in  connexion  with  this,  we  find  serious 
symptoms  of  moral  decay.  In  the  first  Punic  war  it  was 
still  the  rule  to  disband  and  dismiss  the  legions  at  the 
end  of  the  summer  campaign.  This  system,  rendered 
inconvenient  by  the  great  distance  of  the  theatre  of  the 
war  in  Sicily,  could  not  be  universally  carried  out  without 
abandoning  the  island  during  the  winter  to  the  Cartha- 
ginian armies  and  garrisons.  But  still  the  Boman 
military  system,  which  required  every  citizen  to  serve  in 
turn,  made  it  necessary  periodically  to  reconstitute  the 
legions;  and,  in  the  absence  of  higher  considerations, 
the  peasants  and  artisans  were  not  veithdravni  fix)m  their 
families  for  more  than  one  or  two  campaigns. 

The  carrying  out  of  this  arrangement  became  more  and 
more  difficult  during  the  Hannibalian  war,  first  because  the 
exhausting  levies  made  it  impossible  regularly  to  relieve 
the  troops,  then  because  the  peril  of  the  republic  whilst 
Hannibal  was  in  Italy  called  for  a  standing  army,  and 
lastly  because  the  regular  renewal  of  the  legions  in  distant 


GENERAL  REMAEKS  ON  THE  HANNIBALIAN  WAR.  ETC,  467 

Spain  would  have  caused  too  mnch  expense.    In  addition     CHAP, 
to  this,  the  legions  defeated  at  Cannse  and  at  Herdonea 


were  sent  to  Sicily  with  the  intention  of  punishing  them 
for  their  conduct,  bj  retaining  them  under  arms  until  the 
end  of  the  war.  Whilst  the  legions  stationed  in  Italj 
were  less  frequentlj  relieved  than  formerly,  the  armies 
of  Spain  and  Sicily  consisted  chiefly  of  veterans,  of  whom 
many  had  served  as  much  as  fourteen  years.  These 
soldiers  were,  evidently,  very  different  from  the  old  militia. 
They  had  become  estranged  from  civil  life;  war  had 
become  their  profession,  and  from  war  alone  they  de- 
rived their  support  and  boped  for  gain.  The  Soman  pay 
was  not,  as  with  a  mercenary  army,  a  remuneration  in- 
tended to  induce  men  to  enlist  and  to  reward  them  for 
their  services.  It  was  only  a  compensation,  and  a  very  in- 
sufBcient  compensation,  paid  by  the  state  to  the  citizen 
who  was  taken  from  his  calling  and  burdened  with  a 
public  duty.  Even  the  troops  levied  only  for  a  short 
time  reckoned  more  upon  the  booiy  than  on  their  pay, 
and  as  a  rule  the  movable  booty  was  appropriated  by  a 
victorious  army. 

Though  the  Soman  soldiery  were  thus  accustomed  from  Reoogni- 
the  very  beginning  to  rely  on  plunder,  the  demoralisation  plunder  as 
which  necessarily  resulted  from  this  practice  remained  a»opple- 

ment  for 

within  narrow  limits  so  long  as  the  soldiers  did  not  make  inndequate 
the  service  a  profession,  and  so  long  as  they  fought  only  i^J^^"^  ^^ 
a^ainat  foreign  enemies,  and  not  against  rebellions  snb- 
jeots  or  allies.  All  this  was  changed  in  the  Hanni- 
balian  war.  The  Soman  soldiers,  now  serving  for  years 
together,  became  naturally  more  and  more  estranged  from 
a  life  of  labour,  and  adopted  the  habits  of  soldiers, 
which  naturally  lead  to  the  destruction  and  violent  seizure 
of  properiy.  For  the  indulgence  of  such  propensities  Italy 
during  the  Hannibalian  war  offered  the  most  favourable 
terms.  A  great  number  of  Soman  subjects  had  joined  the 
invader.  All  these  revolted  towns  and  villages  were  gra- 
dually reoccupied  by  the  Somans,  and  the  soldiers  could 

H  H  2 


468  BOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     at  the  same  time  indulge  in  their  desire  for  pillage  and 
.^  /  ■  ^  inflict  chastisement  on  a  rebellions  population. 
Ferocity  ^  what  manner  this  was  done  we  learn  from  the  dis- 

consequent  graceful  sccnes  that  took  place  in  Locri — scenes  which 
licence  of  Were  certainly  no  isolated  instances  of  such  ferocity,  but 
pillage.  which  probably  owe  their  notoriety  to  the  mutiny  to 
which  the  pillage  gave  rise.  At  that  time  the  prosperity 
of  whole  districts  of  Italy  was  destroyed  for  many  years— 
a  prelude  to  that  desolation  which  continued  down  to  the 
imperial  epoch.  That  the  havoc  made  by  the  Boman 
soldiery  in  Sicily  was  even  greater,  the  horrors  of  Leon- 
tini,  of  Enna,  and  of  Syracuse  are  sufficient  evidence* 
In  Spain  the  same  rapacity  led  to  insubordination 
and  mutiny.  What  Appian  relates  of  the  conquest  of 
the  town  of  Locha  in  Africa  shows  that  the  Boman 
soldiers  ventured  to  satisfy  their  thirst  for  blood  and  love 
of  plunder  in  utter  defiance  of  military  discipline,  and 
under  the  eyes  of  the  commander  himself.'  If  this 
could  happen  with  troops  levied  from  the  population  of 
Bome  and  of  the  Latin  and  allied  towns,  and  serving 
in  the  Boman  legions,  how  much  more  reckless  must 
have  been  the  conduct  of  the  irregular  troops  to  whom 
Bome  had  recourse  under  the  pressure  of  her  disasters  ? 
When,  after  the  fall  of  Syracuse,  the  prsetor  Yalerins 
Lsevinus  endeavoured  to  restore  Sicily  to  order  and  to  the 
occupations  of  peace,  he  collected  all  the  bands  of  marau- 
ders that  were  devastating  Sicily,  and  sent  them  over  to 
Italy,  in  order  to  molest  the  Bruttiaus  as  much  as  pos- 
sible.^ In  like  manner,  the  two  notorious  publicans  and 
swindlers  Pomponius  and  Postumius  waged  war  on  their 
own  account,  but  with  the  sanction  of  the  senate.    Then^ 

^  Appian  viii.  15  :  UoXtopKoviri  8*  o^rotir^Xiy  fuydXtfi^f  f  Spofta  fp  A^x^  *^ 
iroAX^  Btiph  irdcrxov<rtf  ol  fi^p  Aoxtuoi  lepoartB^iiipvp  tStP  KXifidKvp  iwtiaffnMctiopro 
iicKtii^tP  r^p  T6\iy  ^ir6<nrop9ot.  Kal  6  ^nrlmp  &yc«dAct  rp  aaknyyi  t^f 
<rrf>aridp'  ^  8*  oix  Mikovw  ^h  6py^s  Sp  iT9w6p9€ffaPy  ^X*  hrtfidrrn  roTs 
rfix^fft  Kol  y6pcua  ictd  Tcu^la  icartar^rrop'  6  8^  robs  /jAp  IPri  Sktos  Attx^lm^ 
&4>^Kcv  &ira0€7r,  r^p  8i  arrfyariiip  riiP  Xtlav  i^c^Xfro*  ical  robs  XoxoTobt,  Bmn 
avpt^'flfioprop  ixK^pwrfp  ip  rf  iiitrtp  koJl  rpus  rohs  Xax^pras  MXxurt  Owir^, 

•  Livj,  xxvi.  40. 


GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  THE  HANNIBALIAN  WAR,  ETC.  469 

again,  the  slaves  who  Iiad  been  enlisted  as  soldiers,  and     CHAP. 


IX. 


dispersed  after  the  death  of  Gracchns,  can  have  lived  only  . 
hj  plunder,  and  musi  have  contributed  to  the  misery  and 
wretchedness  into  which  years  of  war  had  plunged  the 
whole  population  of  Italy. 

That  the  mercenaries  and  foreign  troops,  employed  in  inflnence 
great  numbers  by  the  Romans,  exercised  a  pernicious  in-  ^^j^^^^ 
fluence  on  the  discipline  and  bearing  of  the  Boman  soldiers,  the  regniar 
is  a  &uit  which  cannot  be  doubted.    The  first  traces  i  of  Bome. 
foreign  mercenaries  in  the  Boman  armies  we  have  noticed 
already  in  the  first  Punic  war.^    In  the  second  war  the 
instances  are  very  numerous.    These  troops  were  partly 
Greek  mercenaries  sent  by  Hiero,  partly  deserters  firom 
the  Punic  armies,  partly  Gallic,  Spanish,  and  Numidian 
auxiliaries,  and  partly  genuine  mercenaries  enlisted  by 
Boman  agents.    All  these  troops  were  animated,  not  by 
patriotism  or  a  sense  of  duty,  but  by  the  hope  of  gain ;  and 
if  we  are  justified  in  assuming  that  the  Boman,  Latia,  and 
Sabellic  soldiers  were  originally  inspired  by  higher  motives, 
still  they  could  not  fail  to  be  affected  by  the  character  of 
their  mercenary  comrades. 

But  it  was  by  no  means  the  common  soldiers  alone  who  Character 
became  more  and  more  habituated  to  plunder.    It  seems  jtoman 
that  even  the  superior  ofBlcers  set  the  example  to  their  military 

officers. 

men.  In  Locri,  Pleminius  conducted  himself  as  a  bare- 
faced robber,  and  his  quarrel  with  the  two  military  tribunes 
arose  only  from  their  having  disputed  the  booiy  with  the 
commander-in-chief.  When  Scipio  had  taken  New  Car- 
thage, his  friends,  as  we  are  told,  brought  him  the  most 
beautiful  maiden  they  could  find  as  a  choice  article  of 
booty,  and  his  refusal  of  this  present  was  deemed  an  act 
of  exceeding  magnanimity  and  self-denial.  How  Marcellus 
acted  in  Syracuse  we  can  judge  from  the  complaints  of 
the  Syracusans.*  In  fact  it  was  an  inveterate  vice  of  the 
Boman  aristocracy,  that  they  always  surpassed  the  populace 
in  greed,  and  in  skiU  in  plundering.    Hence,  in  the  old 

>  See  above,  p.  102.  *  See  above,  p.  873. 


470  KOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     times,  the  charge  that  Camillus  illegallj  appropriated  the 
>-   Z.,^  Bpoil  of  Yeii,  whilst  the  exceptional  praise  bestowed  upon 
Fabricius  for  his  abstinence  only  proves  the  general  rule. 
But  the  most  striking  proof  of  the  systematic  robbery  of 
the   Boman  nobility  is  their  wealth.    This  wealth  was 
gained,  not  by  labonr  and  economy,  not  by  commerce  and 
enterprise,  but  by  plunder.    It  grew  with  every  new  con- 
quest ;  and  since  Eome  had  possessions  out  of  Italy,  the 
wealth  accumulated  in  certain  hands  attained  princely 
dimensions,  and  raised  its  possessors  higher  and  higher 
above  republican  equality  and  above  the  laws.    Whilst 
the  commanders  of  armies  openly  and  by  force  seized 
upon  whatever  they  chose,  another  class  of  men  carried 
on  the  same  crafb  with  quite  as  much  skill  under  the 
protection  of  legal  forms.    These  were  the  contractors 
and  merchants  who  followed  in  the  wake,  of  the  armies, 
as  the  jackal  follows  the  lion,  to  gather  up  the  fragments 
left  by  the  haste  or  satiety  of  those  who  had  gone  before 
them.  The  soldiers  could  seldom  make  use  of  the  booty  that 
fell  into  their  hands,  and  they  sought  to  convert  it  into 
ready  money  as  quickly  as  possible.    For  this  purpose 
they  had  recourse  to  the  traders,  who,  it  seems,  regularly 
accompanied  them,  and  knew  how  to  take  advantage  of 
the  ignorance  or  impatience  of  the  troops.    These  men 
bought  valuables  and  all  kinds  of  plunder,  but  particularly 
the  prisoners,  and  for  what  they  had  purchased  at  a  low 
figure  in  the  camp  they  found  a  good  market  in  Bome 
and   elsewhere.      Their   business    was    of   course  most 
lucrative,  as  they  were  obliged  to  share  danger  and  hard- 
ships with  the  soldiers.     That  they  should  be,  as  a  rule, 
consummate  rascals  is  natural,  and  this  circumstance 
contributed  to  brand  the  merchants  of  Bome  as  a  set  of 
unprincipled  impostors  and  as  a  species  of  thieves. 
The  Another  class  of  traders  were  the  usurers  and  speca- 

andl!pecu-  ^*^^^>  '^^^  settled  everywhere  in  the  conquered  countries, 
lAtois.        and  brought  down  the  curse  of  the  provinces  on  the  name 
of  Italians.    The  worst  of  these  were  the  fiEirmers  of  the 
customs  and  revenues  i  but  their  practices  belong  more  to 


OENERAL  RE3LiRKS  ON  THE  HANNIBALIAN  WAB,  ETC.  471 

the  long  years  of  peace^  and  their  system  of  oppression  chap. 
could  not  be  fully  developed  during  the  continuation  * — 4-^—^ 
of  the  war.  On  the  other  hand  it  was  precisely  during 
the  war  that  the  army  contractors  flourished.  These 
speculators  formed  joint-^tock  companies  and  carried 
on  a  most  lucrative  trade.  There  may  have  been  honest 
people  among  them  who  became  rich  without  stealing; 
but  when  we  think  of  the  in&mous  acts  of  which  a 
Postumius  could  be  guilty,^  we  cannot  doubt  that  the 
practice  of  robbing  the  state  was  then  as  general  with 
these  people  as  it  has  been  with  the  same  class  in 
modem  times  in  all  cases  where  they  have  not  been 
subjected  to  strict  control 

The  consequence  of  every  war  is  an  increased  inequality  Influence 

,_  of  \FHP  on 

in  the  distribution  of  property.     Whilst  war  greatly  en-  the  distp*- 
riches  a  few,  it  impoverishes  the  mass  of  the  people.     The  ^^*'"°  ^^ 

'  *  .  property, 

two  principal  conditions  of  peace — productive  labour  and 
legal  order — are,  in  every  war,  more  or  less  set  aside  by 
destruction  and  violence.  The  former  reduces  the  total 
amount  of  capital,  and  the  latter  brings  about  an  unequal 
and  unfair  distribution  of  it.  This  is  the  case  particu- 
larly in  a  predatory  war;  and  in  a  certain  sense  all 
the  wars  of  antiquity,  and  particularly  the  wars  waged 
by  the  Eomans,  were  predatory.  A  war  so  great  as 
that  which  Hannibal  waged  against  the  Bomans,  and 
which,  after  long  suffering  and  privation,  bestowed  upon 
the  victors  so  immense  a  booty,  could  not  but  exercise 
a  momentous  influence  upon  Boman  society  and  the  Boman 
state.  On  the  one  hand  pauperism,  and  thereby  the  de- 
mocratic element,  were  increased ;  on  the  other  hand,  the 
power  and  wealth  of  the  reigning  families  grew  more  and 
more ;  and  we  already  see  the  predecessors  of  those  men 
whose  personal  ambition  and  love  of  power  could  no 
longer  be  kept  within  bounds  by  the  laws  of  the  republic. 

We  can  form  only  an  approximate  idea  of  the  devasta-  General 
tion  of  Italy  at  the  close  of  the  Hannibalian  war,  as  we  do  tkmof^" 

Italy. 
>  See  above,  p.  319. 


472  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     not  know  the  thousandth  part  of  the  detail.      Surely 
>.- — ^ —   the    dream    had    come    to    pass    which^    according*     to 
the  narrative  of  Livy,*  Hannibal  had  dreamt  before    liis 
departure  from  Spain.     On  his  march  fix)m  the  nortli  of 
the  peninsula  to  its  southern  extremity  he  had  been   fol- 
lowed by  the  dreadful  serpent  which  crushed  plantations 
and  fields  in  its  coils,  and  which  was  called  the  *  desolation 
of  Italy/    The  southern  portion  in  particular  had  been 
visited  most  dreadfully  by  the  scourge  of  war.    In  Sajn- 
nium,  in  Apulia,  Campania,  Lucania,  and  Bruttium  there 
was  hardly  a  village  that  had  not  been  burnt  down  or 
plundered,  hardly  a  town  that  had  not  been  besieged  or 
stormed.     Those  fared  worst  that  fell  alternately  into  the 
hands  of  the  Bomans  and  of  the  Carthaginians.      The 
most    flourishing   cities,  and    especially  almost  all   the 
Greek  towns,  were  in  this  position,  on  which  the  fate  of 
Capua  is  a  memorable  commentary.     But  the  great  suf- 
ferings of  this  town  must  not  divert  our  attention  fix>ni 
the  misfortunes  that  befell  other  less  prominent  communi- 
ties.    Great  tracts  of  land  were  entirely  deserted,  whole 
populations  of  certain  towns  were  transplanted  to  other 
abodes.      Forfeitures  and  executions  followed  upon  the 
reconquest  of  every  rebellious  township.    A  great  part  of 
Italy  was  for  the  second  time  confiscated  by  the  conquerors, 
and  considerable  tracts  of  land  became  the  property  of  the 
Boman  people.     Tet  it  was  by  no  means  the  rebellious 
Italians  alone  that  felt  the  scourge  of  war.     The  trusty 
allies,  the  Latins,  and  the  Boman  citizens  themselves 
suffered  as  they  had  never  suffered  before.     Whilst  the 
lands  remained  untilled,  and  the  hand  of  the  husband- 
man grasped  the  sword  instead  of  the  plough,  whilst  the 
workshops  stood  empty,   the  families  were  necessarily 
exposed  to  want,  even  if  they  had  not  had  to  suffer  under 
the  pressure  of  an  increased  taxation.  The  decrease  of  the 
population  is  the  surest  sign  of  the  effect  of  the  war  on  the 
citizens  of  Bome.    Whilst  in  the  year  220  the  number  of 

*  Livy,  xri.  22. 


GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  THE  HANNIBALIAN  WAR,  ETC.        475 

citizens  on  the  census  lists  amounted  to  270,213,  it  had     CHAP, 
fallen  in  204  to  214,000.    We  may  certainly  assnme  that    _  ^^'    - 
the  Hannibalian  war  cost  Italy  a  million  of  lives. 

It  seems  strange,  at  first  sight,  that  the  great  sufferings  Hultipli- 
of  the  Eoman  people  should  have  been  the  cause  of  new  ^^an* 
festivities  and  popular  rejoicings.  But  festivals  and  feetivala. 
games  were  religious  ceremonies,  designed  to  pacify  the 
gods.  The  plague  of  the  year  364  had  been  the  cause  of 
the  introduction  of  scenic  games,^  and  thus,  in  the  course 
of  the  Hannibalian  war,  the  number  of  public  festivals  in- 
creased, in  apparent  contradiction  to  the  public  distress. 
To  the  ancient  ^  Eoman  '  or  ^  great  games,'  which  had 
originated  in  the  regal  period,  and  to  the  ^  plebeian  games ' 
introduced  at  the  commencement  of  the  republic,  there 
were  added  in  the  year  212  the  ^  ApoUinarian  games ' 
celebrated  every  year  from  208  downwards;  and  in  the 
year  204  the  ^Megalesian  games'  were  introduced,  in 
honour  of  the  great  mother  of  the  gods.  Besides  these 
the  celebration  of  games  of  Ceres  is  mentioned  in  the 
year  202,*  and  very  frequently  the  several  games  were 
renewed  and  extended  for  longer  periods.' 

Naturally  such  festivals,  even   if  at  first  they  bore  a  Character 
religious  character,  could  not  fail  to  encourage  the  love  ®^  ^"^^^ 
of  pleasure.     The  numerous  processions,  the   gorgeous  ments. 
funerals,  and  the  funeral  games  arranged  by  private  persons 
at  their  own  expense  hnd  the  same  tendency.     Eor  this 
latter  purpose  the  inhuman  combats  of  gladiators,  which 
seemed  destined  to  root  out  all  the  nobler  and  tenderer 
sympathies  of  man  and  to  extinguish  all  respect  for  the 
dignity  of  the  human  race,  had  been  imported  from  Etruria 
as  early  as  the  year  261,  the  first  year  of  the  war  in 
Sicily.     This  element  of  demoralisation  was  introduced 
simultaneously  with  the  humanising  art  and  poetry  of 
Greece,  as  if  it  had  been  intended  to  counteract  its  in- 
fluence ;  and  thus  grew  the  taste  for  the  most  abomin* 
able    and    disgusting  sights  by  which  men   have  ever 

>  Vol.  i.  p.  669.  •  Livy,  xxx.  39. 

*  Livy,  xxiii.  30;  uyii.  6,  21,  36;  zzyiii.  10;  zxiz.  11,  38;  zxx.  26,  39« 


471 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 

IV. 

'^-    *   — ^ 

Character 
of  Roman 
art  and 
litpratoze. 


corrapted  and  killed  within  themselTes  all  ihe  higher 
instinctB  of  humanity. 

A  people  that  revelled  in  the  dying  agonies  of  a  man, 
mnrdered  for  their  brutal  pleasure  before  their  eyes,  could 
not  really  feel  the  ennobling  influence  of  pure  art  We 
cannot  therefore  wonder  that  Greek  poetry  never  took 
deep  root  in  the  Soman  mind,  but  only  covered  its  coarse- 
ness with  outward  ornament,  just  as  the  Greek  mythology 
was  patched  on  to  the  unimaginative  religion  of  Italy  as 
an  external  addition.  It  is  eminently  characteristic  of  the 
literature  now  developed  among  the  Bomans,  that  it  was 
transplanted  and  never  fully  acclimatised  on  the  foreign 
soil.  Instead  of  passing  through  a  natural  growth,  as  in 
Greece,  and  advancing  gradually  from  epic  to  lyric  poetry, 
and  from  lyric  poetry  to  the  drama,  poetry  was  imported 
into  Italy  complete,  and  all  its  branches  were  cultivated 
at  the  same  time.  We  may  consider  Liyius  Ajidronicus, 
from  Tarentum,  of  whom  we  have  already  mentioned  a 
lyric  composition,  as  the  oldest  poet  of  Bome.'  His  chief 
strength  lay  in  the  drama,  and  at  the  same  time  he  also 
made  the  Bomans  acquainted  with  the  epic  poetry  of 
Greece  by  a  translation  of  the  Odyssey.  It  is  surprising 
that  the  Bomans,  from  the  very  beginning,  received  with 
such  favour  those  Greek  subjects  which  their  poets  treated 
in  the  Latin  tongue.  They  were  certainly  not  acquainted 
with  the  overflowing  wealth  of  Greek  myths  and  fables 
which  formed  the  subject  of  the  poems  now  transplanted 
to  Italy ;  yet  they  listened  with  breathless  attention  not 
only  to  the  adventures  and  sufferings  of  Ulysses,  which  in 
their  simplicity  are  easy  to  understand,  but  also  to  the 
tragic  fieite  of  the  sons  of  Atreus  and  of  Laios,  and  to  the 
mmes  of  Thyestes,  Aig^thos,  and  Tereus,  which,  in  their 
dramatic  form,  roused  the  deepest  emotion  of  the  Greeks 
simply  because  they  were  so  generally  known.  We  see  here 
most  clearly  how  the  marvellous  influence  of  Greek  fancy 
prevailed  even  over  barbarians,  and  took  by  storm  an  intel- 


*  See  aboTo,  p.  388. 


GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  THE  HANNIBAUAN  WAR,  ETC.        475 

lectual  field  hitherto  uncultivated.  Almost  from  the  first 
moment  that  the  Bomans  were  touched  with  the  ma^c 
wand  of  Greek  poetry,  they  had  lost  their  taste  and  affection 
for  the  first  rude  beginnings  of  their  own  poetic  literature. 
The  Satumian  and  Fescennine  verses  and  the  Atellanian 
plays  were  cast  aside  and  despised  by  the  educated.  The 
Latin  language  was  forced  into  Greek  rhythms,  and  the 
whole  Greek  apparatus  of  poetical  conceptions,  phrases, 
and  rules  T^as  BlaviBhly  adopted.  A  confusion  of  ideaa 
was  the  consequence.  The  simple  Bomans  were  often 
unable  folly  to  understand  what  filled  them  with  wonder 
and  astonishment.  It  was  not  possible  for  them  to  absorb 
and  assimilate  at  once  the  varied  products  of  a  foreign 
civilization,  which  had  been  the  growth  of  centuries,  and 
to  master  at  once  the  different  philosophical  systems  j&om 
the  old  simple  mythology  down  to  Epicurism  and  Eu6- 
merism.  It  waa  long  before  they  found  then*  way  in  this 
flowery  maze ;  but  firom  the  beginning  their  delight  was 
great,  and  the  victory  of  the  Hellenic  mind  over  the  Italian 
was  decided. 

The  successor  of  the  Greek  Livius  Andronicus  was  Livitts 
Neevius,  most  likely  a  native  of  Campania.  He  also  pur-  ^^^  ^' 
sued  the  same  path,  but  he  seems  to  have  given  to  his  ^^^  buc- 
poems  a  more  national  colouring.  Like  his  predecessor, 
he  wrote  tragedies  and  comedies  according  to  the  Greek 
pattern  and  filled  with  Greek  subjects;  but  he  also 
selected  materials  from  the  national  history,  and  chose  the 
first  Punic  war  as  the  subject  of  an  epic  poem.  In  thus 
entering  upon  the  domain  of  real  life  and  leaving  that  of 
mythology,  he  acted  in  accordance  with  the  tendency  of 
the  Italian  mind,'  which  had  based  the  oldest  dramatic 
poetry  on  experience,  and  retained  this  principle  in  the 
satires,  the  only  branch  of  poetic  literature  which  is  native 
on  Italian  soil.  Naevius  was  also  a  satirist ;  he  persecuted 
with  venomous  irony  the  powerful  nobles  destined  by  &te 
to  become  consuls  in  Rome,  and  paid  for  his  audacity  by 

>  Vol.  i.  p.  670. 


47fi 


ROMAN  HISTORY, 


BOOK 
IV. 


Greek 
influence 


exile.     The  third  and  most  eminent  of  those  men  wlxo 
endeavoured  to  acclimatize  Greek  poetry  in  Borne  was  tlie 
half-Greek  Ennius,  bom  at  Budisa  in  Calabria,  a  district 
which,  from  its  nearness  to  Tarentum,  had  become  partly 
Greek.   Like  his  predecessors,  Ennins  was  versed  in  several 
kinds  of  poetry.    He  wrote  tragedies,  comedies,  and  heroic 
poems,  and  it  was  he  who  first  introduced  the  Greek  heiot- 
meter  for  the  latter,  and  thus  finally  banished  the  old 
Satumian  verse  from  Boman  poetry.    His  ^  Annals,'  in 
which  he  treats  of  the  history  of  Bome  from  the  found- 
ation of  the  town  down  to  his  own  time,  in  eighteen 
books,  have  been  of  great  importance  to  the  historians. 
As  in  England  many,  even  educated,  people  derive  their 
views  of  English  history  in  the  middle  ages  from  Shake- 
speare's ^  Histories,'  so  the  Bomans,  who  read  the  ^  Annals 
of  Ennius '  much  more  diligently  than  those  of  the  ponti- 
fices,  often  derived  their  first  impressions  of  the  old  times 
and  heroes  from  his  poetical  descriptions ;  and  even  the 
annalists,  who  undertook  to  write  the  history  of  the  Boman 
people  in  the  period  intervening  between  the  Punic  wars 
and  the  time  of  Livy,  could  not  free  themselves  from  the 
influence  which  a  popular  poet  like  Ennius  exercised  upon 
them.    This  is  most  striking  in  those  parts  of  the  second 
Punic  war  in  which  Scipio  plays  a  prominent  part.     Evi- 
dently a  considerable  portion  of   this  so-called  history 
belongs  to  the  domain  of  fiction.   Unfortunately,  however, 
we  are  unable  to  ascertain  from  the  scanty  fragments  of 
the  poems  of  Ennius  whether  the  chief  source  of  these 
poetic  ingredients  was  his  Annals  or  a  separate  heroic 
poem  which  he  composed  to  the  glory  of  Scipio.^ 

Like  literature,  religion  also  felt  the  influence  of  Greece 
during  the  Punic  wars.    The  direct  evidence  of  this  is 

>  The  histoiy  of  Roman  literature  concerns  us  only  in  so  far  as  it  can  be 
shown  that  the  political  and  social  condition  of  the  Roman  people  was  in* 
fluenced  by  it.  A  detailed  examination  of  the  various  literary  productiotts 
belongs  to  the  history  of  literatnre,  not  to  the  political  history  (tf  Rome.  We 
avoid  therefore  aU  purely  linguistici  esthetic,  and  literary  disquisitions,  jost 
as  we  avoid  on  principle  everything  which  properly  belongs  to  a  handbook  of 
antiquities,  archseology,  chronology,  &c. 


GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  THE  HANNIBAL! AN  WAR,  ETC.  477 

fotind  in  tlie  adoption  of  Greek  deities,  as  for  instance  the     CHAP. 
great  mother  of  the  gods,  in  the  increasing  importance  of 


the  worship  of  Apollo,  of  the  Sibylline  books,  and  of  the  on  the  re- 
Delphic  oracle,  and  in  the  decline  of  ancient  superstitions  [js^ioii  of 
nnder  the  influence  of  free-thought.  It  is  true  the  old  RomanB. 
auguries  and  the  yoke  of  ceremonial  law,  with  its  thousand 
restrictionB  and  annoyances,  were  not  yet  cast  off,  but 
they  ceased  to  trouble  the  cons«iences  of  the  Bomans. 
Scepticism  had  reached  a  considerable  height  when  a 
Boman  consul  could  venture  to  say  that  ^  if  the  sacred 
fowls  refused  to  feed,  they  should  be  cast  into  the  water, 
that  they  might  drink.'  What  Livy  relates  about  C. 
Valerius  Flaccus  is  also  very  significant.^  This  man  had 
in  his  youth  quarrelled  with  his  brothers  and  other  kins- 
folk, owing  to  his  own  irregular  and  dissolute  mode  of  life, 
and  was  considered  altogether  a  man  lost  to  decent  society. 
But  in  order  to  save  him  from  utter  perdition,  the  chief 
pontifez,  P.  lacinius,  ordained  him,  against  his  wish,  to  the 
o£Gice  of  priest  of  Jupiter  (flamen  dialis),  and  under  the  in- 
fluence of  the  sacred  office  this  rake  became  not  only 
a  respectable  but  even  an  exemplary  man,  and  succeeded 
in  regaining  the  official  seat  in  the  senate  which  his  pre- 
decessors in  office  had  lost  through  their  unworthiness. 
Nothing  can  be  more  characteristic  of  the  spirit  of  the 
Boman  religion,  and  of  the  total  absence  of  a  morally 
sanctifying  element,  than  this  appointment  of  a  notorious 
profligate  as  priest  of  the  supreme  god.  It  was  a  fabric 
of  formulae  without  meaning,  a  dish  without  meat.  The 
religious  cravings  were  not  satisfied,  and  men  were  carried 
either  to  the  schools  of  Greek  philosophy  or  to  the  grossest 

'  Liyy,  zxrii.  8 :  *!Flaininem  dialem  iii?itaiii  inangoniri  coegit  P.  lAdnmB, 
pontifex  maximiis,  C.  Valerinm  Flaocnm  ....  Ob  adolescentiani  negligentem 
Inznriosamqiie  C.  Flaccns  flamen  eaptns  a  P.  Lieinio  pontifice  maximo  erat, 
L.  Flaeoo  iiratri  germano  cognatisque  aliis  ob  eade m  vitia  inrisiiB.  Is,  ut  animum 
eiva  cuia  Bacronim  et  oeremoniaram  cepit,  ita  repente  ezait  antiqnos  mores,  ut 
nemo  totaioTeDtote  haberetnr  prior  necprobatior  primoribus  patmm,  sms  pariter 
alienisqnei  esset  Huins  fam»  consensn  elatns  ad  instam  fiduciam  sui,  rem 
intermissam  per  multoa  annoB  ob  indigDitatem  flaminum  priomm  repetiyit,  in 
senatam  nt  introiret,  etc/ — Compare  Valerius  Maximus,  vi.  9,  3. 


478 


ROMAN  HISTORY. 


BOOK 
IV. 


Increasing 
poverty  of 
the  lower 
classes  of 
Roman 
citizens. 


and  meanest  superstition.  Hence  it  ceases  to  be  a  matter 
of  wonder  that  in  times  of  danger,  as  in  the  Gallic  (225  b.c.) 
and  in  the  Hannibalian  war  (216  b.o.),  the  Roman  people 
should  return  to  the  barbarous  rite  of  human  sacrifices,  thart 
the  town  should  be  fiUed  with  magicians  and  prophets,  thart 
every  form  of  superstition  should  be  readily  received  by* 
the  common  people,  and  that  religion  and  morals  should 
cease  to  make  an  effectual  stand  against  selfishness  and 
vice. 

The  increasing  love  of  pleasure  in  Rome,  and  the  grow- 
ing splendour  of  the  public  festivaLs  and  games,  cannot  be 
considered  as  a  proof  of  a  general  increase  of  wealth  in 
the  capital,  and  still  less  in  the  whole  empire.    The  trea- 
sures collected  in  Some  had  not  been  earned  by  labour, 
but  captured  by  force  of  arms.    The  peaceful  exchange 
of  goods,  which  is  the  result  of  productive  labour  and 
legitimate  commerce,  enriches  the  buyer  and  the  seller, 
and  encourages  both  to  renewed   exertion.    But  when 
brute  force  takes  the  place  of  a  free  exchange,  both  the 
robbed  and  the  robber  become  enervated.    The  curse  of 
barrenness  cleaves  to  stolen  goods.    Who  would  gladly 
toil  in  the  field  or  in  the  workshop,  and  earn  a  scanty 
livelihood  in  the  sweat  of  his  brow,  if  he  has  once  revelled 
in  the  spoils  of  a  conquered  foe  9    The  Roman  soldiers 
lost  in  the  long  war  the  virtues  of  citizens.    What  they 
had  gained,  they  rapidly  squandered,  and  they  returned 
home  to  swell  the  impoverished  crowd  that  daily  increased 
in  the  capital,  attracted  by  the  amusements  and  still  more 
by  the  hope  of  sharing  the  profits  of  the  sovereign  people 
through  the  exercise  of  their  sovereignty.    Whilst,  on  the 
one  hand,  the  love  of  sightnseeing  was  nourished,  we  hear 
already  of  those  demoralising  distributions  of  com  which 
destroyed,  more  than  anything  else,  the  spirit  of  honourable 
independence  and  of  self-help.    Already,  in  the  year  203,^ 
a  quantity  of  com,  that  had  been  sent  from  Spain,  was 
distributed  at  a  low  price  by  the  curule  eediles.    This  was 


'  Livy,  XXX.  26. 


GENERAL  REMAKKS  ON  THE  HANNIBALTAN  WAB,  ETC.  479 

the  most  convenient  way  of  keeping  the  populace  in  good     chap. 
humour^  and  opposing  those  reformers  who  advocated  the  %,    , ' ,  > 


restoration  of  a  free  peasantry  by  means  of  assignments  of 
land  on  a  large  scale.  At  the  close  of  the  Hannibalian  war 
there  was  the  best  opportunity,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
most  urgent  necessity,  for  a  radical  agrarian  reform. 
Great  tracts  of  land  in  Italy  were  deserted,  while  thou- 
sands of  people  were  impoverished  and  without  employ- 
ment. It  was  possible  and  even  easy  to  remedy  both 
evils  at  once,  and  to  spread  over  Italy  a  free  and  vigorous 
population,  such  bs  had  existed  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war.  If  this  was  now  neglected,  a  future  revolution  and 
the  fall  of  the  republic  became  inevitable. 

That  it  was  neglected  was  the  fault  of  the  nobility.    A  Lawless 
few  colonies,  it  is  true,  were  founded,  and  a  certain  number  ment  of 
of  veterans  received  grants  of  land.    But  these  measures  ^ 
were  not  carried  out  in  the  spirit  of  the  Flaminian  distri-  nobility, 
bution  of  lands  in  Picenum.'     The  estates  of  the  nobility 
grew  larger,  and  slaves  took  the  place  of  a  free  peasantry. 
The  Licinian  law,  restricting  the  right  of  inclosure  and  of 
using  the  common  pasture — a  law  which  had  always  been 
infringed  more  or  less — ^now  became  gradually  obsolete. 
By  degrees  these  various  causes  brought  about  that  state 
of  things  which  two  generations  later  converted  the  Gracchi 
into  demagogues,  and  which,  after  the  failure  of  reform,  led 
to  the  establishment  of  the  monarchy.    The  course  which 
the  development  of  the  Boman  state  thus  took,  can  be 
ascribed  neither  to  particular  men  nor  to  a  particular  class. 
It  was  the  necessary  consequence  of  the  frmdamentaJ  form 
of  the  political  and  social  institutions  of  Bome.     The 
growth  of  the  repubUc  involved  the  emancipation  of  the 
ruling  class  fix)m  all  public  control. 

The  periodical  admission  of  all  citizens  to  the  public  Fnpon- 
offices,  which  constitutes  the  real  essence  of  republican  thTiienate. 
freedom  and  equality,  was  naturally  checked  by  the  supre- 
macy of  one  city  over  great  districts;   while  the  in- 
equality in  the  division  of  wealth,  which  impoverished  and 

'  Sec  above,  p.  126. 


480  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     cowed  the  mass  of  the  sovereign  people,  raised  the  ruling' 
^.^ — r^~^^  classes  above  the  authority  of  the  laws.    At  the  time  of 
the  Hannibalian  war  this  process  was  completed,  and  the 
theory  of  the  constitution  no   longer   agreed  with   the 
practice.    The  senate  had  ceased  to  be  merely  a  delibera- 
tive body,  and  the  people  had  only  a  nominal  control  of 
the  legislative  and  executive  power.     The  senate  reigned 
exactly  as  a  sovereign  reigns  in  a  state  which  has  only  a 
sham  constitution.    The  officers  of  the  state  were  its  sub- 
missive servants,  and  the  people  were  used  as  a  tool  to  give 
the  stamp  of  legality  to  the  edicts  of  the  senate.     The 
ruling  nobiUty  was  fuUy  developed.  The  government  was  in 
the  hands  of  a  small  number  of  noble  families,  to  which  it 
m«  aJl  but  impossible  to  gain  admission.    During  the 
whole  course  of  the  Hannibalian  war  we  find  no  instance  of 
a  *new  man'  having  been  chosen  for  any  high  republican 
office.    The  names  of  the  Comelii,  Valerii,  Tabii,  Sem- 
pronii,  Servilii,  Atilii,  ^milii,  Claudii,  Fulvii,   Sulpicii, 
Livii,  Gsecihi,  Licinii  fiU  the  consular  fasti  of  the  period. 
Even  the  most  brilliant  personal  merit  no  longer  sufficed 
to  admit  a  man  who  was  not  a  member  of  the  nobility  to 
the  higher  offices  of  state.     The  knight  L.  Marcius,  who 
afber  the  fall  of  Cn.  and  Publius  Scipio,  had  saved  the 
remainder  of  the  Boman  army  in  Spain,  and  had  after- 
wards been  employed  by  the  younger  Scipio  in  the  most 
important  operations  of  the  war,  was  shut  out,  in  spite  of 
his  merits,  from  all  high  office,  because  he  was  not  of  noble 
descent,*  and  this  was  at  a  time  when  military  ability  was 
more  important  than  any  other.     Even  Lselius,  Scipio's 
staunch  friend  and  confidant,  obtained  admittance  to  the 
high  offices  of  state  with    great  difficulty,  afber  he  had 
failed  in  his  first  candidature  for  the  consulship,  in  spite 
of  the  intercession  of  his  powerful  friends  (192  B.C.).  This 
jealousy  of  the  nobility  with  regard  to  interlopers  was  by 
no  means  due  only  to  ambition  and  to  a  desire  to  serve  the 

>  Livy,  xxviii.  42 :  '  Dux  tnmnltuarius  ille  L.  Marcius  militari  snfiragio  ad 
tempus  lectus,  ceterum  si  nobilitas  ac  jusii  hofiorcs  adomarent  daiid  impeia- 
*  toribus  qualibet  arte  belli  par.* 


GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  THE  HANNIBALIAN  WAR,  ETC.  481 

state.     The  extension  of  the  Roman  republic  had  rendered     chap. 

T  Y 

the  honorary  public  offices    sources   of    profit  to  their   , _^_x 

holders  to  an  extent  which  the  old  patricians  had  never 
anticipated  when  they  consented  to  share  them  with  their 
plebeian  rivals.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  was  even 
then  chiefly  the  prospect  of  pecuniary  profit  that  increased 
the  obstinacy  of  the  conflict  for  the  possession  of  office. 
But  in  the  olden  time  religious  conservatism,  and  the  fear 
of  the  profanation  of  the  auspices  by  the  plebeians,  had  also 
exercised  a  considerable  influence.  Now  there  was  no  longer 
any  pretext  for  religious  scruples,  and  the  families  that 
were  once  in  office  excluded  all  outsiders  chiefly  because 
they  did  not  feel  inclined  to  share  the  booty  with  them. 

One  of  the  most  effectual  means  of  excluding  new  Modes  of 
candidates  was  the  burden  laid  on  the  sediles,  who  were  now  courting 
required  to  fiurnish  in  part  the  cost  of  the  public  games. 
At  first  the  state  had  borne  the  expenses,  and  these  had 
remained  within  reasonable  limits.  But  when  the  passion 
for  public  amusements  increased,  whilst  at  the  same  time 
the  conduct  of  the  wars  and  the  administration  of  the 
provinces  brought  immense  wealth  to  the  noble  houses,  the 
younger  members  of  the  nobility  used  this  wealth  to  win 
popularity  for  themselves,  by  increasing  the  splendour  and 
prolonging  the  duration  of  the  games  at  their  own  expense, 
and  thus  acquiring  a  claim  to  the  consulship  and  procon- 
sulship,  and  the  means  of  enriching  themselves.'  There 
is  no  economy  more  pernicious  or  more  costly  than 
that  of  paying  the  public  servants  badly  or  not  at  all.  The 
consequence  is  that  they  indemnify  themselves,  and  that 
they  cease  to  consider  fraud,  theft,  and  robbery  as  serious 
crimes.  Thus  the  political  life  of  Some  moved  continually 
in  a  narrowing  and  destructive  circle,  and  approached  more 


*  Polybins  (z.  5)  says  of  Scipio  Airicanus:  ^dpxonf  thtpy^riKhs  Koi 
fi€yak69c»pos  KoUt  trpoo-^iX^s  (cctr^  riiif  &ir(ivrY)<rtv  awtKoylcaro  r^v  tov 
irA'fiOovs  vphs  avrhy  tUvoicty,  lavy  (xxv.  2)  says  of  his  sedileship :  *  JGdilicia 
largitio  haec  fait :  ludi  Romani  pro  temporis  illios  copiis  magnifice  fucti,  et 
diem  unum  ioRtaarati  et  cong^i  olei  in  vicos  siDgulos  dati.' — Compare  Weissen* 
bom's  note. 

VOL.  II.  I  I 


482  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK     and  more  to  the  fatal  catastrophe.     Corruption  led  to  office 
« — r-^ — '  and  to  wealth,  and  this  wealth  again  made  corraption 

possible. 
Growing         The  calculating  avarice  of  the  great,  and  the  venality  of 
anceofthe  ^^^  impoverished  mass,  were  both  engaged  in  bring-ing 
nobility,      about  the  ruin  of  the  state,  at  first  timidly  and  on  a  small 
scale,  but  with  constantly  increasing  boldness  and   reck- 
lessness.    Even  in  the  Hannibalian  war  we  find  traces  of 
that  cynical  spirit  which  a  dominant  party  does  not  ex- 
hibit until  it  has  lost  both  the  fear  of  rivalry  and  the 
fear  of  disgrace.     It  was  even  then  not   customary  to 
measure  by  the  same  standard  the  crimes  of  the  nobility 
and  those  of  the  common  people.   Whilst  the  soldiers  who 
fied  at  Cannae  were  punished  with  the  greatest  severity  and 
condemned  to  serve  in  Sicily  without  pay,  the  young  nobles, 
who  had  certainly  not  behaved  with  exceptional  gallantty, 
had  risen  step  by  step  to  the  highest  offices  of  the  republic. 
Cn.  Cornelius  Lentulus  had  been  military  tribune  in  the 
battle,  and  had  escaped  through  the  fieetness  of  his  horse  : 
he  became  queestor  in  the  year  212,  then  curule  sedile^  and 
at  last  even  consul  in  201.    P.  Sempronius  Tuditanus^  who 
had  also  been  military  tribune  at  Cannse,  became  curole 
sedile  in  214,  prsetor  in  211,  censor  in  209,  proconsul  in 
205,  and  consul  in  204.     Q.  Fabius  Maximus,  the  son  of 
the  celebrated  Cunctator,  was  in  a  similar  position;  he 
became  successively  curule    sedile,  praetor,   and  consul. 
Even  L.  Csecilius  Metellus,  who  was  said  to  have  formed 
the  plan  of  leaving  Italy  after  the  battle  of  Cann®,  and 
was  therefore  the  object    of  violent  attacks  from  those 
who,  like  Scipio  and  Tuditanus,  claimed  for  themselves 
the   credit  of  greater  bravery,  became,  after  his  return, 
quaestor  and  tribune  of  the  people.    But,  above  aU  others, 
P.  Cornelius  Scipio  himself,  the  conqueror  of  Zama,  was, 
in  spite  of  his  flight  at  Cannse,  loaded  with  honours  and 
distinctions.   It  would  surely  have  been  natural  if  the  really 
ill-treated  soldiers  of  Cannse  had,  in  the  prayer  for  justice 
which  they  addressed  to  Marcellus,    made  use  of  the 
words  put  into  their  mouth  by  Livy :  *  We  have  heard 


GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  THE  HANNIBALIAN  WAR,  ETC.  483 

that  our  comrades  in  iniBfortune  in  that  defeat,  who  were  CHAP, 
then  our  legignary  tribunes,  are  now  candidates  for  honours,  ,  *  ^ 
and  gain  them.  Will  you  then  pardon  yourselves  and 
your  sons,  Conscript  Fathers,  and  only  vent  your  rage 
against  men  of  lower  station  9  Is  it  no  disgrace  for  the 
consul  and  the  other  members  of  the  nolHlity  to  take  to 
flight  when  no  other  hope  is  left  ?  and  have  you  sent  ua 
alone  into  battle  for  certain  death  ? '  ^ 

If  this  contemptuous  and  overbearing  spirit  of  the  nobi- 
lity had  been  general  at  that  time,  the  Boman  people  would 
certainly  not  have  borne  the  struggle  with  Carthage  as 
bravely  and  as  successfully  as  they  did.  But  these  instances 
of  political  degeneracy  were  as  yet  isolated.  In  the  year 
212,  for  instance,  the  nobility  did  not  dare  to  protect  the 
incapable  praetor  Cn.  Fulvius  Flaccus,  who  had  lost  the 
second  battle  of  Herdonea,  from  an  accusation  and  from 
condemnation,'  after  the  fugitive  troops  had  been  punished 
by  being  sent  to  serve  in  Sicily.  In  spite  of  the  inter- 
cession of  his  brother  Quintus,  who  had  already  been  three 
times  consul,  and  who  was  at  that  moment  besieging 
Capua  as  proconsul,  a  capital  charge  was  brought  against 
him,  and  he  escaped  the  sentence  only  by  going,  as  a 
voluntary  exile,  to  Tarquinii. 

In    spite  therefore  of  some  marks  of  decay  already  Hapid 
visible  in  the  political  and  social  life  of  Home,  the  period  of  ^man 
the  Hannibalian  war  was  still  the  zenith  of  the  republican  V^wtr, 
constitution  and  the  heroic  age  of  the   Boman  people. 
From  this  time  conquest  followed  upon  conquest  with 
surprising  rapidity.     Within  two  generations  Bome  had 
attained   an  undisputed  sovereignty   over    all  countries 

'  Livy,  xxri.  2.  In  a  similar  manner,  the  tribune  of  the  people  C.  Sem- 
proniufl  BUestus  expresses  himself  in  the  impeachment  of  Cn.  Fulvius  Flaocus, 
who  had  been  disgracefully  beaten  by  Hannibal,  and  whose  men  were  treated 
just  like  the  fugitive  legions  of  Cannae.  '  Cn.  Fulvio  fugam  ex  proelio  ipsius  te- 
meritate  commisso  impunitam  esse,  et  eum  in  ganea  lustrisque,  ubi  iuventam 
egerit,  senectutem  acturum ;  milites  qui  nihil  aliud  peccaverint,  quam  quod 
imperatoris  similes  fuprint,  relegatos  prope  in  exilium  ignominiosam  pati 
militiiim :  adeo  impanm  lihtrtaiem  UoitktB  diti  ac  pauperis  honorcUo  atque 
inhonorato  esse*  *  Liyy,  xxvi.  2-4. 

I  I  U 


481  BOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  bordering  on  the  Mediterranean.  But  the  increase  of 
>,  /  ^.  wealth  and  the  decay  of  the  old  republican ^virtnes  kept 
pace  with  the  extension  of  the  Boman  power.  We  turn 
now  to  the  consideration  of  the  easy  yictories  over  the 
degenerate  Hellenic  states,  before  describing  the  great 
straggles  that  preceded  the  transition  of  the  republic  into 
the  monarchy. 


APPENDIX. 


THE  POPULATION  OP  ITALY  IN  THE  THIED 

CENTUEY  B.C. 

The  nninbers  as  given  by  PoljbiuB  (ii.  24)  are  tlie  following : — 

I.  The  field  army,  156,800  men,  namely — 

a,  Roman  citizens : 

lonr 

Four  legions  of  5,200  foot  and  800  horse 

each =  22,000 

h.  The  auxiliaries  of  the  said  fonr  legions — 

30,000  foot,  2,000  horse      .        .        ,     =  32,000 

c.  Two  legions  of  which  we  are  not  told 

whether  they  were  Romans  or  con- 
federate&--8,400  foot  and  400  horse    .     =     8,800 

d.  Allies: 

1.  Etmscans  and  Sabines — 50,000  foot, 

4,000  horse =  54,000 

2.  Umbrians  and  Sarsinates  (no  divi- 

sion of  foot  and  horse)  .     =s  20,000 

8.  Genomanians    and    Venetians    (no 

division  of  foot  and  horse)  .     =s  20,000 

n.  Reserves  58,500  men,  namely — 

a.  Romans— 20,000  foot,  1,500  horse    .        .     =  21,500 
h.  Anxiliaries— 80,000  foot,  2,000  horse       .     =  32,000 

210,800 


486  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  "^ 

IV.        Brought  forward 210,300 

in.  Besides  these,  the  muster-rolls  name  558,000 
men,  namely — 

a,  Romans  and  Campanians — 250,000  foot, 

23,000  horse =  273,000 

h.  Allies,  namely — 

1.  Latins— 80,000  foot,  6,000 

horse  ....  =85,000 

2.  Samnites— 70,000     foot, 

7,000  horse  .        .        .  =  77,000 

3.  lapygians  and  Messapians 

—50,000   foot,    16,000 

horse   ....  =  66,000  >  =285,000 

4.  Lucanians  —  30,000  foot, 

3,000  horse.         .        .  =33,000 

5.  Marsians,      Marrucinians, 

Frentanians,  Vestinians 
—  20,000  foot,  4,000 
horse  ....  =  24,000j      

The  whole  armed  force 768,300 

These  statements  are  no  doubt  based  on  an  official  enumeration, 
but  leave  much  to  be  desired  as  regards  accuracy  and  clearness. 

Three  distinct  divisions  are  made :  Homans,  auxiliaries,  and 
allies.  But  only  in  the  first  two  classes  are  given,  besides  the 
numbers  of  the  troops  in  the  field,  the  muster-rolls  of  those  liable  to 
mihtaiy  service.  Thence  it  appears  that  the  states  allied  with 
Home  as  equals  kept  no  muster-rolls,  and  levied  their  auxiliary 
forces,  not  ex  formula^  but  according  to  special  agreement.  With 
the  Cenomanians  and  Venetians  this  is  self-evident ;  but  it  must 
also  have  been  the  case  with  the  Umbrians  and  Etruscans.  How  the 
Sabines  come  to  be  named  in  this  class  is  inexplicable,  as  already 
in  the  year  290  B.C.  they  were  made  Roman  citizens  sme  suffragio. 
It  may  perhaps  be  supposed  that  a  part  of  them  remained  tree 
and  became  a  dvitas  fcedernia,  Now,  if  of  the  Etruscans  and 
the  Umbrians  we  are  informed  that  they  furnished  a  field  force 
of  74,000  men,  we  are  not  justified  in  supposing  that  these  com- 
prised the  whole  population  capable  of  bearing  arms.  If  we 
could  assume  that  here  the  field  force  bore  the  same  proportion 
to  the  number  of  those  still  liable  to  service  as  in  Rome  and  in 
the   auxiliary  or  confederate  states  (socii),  namely,   116,300  : 

*  See  above,  p.  418,  note  4. 


APPENDIX.  48' 

558,000  or  about  1  :  5,  we  shonld  find  for  Etmria  and  TJmbria  the  APP. 
number  of  370,000  liable  to  service,  in  addition  to  the  74,000  in  "^  * 
the  field,  and  we  shonld  arrive  at  a  snm  total  of  444,000  men 
capable  of  bearing  arms.  If  we  allow  five  children,  old  men,  and 
women  to  each  man  liable  to  serve,  i,e.  to  each  man  between  seven- 
teen and  forty-five  years  of  age,  we  shall  have  to  estimate  the  free 
population  of  these  coxmtries  at  2,664,000,  a  number  which  seems 
not  too  great  if  compared  with  the  population  of  the  remainder 
of  Italy. 

2.  In  Polybius'  enumeration  of  the  peoples  of  Italy,  we  miss 
the  Bruttians.  Now  it  is  possible  that  they  may  have  been  a 
civitas  foBderata^  and  we  may  perhaps  explain  this  omission  in 
the  list  by  the  &ct  that  they  were  thus  not  obliged  to  keep 
muster-rolls,  nor  to  frimish  a  contingent  for  the  Gbllic  war, 
because  of  their  southerly  position.  We  are  therefore  left  to 
conjectures  as  to  the  population  of  this  tract  of  country. 

3.  The  same  is  the  case  with  regard  to  the  free  confederate 
towns,  such  as  Tibur,  Prseneste,  Nola^  Nuceria,  Camerinum, 
Iguvium,  and  all  Ghreek  towns  from  Naples  to  Tarentum.  We 
can  only  guess  at  their  population. 

4.  The  numbers  in  Polybius  are  exact  only  for  the  troops 
actually  placed  in  the  field.  For  the  remainder  he  gives  only 
round  numbers.  We  do  not  know  whether,  for  the  sake  of 
simplification,  these  numbers  have  been  rounded  off  by  the 
historian  who  took  them  frx)m  official  lists,  or  whether  they  are 
the  result  of  approximate  estimates,  in  which  case  they  would 
deserve  little  credit.  With  two  peoples,  the  Umbrians  and  the 
Cenomauians,  the  proportion  of  the  infantry  to  the  horse  is  not 
stated.  It  would  certainly  be  a  mistake  to  suppose'  that  the 
20,000  Cenomauians  were  all  foot  soldiers. 

5.  As  the  Cenomauians  and  the  Venetians  dwelt  beyond  the  then 
acknowledged  boundaries  of  Italy,  they  must  be  omitted  in  an 
estimate  of  the  military  forces  of  that  country.  We  cannot  even 
consider  them  as  permanent  allies  of  the  Romans,  for  their 
alliance  with  Rome  accidentally  resulted  from  their  feud  with 
the  Insubrians. 

6.  On  the  other  hand,  in  an  estimate  of  the  Roman  forces, 
Sicily  ought  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  Here  the  Romans 
had,  besides  their  province,  two  allies — ^the  Mamertines  and  Hiero 
of  Syracuse. 

7.  Polybius  does  not  state  whether  the  two  legions  stationed 
in  Sicily  and  in  Tarentum  were  made  up  of  Roman  citizens  or  of 
auxiliaries  ;  and  this  is  an  important  defect  in  the  whole  statement. 

*  As  Wietenheim  dops  {GeschichU  der  Volkerwanderungf  i.  193). 


488  ROMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK  It  thus  becomes  impossible  to  determine  the  proportion*  which 
^^'  .  the  contingents  of  the  Romans  and  their  confederates  (socii)  bore 
to  their  respective  populations.  The  remaining  Eoman  troops 
amount  to  48,500,  and  those  of  the  confederates  to  64,000. 
Now,  if  we  add  the  8,800  men  of  the  two  legions  in  question  to 
the  Roman  forces,  we  find  51,000  Romans  in  the  field,  with  64,000 
confederates.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  add  them  to  the  latter, 
we  find  43,500  Romans  and  72,800  confederates.  It  is  evident 
that  this  makes  a  very  considerable  difierence,  for  the  muster- 
rolls  of  both  show  an  almost  equal  number — 273,000  Romans  and 
285,000  confederates.  Lange  ^  supposes  that  64,000  auxiliaries  in 
the  Roman  armies  were  furnished  entirely  by  the  Latins,  and 
calculates  (85,000  +  64,000,  or  149,000  :  64,000  =  100  :  42^) 
that  the  Latins  therefore  had  to  furnish  nearly  44  (or 
rather  nearly  43)  per  cent,  of  their  population  capable  of  bearing 
arms,  whilst  the  Romans  furnished  only  16  per  cent.,  t.e.  four 
legions  at  22,000,  four  legions  at  21,500,  and  the  two  legions  in 
Sicily  and  Tarentum,  which  Lange  therefore  supposes  to  have  been 
Roman;  therefore  altogether  52,300  Roman  soldiers  drafted 
out  of  273,000  +  52,300,  or  325,300  on  the  muster-rolls. 

How  is  it  possible  to  believe  that  43  per  cent,  of  the  men 
qualified  for  military  service  could  be  drafted  off  to  the  war  at 
ttie  same  time  P 

8.  It  may  appear  doubtful  wbether  the  lower  classes  of  the 
census — ^the  proletarians  and  the  capite  censi,  who  were  free  &om 
the  duties  of  military  service — were  included  in  the  number  of 
men  capable  of  bearing  arms.  Our  estimate  of  the  population 
will  vary  very  much  according  to  the  result  we  arrive  at  respect- 
ing this  question.  If  the  proletarians  and  the  capite  censi  were 
not  counted,  we  should  have  to  add  a  considerable  number  to  the 
sum  total  of  the  population,  for  the  class  of  the  poorest  citizens 
was  very  numerous.  Still  it  is  most  probable  that  the  proleta- 
rians and  the  capite  censi  were  counted,  as  already  in  the  first 
Punic  war  they  were  regularly  drafted  as  rowers  for  the  fleet, 
and  therefore  belonged  to  the  effective  population ;  further, 
because,  in  the  dangers  of  the  Ghkllic  war,  they  would,  in  case  of 
necessity,  have  been  armed,  and  their  numbers  must  therefore 
have  been  known. 

9.  Other  defects  in  the  list  are  of  less  importance ;  e.g,  it  is 
uncertain  whether  those  exempt  from  military  service  are  passed 
over,  and,'  further,  those  unfit  for  military  service  on  account  of 
bodily  infirmities.  Wietersheim  is  certainly  wrong  in  estimating 
these  at  25  per  cent,  of  the  population.     Though  in  Prussia 

'  Romiache  Altertkumer^  ii.  §  103,  p.  137.    *  Wietersheim,  loc.  cit,  p.  196. 


APPENDIX,  489 

one-half  of  the  conscripts  are  found  unfit  to  serve,  and  in  other  APP. 
countries  two-thirds  or  three-fourths,  that  proves  nothing  for 
ancient  Borne.  Sickly  children  were  exposed  by  the  nations  of 
antiquity.  In  the  rural  population  of  Italy,  which  formed  by  far 
the  greater  part  of  the  army,  there  were  few  weakly  persons  to 
be  found,  and  the  ancients  knew  nothing  of  our  parade  exigencies 
or  of  our  medical  examinations. 

10.  In  the  calculation  of  Polybius,  those  troops  that  were 
already  levied  and  formed  inio  legions  (the  field  army  of  62,800 
Bomans  and  auxiliaries,  and  the  53,500  reserves,  altogether 
116,300  men)  are  added  to  the  number  of  Romans  and  allies 
contained  in  the  muster-rolls  (558,000  men).  Thus  Polybius 
arrives  at  the  sum  of  674,300  men  fit  to  bear  arms,  which,  with 
the  addition  of  the  94,000  men  of  the  Umbrians,  Etruscans,  and 
Cenomanians  would  make  768,300,  or,  in  round  numbers, 
770,000  men. 

We  may  well  ask  whether  this  manner  of  calculation  be 
correct ;  that  is  to  say,  whether  the  number  of  soldiers  in  the 
field  ought  to  be  added  to  the  number  of  those  liable  to  serve, 
contained  in  the  muster-rolls,  in  order  to  obtain  the  sum  total  of 
all  persons  capable  of  bearing  arms  ;  and  whether  it  is  not  more 
likely  that  the  number  of  troops  already  levied  is  contained  in 
the  number  of  those  liable  to  serve.  In  other  words  we  must 
consider  whether  these  muster-rolls  were  only  supplementary  lists, 
prepared  after  a  part  of  the  army  had  been  already  levied,  or 
whether  they  were  intended  to  furnish  a  statistical  basis  for  ^hia 
enrolment.  The  latter  plan  would  seem  to  be  the  only  rational 
one,  especially  as  the  Bomans  had  no  standing  army,  but  one 
which  was  recruited  every  year  out  of  the  mass  of  tiie  citizens 
capable  of  serving,  and  which  was  merged  again  in  the  mass  of 
the  people.  If  this  view  of  the  matter  be  correct,  the  number  of 
fighting  men  of  the  Bomans  and  their  allies  amounted  not  to 
674,300,  but  only  to  558,000  ;  to  which  must  be  added  the  forces 
of  the  allies  (Etruscans  and  Umbrians)  consisting  of  74,000  men 
in  the  field,  or  5  x  74,000  =  370,000  fighting  men.  Thus  the 
sum  total  of  the  armies  of  Italy  (with  the  exception  of  the 
Cenomanians  and  Venetians)  would  be  928,000.  Now  if  we  add 
72,000 — certainly  not  too  high  an  estimate — for  the  contingents 
of  the  free  towns  and  of  the  Bruttians,  we  shall  find  in  round 
numbers  amillion  of  fighting  men  for  Italy  proper,  from  the  Sicilian 
straits  to  Liguria  and  Cisalpine  (}aul ;  and  if  for  each  fighting  man 
between  seventeen  and  forty-five,  we  allow  five  as  the  proportion 
for  old  or  sickly  men,  and  for  women  and  children,  we  shall  arrive 
at  a  free  population  of  6,000,000.  How  many  aliens  and  slaves 
there  were,  in  addition  to  the  free  population,  we  cannot  calculate ; 


490  EOMAN  HISTORY. 

BOOK      but  taking  50  per  cent,  of  the  free  population,  the  total  popula- 

_     ^y*    ^   tion  of  Italy  would  amount  to  9,000,000.    According  to  Kalb*s 

'  Statistics '  (1865),  the  popxdatioii  in  Naples,  the  territories  then 

reckoned  as  the  States  of  the  Church,  the  Marches,  Umbria,  and 

Tuscany,  was  10,694,252. 

It  may  further  be  asked,  how  many  out  of  a  given  number  of 
fighting  men  can  actually  be  summoned  to  do  military  service. 
This  depends  upon  the  state  of  civilisation  in  the  country.  The 
more  a  people  has  advanced  on  the  path  of  civilisation,  the  fewer  of 
its  members  it  can  afford  to  place  in  the  only  class  which  destroys 
instead  of  producing.  In  a  barbarous  people  eveiy  grown-up 
man  is  a  warrior.  The  field  labour,  the  tending  of  the  cattle, 
and  all  indoor  work,  are  left  to  women,  children,  and  old  men. 
According  to  Caesar's  account  every  fourth  individual  of  the 
Helvetii  was  a  fighting  man.^  The  Gaelic  clan  of  Glencoe 
numbered,  before  its  extermination  under  William  III.,  three 
hundred  members  and  fifty  fighting  men,  i,e,  one  for  every  six 
individuals.  Where  slavery  prevails,  even  in  a  more  advanced 
stage  of  civilisation,  a  large  proportion  of  the  free  men  are 
available  for  war.  This  was  the  case  in  antiquity,  and  in  the 
Southern  States  during  the  American  Civil  War.  It  seems  that  in 
Home  it  was  a  great  exertion  to  send  one- tenth  of  the  eligible 
population  into  the  field,  and  the  same  proportion  to  the  reserve 
forces.  This  would  be  about  the  proportion  given  in  the  list  of 
Polybius  :  62,800  in  the  field,  53,000  in  the  reserves  drawn  out  of 
674,800,  or,  according  to  our  opinion,  558,000.  The  same  is  seen 
in  the  course  of  the  war,  e.g.  in  the  year  216,  when  about 
100,000  men  were  serving  in  the  field,  i.e.  10  per  cent,  of  the 
said  million  of  fighting  men,  and  probably  not  much  less  in  the 
reserve  force. 

These  were  the  forces  of  a  people  whom  Hannibal  ventured  to 
attack  in  the  year  218  B.C. 

»  Bell.  Gall.  i.  29. 


END   OF   THE   SECOND   VOLUME. 


OCT 


1915 


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